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In memoriam
Cedric Hubbell Whitman

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PREFATORY NOTE

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At the end of my term as editor, I wish to thank my colleagues for their unfailing assistance: ὅψις ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα.

Albert Henrichs

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THE BEE MAIDENS OF THE HOMERIC HYMN TO HERMES

SUSAN SCHEINBERG

THE Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* is peopled for the most part with familiar gods and goddesses — Zeus, Apollo, Hermes, Maia. But toward the end of the hymn three curious maidens appear who are mentioned nowhere else in the extant Homeric or Hesiodic corpus. The passage occurs after Apollo's assertion of the exclusivity of his control over soothsaying (533–540), presumably in reply to Hermes' mention of it in lines 471–472.¹ Prohibited by an oath to Zeus from sharing with other gods his knowledge of “the wise-hearted counsel of Zeus” (535 ff), the son of Leto instead makes Hermes an unusual gift:

- σεμναὶ γάρ τινες εἰσὶ κασίγνηται γεγαυῖαι
παρθένοι ὠκείησιν ἀγαλλόμεναι πτερύγεσσι
555 οἰκία ναιετάουσιν ὑπὸ πτυχὶ Παρνησοῖο
μαντείης ἀπάνευθε διδάσκαλοι ἦν ἐπὶ βουσί
παῖς ἔτ' ἑὼν μελέτησα· πατὴρ δ' ἐμὸς οὐκ ἀλέγιζεν.
ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἔπειτα ποτώμεναι ἄλλοτε ἄλλη
κηρία βόσκονται καὶ τε κραίνουσιν ἕκαστα.
560 αἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν θυίωσιν ἐδηδυῖαι μέλι χλωρόν
προφρονέως ἐθέλουσιν ἀλθθείην ἀγορεύειν·
ἦν δ' ἀπονοσφισθῶσι θεῶν ἡδεῖαν ἐδωδὴν
ψεύδονται δὴ ἔπειτα δι' ἀλλήλων δονέουσαι.
τάς τοι ἔπειτα δίδωμι, σὺ δ' ἀτρεκέως ἐρεείνων
565 σὴν αὐτοῦ φρένα τέρπε, καὶ εἰ βροτὸν ἄνδρα δαείης
πολλάκι σῆς ὁμφῆς ἐπακούσεται αἶ κε τύχησι.

The importance of the art of divination as a theme of the *Hymn* has been signaled from the start by Hermes' speech to his mother (163–181), in which he proclaims his intention to share in Apollo's rite. Since this desire is ultimately satisfied or deflected by Hermes' acquisition of the strange bee maidens of lines 552–563, a study of their mythological

¹ T. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, and E. E. Sikes, eds., *The Homeric Hymns*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1936) 344. Henceforth AHS.

identity may, aside from its intrinsic interest, elucidate the theme of divination.

MAIDEN TRIADS

These bee maidens are unfamiliar, but they are not totally unlike other figures in Greek mythology, which abounds with minor female divinities displaying some of the same traits. Most striking is the number of female goddesses who exist as triads, with the individual members more or less undifferentiated: the *Theogony* contains the Gorgons, the Horae, the Moirae, and the Charites; later sources add the triads of the Erinyes, the Graiae, the Sirens, the Hesperides, the daughters of Leos, and the daughters of Celeus; cult has provided us further with the triads of the Praxidicae, the Cecropids, the Thriae, the Argive Epitellides, the Boeotian Parthenoi, and others.² The thrice-three Muses were in some accounts but three as well, according to information in Diodorus (4.7.1-2), Plutarch (*Quaest. Conviv.* 9.14.2-4), and Pausanias (9.29.2-3). Yielding perhaps to the tendency to create triads, late writers raised the number of the Harpies from two to three.³ A few triads of male divinities do occur, such as the Cyclopes, the Hundred-Handers, and the Winds in the *Theogony*,⁴ but it is the female trinities who predominate in number and importance in Greek myth. The maidens in the *Hymn to Hermes* belong to this class, as the initial position of τρεῖς in line 554 makes emphatically clear.

The Celts, especially those in southeast Gaul, worshiped a trinity of fertility goddesses called the Matres or the Matronae, who are frequently mentioned in inscriptions from the area and depicted in art holding fruit, flowers, or infants; a number of similar votive reliefs "To the Nurses," *Nutricibus*, have been found in ancient Poetovio (now Ptuj), a city of the province of Pannonia.⁵

In Greek mythology, too, female triads at times serve as nurses. The goddesses who do so most frequently are the nymphs, one of whose epithets is *kourotrophoi*.⁶ Aphrodite in the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*,

² H. Usener, "Dreiheit," *Rh. Mus.* 58 (1903) 4, 9-10.

³ E. Sittig, "Harpyien," *RE* 7.2, col. 2418.

⁴ M. L. West, ed., *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 36 n.2.

⁵ J. A. MacCulloch, *The Religion of the Ancient Celts* (Edinburgh 1911) 44-46. For a photograph of a sculpture of three Matronae, each with a child, see H. Petrikovits, *Bonner Jahrbücher* 165 (1965) 199. For the Poetovio evidence, see K. Wigand, "Die Nutrices Augustae von Poetovio," *Jahresh. Österr. Arch. Inst.* 18 (1915), Beiblatt, 188-218, with figs. 96-117.

⁶ L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* V (Oxford 1909) 426; West on *Theog.* 347. See also T. H. Price, *Kourotrophos: Cults and Representations of the*

for example, designates the tree nymphs of Mt. Ida as the future nurses of her unborn son Aeneas (256 ff). The Oceanids in the *Theogony*, similarly, "have youths in their keeping" together with Apollo and the rivers (346 ff). In one of the many versions of the myth about the infancy of Zeus, the nymphs rear him in a Cretan cave (Callim. *h. Iov.* 46 ff; Diod. 5.70), and Pausanias records the Arcadian view that it was in fact a triad of nymphs who did so (8.38.3). Nymphs are said to have reared many other gods and heroes, in particular the infant Dionysus (Hom. *h.* xxvi.3 ff).⁷ So pervasive was the image of the nymphs as *kourotrophoi* that it appears in a painting of the third century A.D. synagogue at Dura, where three nymphs straight out of Western pagan tradition attend the exposure and rescue of the baby Moses on the Nile.⁸

The presence of three nymphs in this last scene is no accident, for the depiction of the nymphs as a triad had long since become an iconographical convention in Greco-Roman art. For example, a votive relief of the fourth century B.C. now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art portrays Hermes on the left leading three nymphs who hold each other by the hand, with Achelous the river god to the right. The inscription reads: "Sacred to Hermes and the nymphs and august Achelous."⁹ Similarly, a votive relief of Pan and the nymphs from Eleusis¹⁰ and votive reliefs from Bulgaria and Thrace depict a triad of nymphs, as does a wall painting from the Baths of Titus.¹¹

In their character as *kourotrophoi*, the nymphs belong to a larger group of fostering goddesses that includes the Horae, the Charites, and the

Greek Nursing Deities, Studies of the Dutch Archaeological and Historical Society, 8 (Leiden 1978); F. Muthman, *Mutter und Quelle* (Basel 1975), esp. 87 ff.

⁷ H. Herter, "Nymphai," *RE* 17.2, cols. 1550-51; W. F. Otto, *Dionysos, Mythos und Kultus* (Frankfurt am Main 1933) 76-77, 159-160.

⁸ E. R. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, IX (New York 1964) 203 ff; and XI (1964) figs. 186-189, 194, 214, and color pl. 9.

⁹ G. M. A. Richter, *The Metropolitan Museum of Art: Handbook of the Greek Collection* (Cambridge, Mass. 1953) 109 and pl. 87d. For similar reliefs, see M. Robertson, *A History of Greek Art* (Cambridge 1975) I 375 f. See also R. Feubel, *Die attischen Nymphenreliefs* (Heidelberg 1935), and W. Fuchs, "Attische Nymphenreliefs," *AM* 77 (1962) 242-249 with pls. 64-69.

¹⁰ Richter, "A Neo-Attic Krater in the Metropolitan Museum," *JHS* 45 (1925) 204 and fig. 1.

¹¹ Goodenough (above, n.8) XI, figs. 186, 187, 214, with text in IX 204, 215. See also the illustrations in L. Bloch, "Nymphen," *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, ed. W. H. Roscher, III.1 (Leipzig 1897-1902) cols. 555-564; and the excellent plates in C. M. Havelock, "Archaistic Reliefs of the Hellenistic Period," *AJA* 68 (1964) 43-58 and pls. 17-22.

Aglaurids. All of these nourishing deities regularly appear in art from the archaic period onward as triads;¹² the François vase (c. 570 B.C.), for instance, depicts three Charites, three Horae, and three dancing nymphs (besides one in the embrace of a Silen), but, surprisingly, four Moirae. Dancing is one of the most frequent pursuits of these deities in art. On a late archaic relief from the Athenian acropolis an unbearded flute player leads three maidens in a dance, each holding the wrist of the other in the manner described by Homer, and leading a smaller human figure. So undifferentiated is the traditional iconography of the Charites, Horae, Aglaurids, and nymphs that scholars cannot agree which of the triads is here depicted.¹³ The Charites and the three nymphs (identifiable by an inscription listing their names) dance together on an early Hellenistic relief now in Naples.¹⁴ A pair of neo-Attic reliefs probably based on a fifth-century original portray the three Horae and the three Aglaurids, each triad dancing in a line.¹⁵ A neo-Attic krater with a marble relief derived from fifth-century models contains on each side three women, probably maenads, with two dancing and one playing a musical instrument; over one handle is a tiny votive relief mounted on a pilaster, depicting three dancing nymphs.¹⁶

In literature as well the nymphs participate in the dance (Hom. *h. Aphr.* 118 ff, 261), as do the Horae and Charites, "holding each other by the wrist" (Hom. *h. Apollo* 194 ff). Aristophanes' Agathon speaks of the "rhythmical whirlings of the Phrygian Charites" (*Thesm.* 121 f) and the chorus in the *Frogs* summons Iacchos to join in the holy dance "that has the greatest share of the Charites" (335 f).¹⁷ Similarly, *Olympian* 14 of Pindar describes the dance as the special sphere of the Charites, and in the *Phoenissae* of Euripides they have the epithet χοροποιοί (788). According to a Homeric hymn to Artemis (*h.* xxvii.15) the Muses and

¹² E. B. Harrison, *AJA* 81 (1977) 269. For additional bibliography on kourotrophic triads, consult Price, "Double and Multiple Representations in Greek Art and Religious Thought," *JHS* 91 (1971) 56-58, 66, and pls. 2 and 10. See also F. T. van Straten, *BABesch* 51 (1976) 1-2, 7-9, 20, with pls.

¹³ Harrison, 269; N. Himmelmann-Wildschütz, *Θεόληπτος* (Marburg-Lahn 1957) 13 ff and pl. 4.

¹⁴ Himmelmann-Wildschütz, 17 and pl. 5.

¹⁵ Harrison (above, n.12) 267 and pl. on 268.

¹⁶ Richter (above, n.10) 201-209; see also Richter, *Catalogue of Greek Sculptures in the Metropolitan Museum of Art* (Cambridge, Mass. 1954) 40-41 and pl. 52; and Harrison (above, n.12) 284-285 and pl. on 286.

¹⁷ J. Duchemin, *Pindare, poète et prophète* (Paris 1955) 80 ff. See also E. Schwarzenberg, *Die Grazien* (Bonn 1966).

Charites dance together at Delphi. One notes that, unlike the Roman and Celtic Matronae, the Greek nurturing goddesses are generally maidens rather than matrons. In the words of Jane Harrison: "Three Mothers are rather heavy, and do not dance well."¹⁸

The bee maidens of the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* do not explicitly dance, but they do move "now here, now there" and at times they "swarm in and out together." Moreover, like the triads discussed above they are *parthenoi* and serve as *kourotrophoi*, being the childhood teachers of Apollo. They resemble the nymphs in other respects as well, especially the tree nymphs described in the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*. Both sets of divinities inhabit a particular mountain (*h. Herm.* 555, *h. Aphr.* 258). Both eat the food of the gods (*θεῶν ἡδεῖαν ἔδωδῆν*, *h. Herm.* 562; *ἄμβροτον εἶδαρ ἔδουσι*, *h. Aphr.* 260). The exact nature of this food is not stated in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, but in Porphyry's *De Antro Nympharum* the food of the gods is honey: *θεῶν τροφῆς ὄντος τοῦ μέλιτος* (16). Honey was offered to the gods as early as Mycenaean times,¹⁹ and in Greek literature nectar and ambrosia are frequently treated as though equivalent to honey.²⁰ One mythological tradition, moreover, ascribes the discovery of honey as a food to a nymph named Melissa, or "Bee" (schol. Pind. *Pyth.* 4.106). Traces of the association of the nymphs and honey survive in modern Greek folklore — honey is offered to the nymphs, and in Macedonia they are called *μελιτένιαις*.²¹ In the *Hymn to Hermes* the "food of the gods" is unquestionably identified as honey: *κηρία βόσκονται* (559) and *ἐδηδύαι μέλι χλωρόν* (560).

In addition, both the bee maidens and the nymphs possess the power

¹⁸ J. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge 1922) 289, in a discussion of "maiden-trinities." For some reason H. G. Evelyn-White, trans., *Hesiod: the Homeric Hymns and Homericica*, Loeb Classical Library, 3rd ed. (1936; repr. Cambridge, Mass. 1959) 403n., calls the bee maidens "aged maidens." AHS also refer to them as "aged," despite their insistence that the words "with white barley sprinkled on their heads" are not a paraphrase for "white-haired," but rather are to be taken "literally": "The three hags wore as it were white wigs" (347). White barley was used in sacred rites: the canephoroi in sacred processions sprinkled it on their heads (cf. Hermippus fr. 26 Kock), and it was employed in the ritual of alphetomancy (P. Amandry, *La mantique apollinienne à Delphes* [Paris 1950] 60 ff).

¹⁹ J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1973) 131, 283, 309, 310. See also L. Ziehen, "Νηφάλια," *RE* 16.2, col. 2487 f.

²⁰ W. H. Roscher, *Nektar und Ambrosia* (Leipzig 1883) 25 et passim.

²¹ J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* (Cambridge 1910; repr. New Hyde Park, N.Y. 1964) 150-151.

of divination. This faculty is, of course, the reason for the introduction of the bee maidens into the hymn. As for the nymphs, attestations show that in various locales they were believed to be endowed with this gift.²² In a tragedy of Aeschylus, for instance (fr. 355 Mette), Hera addresses the nymphs of the Argive river Inachus as *νύμφαι ναμερτεῖς*, "truthful nymphs"; the same epithet, applied in the *Odyssey* to the Old Man of the Sea (*Od.* 4.349) and in the *Theogony* to Nereus (*Hes. Theog.* 235), suggests the possession of prophetic powers.²³ Pausanias (9.3.9) describes a cave of the nymphs on Cithaeron where "word has it" that they once gave out prophecies, while Dio Cassius (41.45) refers to an oracle of the nymphs in Apollonia of Epeiros. The nymph Erato was reportedly the prophetess of Pan in Arcadia (*Paus.* 8.37.11), and the nymph Daphnis was the first prophetess of the oracle of Ge at Delphi (*Paus.* 10.5.5). An additional piece of evidence is the word *νυμφόληπτος*, an epithet describing men possessed and inspired by the nymphs and hence able to tell the future.²⁴ The seer Bakis is a famous example (*Aristoph. Pax* 1070 f; *Paus.* 4.27.4, 10.12.11). The nymphs' association with soothsaying may also be relevant to the epitaph of the prophetess Herophile recorded in Pausanias (10.12.1-7): "I am buried near the nymphs and this Hermes, / Enjoying in the world below a part of the kingdom I had then."

As this epitaph illustrates, the nymphs had a special connection with Hermes — another trait they share with the bee maidens. In the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*, for example, Aphrodite describes the nymphs as the lovers of the Silens and "the sharp-eyed slayer of Argus," Hermes (262 f). The nymphs in the company of Pan like to sing of Hermes "beyond all others" (*h.* xix.27 ff), including the story of his union with another nymph, Dryope. The *πότνια νύμφη* Calypso bore children to Hermes (*Hes.* fr. 150.31 M-W). When Eumaeus carves the meat in the *Odyssey*, he sets aside a portion "for the nymphs and Hermes the son of Maia" (*Od.* 14.435). Hermes is often said to make music for the dances not only of the nymphs, but also of the Charites and Aglaurids,²⁵ and to have become enamored of one of the latter (*Ovid Met.* 2.710-835). Many of the votive reliefs dedicated "to the nymphs"

²² Farnell (above, n.6) V 425.

²³ See West (above, n.4) on lines 235 and 233.

²⁴ Farnell, V 425 f; A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik* (Heidelberg 1965) 43-45; Himmelmann-Wildschütz (above, n.13) 7-8.

²⁵ U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, 1st ed. (Berlin 1931) I 168. In *Aristoph. Thesm.* 301 the names of Hermes and the Charites appear together in prayer. Cf. also *Pax* 456.

depict Hermes leading three maidens in the dance. Black-figure vase paintings of the judgment of Paris, on which Hermes conducts three almost identical goddesses, Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite, with Paris omitted more often than not, seem to have been modeled on such reliefs.²⁶

Before their presentation to Hermes, the bee maidens belonged to the sphere of Apollo. So, too, the Charites are often linked with this god: Pindar locates their thrones on Olympus near that of Apollo (*Ol.* 14.9 ff), while a statue of the god holding the three Charites in his hand stood on Delos (Callim. fr. 114.8 f Pfeiffer, with his note).²⁷ In Thasos Hermes and Apollo stood opposite each other at the entrance to the Prytaneum, the one leading the Charites and the other, the nymphs.²⁸ The nymphs and Apollo often consort together, as Apollo's epithet *nymphēgetes* attests.²⁹ We learn from Hypothesis C of the scholia to Pindar's Pythian odes that *Παρνασσίδες νύμφαι* brought succor to Apollo after his victory over the Python.

MODERN IDENTIFICATIONS

Wilamowitz, after identifying the bee maidens with these particular nymphs, goes so far as to equate the Parnassian nymphs/bee maidens with the elusive "white maidens," those allies of Apollo mentioned in the oracle *ἐμοὶ μελήσει ταῦτα καὶ λευκαῖς κόραις* (Cic. *De Div.* 1.81, with Pease's note). He attempts to support the latter equation by the localization on Parnassus of all three groups, as well as by the detail of the "white barley" sprinkled on the heads of the bee maidens (*h. Herm.* 554).³⁰ It would seem preferable, however, to regard the epithet *λευκαί* of the white maidens as signifying "shining" and hence "beneficent,"³¹ without relation to the bee maidens, who were "white" only on their barley-strewn heads. Upon examination, the similarities among the Parnassian nymphs, the white maidens, and the bee maidens, although undeniable, seem no more compelling than the similarities among the

²⁶ P. Zanker, *Wandel der Hermesgestalt in der attischen Vasenmalerei* (Bonn 1965) 19–24, esp. 21. See also J. Harrison (above, n.18) 291–298.

²⁷ Duchemin (above, n.17) 71.

²⁸ Amandry (above, n.18) 28 n.4; van Straten (above, n.11) 20 and figs. 29–30.

²⁹ O. Höfer, "Nymphēgetes," *Roschers Lexikon* (above, n.11) III.1, col. 500.

³⁰ Wilamowitz (above, n.25) I 381. For the opposing view see G. Nachtergaeel, *Les Galates en Grèce et les Sôtéria de Delphes* (Brussels 1977) 158–159.

³¹ G. Radke, "Die ΑΕΥΚΑΙ ΚΟΡΑΙ in Delphi und ähnliche Gottheiten," *Philol.* 92 (1937) 387–402.

bee maidens, nymphs, and Charites outlined above. While acknowledging that all of these divinities are related to one another as by a tangled web, one would nonetheless be wrong to attempt to reduce the nexus to a set of equations.

The most widely accepted view of the bee maidens' identity, proposed by Gottfried Hermann in his 1806 edition of the *Hymns*,³² rests on a similar error in method. Hermann's contribution was to supply *Θριαί*³³ in place of the alternate manuscript readings *σεμναί* (Mosquensis) and *μοῖραι* (all other manuscripts). Although not all subsequent editors have chosen to print Hermann's conjecture in the text, they have, for the most part, accepted Hermann's identification of the bee maidens as the Thriae.

What do we know of the Thriae? The earliest extant reference to these figures appears in a fragment of Pherecydes (*FGrHist* 3 F49 = Archilochus fr. 267 West)³⁴ stating that they were three in number, whence their name, and were the daughters of Zeus. According to Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F195), "nymphs inhabited Parnassus, the nurses of Apollo, three, called Thriae, after whom the mantic pebbles are called *θριαί* and prophesying, *θριαῖσθαι*." Later sources add a few more details. Callimachus, for instance, lists *θριαί καὶ μάντιες* as part of the province of Apollo (*h. Ap.* 45), and the scholiast informs us that "the thriae are mantic pebbles, said to have been found by three nymphs." Bekker's *Anecdota Graeca* (I. 265.11) and the *Etymologicum Genuinum* p. 160 Mi. (= *Et. Mag.* p. 455.34) contain the information that the Thriae discovered the mantic pebbles and offered them to Athena, who cast them onto the plain called thereafter *Θριάσιον* because she was charged with meddling in soothsaying, Apollo's province. Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. *Θρία* and Zenobius 5.75 (= *FGrHist* 328 F195) record a variant of the myth, in which Athena herself discovers the mantic pebbles, but Zeus makes their prophecies worthless upon Apollo's request, occasioning the proverb: *πολλοὶ θριοβόλοι, παῦροι δέ τε μάντιες ἄνδρες*. Hesychius, s.v. *θριαί*, calls the Thriae the first *μάντιες*.

We see then that the bee maidens resemble the composite picture of the Thriae gleaned from these scattered sources in the following respects:

³² AHS, 346 and cxiii.

³³ The correct accentuation would be *Θρίαί*, according to the most recent editor of the hymns, F. Càssola (Milan 1975) in his notes on lines 552–554 and 552. Càssola himself prints *σεμναί* in the text and explicitly rejects Hermann's conjecture in his commentary.

³⁴ For the sources on the Thriae, see F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin 1923–55) 3 F49 with commentary, and 328 F195 with commentary and notes.

their number, their being sisters, their home on Parnassus, their role as nurses or teachers of Apollo, and their possession of a mantic art of some kind. Our previous discussion, however, has demonstrated how common are triads of sisters who nurture young gods and heroes in Greek myth. We have also noted that these women customarily consort with Apollo, and that certain nymphs practice divination. Viewed in this context, Hermann's conjecture loses its force.

The probability of the exact equation of the bee maidens with the Thriae decreases when one considers the types of divination involved. Divination by mantic pebbles, the art practiced by the Thriae, is generally acknowledged to have been one of the oldest forms of divination in Greece;³⁵ the verb *ἀναιρεῖν* for the giving out of the Pythia's oracle seems to point to a time in which drawing lots — whether pebbles, beans, pieces of wood, or leaves — was the method employed at Delphi.³⁶ If fig or vine leaves were used as lots, the glosses *θρία· φύλλα συκῆς, ἣ ἀμπέλου* (= Apollodorus *FGrHist* 244 F153) and *θριάζειν· φυλλολογεῖν, ἐνθουσιᾶν, ἐνθουσιάζειν* (= Soph. fr. 466 Radt, Eur. fr. 478N²) in Hesychius may supply an etymology of the word *θριάι*.³⁷ Several relatively late writers, all drawing on a common earlier source, describe the ritual of prophecy at Delphi. The petitioner asked the priestess his question, whereupon the mantic pebbles, lying in a dish on the tripod, began to move. The inspired priestess, *ἐμφορουμένη ἥτοι ἐνθουσιῶσα* (Suda s.v. *Πυθώ*), then pronounced Apollo's will.³⁸ As time went on, a conscious or unconscious attempt seems to have been made to slight the "material element" of the ritual while elevating the importance of the Pythia's inspired response; the legends of Athena's rejection of the mantic pebbles and the proverb *πολλοὶ θριοβόλοι* may have arisen in this way.³⁹ Divination by lot continued to be used at Delphi as late as Plutarch's day, though perhaps only for minor or preliminary steps in the oracular consultation.⁴⁰

To compare the bee maidens' soothsaying with that of the Thriae one must look within the *Hymn*. Hermes has promised never to go near

³⁵ AHS, 346; L. Weniger, "Thriae," in *Roschers Lexikon* (above, n.11) V (1916-1924) cols. 867-868; A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1879) I 192.

³⁶ C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* (Königsberg 1829) 814n., was the first to recognize the significance of *ἀναιρεῖν*; cf. W. Burkert, *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* (Stuttgart 1977) 189.

³⁷ Wilamowitz (above, n.25) I 380 f; Weniger, col. 868 f.

³⁸ Amandry (above, n.18) 29-30, 72 and pls. I-IV, 258-259.

³⁹ Amandry, 194.

⁴⁰ Bouché-Leclercq (above, n.35) I 194; Amandry, 195.

Apollo's temple (523), and Apollo has told of his vow not to share with other gods his special knowledge of the will of Zeus (533 ff). The mantic art of the bee maidens is then a different type from Apollo's, which is portrayed in the *Hymn* as consisting at least in part in the interpretation of bird omens (213, 544 ff). The bee maidens practice their soothsaying ἀπάνευθε, "apart" (556). In Homeric diction this adverb always denotes geographical, rather than metaphorical, distance. Whether in this case it means "apart from me" and hence "not at Delphi," or "apart from the temple at Delphi," or "apart from Olympus," where Apollo and Hermes are conversing,⁴¹ or even "apart from the haunts of men," the adverb helps isolate the sisters from the mature Delphic Apollō. Their association with him is placed in the past tense (557).

In addition, Apollo says of the bee maidens' activity that πατήρ δ' ἐμὸς οὐκ ἀλέγισεν (557). Homeric usage of this formula such as *Il.* 11.80: τῶν μὲν [sc. ἄλλων θεῶν] ἄρ' οὐκ ἀλεγίζε πατήρ [sc. Ζεύς] and Hector's comment on bird omens in *Il.* 12.238: τῶν οὐ τι μετατρέπομ' οὐδ' ἀλεγίζω support the interpretation "paid no attention to, ignored" rather than "allowed," as some have taken it.⁴² The bee maidens thus are placed out of the mainstream of prophetic technique.

Apollo's gift to Hermes, however, does not lack value, for the bee maidens are far from powerless: καί τε κραίνουσιν ἕκαστα (559). The verb κραίνω or ἐπικραίνω, which often appears in Homer in a prayer formula meaning "to grant a wish," usually has a god or king as its subject, with Zeus being the most frequent. Another use of the verb, very similar to our passage in the *Hymn to Hermes*, is Penelope's description of true dreams: οἳ ῥ' ἔτυμα κραίνουσι (*Od.* 19.567). The simple verb or its compound appears two other times in the *Hymn*; in line 427 it refers to Hermes' singing, and in line 531 it describes the powers of the magical golden staff. In all three instances, the verb retains its basic Homeric meaning, "to give sanction of accomplishment." Just as Zeus "nods his head" to the requests of men or other gods, thereby rendering them effective, so too the bee maidens, through their prophecies, enable things to come into being.⁴³

⁴¹ The suggestions, respectively, of AHS, 347; M. Feyel, "Σμῆναι: Etude sur le v. 552 de l'hymne homérique à Hermès," *Rev. Arch.* 25 (1946) 10 and H. Herter, "Hermes," *Rh. Mus.* 119 (1976) 235; and Amandry, 62. The latter interpretation seems to me the least likely.

⁴² "Allowed" is the translation of AHS, 347. Jacoby (above, n.34), in n.14 to his commentary on 328 F195, supports the other view.

⁴³ E. Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes* (Paris 1969) II 41-42; M. Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* (Paris 1967) 53-56; Amandry (above, n.18) 63 n.1.

Likewise, Apollo asserts that the man who learns to inquire of the bee maidens will often hear Hermes' "response" — ὁμφή (566). The same word has occurred twice before in the *Hymn* to denote the instructions of Zeus to Apollo (471, 532) and twice to denote the oracular response of Apollo to suppliants at Delphi. By means of the word ὁμφή the poet thus draws a direct parallel between the oracular powers of Apollo, granted by Zeus, and those of Hermes and the bee maidens.

We also know of the bee maidens' prophesying that it alternates between truth and falsehood: at times προφρονέως ἐθέλουσιν ἀληθεῖην ἀγορεύειν (561), while at others ψεύδονται δὴ ἔπειτα (563). The Muses in the *Theogony* use similar language about themselves:

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι
(27 f).⁴⁴

Even the oracle of Apollo withholds the truth at times, though accepting all offerings (*h. Hermes* 543–549). The revelation of accurate prophecies is thus a matter of discretion for the gods. Of greater interest is what factor determines the veracity of the response. At Delphi, the suppliants' behavior influences Apollo to reveal or withhold the truth. But with the bee maidens, their own condition determines the reliability of their oracle. When they "rave" or "rage"⁴⁵ after eating honey, they are willing to tell the truth; deprived of honey, they mislead men. As an outward sign of their mental state, they fly "now here, now there"⁴⁶ when truthful, but they "swarm in and out together" when they lie.

Admittedly we do not have a detailed vision of the bee maidens' method of prophecy, aside from its reliance on the honey-maddened condition of the prophetesses. The lot oracle at Delphi also depended on an "enthusiastic" priestess, but her words came in response to the stimulus of mantic pebbles moving in a dish. If the bee maidens were identical to the Thriae, as Hermann proposed, one would expect a reference in the *Hymn* to the use of these pebbles, especially since the Thriae are their eponymous inventors. No such mention is made. In addition, the argument that the bee maidens/Thriae were added to the *Hymn* by a reviser intent upon denigrating Hermes by linking him with

⁴⁴ P. Pucci, *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry* (Baltimore 1977) 9–16, 19–21, discusses this passage and honey as a symbol for poetry.

⁴⁵ See Amandry, 63 n.1.

⁴⁶ One third of the places where forms of ἄλλοτε ἄλλη appear in Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar describe the unpredictable actions of a god toward mortals.

the unfashionable practice of divination by lot, as has been suggested,⁴⁷ stumbles against the same obstacle — why did this hypothetical reviser omit any explicit reference to divination by lot?

The only evidence that the bee maidens performed divination with pebbles would have to be derived in a roundabout way from the account of Hermes' cattle-rustling exploit in the *Bibliotheca* attributed to Apollodorus. Near the end of this tale, the author writes of Hermes: ἤθελε καὶ τὴν μαντικὴν ἐπελθεῖν· καὶ . . . διδάσκεται τὴν διὰ τῶν ψήφων μαντικὴν (3.10.2). This account does not mention any nymphs as the patronesses of these pebbles. Since the author seems to have relied on more than one source,⁴⁸ it is not justifiable to treat the story in the *Bibliotheca* as a mere paraphrase of the Homeric hymn which has turned the three maidens of the latter into the pebbles that they personify. The composer of the *Hymn* may have known of a story linking Hermes and divination by lot, but if so, he has consciously chosen another version of the myth, one which conforms, as we shall see, to the themes of the *Hymn*. Rather than charge that in presenting the bee maidens/Thriæ the poet of the *Hymn to Hermes* "ne se rend pas bien compte de leur méthode qu'il assimile au délire des Bacchantes,"⁴⁹ would it not be preferable to attribute the defect not to the ancient poet, but to modern commentators trying to impose upon the poem an incorrect interpretation?

This comparison of the bee maidens' soothsaying technique to the "delirium of the Bacchantes" — αἷ δ' ὅτε μὲν θυῶσιν ἐδηδυῖαι μέλι χλωρόν (560) — calls to mind another group of "raving" females bearing a resemblance to the bee maidens, the Thyiads (Delphic and Attic maenads) and their mythical equivalents in the entourage of Dionysus at Delphi, the Corycian nymphs.⁵⁰ Alcman (fr. 63 Page) lists the Thyiads as a type of nymph: Ναῖδες τε Λαμπάδες τε Θυιάδες τε. The Corycian nymphs are mentioned reverentially by the prophetess in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus: σέβω δὲ νύμφας, ἔνθα Κωρυκίς πέτρα / κοίλη (22 f), and they also appear in a choral invocation to Dionysus in the

⁴⁷ Notably by N. O. Brown, *Hermes the Thief* (Madison, Wis. 1947) 100–101.

⁴⁸ AHS, 271; Feyel (above, n.41) 9; Càssola (above, n.33) 543.

⁴⁹ Bouché-Leclercq (above, n.35) I, 193.

⁵⁰ On the historical Thyiads see G. Roux, *Delphes: Son oracle et ses dieux* (Paris 1976) 168 ff, 178 ff; on the similarity of the mythological Thyiads to the Thriæ and bee maidens (whom he conflates) see H. Jeanmaire, *Dionysos* (Paris 1951) 191. Roux, 184–186, in discussing the Corycian nymphs, emphasizes the necessity to distinguish among these nymphs, the Thriæ, and the bee maidens.

Antigone of Sophocles: ἐνθα Κωρύκῃαι / στείχουσι Νύμφαι Βακχίδες (1126 ff). These nymphs seem to be identified with the Thyiads a few lines later: προφάνηθ', / ὠναξ, σαῖς ἅμα περιπόλοις / Θυίαισιν, αἷ σε μαινόμεναι πάννυχοι / χορεύουσι (1149 ff).⁵¹ The small votive tablet of the nymphs included on the marble relief of the neo-Attic krater depicting dancing maenads may be an allusion to the pairing of the maenads with the nymphs of Parnassus.⁵² So, too, Plato refers to the Bacchae as nymphs in *Laws* 815c-d. Like the Corycian nymphs, the maenads of the *Bacchae* of Euripides roam the mountain ridges — εἰς ὄρος εἰς ὄρος (116) — although their mountain is Cithaeron; both the bee maidens and the Corycian nymphs inhabit the slopes of Parnassus.⁵³

The maenads and other women linked with Dionysus in myth, like the bee maidens, frequently appear in triads. For instance, the first maenads were the three sisters of Semele — Ino, Autonoe, and Agave — who each presided over a thiasos celebrating the god (Eur. *Bacch.* 680 ff), and in the third century B.C. three “maenads from the race of Cadmean Ino” led Dionysiac worship in Magnesia.⁵⁴ The Proetides and the Minyades were both groups of three sisters who suffered cruel punishment for despising the worship of Dionysus.⁵⁵ The god himself was reared by a trio of nymphs (Diod. 5.52.2); we see here again the kourotrophic role shared also by the bee maidens,⁵⁶ Charites, Aglaurids, and Horae. Like these women, again, the maenads were noted for their dancing, as numerous vase paintings and reliefs attest.

Finally, along with the bee maidens and the nymphs, the Bacchae

⁵¹ R. C. Jebb on Soph. *Antigone* 1152 f (Cambridge 1900) remarks that the Thyiads here are Dionysus’ “attendant Nymphs . . . — not human worshippers.” The Corycian nymphs also appear in Aristonous, *Paeon in Apoll.* 33 ff and Philodamus Scarpheus, *Paeon in Dionysum* 21 ff (Powell, *Collect. Alex.*).

⁵² Richter (above, n.10) 201 and 203 n.17 admits that on this vase there is “unity of action” but denies that the votive tablet of the nymphs serves any purpose here beyond that of “an effective space-filler.”

⁵³ Jebb on *Antigone* 1126 ff notes that the Corycian cave lies about seven miles northeast of Delphi.

⁵⁴ *Inschr. Magn.* 215(a) 24 ff. Cf. Otto (above, n.7) 63–64; A. Henrichs, “Greek Maenadism from Olympias to Messalina,” *HSCP* 82 (1978) 121–160, esp. 123 ff.

⁵⁵ Usener (above, n.2) 10–11. See also Burkert, *Homo Necans* (Berlin 1972) 190 f, for a theory connecting the leprous Proetides and the barley-strewn bee maidens.

⁵⁶ Wilamowitz (above, n.25) I 381; J. Harrison (above, n.18) 442. Otto, 77, remarks that the cultic rituals of the Thyiads are both maternal and ecstatic, mirroring the dual role of the nymphs as the followers as well as the nurses of Dionysus (cf. Hom. *h.* xxvi). We see the same combination of roles in the bee maidens.

have a special connection with honey: for them it flows spontaneously from the earth (Eur. *Bacch.* 141, 704 ff). Ovid even attributes the discovery of honey to Bacchus (*Fasti* 3.736 ff).

Greek mythology thus provides us with many groups of female divinities or demi-goddesses who resemble the bee maidens of the *Hymn to Hermes* — so many, in fact, that it is ill-advised to single out one particular group as their equivalent. In particular, the hypothesis that they are the Thriae is flawed, as I have argued, by the omission of any reference in the *Hymn* to the chief attribute of the Thriae, their mantic pebbles. None of the sources for our knowledge of the Thriae mentions any association between the Thriae and the god Hermes, although they are all later than the *Hymn to Hermes*. None, moreover, even hints that the Thriae resemble bees. The maidens in the *Hymn*, on the other hand, have wings; they are sprinkled with pollen-like grains of barley;⁵⁷ they fly “now here, now there,” ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ, just as in the Pindaric simile: ἐγκωμίων γὰρ ἄωτος ὕμνων / ἐπ’ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλον ὥτε μέλισσα θύνει λόγον (*Pyth.* 10.53 f); they are chaste, as bees were believed to be (553);⁵⁸ they eat honeycomb and liquid honey; they “swarm” past one another (δονέουσai, 563).⁵⁹ If the bee maidens and the Thriae are one and the same, it is odd, to say the least, that the sources for the Thriae seem unanimously ignorant of any bee-like characteristics; it is almost as though a centaur were described without using the word “horse.”

Which manuscript reading is then preferable in line 552 of the *Hymn*, if θριαί is to be rejected? Μοῖραι is unacceptable because, among other reasons, Zeus would hardly “pay no heed” to the Fates. A survey of the context in which the adjective σεμνός appears in early Greek poetry, on the other hand, supports the reading σεμναί of the Moscow manuscript.⁶⁰ Neither the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, nor the Hesiodic corpus contains this word in any form. The adjective does occur, however, in lines 1, 478, and 486 of the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*, as an epithet of Demeter, of

⁵⁷ AHS, 347, note that Ilgen made the comparison of the barley to pollen (in his 1796 edition of the Homeric hymns).

⁵⁸ Cf. Virgil, *Georgics* 4.197–202. On bees and chastity see also M. Detienne, “Orphée au miel,” *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 12 (1971) 7–23.

⁵⁹ AHS, 347 f. Gold, embossed plaques of the late geometric period unearthed at Camiros on Rhodes depict a winged woman with a bee’s body from the waist down. See illustration in J. Harrison (above, n.18) 443; Weniger (above, n.35) col. 870; or A. B. Cook, “The Bee in Greek Mythology,” *JHS* 15 (1895) 12. For the “flitting” motion cf. Aesch. *Pr.* 275 f.

⁶⁰ In suggesting Σεμῆναι, Feyel (above, n.41) 7 fails to explain why he feels that a proper name is required at this point and σεμναί therefore unacceptable. As Càssola (above, n.33) points out his commentary, σμήνη means the cell of a beehive and is therefore inappropriate.

her rites, and of the goddess and her daughter Kore. In lines 478 and 486, as in Homeric *Hymn* xxviii.5 and the *Hymn to Hermes* 552, the word stands first in its line; in all its occurrences in the *Hymns* (the references above and *Hymn* xxx.16) the word is feminine or associated with female divinities. The adjective appears once in the extant poetry of Solon (4.14 f West):

οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα,
ἧ σιγῶσα σύνοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ' ἔοντα.

It appears twenty-one times in the extant poetry of Pindar: seven times of gods and heroes, fourteen times of things. Of the former category, all but one are female goddesses; in three of the seven occurrences the adjective describes the Charites. The Charites also have this epithet in an inscription from Epidaurus (fr. Ades. 937.7 Page). Because of the similarities between the Charites and the bee maidens it would be appropriate that they share an epithet as well.

In the lines from Solon quoted above the adjective σεμνά appears in proximity to a description of prophetic knowledge — for to the ancients this included knowledge of past and present as well as future events. This collocation supports the reading σεμναί in the *Hymn to Hermes*, for the adjective would there appear in a similar juxtaposition. Furthermore, Pindar *Olympian* 6.65 ff and *Nemean* 3.69, Aeschylus *Septem* 800, Sophocles *Oedipus Tyrannus* 556 (σεμνόμαντιν) and Corinna 654.iii.30 (Page) all contain the same collocation of σεμνός and prophecy and/or Apollo, god of prophecy.

Other contextual similarities are best seen in a list:

<i>Hymn to Hermes</i>	σεμναί (552)	ναιετάουσιν (555)	προφρονέως (561)
<i>Hymn to Demeter</i>	σεμναί (486)	ναιετάουσι (485)	προφρονέως (487)
<i>Hymn to Hermes</i>	σεμναί (552)	κραίνουσιν (559)	
Aesch. <i>Septem</i>	σεμνός (800)	κραίνων (802)	
<i>Hymn to Hermes</i>	σεμναί (552)	ψεύδονται (563)	
Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6.65 ff	σεμνόν (68)	ψεύδων (67)	
Corinna 654.iii	σεμνών (30)	ἁψεύδιαν (31)	
<i>Hymn to Hermes</i>	σεμναί (552)	ψεύδονται (563)	ποτώμεναι (558)
Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 7.22 f	σεμνόν (23)	ψεύδεσι (22)	ποτανῆ (22)

These appearances of the adjective σεμνός in an environment similar to that of the bee maiden passage of the *Hymn to Hermes* cannot prove the authenticity of the reading σεμναί there, but they do argue in its favor.

The previous discussion has traced the resemblance of the bee maidens to various other mythological types seen in Greek art and

literature. What makes the bee maidens unique, however, is a set of motifs added to this core, motifs reaching back to Indo-European times, those of bees, honey, and their relation to soothsaying. We turn now to a survey of the influence of these motifs on the literary tradition, before concluding with an examination of their relevance to the themes of the *Hymn to Hermes*.

BEES, HONEY, AND TRUE SPEECH

The bee maidens do not prophesy truthfully unless they have partaken of μέλι χλωρόν, which causes them to "rage" (560). The association of prophetic speech with madness, known to all in the person of Cassandra, may be detected in Greek thought as early as Homer.⁶¹ One of Penelope's suitors in the *Odyssey* calls the seer Theoclymenus "mad" when he interprets the strange portents at their feast: ἀφραίνει ξέϊνος (20.360). The words are flung as an insult, but they reflect the belief that practitioners of the mantic art are possessed by a god and hence ἑκφρονες. The gods' influence over men moved to forecast the future is expressed by the formula ὡς ἐνὶ θυμῷ / ἀθάνατοι βάλλουσι (*Od.* 1.200 f, 15.172 f). Plato calls this μαντικὴ ἔνθεος (*Phaedr.* 244a-d); his Euthyphro, a professional seer, complains that he is laughed at "as if mad" when prophesying (*Euthyphro* 3c), and Socrates says that the god "takes away the mind" of divine seers (*Ion* 534c-d).

In Greek cult practice the god was sometimes held to enter the body of the inspired mortal through a sacred liquid that reached the seat of consciousness, the φρένες.⁶² The practice of "hydromanteia," for example, at Hysiae near Plataea, at Klaros, and perhaps even at Delphi, required that the prophet or prophetess drink sacred spring water in order to achieve divine inspiration.⁶³ Blood also served this end: at the oracle of Ge in Achaia, according to Pausanias (7.25.13) and Pliny (*H.N.* 28.147), the priestess drank bull's blood before prophesying.⁶⁴ One finds a

⁶¹ This despite assertions to the contrary: for example, Farnell (above, n.6) IV (1907) 190 denies that the Homeric world knew of any form of soothsaying besides the "rational" type. Against this view, see R. Flacelière, *Devins et oracles grecs* (Paris 1961) 34.

⁶² R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1954) 34 ff, 66-67.

⁶³ Farnell, IV 188-189, 222.

⁶⁴ Roux (above, n.50) 27; P. de Félice, *Poisons sacrés, ivresses divines* (Paris 1936) 361. The seer Teiresias' drinking blood before "speaking the truth" (νημερτέα) to Odysseus in the underworld (*Hom. Od.* 11.95-99) may reflect the ritual use of blood for mantic inspiration. See also Paus. 2.24.1.

similar concept in the mythology of another Indo-European people, the Welsh: in one tale three *awen*, or "drops of inspiration," fly from the cauldron of the goddess Gorgyrwen or Ceridwen and bestow knowledge of the future upon the one tasting them; the word *awenithion*, moreover, denotes individuals who prophesy in an ecstatic mode.⁶⁵

Intoxicating beverages were among those used by non-Greeks in their cults and myths to transfuse the soothsayer with prophetic power. Macrobius writes of a Thracian oracle whose priests prophesy *plurimo mero sumpto* (*Sat.* 1.18.1).⁶⁶ The corresponding Indian intoxicant, soma, regarded as a drink of the gods much like nectar or honey among the Greeks, also furnished inspiration for seers.⁶⁷ In Norse mythology mead — fermented honey — is a prophetess' source of inspiration.⁶⁸

It is against this background that the honey-induced soothsaying of the bee maidens should be considered. The magical power of the honey doubtless sprang from its status as a sacred liquid like blood, spring water, and wine, imbued with the god and hence conveying superhuman knowledge. There is evidence, however, to support the hypothesis that the μέλι χλωρόν of line 560 may represent an intoxicating drink that causes "raving,"⁶⁹ for Greek literary tradition not only refers to the drinking of mead among the barbarians, but also hints that fermented honey was known to primitive Greek society as well.⁷⁰ Thus Plutarch has one of his friends say, with regard to honey, that among the Jews

⁶⁵ H. M. Chadwick and N. K. Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature I* (Cambridge 1932) 103-104, 636-637.

⁶⁶ In the *Bacchae* of Euripides (298-301) Teiresias calls Dionysus a prophet because those who drink wine, pouring the god into themselves, can foretell coming events in their drunken frenzy.

⁶⁷ On the soma ritual see K. F. Geldner, trans., *Der Rig-Veda*, Harvard Oriental Series 35 (Cambridge, Mass. 1951) III, intro., 1-9. Cf. also Chadwick and Chadwick, II (1936) 625.

⁶⁸ Weniger (above, n.35) V col. 870. Cf. also Chadwick and Chadwick, I 651-653.

⁶⁹ G. W. Elderkin, *Hesperia* 10 (1941) 129 n.20, writes that in the *Hymn to Hermes*, lines 560-561, "honey in the form of mead is the intoxicant instead of the later wine." Unfortunately, he supplies no evidence for his statement. The epithet χλωρόν is of little help, having been defined recently in different ways: E. Irwin, *Colour Terms in Greek Poetry* (Toronto 1974) 31 ff, 56-57, believes the basic meaning to be "liquid." H. Dürbeck, *Zur Charakteristik der griechischen Farbenbezeichnungen* (Bonn 1977) 110 ff, 228 n.404, explicitly rejects Irwin's proposal, suggesting instead either "fresh" or "golden." For "fresh" honey as an intoxicant, cf. Xenophon, *Anab.* 4.8.20 and Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe* 1.25.

⁷⁰ For a list of references to the use of mead in Greece, see Roscher (above, n.20) 34-36 and V. Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, 6th ed. (Berlin 1894) 151-152; cf. J. Harrison (above, n.18) 422.

καὶ τοῦτ' ἦν σπονδὴ καὶ μέθυ πρὶν ἄμπελον φανῆναι (*Quaest. Conviv.* 4.6.2). It was the custom of an Illyrian people, according to the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mir. Ausc.* (22), ἐκ τοῦ μέλιτος ποιεῖν οἶνον. Hesychius, similarly, glosses the word μελύγιον or μελίτιον as πόμα τι Σκυθικόν. . . .

The early use of mead by the Greeks, although not directly attested in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, may perhaps be induced from the adjectives μελιηδής and μελίφρων, which appear most often in Homer with the noun οἶνος. We know from a Linear B tablet containing the word *me-ri-ti-jo* (= **melitio*-) before the ideogram for wine that honey was added to wine in Mycenaean times.⁷¹ Nestor's maidservant mixes a potion containing wine, honey (μέλι χλωρόν), and barley (ἄλφιτα λευκά) in her master's famous cup in the eleventh book of the *Iliad* (628 ff), and Circe in the *Odyssey* prepares a similar drink (*Od.* 10.233–236).⁷² The Homeric adjectives μελίφρων and μελιηδής may, however, be reminiscences, frozen into the traditional epic diction, of a time when the chief intoxicant was not honeyed wine, but mead.

More direct references to the use of mead occur not in archaic Greek poetry, but rather in contexts that could be described as "archaistic." For example, in a late fifth-century epic, the *Thebais* of Antimachus of Colophon (quoted in Athenaeus 11.468a), Adrastus has his servants prepare a drink consisting of honey and water:

. . . ἐν μὲν ὕδωρ, ἐν δ' ἄσκηθές μέλι χεῦαν
ἀργυρέῳ κρητῆρι, περιφραδέως κερώντες
(fr. 20.2 f Wyss).

Porphyry preserves an Orphic fragment (fr. 154 Kern) in which Zeus plots to castrate Kronos by ambushing him when he is drunk on "honey." Wine, explains Porphyry, had not yet been invented (*De An. Nymph.* 16).⁷³ Just as Dionysus is conventionally the "new" god in the Greek pantheon, so, too, wine is traditionally portrayed as a "new" discovery;⁷⁴ the drinking of mead, by contrast, is a mark of the most primitive society (cf. Plutarch, *Life of Coriolanus* 3.4).

⁷¹ J. Chadwick (above, n.19) 560.

⁷² On such mixtures in Greek and Sanskrit literature, see C. Watkins, *Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc.* 122 (1978) 9–17. N. J. Richardson, ed., *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) app. 4: "The Cyceon," 344–346, in contrast, denies that the mixed potion drunk at Eleusis (cf. Hom. *h. Dem.* 206 ff) was intoxicating or hallucinogenic.

⁷³ A similar tale, with nectar as the intoxicant (οἶνος γὰρ οὕτω ἦν), appears in Plato *Symp.* 203b. For a discussion of honey in Porph. *De An. Nymph.*, see F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris 1956) 430 ff.

⁷⁴ In Nonnos' *Dionysiaca* (13.253–274; 19.227–262) Aristaeus and Dionysus conduct a contest between honey and wine before a jury of the other gods. Wine

Linguistic evidence, too, helps confirm the hypothesis that the earliest speakers of Greek knew or partook of an intoxicating honey drink.⁷⁵ In some Indo-European languages the root **medhu-* denoted both honey and the intoxicating drink made from it. The other Indo-European languages, including Greek, maintained two distinct roots, **melit-*, honey, and **medhu-*, mead. The latter root did survive in Greek, but only in the poetic word for wine, μέθυ, and related words for drunkenness. Here again, as in the myths discussed earlier, wine has supplanted the primeval drink, mead.

The honey-induced prophetic frenzy of the bee maidens in the *Hymn to Hermes* thus belongs to a tradition in which divination depended upon the ritual drinking of a sacred, perhaps intoxicating liquid, which opened the human psyche to messages from the divine world by bringing the god within the seer.⁷⁶ Corollary to this is a still more obscure tradition, nearly forgotten by Greek mythographers and by the Greek language, according to which the men and gods of earlier times drank honey, mixed with wine or fermented as mead. The *Hymn to Hermes* seems to contain the only extant example of the intersection of these two traditions.

The association of honey and prophetic skill also appears in the story of Iamus in Pindar (*Ol.* 6.53 ff), although here the motif of nurturing infants on honey may be the dominant one. The son of Apollo and Euadne, Iamus, is nourished as a baby by two snakes who feed him with "the blameless poison of bees," ἀμεμφεῖ ἰὼ μελισσῶν (46 f). When he grows to manhood, he fulfills his destiny by becoming a seer "preeminent among men" (50 f).⁷⁷

is represented here as a new invention, winning the competition because it is free from the cloying sweetness of honey; it is uncertain whether the "honey" is meant to represent mead.

⁷⁵ On the etymology of μέλι and μέθυ see D. E. LeSage, "The Language of Honey," in *Honey*, ed. E. Crane (New York 1975) 428–432. See also the entries for these words in P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, III (Paris 1974) and H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, II (Heidelberg 1970).

⁷⁶ See Félice (above, n.64). Soma, the sacred Indic intoxicant, was also venerated as a god; hence the god literally entered the body of the partaker in the ritual (cf. Geldner [above, n.67] passim).

⁷⁷ This passage is discussed by J. H. Waszink, *Biene und Honig als Symbol des Dichters und der Dichtung in der griechisch-römischen Antike*, Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vorträge G 196 (Opladen 1974) 11. Waszink focuses on the development over time of the honey metaphor for seers and prophets (see esp. 13–14). I wish to thank Professor Richard Thomas for calling this book to my attention.

A related motif is the association of bees with oracles in Greece and Rome. Bees, for instance, revealed the oracle of Trophonius to the Boeotians (Paus. 9.40.1). Pliny (*H.N.* 11.55) writes that bees' swarms provide portents of individual success and military victory. The belief that swarms could also forecast doom is exemplified in Latin literature by the portent of the bees lighting on the sacred laurel of Latinus in Virgil's *Aeneid* (7.59 ff), as well as by similar omens in Livy (21.46) and Tacitus (*Ann.* 12.64), among others.⁷⁸ Plutarch's biography of Dion reports that a bee portent appeared to Dion's fleet on its way to attack Syracuse (24).

Bees are associated in particular with the oracle at Delphi, a fact relevant to the study of the Parnassian bee maidens. Tradition has it that the second temple of Apollo at Delphi was built by bees and birds out of wax and feathers (Paus. 10.5.9; Plut. *De Pyth. Or.* 17, p. 402d; Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 6.10). Certain coins from Delphi were stamped with bees.⁷⁹ Pindar calls an oracular pronouncement from Delphi "the response of the Delphic bee": χρησμὸς . . . μελίσσας Δελφίδος (*Pyth.* 4.60).⁸⁰

Because the social organization, industriousness, and purity of the life of bees, as well as their ability to sting while providing men with the sweetness of honey, made them fascinating to the ancients — witness, for example, Virgil's description of the activities of the hive in *Georgics* 4.149–227 — it would be foolhardy to seek a single formulation that

⁷⁸ W. Robert-Tornow, *De apium mellisque apud veteres significatione et symbolica et mythologica* (Berlin 1893) 43–60. Waszink, 5, cautions against the common failure to differentiate between the Greek and Roman use of bee symbolism.

⁷⁹ Weniger, "Melissa," in *Roschers Lexikon* (above, n.11) II.2 (1894–1897) col. 2640.

⁸⁰ The scholiast on this Pindaric line asserts that the appellation "bee" properly belonged to priestesses of Demeter (cf. schol. Theocr. 15.94), but had been extended to apply to other priestesses as well. Bees were associated with Demeter's cult: the first priestess of Demeter at Corinth, according to legend, was an old woman named Melissa (Servius on *Aen.* 1.430); the initiates in the Eleusinian mysteries and the participants in the Thesmophoria are called "bees" (Hesych. s.v. μέλισσαι; Apollodorus *FGrHist* 244 F89); Kore has an epithet *Μελιτώδης* (Theocr. 15.94); Callimachus says that bees bear water to Demeter (Callim. *h. Ap.* 110 ff). See Jacoby's commentary on the Apollodorus fragment and Detienne (above, n.58) 13 ff. Bee priestesses also served Artemis at Ephesus; cf. *Et. Mag.* 383.30 and Aristoph. *Frogs* 1274; also Cook (above, n.59) 11 ff; Elderkin, "The Bee of Artemis," *AJP* 60 (1939) 203–213; and R. Fleischer, *Artemis von Ephesos*, *Etudes prélim. aux relig. orient.* 35 (Leiden 1973) *passim*.

could explain all the bee symbolism of antiquity. What seems clear is that one set of motifs linked honey with prophecy and bees with oracles and seers; it is within such a framework that the bee maidens, like the Pythia's epithet "Delphic bee," are best understood.

It has been suggested that prophetesses acquired the epithet "bee" because of the humming noise they made when prophesying.⁸¹ This conjecture, regardless of its historical veracity, touches upon an important theme in Greek literature generally and the *Hymn to Hermes* in particular: the connection between song and prophecy and hence between poetry and prophecy. That the two were nearly indistinguishable at their inception has been well established by modern scholarship.⁸² Both the singer and the seer receive their inspiration from the gods⁸³ and are therefore privy to knowledge of events outside their own experience (cf. *Iliad* 2.484-486). The Muse prompts the poet, and he in turn is her spokesman, her *προφήτης*. Pindar uses this word for seers — Teiresias (*Nem.* 1.60) and Amphiaraus (fr. 202 Snell) — and for poets, calling himself the *αοίδιμον Πιερίδων προφάταν* (*Pae.* 6.5).⁸⁴

Poets and seers share the same subject matter as well, since their god-given vision provides them with access to knowledge of the past, present, and future. Both the divine inspiration of the poet and his resultant wisdom appear in Hesiod's famous description of his encounter with the Muses near Helicon:

ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν
θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα
(*Theog.* 31-32).

⁸¹ W. Robertson Smith, *Journal of Philology* 14 (1885) 120. The Jewish historian Josephus writes (correctly) that the name of the prophetess Deborah means "bee" in Hebrew (*Ant. Jud.* 5.200).

⁸² Frequently cited is N. K. Chadwick, *Poetry and Prophecy* (Cambridge 1942). This subject is also discussed in W. R. Halliday, *Greek Divination* (London 1913) 54-57; H. Dahlmann, "Vates," *Philol.* 97 (1948) 337-353 (= *Kleine Schriften* [Hildesheim 1970] 35-51); E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 80-82; F. Cornford, *Principium sapientiae; The Origins of Greek Philosophic Thought* (Cambridge 1952) 62-87; Duchemin (above, n.17) 32-33, 53, 337-338; H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1956) II, xxiv, xxxiii; Kambylis (above, n.24) 12-13; West (above, n.4), on line 32; Detienne (above, n.43) 15 ff, 25, 58-59; Waszink (above, n.77) 12-13. Dodds, 100 n.118, points out that in several Indo-European languages one word can mean both "poet" and "seer."

⁸³ Cf. Plato, *Apology* 22c, *Meno* 99c-d, *Phaedrus* 244a-245a, *Laws* 682a.

⁸⁴ Similarly, Pind. fr. 150 Snell: *μαντεύεο Μοῖσα προφατεύσω δ' ἐγώ*; Bacchylides (9.3 Snell) calls himself *Μουσᾶν γε ἰοβλεφάρων θεῖος προφάτας*. Cf. Duchemin (above, n.17) 32-33.

The Muses, Hesiod continues, delight Zeus their father by singing τά τ' ἔόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα (38). Likewise the seer of the Achaeans in the *Iliad*, Calchas, knows τά τ' ἔόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα (*Il.* 1.70). An oracle recorded in Diodorus bids a golden tripod be awarded to the wisest man, the one who beholds τά τ' ἔόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα (9.3.2).⁸⁵

Thus poetry and prophecy, traditionally viewed as springing in common from divine inspiration, were at first not clearly distinguished from one another even by their content. Poetry could foretell the future, while oracles often provided men with information about the forgotten past. The two crafts corresponded in form as well as content. Both were composed in verse and performed as music, at times with instrumental accompaniment.⁸⁶ The word ὀμφή, which denotes the oracular voice of a god, is derived from the same Indo-European root as the English word "song."⁸⁷ Strabo writes that τὸ παλαιὸν οἱ μάντις καὶ μουσικὴν εἰργάζοντο and describes Orpheus as ἄνδρα γόητα ἀπὸ μουσικῆς ἅμα καὶ μαντικῆς (7. fr. 18–19 Jones). Just as the Muses inspire both poets and seers — in Apollonius of Rhodes (2.511–512) they are credited with teaching Aristaeus the art of prophecy — so Apollo presides over both professions and is the god most often associated with music.

Evidence of the original alliance of poetry and prophecy appears within the *Hymn to Hermes*. The bee maidens, it may be recalled, κραίνουσιν ἕκαστα as they feed on honeycomb (559). Earlier in the *Hymn*, Hermes sings a theogony on his lyre, κραίνων ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς καὶ γαῖαν ἐρεμνὴν (427). Song and divination are so closely linked that the same verb, κραίνω, expresses both activities in the *Hymn*.⁸⁸

Although the disciplines of poetry and prophecy, originally so closely bound together, drew apart from one another, their original proximity can be detected in literary tradition, after the fact, through a shared metaphor. Just as honey and bees are associated with oracles and prophets, so too honey and bees appear time and again in metaphors for poetry and poets. Thus in the *Iliad* speech flows "sweeter than honey"

⁸⁵ Given this formulaic background, one may appreciate the audacity of Hesiod's challenge in the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (97–98):

Μοῦσ' ἄγε μοι τά τ' ἔόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα
τῶν μὲν μηδὲν αἶειδε, σὺ δ' ἄλλης μνήσαι ἀοιδῆς.

⁸⁶ N. K. Chadwick (above, n.82) 14.

⁸⁷ N. K. Chadwick, 45; Frisk (above, n.75) II 392 f, and Chantraine (above, n.75) III 801.

⁸⁸ Benveniste, (above, n.43) II 40, adds that the meaning of κραίνων in line 427 of the *Hymn* became obscure as the spheres of song and prophecy continued to separate from one another, perhaps occasioning Hesychius' otherwise inexplicable gloss of κραίνειν as τιμᾶν.

from Nestor's tongue (*Il.* 1.249), and the voice of the Sirens in the *Odyssey* is μελίγηρυν (*Od.* 12.187). The Muses of the *Theogony* pour "sweet dew," from which the ancients believed honey to be produced,⁸⁹ upon the tongues of infant princes, causing their words to "flow sweetly" (83–84; cf. 96–97). Twice in the Homeric hymns song is described as "honey-voiced": μελίγηρυν αοιδήν (*h. Apoll.* 519, *h.* xix.18).

Compound adjectives with μέλι- as the first element are especially frequent in Pindaric poetry as epithets for song or poetry. Pindar describes ὕμνοι, ὀμφά, and κῶμοι as μελιγάρυες (*Ol.* 11.4, *Pyth.* 3.64, *Is.* 2.3, *Pae.* 5.47, *Nem.* 3.4). The Muses and the songs they inspire are μελίφθογγοι (*Ol.* 6.21; *Is.* 2.7, 6.9).⁹⁰ The poet refers to songs as μελίγδουπος (*Nem.* 11.18), μελίκομπος (*Is.* 2.32), μελίρροθος (fr. 246a Snell), and μελίφρων (*Nem.* 7.11, *Pae.* 8.78, fr. 122.14 Snell). Pindar has a voice "sweeter than bee-fashioned honeycomb" (fr. 152 Snell). In four of the six attestations of the word μέλι in Pindar, "honey" serves as a metaphor for "poetry" (*Ol.* 10.98–99, *Nem.* 3.77, *Is.* 5.54, *Pae.* 6.59).

Later poets perpetuate this honey imagery, although perhaps without any intention of invoking the relationship of poetry to prophecy. The metaphor appears, for example, in Sophocles (fr. 155 Radt) and perhaps Euripides (fr. 899N² with Barnes' conjecture). In Theocritus' story of the shepherd-poet Comatas (*Idyll* 7.78 ff) bees nourish him with honeycomb because οἱ γλυκὴ Μοῖσα κατὰ στόματος χέει νέκταρ. Poets also take advantage of the assonance of μέλι and words like μέλπω and μέλισμα: in Epigram 4.12 of Theocritus the blackbirds warble, μέλπουσαι στόμασιν τὰν μελίγαρυν ὄπα.⁹¹ One may note in this context that the *Etymologicum Magnum* suggests μέλι, incorrectly, as one possible etymology for μέλος, "song."

The association of honey with eloquence appears in Sanskrit poetry as well. In the *Atharva-Veda*, for example, the singer of a hymn asks: "O Ásvins, lords of Brightness, anoint me with the honey of the bee, that I may speak forceful speech among men" (IX 1.19).⁹² Another hymn to the Ásvins, this time in the *Rig-Veda*, juxtaposes the gods' gift

⁸⁹ West (above, n.4) on line 83; Waszink (above, n.77) 6–7; cf. Virgil *Ecl.* 4.30, *Georg.* 4.1.

⁹⁰ Cf. discussion in Duchemin (above, n.17) 250–251.

⁹¹ Cf. also Theocr. *Idyll* 7.89 and the pseudo-Theocritean *Idylls* 8.83 and 20.27, as well as the word play in fr. Ades. 979 Page. For honey as a reward for sweet singing, see Theocr. *Idyll* 1.146–148. These and additional references in Robert-Tornow (above, n.78) 105 ff; and Roscher (above, n.20) 69–71.

⁹² *Hymns of the Atharva-Veda*, trans. M. Bloomfield (Oxford 1897; repr. New York 1969) 231.

of honey to the bee with a poet's composition of "sweet songs" in their honor (1.119.9).⁹³

Latin poets adopted the Greek poetic motif of honey for their own writing.⁹⁴ Lucretius, for example, compares his poetic exposition of difficult scientific doctrines to doctors' using honey to sweeten bitter medicine, saying in conclusion:

volui tibi suaviloquenti
carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram
et quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle . . .
(1.945-947 = 4.20-22).

Horace, similarly, describes the writing of poetry as "distilling *poetica mella*" (*Epist.* 1.19.44). The image of words flowing like honey survives in English in an adjective used almost exclusively with nouns denoting speech, "mellifluous."

The Hesiodic image of the Muse's pouring honey or dew upon the lips of a poet or eloquent speaker, combined perhaps with the actual practice of feeding honey to infants,⁹⁵ led to the fabrication of stories narrating the nurture of various poets by bees at some point in their lives. These poets include Homer (*Anthol. Pal.* 2.342), Hesiod, Pindar, Sophocles, Plato, Menander (*Anthol. Pal.* 9.187), Virgil, and Lucan.⁹⁶ Servants of the Muses in these stories, bees are elsewhere associated with the Muses in other ways. For instance, the Muses take the shape of bees in guiding the Athenians to Ionia (Philostr. *Im.* 2.8.6). Varro calls bees "the birds of the Muses," noting their attraction to musical sounds and their habitation of the uncultivated mountains (*De R.R.* 3.16). Aelian (*N.A.* 5.13) remarks on the bees' "love of song and love of the Muses."

Poets also represent themselves and other poets as bees. Simonides apparently compared the poet to τὴν μέλιτταν ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομένην (fr. 593 Page), and Bacchylides calls himself "the shrill-voiced island bee" (10.10 Snell). Aristophanes refers to Phrynichus as a "bee . . . feeding on the fruit of ambrosial songs" (*Aves* 748 ff). Lucretius asserts that he approaches the teachings of Epicurus *floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant* (3.11). Horace, contrasting himself to the "Dircaean swan" Pindar, writes:

⁹³ *Der Rig-Veda*, trans. Geldner (above, n.67) vol. 33, I 162, with note.

⁹⁴ On honey and bee symbolism in Latin literature, see Waszink (above, n.77) 20 ff.

⁹⁵ Roscher (above, n.20) 62-63.

⁹⁶ Sources listed in Cook (above, n.59) 8.

ego apis Matinae
 more modoque
 grata carpentis thyma per laborem
 plurimum circa nemus uvidique
 Tiburis ripas operosa parvus
 carmina fingo.

(C. 4.2.27-32)⁹⁷

Later commentators commonly call Sophocles a bee (schol. Soph. *OC* 17; schol. Soph. *Aias* 1199; schol. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 462; *Vit. Soph.*, ed. Westermann 132). Xenophon, whose speech Cicero called *melle dulcior* (*Or.* 32), is the "Attic bee" (*Suda* s.v. Xenophon). Likewise Sappho and Erinna are compared to bees in the *Palatine Anthology* (2.69; 2.108 ff, 7.13).⁹⁸

The tradition of honey and bee metaphors and similes for poetry and poets was at least as firmly established as that which linked honey and bees with divination and seers in Greek literature. The primeval unity of the spheres of poetry and prophecy can thus be glimpsed by means of the recognition of a motif common to both realms. The imagery of honey and bees, originally associated with the privileged guild of mortals who were divinely inspired to reveal the past, present, or future to their less perceptive brethren, clung to descriptions of these wise men and their utterances long after their profession had splintered into separate disciplines.

Many of the themes discussed above — the Muse, divine inspiration, frenzy, madness, poets, prophets, bees, and honey — converge in a passage in the *Ion* of Plato, 533e to 534e. The interlocutors in the dialogue are discussing the necessity for good poets to be *ἐνθροιοι*, inspired by a god, and *ἑκφρονες*, mad. For, Socrates continues (533e-534b),

ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἀρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ρυθμόν, βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι, ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι ἀρύονται ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμεναι, ἔμφρονες δὲ οὔσαι οὐ, καὶ τῶν μελοποιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται, ὅπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι. λέγουσι γὰρ δῆπουθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω πετόμενοι· καὶ

⁹⁷ Similarly Hor. *Epistle* 1.3.21: *quae circumvolitas agilis thyma*? Cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 10.53-54 (quoted above). The difference between the similes in Pindar and Horace is discussed by Waszink (above, n.77) 14-15, 24-25.

⁹⁸ Robert-Tornow (above, n.78) 108. See also F. Williams' commentary (Oxford 1978) on Callim. *h. Ap.* 110 ff.

ἀληθῆ λέγουσι. κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητῆς ἐστὶν καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερὸν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἐνθεὸς τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ· ἔως δ' ἂν τουτὶ ἔχῃ τὸ κτῆμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν καὶ χρησµωδεῖν.

Socrates here likens lyric poets to the dancing Corybantes and to the maenads, who when possessed draw from the rivers both honey and milk.⁹⁹ The Corybantes were the warriors who danced around the cave in Crete where the infant Zeus was nurtured on honey by nymphs or bees, it may be recalled. Socrates then cites the poets' own poetic claim of culling τὰ μέλη from the κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων of the Muses' gardens ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, using a now familiar play on words. Finally, Socrates compares the divinely inspired poets to τοῖς χρησµωδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θεοῖς, for the god has taken away their minds as well (534c).¹⁰⁰

The bee maidens of the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, in conclusion, serve as an interesting addition to the sisterhood of Greek nursing triads and provide a rare illustration of two aspects of the honey and bee imagery so prevalent in Greek literature — prophetic inspiration through honey and the portrayal of the prophetess as a bee. Herein lies their value from a “diachronic” perspective, since they help elucidate a poetic tradition which, comparative evidence suggests, extends back to Indo-European society. To accept the identification of the bee maidens as the Thriae,¹⁰¹ with the concomitant assumption that their chief attribute was the invention of mantic pebbles, is to obscure their most significant traits, their bee-like appearance and behavior and their willingness to speak oracular truth only when intoxicated with honey.

Keeping the relationship of bee imagery to poetry and prophecy in mind also enhances one's understanding of the bee maidens from a “synchronic” standpoint, that of the *Hymn to Hermes*. The dominant theme of the poem is the rivalry and reconciliation of the two immortal half-brothers, Apollo and Hermes. From the first day of his life, Hermes excels in music by dint of his invention of the lyre. But this musical prowess is not wholly satisfying or absorbing for him, since even as he performs his first songs his mind is preoccupied with other plans: καὶ τὰ μὲν οὖν ἤειδε, τὰ δὲ φρεσὶν ἄλλα μενοίνα (62). Beautiful as his songs are, they concern only the past and the present (57–61, 427–433). It is vision

⁹⁹ On the traditional doublet milk and honey, see Usener, “Milch und Honig,” *Rh. Mus.* 57 (1902) 177–195 (= *Kleine Schriften* [1913; repr. Osnabrück 1965] IV 398–417).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. also the discussion of this passage in Waszink (above, n.77) 17 ff.

¹⁰¹ As does Waszink, 10 n.10.

of the future, among other honors, that he sets out to procure by means of the theft of the cattle; he thus plots to intrude upon the realm where Apollo reigns supreme.¹⁰²

Zeus begins the resolution of the quarrel by bidding the brothers to have a united spirit, *ὁμόφρονα θυμόν* (391). The reconciliation that ensues is an enactment of the adjective *ὁμόφρων*: Hermes cedes to Apollo a part of his domain by giving him the lyre, and Apollo responds by allowing his brother to preside over a form of divination, the bee maidens.

The language of the *Hymn* reflects the equilibrium that is established between the two gods. In line 427 Hermes sings and plays on his lyre (*κραίνων*) with Apollo as his audience; at the end of the poem he possesses oracular maidens who *κραίνουσιν ἕκαστα*, with Apollo the donor. Both the lyre and the bee maidens can deceive and disappoint (486 ff, 562 f), as can the oracle of Apollo:

ὅς δέ κε μαψιλόγοισι πιθήσας οἰωνοῖσι
μαντείην ἐθέλῃσι παρέκ νόον ἐξερεεῖν
ἡμετέρην, νοέειν δὲ θεῶν πλεον αἰὲν ἐόντων,
φήμ' ἀλίην ὁδὸν εἴσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κε δῶρα δεχοίμην
(546–549).

But Hermes' new power of divination also gives him a truthful *ὁμφή* like that of Apollo; compare *οὗτος ἐμῆς ὁμφῆς ἀπονήσεται οὐδ' ἀπατήσω* (545) and *πολλάκι σῆς ὁμφῆς ἐπακούσεται, αἶ κε τύχησι* (566). Balance is further maintained in that neither god forsakes his former province in the course of the exchange, but Apollo keeps his oracle (533–549), and Hermes invents himself a new musical instrument, the shepherd's pipes (511–512).¹⁰³

In presenting the lyre to his brother, Hermes explains that *ὅς τις ἂν αὐτήν / τέχνη καὶ σοφίῃ δεδαημένος ἐξερεεῖν* will thereby gladden his mind (482 ff). Similarly, the son of Leto bestows the bee maidens on Hermes with the words: *σὺ δ' ἀτρεκέως ἐρεεῖων / σὴν αὐτοῦ φρένα τέρπε* (564 f). If the verb *τέρπε* sounds somewhat odd in the context of an oracle, it may be because elsewhere it denotes the pleasure of music. In

¹⁰² Note, for example, the contrast between Apollo's *οἰωνός*, a bird omen (213 f), and the *οἰωνός* that Hermes produces (295). Cf. also lines 173, 463 ff, 533 ff.

¹⁰³ Zanker, (above, n.26) 56–58 and pls. 1 and 2, discusses a black-figure skyphos from the last quarter of the sixth century which depicts, on one side, Apollo playing the lyre for five Muses, and on the other side, Hermes playing the pipes for four dancing nymphs. Many vases, Zanker reports, show Apollo and Hermes together with the nymphs, but this one is unique in contrasting the two gods, their companions, and their musical instruments.

line 506 of the *Hymn* Apollo and Hermes walk together "delighting in the lyre," *τερπόμενοι φόρμιγγι*; in the *Theogony* the Muses "delight the great mind of father Zeus," *τέρπουσι*, with their songs (36 ff). The imagery in which the bee maidens are clad, with its traditional evocation of both poets and seers, enables them to bring to a fitting close a hymn whose chief concern is the rivalry, and then the harmony, between the poetic and mantic spheres.¹⁰⁴

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¹⁰⁴ I am indebted to Professors Albert Henrichs and Gregory Nagy for their help and encouragement in writing this article.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF THE FIFTH HOMERIC HYMN

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THE texts of Greek epic poems are not things to be toyed with. The more we learn of the complexity of the Homeric tradition, of the interplay within it of metrical and narrative constraints and of its bewildering combination of verbal conservatism and innovation, the more cautious we should become in emending those texts and the less confident we can be that our choices among variant readings are correct. But though we cannot be confident, we still must choose; and the more we learn of what was possible and necessary to oral poets in the epic tradition, the more we need to re-examine the standard editions. A small example of that continuing re-examination is offered here. In the course of preparing a larger study of the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*, I found what I think are good reasons for sometimes differing with T. W. Allen's Oxford text of that poem. In what follows I shall argue for a different reading from Allen's in eight places in the hymn; since his text of the hymns is still the standard one in use and not only underlies a number of recent translations¹ but also serves as the base for analysis by scholars,² it seems worth presenting in full these arguments for deserting it.³ It is particularly worthwhile in that 6 of these 8 problems (II–VII below) concern differences of reading which make for substantive differences in the content or the tone of statements made in the poem, and the other two (I and VIII) will be found to lead us into the important question of anomalies (metrical and syntactic) which result from the poet's transfer of formulaic phrases from one position in the verse to another. The second of these two cases will cause us to raise a not

¹ For example, the recent translations by C. Boer (Chicago 1971), D. Hine (New York 1972), and A. Athanassakis (Baltimore 1976).

² I.e., for such disparate studies as those of H. Porter, "Repetition in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite" *AJP* (1949) 249 ff, P. G. Preziosi, "The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite: An Oral Analysis" *HSCP* (1966) 171 ff, and L. Lenz, *Der homerische Aphroditehymnus und die Aristie des Aineias in der Ilias* (Bonn 1975).

³ F. Càssola, the most recent editor of the hymns (*Inni Omerici* [Milan 1975]), has the same readings as those for which I have (independently) argued in cases I and III–VI below, but without the full discussion which justifies them and I hope makes them certain.

uninteresting question of syntax (the reasons for the occasional occurrence of aorist imperative forms in second-person prohibitions) and to discover a new answer to that question.

I have no new conjectures of my own to offer but will in three cases (I, II, and VIII) defend the reading of either all or some of the manuscripts against Allen's decision to emend the text, and in the remaining five I shall support emendations of August Matthiae (III, VI, and VII), Bernard Martin (IV), and Gottfried Hermann (V) which I think Allen should have accepted but did not.⁴

I

Ἀγχίσης δ' ὁρώων ἐφράζετο θαύμαινέν τε
85 εἰδός τε μέγεθός τε καὶ εἶματα σιγαλόεντα.

Anchises is alone in a steading on Mt. Ida; suddenly Aphrodite stands before him in the form of a young girl, and he is struck with wonder at her appearance. All the manuscripts give v. 85 as I have here quoted it, but Allen (following Flach, though without saying so) deleted the second τε in order to respect the influence of the digamma with which εἶματα once began and which is observed in the recurrence of the phrase εἶματα σιγαλόεντα at v. 164. He does not comment on the text here, but we can assume he thought that a copyist introduced the second τε either in ignorance of the normal epic scansion of εἶματα or through familiarity with the phrase εἰδός τε μέγεθός τε. Certainly it is true that the effect of digamma is normally observed in the word εἶματα, for it is neglected only once (at *Odyssey* VII 259) of the 75 items it occurs in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. This strictness greatly exceeds the ratio of observances to neglects of digamma for all words taken together, which is a little more than 5:1. But if we insist on observing its effect here in the Homeric Hymn, the price of such strictness may be too high; for μέγεθος is then left without any connection, and it is surely more likely that the poet of the hymn could neglect a digamma than that he would tolerate an awkwardness of syntax so great as that.⁵

⁴ Professor Edwin Brown has read this paper in draft and generously helped me both with valuable suggestions and with needed criticism. And in the preparation of these notes I have been immeasurably aided by the computer facility of the Department of Classics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; I am grateful to Professor David Packard, who designed, and introduced me to, its Ibycus System.

⁵ Matthiae had written εἶδος καὶ μέγεθος καί, which both preserves the digamma and gives μέγεθος a connective; but that is to recompose the verse.

The poet must have felt especially strongly here the pressure of familiar phrasing which included the offending $\tau\epsilon$. $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\delta\acute{o}\varsigma \tau\epsilon \mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\theta\acute{o}\varsigma \tau\epsilon$ occurs 5 times in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (*Iliad* II 58, *Odyssey* VI 152, XI 337, XVIII 249, XXIV 374), never without the second connective. Moreover, if familiarity with this formula prompted the poet to use it here in full, he will have been aided in his consequent need to scan $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ as short by his familiarity with $\tau\epsilon \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ filling the two short syllables of a dactylic foot. In the *Iliad*, for example, the two words fill that position more than seven times as often as they are divided between feet (272 of the 310 occurrences of the pair within a single verse); and they are especially frequent as the conclusion of a dactylic third foot (as here). On balance, then, it seems to me most likely that these familiarities of phrasing led the poet into what we must admit was a metrical anomaly. And the state of knowledge which Allen must have inferred for a scribe who could have introduced the second $\tau\epsilon$ is just such a state of knowledge as also fits a seventh-century poet — and fits him even better. Such a poet was, we will admit, accustomed to treat $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\mu\alpha/\epsilon\dot{\iota}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ as though the word began with a consonant (although the consonant was sometimes neglected in forms of $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\nu\nu\mu\iota$), but he will have been prepared to desert that custom when the joining together of formulaic phrases seemed to require him to. Overall the *Hymn to Aphrodite* observes digamma only about twice as often as it neglects it; its poet was much less strict in observing it than were the poets of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. “Le digamma . . . n’est . . . qu’une survivance traditionnelle de la langue épique. Les anciennes formules comportaient le digamma mais les aèdes qui les ont combinées en dernier lieu ont commis des fautes contre le digamma. Dans la plupart de ces cas ces fautes doivent être anciennes et appartenir authentiquement à l’*Iliade* et à l’*Odyssee* lorsque ces poèmes ont pris leur forme définitive en Ionie. Il est donc imprudent de corriger systématiquement: les corrections effacent une réalité ancienne . . . pour rétablir un archaïsme artificiel que les aèdes ne connaissaient plus.”⁶

⁶ P. Chantraine *Grammaire homérique*, I (Paris 1953) 123, following M. Parry in *Language* 10 (1934). Arie Hoekstra included the neglect of digamma here — and also in v. 232, on which more below — in his discussion of *Homeric Modifications of Formulaic Prototypes* (Amsterdam 1965) 58–63. He took both cases to be examples of the modification (made possible by the loss of digamma from Old Ionic speech) of a post-penthemimeral-caesura formula for use as a post-trochaic-caesura formula; to do this he had to regard the formula, rather arbitrarily I think, as beginning with the $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$. He was analyzing these verses from the wrong end; had he started from their beginnings, he would probably have given the necessary weight to the constraints which the *initial* segments of these

What makes our conclusion for v. 85 a near certainty is a second occurrence in the hymn (v. 232, strangely ignored by Allen, though Gemoll had pointed to it exactly fifty years before) of εἵματα not preventing correption in a preceding καί. Its position in the verse is the same:

σίτω τ' ἀμβροσίῃ τε καὶ εἵματα καλὰ διδοῦσα.

Once again it is the joining together of verse segments which has caused the anomaly; in this case the first part of the verse was probably constructed for the occasion, on the model of νέκταρ τ' ἀμβροσίην τε (*Theogony* 640), since mortal food and ambrosia do not normally belong in the same diet. (The poet brings them together here especially in order to define the unique and contradictory position of Tithonos.) The substitution was a natural one, for σίτος is often the first word in the verse (32 times in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*), and it is also more often than not followed by a connective word (29:3). Some form of ἀμβρόσιος begins the second foot of the verse some 10 times in the two epics (on all occasions feminine singular, as it happens; note especially χρῖσόν τ' ἀμβροσίῃ at *Iliad* XVI 670, 680). For the second part of his verse the poet may also have had precedents, though no similar phrase survives to us now. His own phrasing earlier in v. 85 may have helped him, at least as far as καὶ εἵματα. εἵματα are called καλὰ on 6 occasions in the *Odyssey* (at the verse end, however); and clothes are frequently the objects of giving in the epic. It seems a little ironic that, while the poet was led to disregard the same digamma in v. 232 which he had disregarded in v. 85 and for exactly the same reason, he was constrained in the first instance by a familiar formula and in the second by a phrase probably adapted specifically for this story.

II

ἔνθεν μ' ἥρπαξε χρυσόρραπις Ἀργειφόντης,
πολλὰ δ' ἔπ' ἤγαγεν ἔργα καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων,
πολλὴν δ' ἄκκληρόν τε καὶ ἄκτιτον, ἦν διὰ θήρες
ὠμοφάγοι φοιτῶσι κατὰ σκιόεντας ἐναύλους,
125 οὐδὲ ποσὶ ψαύειν ἐδόκουν φυσιζοῦσ' αἴης·

two verses placed upon the poet and would therefore have treated the neglect of digamma as a consequence of the conjunction of phrases (as in his convincing treatment of *Odyssey* XV 149 f on pp. 116 f), not as a concomitant in the creation of a new formula. (His treatment has the further difficulty that the digamma of *Φεῖμα* is quite strictly observed in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, which is evidence against its having lent itself to the particular kind of formula-adaptation he has in mind for it here.)

Aphrodite is telling Anchises that she is the daughter of Otreus, king of the Phrygians; she says that Hermes snatched her away from the midst of a chorus of young women in her homeland and has brought her to Mt. Ida, where she now stands before him. All our manuscripts but one give v. 125 with *ψαύειν*, "And I seemed not to touch the life-giving earth with my feet." The Leiden MS M, however, gives *ψαύσειν*, which makes her say "And I thought I would not [sc. ever] touch the life-giving earth with my feet." Allen adopted this reading, in disagreement with most modern editors; the most recent, however, Càssola, follows him. The difference here of a single letter makes a significant difference in the tone of Aphrodite's narrative, for with a present infinitive she calls attention to her perception of what was happening to her as the god carried her through the air, while the future makes her refer rather to thoughts about the future which she will have had during the journey.

The second of these two possibilities seems to me to fit its context less well than the first; but in any case it is worthwhile to see where the evidence points which may be brought to bear on this problem. That only one manuscript has the future form cannot help us, for that manuscript represents a tradition independent of that which lies behind the others; of the 150 readings peculiar to M, many are likely to be correct (Allen thinks so of at least 46 examples, including the present case); but of course many others of them are wrong. We must choose between the two tenses on their own merits. Allen's reason for preferring the future was that he thought the present would imply that the journey was not through the air after all: "I thought I was not touching ground" (but *was*). If that were indeed the necessary meaning of a present infinitive, it would certainly be wrong; for, as Allen pointed out, when the gods carry mortals they carry them through the air. But the present infinitive need not mean what Allen took it to mean. There is no reason to infer an opposition here between what "seemed" and what was, and surely any audience of the Greek epic would have taken the statement (if it contained a present infinitive) to be the description of a striking, but true, perception.

On the other hand it might be objected that *just because* an early Greek audience was used to the convention that gods could and did carry mortals through the air, the statement with *ψαύειν* would add nothing essential to Aphrodite's story, while *ψαύσειν* would imply a fearful expectation which would be something new. But such an objection would misconceive, I think, the psychology both of the audience and of the girl Aphrodite is pretending to be. Would an audience really object to being reminded explicitly that conveyance by

a god could be through the air (cf. of Aineias at *Iliad* XX 325)? And the young and innocent girl whom Aphrodite here impersonates at some length is one who might very appropriately call attention to the novelty and the strangeness of her experience. In fact it fits that assumed personality much better that Aphrodite should describe the odd sensation of the flight than that she should recall a doubt that it would ever end. But, however conclusive in themselves, arguments from psychological aptness in an epic narrative will probably not settle the issue for everyone, so I will add that the evidence of Homeric usage also somewhat favors the present infinitive. *δοκέω* is followed by a present infinitive 22 times in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, by the future only 3 times (*Iliad* VI 338, VII 192, IX 625). The verb *ψάω* itself occurs 4 times in the two epics, 3 times in the present system and once in the aorist; the earliest occurrence of the future which I have found is at *Choephoroi* 182.⁷

III and IV

- αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ μέγ' ὄνειδος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν
 ἔσσεται ἡμᾶτα πάντα διαμπερές εἵνεκα σεῖο,
 οἳ πρὶν ἐμοὺς δάρους καὶ μήτιας, αἷς ποτε πάντας
 250 ἀθανάτους συνέμιξα καταθνητῇσι γυναιξί,
 τάρβεισκον· πάντας γὰρ ἐμὸν δάμνασκε νόημα.
 νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκέτι μοι στόμα τλήσεται ἐξονομήναι
 τοῦτο μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν, ἐπεὶ μάλα πολλὸν ἄασθην,
 σχέτλιον, οὐκ ὀνομαστόν, ἀπεπλάγχθην δὲ νόοιο,
 255 παῖδα δ' ὑπὸ ζώνῃ ἐθέμην βροτῶ εὐνηθεῖσα.

Aphrodite is here describing to Anchises the shame she will feel before the gods now that she has been given a taste of her own medicine by being driven to make love with a mortal. In v. 252 the manuscripts give us the impossible *στοναχῆσεται*. In the year 1605 Bernard Martin proposed *στόμα χεῖσεται*: "My mouth will no longer suffer me to utter this," and this striking conjecture has been followed by most editors since, including Allen. But the sense required then of *χανδάνω* is very strained (as Gemoll remarked), for the verb has always in epic the meaning "contain, allow room for," and it is said of contents which are assumed to strain their confines. It could hardly take an infinitive for its object; and even if it could, it would then have a meaning the opposite

⁷ We should note the parallel phrasing of Sappho fr. 52 (L-P): *ψαῖν δ' οὐ δοκίμωμ' ὀράνω †δυσπαχα†*. But the text of that quotation by Herodian is hopelessly corrupt, and we cannot be sure what thought these words expressed.

of what is required. Aphrodite is saying that she will no longer dare to refer among the gods to her earlier domination of them; but “My mouth will no longer contain the naming of this” would mean that she will no longer be able to keep silent about it.

Matthiae's στόμα πλῆσεται is not as close to the reading of the manuscripts but is much better as an emendation: "My mouth will no longer be bold to speak of this." The expression is a little odd, certainly, for it is normally *persons* who are the subjects of πλάω, and the στόμα is not said elsewhere in epic to do anything like this on its own. But the second of these objections applies to all the emendations known to me (And *Iliad* XIV 91 is a parallel at least for the sense: μῦθον, ὃν οὐ κεν ἀνὴρ γε διὰ στόμα πάμπαν ἄγοιτο). To the first objection we might reply that, although στόμα may be a novel subject for πλάω, that verb is quite at home in the sense "have the hardihood or boldness to do something" (Cunliffe). For example:

Od. II 82 ff ἐνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἀκὴν ἔσαν, οὐδέ τις ἔτλη
 Τηλέμαχον μῦθοισιν ἀμείψασθαι χαλεποῖσιν.
 . . . , οὐδέ τί πώ μοι
 Il. I 543 πρόφρων τέτληκας εἰπεῖν ἔπος ὅττι νοήσης.

And it is particularly interesting that $\tau\lambda\acute{\alpha}\omega$ in this sense is repeatedly used of the boldness required for a specific act of *speech* (*Odyssey* V 178 = X 343, XI 143, 376, XVII 104 f). This in itself makes $\tau\lambda\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ much more likely than $\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ (Buttmann) or $\ast\eta\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ (Ludwich, as though from $\eta\delta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$), whose other faults Càssola points out.

Hermann objected to this reading that *πλήσεται* should lengthen the syllable preceding it and so be impossible here. But mute-plus-liquid combinations fail to lengthen a preceding syllable at no fewer than 4 other places in the hymn (114, 131 = 187, 179). In fact this license is normal in epic when (as would be the case here) the syllable not lengthened ends a word preceding the mute-plus-liquid combination and when that syllable does not begin a metrical foot.⁸

Martin's conjecture, which was certainly a brilliant one, has found most favor (being adopted, for example, by both Allen and Humbert); but Matthiae's (followed by Càssola, who uses some of the same reasons urged here) is clearly better and deserves to be treated as the best available.

⁸ For this rule see Chantraine (above, n.6) 108 f; for this treatment specifically of -τλ- cf. *Iliad* III 414.

A second textual problem meets us later in the same sentence in the hymn. In v. 254 the manuscripts give *ὀνότατον*, which is not a Greek word. Martin proposed to emend this to *ὀνομαστόν* so that Aphrodite will have said (249 ff):

In the past the lovers' talk and the plots by which I used
to make the immortal gods all join with mortal women
kept them afraid — for my purpose repeatedly tamed them all.
But now my mouth will no more be bold to speak of that
among the immortals, since I have been so thoroughly foolish —
a hard thing, not to be spoken of; I was driven quite out
of my senses.

Martin's suggestion was accepted by everyone except Samuel Clarke and T. W. Allen, and it should have been accepted by them as well. But Allen accepted Clarke's *ὀνοταστόν* (calling it indeed "certain"), in order to make the goddess say "a hard thing, not to be made light of."

But the case for *ὀνομαστόν* is very strong and that for *ὀνοταστόν* very weak. It is true that the latter is marginally easier palaeographically; but with that its advantages cease, and its difficulties begin. The first of these is that it is nowhere attested as a Greek word. The very rare verb *ὀνοτάζω* (not in Homer; once each in Hesiod *WD* 258 and the *Hom. Hymn to Hermes* 30) simply does not have a verbal adjective in use, that need being filled by the adjective formed from its more common synonym *ὀνομαι*. Even if the adjective *ὀνοταστός* did occur, it would not have the sense which Allen wanted to give it; for *ὀνοτάζω*, like *ὀνομαι*, means "look down upon, despise" and not "make light of, treat as of little value." If the sense "make light of" were possible, it would not be appropriate here; and the former sense, which is the one the verbal adjective would have if it existed at all, is quite clearly impossible.

ὀνομαστός on the other hand is not only attested in the epic, but is attested in just the sense required here: 3 times in the *Odyssey* (at XIX 260, 597, and XXIII 19) Penelope refers to her husband's departure for Troy with bitter regret: *ᾤχετ' ἐπιψόμενος Κακοῖλιον οὐκ ὀνομαστήν*. This is just the sense in which Aphrodite, too, looks back on an action in the past which now is a cause of bitter remorse; her desire resembles Penelope's in that she wishes not even to hear mention of the cause of what she sees as a continuing remorse. Allen's objection to *οὐκ ὀνομαστόν* — that the sense "unmentionable" occurs first only with Apollonios of Rhodes — badly misses the mark, for it is not that (prurient) sense which is wanted here. The primary sense of

the phrase, "not to be spoken of," is the sense needed in the Homeric Hymn.⁹

V

270 ἄλλ' ὅτε κεν δὴ μοῖρα παρεστήκη θανάτοιο
 ἄζανεται μὲν πρῶτον ἐπὶ χθονὶ δένδρεα καλά,
 φλοιὸς δ' ἀμφιπεριφθινύθει, πίπτουσι δ' ἅπ' ὄζοι,
 τῶν δέ θ' ὁμοῦ ψυχὴ λείπει φάος ἡέλιοιο.

This is the end of Aphrodite's description of the nymphs who will raise Aineias. They live much longer than men do¹⁰ but they are not deathless; they die when certain trees, with which their lives are magically bound up, themselves wither and perish. In the last of the verses I have quoted the manuscripts give us, unfortunately, impossible syntax. Since *κε* cannot occur with a present indicative,¹¹ we have either to change the mood of the verb or else somehow to get rid of the particle. Allen chose to emend to *λείποι*, inferring a (certainly common) iotacist error; but he should, I think, have followed Hermann's preference for emending *χ'* to *θ'* instead. To begin with, there are no advantages in Allen's reading, for the one which he himself saw is imaginary: "The statement of the dryads' death is [appropriately] less precise than the drying up of the tree, the withering of the bark, and the falling off of the boughs." But the entire point of these verses is surely their precise definition of the term of the nymphs' lives and their precise equation of the trees' time of death with the nymphs' own. It is hard to imagine that the poet wished the succession of three indicative verbs in 270 f to be concluded by a "less precise" optative construction in 272. Another indicative verb is needed for the climax in the series; and the fact that this climax states a general truth of which instances occur repeatedly makes the particle *τε* right at home.

⁹ It is true that H. Güntert suggested an originally magical reference for the phrase (see M. L. West on *Theogony* 148) which would require the sense "not to be named." But I think even a brief review of the Homeric uses of *ὀνομάζω* and its derivatives makes it clear that the primary use of the word is to mean "speak out (something)"; it cannot be limited to the speaking out of names alone.

¹⁰ For how much longer, see Hesiod fr. 304 (M-W).

¹¹ Ludwich thought it could, citing *Iliad* XIV 484 τῷ καὶ κέ τις εὔχεται ἀνὴρ . . . But this is the only example, and although it was the vulgate text, *τε* occurs as a variant (and in the form *τις τ'* is adopted, for example, by both Allen and Mazon) and is surely right. See on this point C. J. Ruijgh, *Autour de τε épique* (Amsterdam 1971) 774. At *Iliad* I 67 βούλεται either is subjunctive or needs to be emended (reading *η* for *ε*); see Chantraine (above, n. 6) II 458.

Indeed the force of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon$ seems most often to be just this: the addition to a statement already syntactically complete of another statement which is either permanently or repeatedly true. A good example is to be found in the beautiful simile at *Iliad* VIII 555 ff, where the poet describes the look of the multitude of Trojan campfires in the night:

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄστροι φαεινὴν ἀμφὶ σελήνην
φαίνεται ἄριπρεπέα, ὅτε τ' ἔπλετο νήνεμος αἰθήρ.
ἔκ τ' ἔφανε πᾶσαι σκοπιαί καὶ πρῶνες ἄκροι
καὶ νάπαι· οὐρανόθεν δ' ἄρ' ὑπερράγῃ ἄσπετος αἰθήρ,
πάντα δὲ εἶδεται ἄστροι, γέγηθε δέ τε φρένα ποιμήν.
560 τόσσα μεσηγὺ νεῶν ἦδὲ Ξάνθοιο ῥοάων
Τρώων καιόντων πυρὰ φαίνεται Ἰλιόθι πρό.

This example is specially apposite to our passage in the Homeric Hymn in that $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon$ is used here to add the natural (and in a sense "necessary") reaction of the shepherd to a series of statements which give the consequences in the world of nature which follow once the sky falls windless and clear. In the hymn the nymphs' death is added to a series of consequences in the world of nature which follow once the fated time of death is at hand. But even when the analogy is not so detailed as this, the same general force of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon$ may be observed: in 132 of its total of 152 appearances in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, this pair of particles introduces an appended statement of a permanent truth, a truth expressed by an indicative verb.¹²

How, then, might the text have been corrupted from $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\theta'$ to $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\chi'$? Certainly $\tau\epsilon$, $\kappa\epsilon$ (and $\gamma\epsilon$) are frequently confused with one another in the Greek manuscripts (as, for example, in v. 132 of the present hymn); this was probably especially frequent with cases of the adverbial $\tau\epsilon$ in epic, since the epic use of the word was neither familiar to copyists from their

¹² In this treatment of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon$ I am following C. J. Ruijgh, whose exhaustive analysis may be found in Chapter 18 of the work mentioned in the previous note; see esp. secs. 532 ff, 541 f, and cf. 28. But, as opinions have differed quite a lot over the force of adverbial $\tau\epsilon$ in epic texts, I should say that the appearance of it for which I am arguing in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* fits well with other views: Denniston, for example, who follows Wentzel and Monro, suggests that epic $\tau\epsilon$ "generalizes" the statements it introduces, which are often habitual acts or events; see his *The Greek Particles*² (Oxford 1954) 520 ff. Schwyzler/Debrunner (*Griechische Grammatik* [Munich 1950] 574 ff) suggest that the force of $\tau\epsilon$ in such cases is simply copulative, i.e., is closely allied to that of the connective $\tau\epsilon$. Chantraine, like Denniston, keeps to the more traditional view, concluding that epic $\tau\epsilon$ conveys "une idée de généralité ou de répétition" (*Grammaire homérique*, II [Paris 1953] 341). For an extensive discussion of these and other modern views, see Ruijgh 66-97.

own speech nor properly understood by ancient grammarians.¹³ Monro believed, very reasonably it seems to me, that in a substantial number of cases *κε* has in our manuscripts displaced an original *τε* whose generalizing force was not understood.¹⁴ He had specifically in mind clauses with a subjunctive verb, but the same reasoning may be applied to the present case.

VI

- αἱ μὲν ἐμὸν θρέψουσι παρὰ σφίσιν υἱὸν ἔχουσαι.
 [τὸν μὲν ἐπὴν δὴ πρῶτον ἔλῃ πολυήρατος ἦβη
 275 ἄξουσίν σοι δεῦρο θεαί, δείξουσί τε παῖδα·]
 σοὶ δ' ἐγώ, ὄφρα κε ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ πάντα διέλθω,
 ἐς πέμπτον ἔτος αὖτις ἐλεύσομαι υἱὸν ἄγουσα.
 τὸν μὲν ἐπὴν δὴ πρῶτον ἴδῃς θάλος ὀφθαλμοῖσι,
 γηθήσεις ὁρόων· μάλα γὰρ θεοείκελος ἔσται·
 280 ἄξεις δ' αὐτίκα νιν ποτὶ Ἴλιον ἡνεμόεσσαν.

Aphrodite completes here her description of the nymphs who will look after Aineias as a child, and she tells Anchises how the boy will be presented to him when he is old enough to live with his father in Troy. The problem here is that the double time-reference (in vv. 274 and 277) and the duplication of presenters (the nymphs in v. 275, Aphrodite in v. 277) are difficult to reconcile. The manuscripts agree in giving all these verses, and always in the same order, and Allen persuaded himself that one could in fact read in them a meaningful sequence of ideas. But most editors since Matthiae have thought that the text contains two *alternate* versions of Aineias' presentation: vv. 274 f and vv. 276 f. Matthiae wished to keep the latter (presentation by Aphrodite); Hermann preferred the former (presentation by the nymphs). In their 1904 edition of the hymns, Allen and Sykes followed Matthiae in retaining the single presentation of Aineias at age five — the age at which Herodotos said Persian mothers presented children to their fathers (I, 136); they were followed in this choice by Humbert and,

¹³ See Ruijgh (above, n.11) 61 ff, 120 f.

¹⁴ See his *Grammar of the Homeric Dialect* (Oxford 1891) 259 f. On the other hand I must admit that the confusion of *τε* and *κε* does *not* seem to have been frequent in cases of *δέ τε(ε)/θ'* and *δέ κ'/κε/κεν/χ'* (phrases which are about equally common: the former occurs 45 times in *Iliad* I–XII, 27 times in *Odyssey* I–XII; the latter occurs 44 times in *Iliad* I–XII, 21 times in *Odyssey* I–XII). As far as I know, neither phrase occurs as a variant for the other in the first twelve books of either epic.

recently, by Càssola. But later Allen changed his mind, and in his and Halliday's 1936 edition he argued that, while Matthiae's suspicion of vv. 274 f may possibly have been right, all four verses might still be taken as a unit. He did this by accepting two presentations, a first one by the nymphs "when the child . . . begins to walk . . . or perhaps when it is weaned," and a second one by Aphrodite when Aineias was five years old. (Strictly speaking, of course, *ἐς πέμπτον ἔτος αὐτίς* could imply an Aineias between three and four years old.)

But the inference of two separate presentations not only assumes a sequence of events which is unparalleled, and in itself inexplicable; it also leaves us with too many unresolved difficulties in the text. The natural sequence of nymphs as guardians of Aineias followed by Anchises as guardian, a sequence initiated by *αἱ μὲν* in v. 273, is overtaken by the less relevant contrast of Aineias himself (*τὸν μὲν* in v. 274) with either Anchises or Aphrodite (*σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ* in v. 276); and then that rhetorically intrusive contrast is awkwardly *renewed* in v. 278. The near repetition of v. 274 by v. 278 is in itself a problem, for although this hymn employs some striking formulaic repetitions for thematic purposes, it cannot easily be argued that its poet would have wished *this* reprise, which would confuse rather than reinforce the clarity of his narrative. More striking still is the difficulty that Anchises' reaction to seeing his son is stressed in vv. 278 f, although the nymphs had earlier shown him that same son in v. 275. (*πρῶτον* in v. 278 need not mean that Anchises is seeing his son for the first time, as Càssola assumes; but the emphasis of the line is much more natural if that is, in fact, the case.)

For a long time I thought that all four verses (vv. 274–277) might still be kept, since we could read them as describing a single presentation: Aphrodite's reference to the "fifth year" might be taken to specify the age of *πολυήρατος ἥβη* mentioned in v. 274, and Aphrodite's "conducting" of her son in v. 277 could be taken as reinforcement of (rather than competition with) the statement of v. 275 that the nymphs "will conduct" Aineias to his father. But, although this interpretation escapes the problem of separate presentations, and also the apparent inconsistency of Anchises' two sightings of his son, it still leaves us with most of the rhetorical awkwardnesses mentioned above. And, more interestingly, it fails to escape completely from a problem which is raised by Allen's reading of the passage, and which I think is inescapable for any reading of it which seeks bravely to avoid athetesis: can the onset of *ἥβη* really be set at (to say nothing of setting it earlier than) age four? Aristotle (*Pol.* VIII 47, 49), Plato (*Alcib.* 121e, *Laws* 794c), and Solon

(fr. 27 West, vv. 1 f) imply that it begins at the age of seven; but ἥβη is also used often enough in reference to puberty (as at *Od.* XV 363 ff), not to mention still later ages with which it is sometimes connected, as with the Athenian ἐφηβοί. Thus, although it *can* be thought of as beginning before puberty (*pace* Càssola, who takes it without argument to be “adolescenza, giovinezza”), it seems difficult to put it before age seven. Solon, indeed, less than a century after the composition of the present hymn, called a child ἄνηβος throughout the first of ten seven-year periods in his life. One cannot escape this difficulty by assuming a presentation by the nymphs at age seven followed by another presentation by Aphrodite “in the fifth year after that,” for ἐς πέμπτον ἔτος αὖτις in v. 277 cannot be made to mean that (αὖτις should be taken with ἐλεύσομαι anyway); the five-year interval can only be placed between the present time of Aphrodite’s explanation and her definitive presentation of Aineias to his father.

If neither two presentations nor a single one shared by Aphrodite and the nymphs is acceptable, which pair of verses is preferable? One cannot be certain, but I think, with Humbert and Càssola, that Matthiae’s preference of vv. 276 f is right. This is not because the nymphs, who are not immortal, are called θεαί in v. 275, but rather because the sequence of personal and demonstrative pronouns throughout the passage is much more convincing if one removes vv. 274 f than if one removes vv. 276 f. In addition, v. 273 seems a natural conclusion to Aphrodite’s description of the nymphs and their role in these events, and it most naturally leads on to a change of subject. In the larger context of the hymn as a whole, the nymphs are very fitting nurses of the infant Aineias: they are long-lived but not immortal, and they incarnate the quality of Aineias as a mediation between the immortality of his mother and the mortality of his father. But there seems no good reason why they should displace his mother in her dealings with Anchises.

VII

ἦν δέ τις εἴρηται σε καταβνητῶν ἀνθρώπων
 ἦ τις σοὶ φίλον υἱὸν ὑπὸ ζώνῃ θέτο μήτηρ,
 τῷ δὲ σὺ μυθεῖσθαι μεμνημένος ὥς σε κελεύω
 φάσθαι τοι νύμφης καλυκώπιδος ἑκγονον εἶναι
 285 αἶ τὸδε ναιετάουσιν ὄρος καταειμένον ὕλη.

Aphrodite wants Anchises never to tell of his liaison with her, and she gives him a false story to use in the event anyone should ask him who the

mother of Aineias is. As the manuscripts have it, she tells him to say (vv. 284 f):

They say (*φασίν τοι*) he is the offspring of a beautiful nymph,
one of those whose home is this mountain clothed with forest.

Now this is surely a whimsical form of evasion for a father to use, and not one which would be likely to do the job it is supposed to do. (This is to say nothing of the oddness of the phrase itself: *φασί(ν) τοι* occurs nowhere in *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. *φασί* at verse beginning is a rarity — only 2 of its 35 appearances in the two epics — but is possible.) And we are left to wonder in vain who “they” are who have given Anchises this news. The best we could do with the manuscript text would be to interpret Anchises’ words somewhat like this: “(Oh, it was a woman I met once and) they say (that is, others who have seen this boy say) that he is (by which they mean that, given his appearance, he *must* be) the offspring of a nymph (and for all I know they may be right).” This reads far too much into the Greek, of course, but at least it makes sense of *φασίν τοι* — although not a very apposite sense. Yet the manuscript text is generally followed, as by Allen (and now Càssola). Allen seems to have thought that the manuscript text could be taken in another sense, for in writing “Anchises cannot identify the mother,” he may have meant that the problem should be taken to be that of the mother’s *name* and that by identifying the mother as a “nymph” Anchises would excuse his ignorance of a particular name. But nymphs did have proper names, and the excuse would not work. And this reading of the sentence is quite impossible anyway: Anchises’ anonymous informants would not after all — as the manuscript text stands — be identifying a particular woman to Anchises as a nymph but rather saying of Aineias that his mother was a nymph.

Allen further thought that the manuscript text could be supported by three passages in the epic: *Odyssey* I 215 and IV 387, and *Iliad* XX 105. But the first two of these are cases of Telemachos expressing his repeated symbolic doubt that Odysseus is really his father; when he says “they say he is my father,” he is in a completely different position from that imagined here for Anchises. The third example Allen cited is one in which Apollo, disguised as the Trojan Lykaon, says to Aineias, “They say that *you* are the child of Zeus’ daughter Aphrodite, but he [Achilles] is the child of a lesser goddess.” That, too, is no parallel for the present case, for Lykaon’s knowledge of Aineias’ mother is no parallel for Anchises’.

But if the received text is unacceptable, what alternative is there?

There is August Matthiae's suggestion, made in the year 1800, of *φάσθαι*. A decisive parallel at *Odyssey* IX 504 led him to it; in that place the fleeing Odysseus shouts back to Polyphemos,

Κύκλωψ, αἴ κέν τις σε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων
ὀφθαλμοῦ εἴρηται ἀεικέλιν ἀλαωτύν,
φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον ἐξαλαῶσαι,
505 υἱὸν Λαέρτew, Ἰθάκῃ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ ἔχοντα.

A further extensive parallel may be found in *Odyssey* XIII 303 ff, for there, too, instruction about what should be said (or in that case *not* said) in a future circumstance uses the infinitive-for-imperative construction, and one of the infinitives is *ἐκφάσθαι*.¹⁵ Allen argued against Matthiae that *μυθεῖσθαι* in 283 expresses the imperative idea here, so that another infinitive doing the same thing is not wanted. But it does not do the same thing, for the second is more particular than the first and narrows the focus to the specific assertion Anchises is to make. Moreover, without *φάσθαι* vv. 284 f become quoted speech without any of the introductory formulas for direct quotation which are normal in epic.

VIII

εἴρηται τοι πάντα· σὺ δὲ φρεσὶ σῆσι νοήσας
290 ἴσχεο μηδ' ὀνόμηνε, θεῶν δ' ἐποπίζεο μῆνιν.

Aphrodite has threatened Anchises with Zeus' thunderbolts if he should ever boast that he has made love with her; here she concludes her injunction to silence — and with it the interview as a whole. In v. 290 the manuscripts all have *ὀνόμηνε*, but the aorist imperative is not normal in second-person prohibitions; Hermann emended to *ὀνόμεινε* and has been followed by all later editors. But I think the manuscripts are nonetheless likely to be right here, for the aorist aspect is more fitting in this case than the present, the syntactic anomaly is not in itself impossible, and the reading of *ὀνόμεινε* creates its own problems, all of which may not have been clearly seen.

On the matter of aspect: of the three things Anchises is here told to

¹⁵ Indeed *-φάσθαι* is used as an imperative in 6 of the 19 places where that form appears in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (the only example of the simplex verb being so used as the first word of a verse, however, is *Odyssey* IX 504, the passage quoted above): *Iliad* XI 788, *Odyssey* IX 504, XI 443, XIII 308, XVI 287, XIX 6.

do, two are positive instructions which refer to continuing attitudes (restraint and respect), and these are of course properly expressed as present imperatives. But the third instruction refers rather to a particular and single action (naming), which would most naturally be expressed by an aorist form. Indeed at *Odyssey* XI 251 a very similar instruction is expressed thus:

νῦν δ' ἔρχευ πρὸς δῶμα, καὶ ἴσχεο μηδ' ὀνομήνης·

Poseidon is there saying farewell to Tyro, to whom he has just made love and who will bear him Pelias and Neleus. Like Aphrodite in the Homeric Hymn, he wants his parenthood kept secret; his instructions "restrain yourself, and do not give out my name" are naturally expressed by a coupling of a present tense with an aorist. Aphrodite's almost identical instructions to Anchises could very naturally have the same pairing of present and aorist aspects.

On the syntactic problem: it is true that the aorist subjunctive is normal in prohibitions which use the aorist, but it is not true that the imperative never occurs. There are two examples of it in the *Iliad* (IV 410, XVIII 134) and one in the *Odyssey* (XXIV 248); in later Greek there is an example from Sophocles' *Peleus* (fr. 453 Pearson = 493 Radt) which seems confirmed by Aristophanes' parody (*Thesm.* 870); there is a second example from tragedy in Aeschylus (fr. 17 Mette); and another (presumably parodic) use in the comic poet Thugenides (fr. 3 Kock); and we know of one use by Kallimachos (fr. 233 Pfeiffer). It seems clear (as modern grammarians are agreed) that a second-person aorist imperative is rare but not impossible in a prohibition. Since the manuscripts of the Homeric Hymn are unanimous in presenting us with one, we ought to admit the possibility that it is another example of this rare species; especially so, since the aorist aspect is in this case preferable to the present and since a present form is entailed by the only reasonable emendation.

A third consideration also favors the aorist form: the poet of the hymn was certainly more familiar with the aorist system of ὀνομαίνω than with the present — indeed he may never have used forms from the present system at all, at least in poetry. The present system never occurs in the epic (its place is taken by ὀνομάζω, which in turn occurs only once in the aorist — out of a total of 37 uses — at *Odyssey* XXIV 339), whereas forms of the aorist system occur 15 times in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

What may have pushed the poet of the hymn into a syntactical rarity was his transferral of a familiar word to a new position in the verse, a position where the subjunctive would not fit but an imperative would.

In 10 of their 15 epic appearances, forms of *ὀνόμηναι* end the verse (the other 5 are all cases of the word's completing the fourth and filling the fifth foot). Surely the poet was adapting the formula quoted above, *ἴσχεο μῆδ' ὀνομήνης*, to a verse-initial role. In order to allow the verse a third-foot caesura (and perhaps because he also wanted a continuation which began with *θεῶν*) he altered the final syllable of the phrase. If he had felt that the resulting form was unacceptable, he would have used *ὀνόμαζε* (which occurs as an imperative at *Odyssey* IV 551 — where the present-tense aspect is appropriate).

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON THE AORIST IMPERATIVE IN PROHIBITIONS

The rare occurrences of the second-person aorist imperative in prohibitions have always been something of a mystery for grammarians, as indeed has been the obverse *normal* practice of using the subjunctive for aorist prohibitions, and of avoiding the present subjunctive in the same construction. It has been suggested that the rare aorist imperatives attested are survivals of the original use of the "injunctive" mood for all prohibitions.¹⁶ On the other hand we have seen in our discussion of the Homeric Hymn that at least one case of this usage might be explained as an epic poet's adaptation of a familiar phrase type to an unusual position in the verse. It may be worthwhile to consider whether a similar cause may have produced any of the other examples of the rare construction. After all, the fact that 3 of the 6 examples we have are in early epic poetry (4 out of 7 if one accepts *ὀνόμηνε* as the correct reading at v. 290 of the Homeric Hymn; I am not counting Aristophanes' and Thügenides' parodic uses) might not be because the epic is early but because the epic was prone to produce anomalies of all kinds when formulas were adapted to one another or to unfamiliar positions within the verse.¹⁷

¹⁶ See, for example, Schwyzer/Debrunner *Griechische Grammatik*, II (Munich 1950) 315, 343, following Wackernagel's discussion in *Vorlesungen über Syntax*, I (Basel 1926) 213 ff.

¹⁷ This phenomenon was first studied by Milman Parry in *Les formules et la métrique d'Homère* (Paris 1928), now available in Adam Parry's translation as part of *The Making of Homeric Verse* (Oxford 1971). More recent detailed studies have been made by A. Hoekstra, *Homeric Modifications of Formulaic Prototypes* (Amsterdam 1965), and J. B. Hainsworth, *The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula* (Oxford 1968). Study of the modification of formulas in epic has greatly increased in the course of recent arguments over the nature of the "formula" itself. But so far as I know it has not been observed that the aorist imperatives discussed here are possibly the products of the adaptation of formulas.

Two of the three examples in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are similar enough that we may consider them together:

Il. IV 410 τῷ μὴ μοι πατέρας ποθ' ὁμοίῃ ἔνθεο τιμῇ.
Od. XXIV 248 ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δὲ μὴ χόλον ἔνθεο θυμῷ.

In the first of these, Sthenelos is complaining to Agamemnon that he and Diomedes are not only not worse than their fathers but are in fact better men altogether. In the second, Odysseus is speaking to his father and is about to follow praise of the old man's orchard with criticism of his personal appearance. In both cases the same aorist imperative form is used in the prohibition; and in neither case is there any manuscript evidence implying an alternative reading. The question we have then to ask is whether the form ἔνθεο might have been used in these cases because of the poet's familiarity with its use in this position in the verse or with its use in phrases of this type. We should also ask the related question whether an aorist subjunctive form seems to have been available for use in these instances had the poet wanted it.

To the first question our answer should probably be yes, for all of the 4 appearances of the word in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are appearances in the fifth foot; and of the 2 examples (*Iliad* VI 326 and IX 639) other than those we are at present considering one is, like them, imperative:

ἄλλα τε πόλλ' ἐπὶ τῇσι· σὺ δ' ἴλαον ἔνθεο θυμόν

It may not be accident that ἔνθεο θυμόν here reminds us of ἔνθεο θυμῷ in *Odyssey* XXIV 248, especially when we find the same word ending the verse in the one remaining example of ἔνθεο (*Iliad* VI 326), where it is an indicative:

δαμόνι', οὐ μὲν καλὰ χόλον τόνδ' ἔνθεο θυμῷ.

It certainly looks as though familiarity with ἔνθεο in fifth-foot position, and particularly in connection with θυμός as final word, led the poet to use that form on two occasions even when the imperative was to be negated; and the pressure of that familiarity will certainly have been aided by the poet's strong preference for a dactyl in the fifth foot.

Moreover, the answer to the second question above appears to point in the same direction, for the second person singular of the aorist subjunctive of -τίθημι does not occur in either *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. That need not mean that the form was either quite unknown to the poet or unused by him in everyday speech, but it does certainly imply that the form was not built into any of the formulas which comprised his poetic vocabulary: it will have been unfamiliar to him in the context of

recitation. (What I have said here applies to both active and middle forms; had the poet wanted to insist both on the subjunctive and on the preferable middle voice, he would have had to produce not only a unique instance of the form in epic but also the violent¹⁸ synizesis of ἐνθῆαι — and in the fifth foot!)

The remaining example of a negated second-person aorist imperative in epic is at *Iliad* XVIII 134:

ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν μή πω καταδύσσο μῶλον Ἄρηος,
πρίν γ' ἐμέ δεῦρ' ἐλθοῦσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἶδῃαι.

Thetis is here asking Achilles not to attack the Trojans until she returns to him with the new arms he will need. Once again our question must be whether familiar phrasing may have prompted the syntactical anomaly. There are three other examples of the imperative -δύσσο (*Iliad* XVI 129, XIX 36, *Odyssey* XVII 276), but none of them occupies the fourth foot of the verse, and none of them has μῶλον Ἄρηος as object. The most they can do is establish the poet's familiarity with the form. On the other hand, when we ask what other examples of the aorist middle of -δύω occur in the epic, we receive an interesting answer: in 16 of some 34 further appearances, the word occupies the fourth foot of the verse, just as it does in the case we are studying. Here are the examples:

<i>Il.</i> VII 103	ᾠς ἄρα φωνήσας κατεδύσετο τεύχεα καλά.
<i>Il.</i> III 328	ἀντάρ ὃ γ' ἄμφ' ὤμοισιν ἐδύσετο τεύχεα καλά
<i>Od.</i> XXIII 366	ἦ ῥα καὶ ἄμφ' ὤμοισιν ἐδύσετο τεύχεα καλά.
<i>Il.</i> IX 596	βῆ δ' ἱέναι, χροῖ δ' ἔντε' ἐδύσετο παμφανόωντα.
<i>Il.</i> XV 120	ζευγνύμεν, αὐτὸς δ' ἔντε' ἐδύσετο παμφανόωντα.
<i>Il.</i> X 517	τῇ κοτέων Τρώων κατεδύσετο πουλὺν ὄμιλον,
<i>Il.</i> XX 379	ᾠς ἔφαθ', Ἔκτωρ δ' αὖτις ἐδύσετο οὐλαμὸν ἀνδρῶν
<i>Il.</i> XI 16	Ἀργείους· ἐν δ' αὐτὸς ἐδύσετο νώροπα χαλκόν.
<i>Il.</i> II 578	λαοὶ ἔποντ'· ἐν δ' αὐτὸς ἐδύσετο νώροπα χαλκόν
<i>Il.</i> XXI 515	ἀντάρ Ἀπόλλων Φοῖβος ἐδύσετο Ἴλιον ἱρήν·
<i>Il.</i> I 496	παιδὸς ἐοῦ, ἀλλ' ἦ γ' ἀνεδύσετο κύμα θαλάσσης,
<i>Od.</i> IV 570	ὡς εἰπὼν ὑπὸ πόντον ἐδύσετο κυμαίνοντα
<i>Od.</i> V 352	αὕτῃ δ' ἅψ' ἐς πόντον ἐδύσετο κυμαίνοντα
<i>Od.</i> XI 253	ᾠς εἰπὼν ὑπὸ πόντον ἐδύσετο κυμαίνοντα.
<i>Od.</i> VI 127	ᾠς εἰπὼν θάμνων ὑπεδύσετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,
<i>Od.</i> XVII 336	Ἀγχίμολον δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐδύσετο δάματ' Ὀδυσσεύς,

Clearly the poet was conditioned to the use of -δύσετο in the fourth foot; he was probably following this habit when he produced the metrically

¹⁸ cf. Chantraine (above, n.6) 57.

equivalent second-person form in *Iliad* XVIII 134, where a subjunctive would give normal syntax but would be metrically awkward. He could have used a subjunctive form (-δύσσαι) in that position only with the rare synizesis mentioned above, or else by shortening its final syllable before a following vowel. But he did not use a vowel-initial formula for the verse ending; that he did not may be due to the pressure of familiar phrase patterns, for one will notice that all of the phrases which follow -δύσεται begin with single consonants (the effect of digamma being normally observed with *Ἰλιος*). The object which the poet gives the verb at *Iliad* XVIII 134 is not one which the verb has elsewhere, but *πουλὸν ὄμιλον* at *Iliad* X 517 is a synonym for it; and the contexts of ἐδύσεται are heavily military, especially so of course in the *Iliad*.¹⁹ It does, then, seem possible that these three occurrences in the epic of aorist imperative forms in prohibitions are all to be explained not as survivals of an earlier and once more general usage of the "injunctive" forms but rather as the results of formulaic adaptation.

The same cannot be said of the later occurrence of the construction in Attic tragedy. At v. 870 of Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousai* Mnesilochos exclaims, in his adopted character of Helen, which he hopes will magically quicken the arrival of Euripides (as Menelaos) who he hopes will rescue him from captivity:

μὴ ψεύσον, ὦ Ζεῦ, τῆς ἐπιούσης ἐλπίδος.

This section of the play is in part designed to allow fulsome parody of Euripides' *Helen*, which is, in fact, extensively parodied here; but the scholiast on v. 870 tells us that in this instance the target was Sophocles, who had written, in his *Peleus*:

μὴ ψεύσον, ὦ Ζεῦ, μή μ' ἔλῃς ἄνευ δορός.

The parody helps guarantee both the genuineness of the tragic use and the rarity of its syntax. If we ask ourselves what Sophocles' reasons may have been for venturing such an anomaly we can probably do no better than to imagine that he was taking advantage of the rare epic precedents for the aorist imperative in prohibitions. Pearson, at any rate, in his comment on the verse²⁰ says simply: "It may be assumed that

¹⁹ Compare also (F) οὐλαμὸν ἀνδρῶν in *Iliad* XX 379.

²⁰ Fr. 453 in his *Fragments of Sophocles* (Cambridge 1917). S. Radt appears to draw the same conclusion (see his fr. 493 in *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* IV [Göttingen 1977]) in referring to the epic uses as *tria exempla potiora*.

That it is in fact epic diction which underlies Sophocles' use here is probable, for even the single verse from the *Peleus* which the scholion gives us has at least

Sophocles was imitating the three Homeric examples," which he quotes. (One cannot of course be sure the scholiast was right in thinking it was Sophocles whom Aristophanes had in mind in his parody; such attributions by scholiasts are often wrong, and it may be that Euripides had somewhere used the anomalous syntax. Similarly, we must assume some possibly additional tragic use underlying the occurrence of *μη νόμισον* in the comic poet Thugenides [Fr. 3 Kock, also 3 Edmonds], whose use of that phrase is attested [with confusion over his name] by Photios and the Suda.)

The other example in tragedy of this rare usage occurs toward the end of a long papyrus fragment of Aeschylus' *Theoroi* (also called *Isthmiastai*; fr. 17 Mette). The chorus of satyrs has deserted the service of Dionysos and wishes to enter the Isthmian games; someone offers them a piece of equipment for that purpose (a chariot [Reinhardt]; a javelin [Snell]). The chorus-leader says "Not for me! Give it to one of my friends," and the other speaker replies *μη ἄπειπε, μηδ' ὄρνιθος οὔνεκ', ὦγαθέ*. Once again, the syntactic anomaly is hard to explain except as a reflex of its rare occurrences in epic poetry. (Its speaker certainly seems in other respects given to the use of grand language, and the odd imperative would be in character.) The alternative supposition, that the aorist imperative in prohibitions had some life in the vernacular, has no evidence to support it. Later ancient and Byzantine grammarians treat it as a curiosity or a solecism; and the paratragic quotation of it by Aristophanes surely signals its literary and potentially artificial flavor for an Athenian audience.²¹

When, much later, Kallimachos availed himself of this same syntax (fr. 233 Pfeiffer: *ἴσχε τέκος, μη πῖθι*), he was, like Aeschylus, serving

two other epic features besides its anomalous syntax: the use of *ἐλγος* in the sense "kill," and the motif of protest to a god (or a respected mortal) over an actual or potential deception: cf. the use of the frank terms *ψεῦδος* and *ψεῦδομαι* at *Iliad* XII 164, XV 159, XXI 276; *Odyssey* XIV 365, 387; the first of these examples concerns Zeus and the third is addressed to him, although the alleged deception is not his.

²¹ I should myself be willing to believe that Aeschylus had epic precedent not only for this use of the aorist imperative as a category but even for the verb *ἀποεῖπον*: 7 of its 12 appearances in *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are at the verse end, so that poets were accustomed to using the word without the need to worry about its final syllable. Like *ὀνόμηναι*, whose metrical shape it shares, its transfer to a position ending in the third foot may have led to the syntactical anomaly of *ἀπόειπε* being used even with a negative. (If it did, the anomaly will have been eased by the circumstance that to say "don't refuse," though formally a prohibition, is really an urgent request.)

up a poetic rarity. Pfeiffer suggested that his model was tragic (*ἴσχω*, always middle in Homer; *πίθι*, an Attic form); but if the direct model was tragic, the ultimate one was epic.

It seems, then, at least to me, that by far the most reasonable explanation of the handful of aorist imperatives used in prohibitions is that they sometimes occurred in the epic as a result of the pressure of familiar phrasing or the transfer of phrases to new positions in the hexameter and that these rare occurrences were rarely echoed in fifth-century tragedy and satyr play. Aristophanes and Thugenides parodied the usage; Kallimachos learnedly quoted it. In the epic poetry still known to us there are only three examples, which is not very many; but I am tempted to think there were others in the epic poetry known to Sophocles and to Aeschylus but lost to us — or perhaps others in the epic poetry we *do* have, but which have been emended away by the learned of various epochs.

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ΑΔΜΗΤΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΣ AND THE ALCESTIS

RUTH SCODEL

Ἀδμήτου λόγον, ὦ ταῖρε, μαθὼν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς φίλει,
τῶν δειλῶν δ' ἀπέχου, γνούς ὅτι δειλῶν ὀλίγα χάρις.

Praxilla 3 = Carm. Conv. 14 PMG

THIS skolion was well known in the latter part of the fifth century, and its title became proverbial.¹ Its date and authorship — in antiquity it was attributed to various famous poets — can only be the subject of speculation,² but few would put it later than the middle of the fifth century. The obscurity of the couplet which survives suggests that it was the first of several stanzas, each a variant on the basic theme, so that guests could continue the song as it passed around the room, as seems to have been the case with the “Harmodius.” As it stands, the little song has caused considerable controversy. Widely differing opinions have been offered about the relationship between the moral given in the lines and the figure of Admetus. The song has been viewed as a warning against cowards like Admetus; others have thought that Admetus himself was the ἀγαθός, or Alcestis, or Heracles, with Admetus’ parents as the δειλοί.³ Some have followed the ancient authority of Phanodemus, who connected the skolion not with the Alcestis story, but with a legend, doubtless particular to Attica, of how Admetus,

¹ Fifth-century allusions to the skolion are Ar. *Vespae* 1239 and fr. 430 Kock, Cratinus fr. 236 Kock. In the grammatical tradition, Phot. *lex.* p. 32 Reitz., Suda α493 Adler, Hesych. α1154, 1156 Latte, Eust. *Il.* 326. 38 (=Paus. att. fr. 14 Schwabe), and in the paroemiographers Zen. I, 18 and Diog. II, 68. The two lines are quoted by Eust. *loc. cit.*, by Athenaeus as the fourteenth in the collection of skolia at xv 694 C ff, and by Sch. Ar. *Vespae* 1238, with slight textual variation.

² It was credited to Alcaeus and Sappho and, according to Schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 1238, was to be found in the *παροίμια* of Praxilla. Page appears to accept this last attribution; the fragment is given as fr. 3 of Praxilla in PMG.

³ Wilamowitz considered that the ἀγαθός was Admetus, and perhaps Heracles, in *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893) II 321; C. M. Bowra, on the other hand, expressed the opinion at *Greek Lyric Poetry* (Oxford 1936) 404–407 that the song must be unconnected with the Alcestis-story, for Admetus could not easily praise the virtue of loyalty; Dale in her commentary (Oxford 1954) xi, remarks that the lines “*might* be a comment on the goodness of Alkestis and Heracles and the cowardice of the parents,” but reserves judgment.

exiled from Pherae, was given asylum by Theseus.⁴ The problem is closely linked to the interpretation of Euripides' *Alcestis*; scholars tend to judge the meaning of the skolion according to their judgment of the character in the play, or to regard Euripides' character as an innovation. Before the skolion can shed any light on Euripides' Admetus, however, it must be placed in a context independent of our preconceptions. The song connects the name of Admetus in some way with friendship; placing the lines in their ethical frame of reference may clarify their possible relevance to the most famous myth about Admetus and its dramatization.

Verses on the theme of the "Admetus" and related themes are common both in the remnants of skolia in Athenaeus' collection and in the corpus of Theognis.⁵ The close parallels Theognis presents to our skolion have been noticed.⁶ The warnings against friendship with δειλοί appear repeatedly:

- 955-956 Δειλοὺς εὖ ἔρδοντι δ'ὺν κακά τῶν τε γὰρ αὐτοῦ
 χηρώσει πολλῶν καὶ χάρις οὐδεμία.
 851-854 Ζεὺς ἄνδρ' ἐξολέσειεν Ὀλύμπιος, ὃς τὸν ἑταῖρον
 μαλθακὰ κωτίλλων ἐξαπατᾶν ἐθέλει.
 "Ἴδεα μὲν καὶ πρόσθεν, ἀτὰρ πολὺ λῶϊα δὴ νῦν,
 οὐνεκα τοῖς δειλοῖς οὐδεμί' ἐστὶ χάρις.
 105-106 Δειλοὺς εὖ ἔρδοντι ματαιοτάτη χάρις ἐστίν·
 ἴσον καὶ σπείρειν πόντον ἄλός πολιῆς.

Friendship begins in the performance of benefactions; the proper response to the benefactor is χάρις. Of this, however, the δειλός is incapable. He does not balance the kindness he has received against even a slight offense from his friend (109-110):

ἄπληστον γὰρ ἔχουσι κακοὶ νόον· ἦν δ' ἐν ἀμάρτηις,
 τῶν πρόσθεν πάντων ἐκκέχυται φιλότης.

The true friend, on the other hand, applies the forbearance among friends which is found between brothers (97-99):

ἀλλ' εἴη τοιοῦτος ἐμοὶ φίλος, ὃς τὸν ἑταῖρον
 γινώσκων ὀργὴν καὶ βαρὺν ὄντα φέρει
 ἀντὶ κασιγνήτου.

⁴ Phanodemus 325, F 26 Jacoby (Sch. Ar. *Vesp.* 1238).

⁵ The authenticity of particular elegies in the Theognidean corpus is irrelevant to my argument; reference to "Theognis" is made for convenience and does not imply any opinion on unity or the authorship of poems.

⁶ Bowra, *loc. cit.*, and Albin Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Bern and Munich, 2nd ed. 1963) 198 mention it.

More important, the *κακός* or *δειλός* does not help his friends in times of trouble or share his good fortune with them; he is a “bad harbor” (114). Thus his friendship is no use (101–104):

Μηδείς σ' ἀνθρώπων πείσῃ κακὸν ἄνδρα φιλῆσαι
Κύρνε· τί δ' ἔστ' ὄφελος δειλὸς ἀνὴρ φίλος ὦν;
οὔτ' ἂν σ' ἐκ χαλεποῖο πόνου ῥύσαιτο καὶ ἄτης
οὔτε κεν ἐσθλὸν ἔχων τοῦ μεταδοῦν ἐθέλοι.

The world of the Theognidean corpus is full of false friends, who are pleasant in words but hide their real thoughts (87 ff, 95–96, and so on); unfortunately, nothing is more difficult to perceive than such a hypocrite. So in PMG 889 (*Carm. Conv.* 6) the singer regrets that one cannot examine directly the *νοῦς* of one's comrade, and 903 (*Carm. Conv.* 20) warns against the scorpion who hides beneath every rock. The true friend can only be discovered by experience. When trouble comes, he shows his *νοῦς*:

125–126 οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός,
πρὶν πειρηθείης ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου.
641–644 Οὐ τοί κ' εἰδείης οὔτ' εὖνουν οὔτε τὸν ἐχθρόν,
εἰ μὴ σπουδαίου πράγματος ἀντιτύχοις.
Πολλοὶ πὰρ κρητῆρι φίλοι γίνονται ἐταῖροι,
ἐν δὲ σπουδαίῳ πράγματι παυρότεροι.

That true friends, *πιστοί*, are rare is stressed over and over:

79–82 Παύρους εὐρήσεις, Πολυπαῖδη, ἄνδρας ἐταῖρους
πιστοὺς ἐν χαλεποῖς πρήγμασι γινομένους,
οἵτινες ἂν τολμῶιεν ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
ἴσον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν τε κακῶν μετέχειν.
696–697 Εὖ μὲν ἔχοντος ἐμοῦ πολλοὶ φίλοι· ἦν δέ τι δεινόν
συγκύρσῃ, παῦροι πιστὸν ἔχουσι νόον.

Therefore it is crucial to take care and await the test (1104–06):

Δόξα μὲν ἀνθρώποισι κακὸν μέγα, πείρα δ' ἄριστον.
πολλοὶ ἀπειρήτοι δόξαν ἔχουσ' ἀγαθοί.
εἰς βάσανον δ' ἐλθὼν παρατριβόμενός τε μολύβδῳ
χρυσὸς ἀπεφθός ἐὼν καλὸς ἅπασιν ἔσθι.

The poet claims at 415–418 himself to have been tried and proven good: elsewhere he makes a similar claim (529–530):

Οὐδέ τινα προὔδωκα φίλον καὶ πιστὸν ἐταῖρον,
οὐδ' ἐν ἐμῇ ψυχῇ δούλιον οὐδὲν ἔνι.

This "betrayal" of a friend is a frequent theme: it is the failure to show oneself πιστός. PMG 908 (*Carm. Conv.* 25) praises the loyal friend:

ὅστις ἄνδρα φίλον μὴ προδίδωσιν, μεγάλην ἔχει
τιμὴν ἔν τε βροτοῖς ἔν τε θεοῖσιν κατ' ἐμὸν νόον.

In Theognis betrayal prompts a sardonic comparison of friends and enemies (811-814):

Χρῆμ' ἔπαθον θανάτου μὲν ἀεικέος οὔτι κάκιον,
τῶν δ' ἄλλων πάντων, Κύρν', ἀνιηρότατον·
οἱ με φίλοι προῦδωκαν· ἐγὼ δ' ἐχθροῖσι πελασθεῖς
εἰδήσω καὶ τῶν ὄντιν' ἔχουσι νόον.

An open enemy is better than a false friend (87-92), and he is blessed who never truly learns his friends' minds (1013-17):

Ἄ μάκαρ εὐδαίμων τε καὶ ὄλβιος, ὅστις ἄπειρος
ἄθλων εἰς Αἶδεω δῶμα μέλαν κατέβη,
πρίν τ' ἐχθροὺς πτῆξαι καὶ ὑπερβῆναι περ ἀνάγκῃ
ἐξετάσαι τε φίλους, ὄντιν' ἔχουσι νόον.

This group of *topoi* does not exhaust the repertoire of sentiments on the subject to be found in Theognis, but it forms a coherent assembly. The real friend, who stands by his comrade in trouble and shares his own good fortune, proving himself πιστός, and who in addition has tolerance for his friend's failings, is rare indeed; such are to be found only among the ἀγαθοί. Far more common are the δειλοί. They profess friendship, but have no χάρις, and, friends only in word, when the test arrives, they betray (προδιδόναι) their comrades.

These ideas are familiar enough. Not so familiar is the way this conventional morality is used in the *Alkestis*.⁷ The play depicts Admetus in relation to his φίλοι, and the *topoi* of these songs about friendship link different sections of the drama. From one aspect, the play's action is a study in φιλία, benefaction and response, and the conventional norms are critical to its understanding precisely because their application is unsure. The drama deals with characters and situations which strain, test, and surpass the norms, norms without which moral meaning and depth are lost.

⁷ The importance of friendship as a theme in the play has recently been discussed by Samuel E. Scully in a University of Toronto dissertation of 1973, "Philia and Charis in Euripidean Tragedy" (summary in *DA* XXXVI 1484 a-b).

The verb *προδιδόναι*, for example, first appears in the messenger speech at l. 180, as *Alcestis* addresses her marriage bed:

προδοῦναι γάρ σ' ὀκνοῦσα καὶ πόσιν
θνήσκω.

She uses the same word of *Admetus'* parents at l. 290, καίτοι σ' ὁ φύσας
χῆ τεκοῦσα προύδοσαν. In her terms, a refusal of self-sacrifice is a failure in *φιλία*, a betrayal of *Admetus*. *Admetus* himself adopts the word at 658–661 as he reproaches his father:

οὐ μὴν ἐρεῖς γέ μ' ὥς ἀτιμάζοντα σὸν
γῆρας θανεῖν προύδωκας, ὅστις αἰδόφρων
πρὸς σ' ἦ μάλιστα· κἀντὶ τῶνδ' ἐμοὶ χάριν
τοιάνδε καὶ σὺ χῆ τεκοῦς' ἠλλαξάτην.

He insists on his own observance of the rules of *φιλία*, which demands a proper *χάρις* in return. *Pheres* does not reply to this charge, basing his self-justification on his having fulfilled the normal requirements of paternity. At 685–686 he withdraws himself from the obligations of *φιλία*:

σαυτῷ γὰρ εἴτε δυστυχὴς εἴτ' εὐτυχὴς
ἔφυς· ἃ δ' ἡμῶν χρῆν σε τυγχάνειν, ἔχεις.

Pheres, of course, is not without right on his side: no one has the right to demand of another that he die for his sake. Yet once *Alcestis* has accepted the sacrifice as a requirement of *φιλία*, refusal appears in a context where it is a form of betrayal. While the code never specifies that friends must die for one another, it does include an obligation to help a friend in need.

But the usage of *προδιδόναι* is more complicated than this. At 201–202 the slave describes *Admetus'* pleas to *Alcestis*:

κλαίει γ' ἄκοιτιν ἐν χεροῖν φίλην ἔχων,
καὶ μὴ προδοῦναι λίσσεται . . .

Admetus uses the same word before the audience at ll. 250 and 275 as he begs his wife to make an effort to live: now it is her death that is a betrayal. This inversion can be interpreted psychologically, as a proof of *Admetus'* selfishness, or as “rhetoric of the situation,” merely what it is proper to say at the death of a beloved wife.⁸ Looked at in terms of

⁸ “Rhetoric of the situation” as a factor in interpretation has been well and vigorously employed by A. M. Dale in the introduction of her commentary, xxii–xxix. The usage of *προδιδόναι* in these passages is treated psychologically (and, I think, incorrectly) by T. Rosenmeyer, *The Masks of Tragedy* (Austin 1963) 222.

the conventions of *φιλία*, however, the repeated word exposes a central dramatic problem. At 277–279 Admetus says that he has no life without Alcestis:

σοῦ γὰρ φθιμένης οὐκέτ' ἂν εἶην·
 ἐν σοὶ δ' ἔσμεν καὶ ζῆν καὶ μὴ·
 σὴν γὰρ φιλίαν σεβόμεσθα.

If Admetus cannot live without Alcestis — and this truth is proven and deepened in the subsequent action — her sacrifice is a failure, and her willingness to die a kind of betrayal. Alcestis cannot really save Admetus; neither has used “betrayal” incorrectly. The situation has made the norms of friendship impossible; Alcestis has, at least, tried.

This reversal, however, is not the only one. Admetus near the end of the play uses the same word in connection with his duty to the dead Alcestis, first at 1059, and then at 1096: *θάνομι' ἐκείνην καίπερ οὐκ οὔσαν προδοῦς*. For him, reception of Heracles' veiled woman would constitute a betrayal of his wife. His resistance is a lesser counterpart to her self-sacrifice. Here again, the actual situation complicates the moral norm. Heracles, too, has the claims of *φιλία*, and it is only at the moment of his apparent failure that Admetus succeeds and recovers his wife. If Alcestis' heroic attempt to keep the canons of *φιλία* was turned into a betrayal by reality, Admetus' failure — after a delay which demonstrates his basic desire to keep his trust in the conventional way — is the opposite of a betrayal. In the extraordinary conditions of the play, the rules do not work.

Yet the traditional norms are celebrated by the drama; the attempt to live by them defines the moral worth of the characters. Both Admetus and Alcestis follow the laws of *φιλία* toward each other. Alcestis' fidelity is proven by her sacrifice and is constantly praised by Admetus, who uses all the terms familiar from Theognis. At 367–368 he says:

μηδὲ γὰρ θανῶν ποτε
 σοῦ χωρὶς εἶην τῆς μόνης πιστῆς ἐμοί.

Again at 880 he calls her *πιστή*; at 1058 he frankly calls her his *εὐεργέτις*. Alcestis, for all her self-praise, does not stress her own value in these terms; instead Admetus, through his praise of her, indicates his adherence to the norm and his recognition of hers. He, in turn, grants her the *χάρις* she asks at 299, *σὺ νῦν μοι τῶνδ' ἀπόμνησαι χάριν*, which, though it cannot equal her proof, allows Admetus to show his worth in the same moral sphere. His promise is not only evidence that he, unlike the

δειλοί, is grateful to his benefactors; it is in substance an attempt to protect the objects of mutual *φιλία* (302–303):

τούσδε γὰρ φιλεῖς
οὐχ ἦσσαν ἢ γὰρ παῖδας, εἴπερ εὖ φρονεῖς·

So just before Alcestis' death he accepts the children from her, *δέχομαι, φίλον γε δῶρον ἐκ φίλης χερὸς* (376). Through his promise he joins her in faith; at 900–901, as he considers suicide, he imagines himself joined to her in loyalty:

δύο δ' ἀντὶ μιᾶς Αἰδης ψυχὰς
τὰς πιστοτάτας σὺν ἅν' ἔσχεν, ὁμοῦ
χθονίαν λήμνην διαβάντε.

He keeps his promise steadfastly enough to earn the praise of Heracles at 1095, *ἐπήνεσ' ἀλόχῳ πιστὸς οὐνεκ' εἰ φίλος*. The praise offered by Heracles in 1093 and 1095 is crucial.⁹ The norm is collapsing, but Admetus is favorably judged by Heracles in accordance with it, and we have no right to dispute with Heracles. Admetus first resists and proves himself faithful to Alcestis; when his loyalty is established, he surrenders, as *φιλία* conflicts with *φιλία* and his faith with Heracles' knowledge. Admetus has the quality he has repeatedly praised in his wife: he is a *πιστὸς φίλος*.

This rare quality is shared by the chorus. At 210–212 the slave addresses the old men of Pherae:

οὐ γάρ τι πάντες εὖ φρονοῦσι κοιράνοις,
ὥστ' ἐν κακοῖσιν εὐμενεῖς παρεστάναι·
σὺ δ' εἰ παλαιὸς δεσπότης ἐμοῖς φίλος.

This does not suggest that the Thessalians are disaffected toward their rulers, but that only true friends, who are few, would come to share the sorrow in the house. The chorus, in “standing by” the royal house (*παρεστάναι*), show themselves *πιστοί*, unlike Pheres and Admetus' mother, *λόγῳ γὰρ ἦσαν οὐκ ἔργῳ φίλοι* (339). The father “stood aside”

⁹ I think that both 1093 and 1095 are genuine, though either alone would suffice for the present argument. 1094 must be a reply to both parts of 1093: either *ἴσθι* is to be understood, or a verb of saying is to be understood as implied by *μυρίαν δ' ὀφλισκάνεις* as well as expressed in *αἰνῶ*: Admetus' response would be, “Call me whatever you want, but you'll never call me a bridegroom,” and his tone of indignation prompts the precise comment of Heracles, who praises Admetus' loyalty as shown in his present action, but not the action. 1094 may be corrupt; if *καλῶν* were a finite verb, the line would present few difficulties. Cf. the discussion of the problem in W. Steidle, *Studien zum antiken Drama* (Munich 1968) 134–135 n.13.

(ἐκποδὼν στὰς . . . 634), according to his son. Pheres, who took no action when Admetus was in danger of death, is rejected when he comes to share his mourning at 614, ἤκω κακοῖσι σοῖσι συγκαμνων, τέκνον. The chorus, however, recognizes that to share in grief is the part of friendship (369–370):

καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ σοι πένθος ὥς φίλος φίλω
λυπρὸν συνοίσω τῆσδε· καὶ γὰρ ἀξία.

Of course, no exceptional demand has been made on the chorus; their visit of sympathy belongs to the normal demands of friendship. But Pheres' refusal to die is put in such terms by his son, and though he counters other accusations — especially that of cowardice — he makes no direct answer to this. His claim to have done his paternal duty removes fatherhood from the realm of *φιλία*.

In fact, the trial mentioned in Theognis has taken place, and Admetus' parents have failed the test. Whether Admetus is right or not to accept another's sacrifice, Apollo's opening speech indicates that willingness to die for another, despite its extremity, is a valid test (15–17):

πάντας δ' ἐλέγξας καὶ διεξελθὼν φίλους,
πατέρα γεραιάν θ' ἢ σφ' ἔτικτε μητέρα,
οὐχ ἡὔρε πλήν γυναικὸς ὅστις ἤθελε...

The central word is echoed by Admetus as he wrangles with his father at 640, ἔδειξας εἰς ἔλεγχον ἐξελθὼν ὃς εἶ. Admetus' desperate situation was an *ἐλεγχος*, the *βάσανος* of the poems of Theognis; Admetus has tested his friends and knows their true mind. The trial is cruel but decisive; his refusal, in l. 630, to consider his father as a friend is its result. He, too, confronts a test; the word *ἐλέγχειν* appears again, not surprisingly, in the final scene with Heracles. Admetus recognizes that Heracles' request is a trial of his loyalty to Alcestis; at 1058–59 he fears

μή τίς μ' ἐλέγξῃ τὴν ἐμὴν εὐεργέτιν
προδόντ' ἐν ἄλλῃς δαμνίους πίτνειν νέας.

The test imposed on him is milder than the one he and his fate have imposed on his family, but it suffices to show his commitment.

The theme appears in another form in the encounters between Admetus and Heracles. Heracles is both guest-friend and friend of Admetus, and the two cannot, in this drama, be entirely separated.¹⁰ Admetus calls him *εὖνους* at 511. This complicates the issue of his

¹⁰ *ξένος* and *φίλος*, regularly joined in fourth-century prose, appear together already at *El.* 83.

reception into the house. At 561–562 the chorus expresses its bewilderment; according to the ordinary rules, a man would tell his griefs to a friend:

πῶς οὖν ἔκρυπτες τὸν παρόντα δαίμονα,
φίλου μολόντος ἀνδρός, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγεις;

Admetus, however, assumes that Heracles would refuse to stay, and this assumption seems to be proven correct by Heracles' evident desire to leave at 536 ff. Courtesy demands that the guest not intrude on a house of mourning. To Admetus, however, the departure of Heracles would be a severe deprivation. As he says at 555–556:

οὐ δῆτ', ἐπεὶ μοι συμφορὰ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄν
μείων ἐγίγνετ', ἀξενώτερος δ' ἐγώ.

The arrival of Heracles poses a dilemma. Admetus responds by attempting to offer his friend and guest ἀγαθά instead of the κακά of his own situation. Several codes are in conflict. It is improper for revels to take place in the mourning house, it is wrong to deceive one's friends — but to fail toward a guest-friend is intolerable. Heracles has entertained Admetus in the past (559–560), and Admetus' letting him go would perhaps obey the letter of the code of propriety but would, in his own view, utterly deny the spirit. He therefore does an extraordinary thing.

The response of the chorus in the lyric of 568–605 both expresses their inability to comprehend the king's action and recalls the role of Apollo in the legend. Apollo's relations with Admetus have followed a pattern of *φιλία*. Well-treated by Admetus, the god has responded by blessing him with vast wealth and extracting a favor from the Moirai. Even between god and man there is a certain reciprocity, suggested by the famous repeated *ὅσιος* of l. 10; the usual *do ut des* of sacrifice and answered prayer is here replaced, on the moral level, by similarity in a human quality and a something at least resembling human friendship.¹¹ Yet the kind of response the god has given to his benefactor transcends the norm it observes.

¹¹ Reciprocity between Admetus and Apollo already belonged to the tradition, as in Aes. *Eu.* 723–726:

Χο. τοιαῦτ' ἔδρασας καὶ Φέρητος ἐν δόμοις·
Μοίρας ἔπεισας ἀφθίτους θεῖναι βροτούς.
Απ. οὐκ οὐν δίκαιον τὸν σέβοντ' εὐεργετεῖν,
ἄλλως τε πάντως χῶτε δεόμενος τύχοι;

But Euripides' Apollo speaks not as a god suitably worshiped, but as a well-treated servant.

It is in this context that the speech of Heracles at 1008 ff should be understood. Heracles has just answered Admetus' action beyond the norm by another. Upon learning the truth, he has had the reactions of a true friend. He considers that Admetus has conferred a benefit upon him (859-860):

τοιγὰρ οὐκ ἔρεϊ κακὸν
εὐεργετῆσαι φῶτα γενναῖος γεγώς.

Admetus has shown αἰδώς, proven himself γενναῖος; it is therefore morally imperative for Heracles to act correspondingly, as he says at 840-843:

δεῖ γάρ με σῶσαι τὴν θανοῦσαν ἀρτίως
γυναικα καὶς τόνδ' αὖθις ἰδρῦσαι δόμον
Ἀλκηστιν, Ἀδμήτῳ θ' ὑπουργῆσαι χάριν.

His rescue of Alcestis is an act of χάρις which goes even more beyond the ordinary requirements of friendship than Admetus' reception of him.

When he next sees Admetus, however, he begins with reproaches. His opening words explain his justification for reproving his friend (1008-10):

φίλον πρὸς ἄνδρα χρὴ λέγειν ἐλευθέρως,
Ἀδμητε, μομφὰς δ' οὐχ ὑπὸ σπλάγχνοις ἔχουν
σιγῶντ'.

Free speech is the rule between friends.¹² Heracles' reproach both exemplifies this norm and reproves Admetus for a violation of it, since what Heracles blames in Admetus is precisely his having not told his friend what was in his heart. Just so the chorus was surprised that Admetus did not speak openly with Heracles, his friend (563). Heracles continues to explain his grievance (1010-11):

ἐγὼ δὲ σοῖς κακοῖσιν ἡξίουν
ἐγγυὺς παρεστὼς ἐξετάζεσθαι φίλος.

It is not just that Heracles was led into the impropriety of song and drink while Alcestis was lamented in the rest of the house. He was denied an opportunity to prove his friendship in the normal way; he would have "stood nearby" and "been proven" a true friend. In fact, the truth would have served as a test of friendship, and Heracles would have shown his willingness to share in his friend's troubles.

¹² It appears in later treatises on friendship: Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1165 a, πρὸς εἰταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν . . ., Cicero *de Amicitia* 85.

Yet the reproach seems peculiar. To be sure, Heracles could be thought to have been truly embarrassed by his *faux pas*, but he has, in private, praised the act for which he now blames Admetus. He has, moreover, been given a far more significant chance to prove his friendship than he would have had if Admetus had behaved normally. Both have far transcended the rules in seeking to follow them; the opening words of Heracles could be seen as a re-establishment of norms. Heracles is about to engage in some deception himself, not, surely, to punish Admetus, or deliberately to test him, but because the extraordinary act demands an extraordinary frame. The return of Alcestis balances the reception of Heracles, since the two friends, as friends should, offer kindness in response to kindness. Heracles has re-emphasized the ordinary rules by his opening reproaches; the method he uses to restore Alcestis shows that his extraordinary act is a response to Admetus'. His final advice to Admetus clearly shows that he admires his friend's behavior (1147-48):

ἀλλ' εἴσαγ' εἴσω τήνδε· καὶ δίκαιος ὦν
τὸ λοιπόν, Ἀδμητ', εὐσέβει περὶ ξένους.

Heracles has surpassed Admetus as Alcestis did; yet in each case Admetus too has acted in the same moral sphere. Alcestis and Admetus, Admetus and Heracles: in each instance a reciprocity is confirmed.

Admetus, whose natural φίλοι fail him, nonetheless has two true friends, both ξένοι. It is not mere quibble that Alcestis is called ὀθνεῖος and ξένη (533, 646, 1117); as the true friend is as faithful as a blood relative should be, he may even show himself loyal when the kinsman fails. In this play, blood ties are divorced from φιλία. Wife and guest-friend are φίλοι, but the father casts away not only any desire for ἀρετή and κλέος, but φιλία. The standard of friendship is not the only one which has a place in the *Alcestis*; the judgment to be placed by it on each character is only partial. Still, it is an important one. It is not without its difficulties and ambiguities. Alcestis cannot really save Admetus. Admetus must ignore some norms in order to keep others. But without an awareness of the rules of friendship, the action of the play does not make sense.

So the Euripidean drama employs the themes of the drinking catch. The poet may actually have had the skolion in mind as he composed his work, or the theme may have been part of the play of Phrynichus.¹³ In any case, the problems of friendship and loyalty were a subject

¹³ Fragments of this work are uninformative (Phrynichus frs. 1 c, 2, and 3 TrGF) and speculations largely futile.

already associated with the story of Alcestis and Admetus; the legend was an *exemplum* of the kind of friendship possible among the noble. Euripides turned the theme into a typically complex pattern which in turn forms part of a still more complex whole, filling his work with ambivalence and quibble. The sympotic associations of the subject, for instance, are linked to the great sympotic speech of Heracles at 773–802, which in turn offers an ethical perspective on the entire action that is very different from that of the friendship theme in isolation. But any interpretation of the play as a whole must take due account of the way the characters stand beside the measure of the *Ἀδμήτου μέλος*.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ELEATIC CONVENTIONALISM AND PHILOLAUS ON THE CONDITIONS OF THOUGHT

MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM

TOWARD the end of the *Clouds*, Aristophanes' Socratic comedy, a young man comes home from the academy where he has been learning to talk like a philosopher. He announces to his father that he can prove it is right for sons to give their fathers a beating. The astonished father answers, "It's not the custom anywhere (*oudamou nomizetai*, 1420) for a father to suffer that." But he has not reckoned with the daring of philosophy. His appeal to convention, *nomos*, plays right into the hands of his eager son. Pheidippides triumphantly launches into a discourse on *nomos*, telling us what is implied by his father's apparent concession that the status of the belief in question is (merely) conventional: "Wasn't it a man who first set down this convention (*nomon*), a man like you and me, who won over the people of his time by speaking? Well, then, is it any less open to me, too, to make a new convention for sons for the future, that they should beat their fathers in return?" (1421-24). The father, stunned by the force of this new idea, yields his authority and takes his beating like a man.¹

Our beliefs are just conventions, perhaps some of them, perhaps all of them. They are things made or set down by people, by us. This claim — its meaning, its merits, its implications if true — is a central and unifying theme in Greek philosophical debate about the grounding of our beliefs and practices. An antithesis between the (merely) conventional and the real or true, closely related to the antithesis between convention and nature, was exploited by many early thinkers in pursuit both of specifically ethical inquiries and of more general epistemological projects. It still plays a prominent role in our continuations of these inquiries.² I would like here to look at the very beginnings of radical

¹ This speech, and the moral use of the *nomos/phusis* antithesis, are further discussed in my "Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wisdom," in *Greek Comedy*, ed. J. J. Henderson, *Yale Classical Studies* 26 (Cambridge 1980). The implications of the conventionalist's claim are further analyzed below.

² On the antithesis between *nomos* and truth or reality, and its relationship to the *nomos-phusis* antithesis, see F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel 1945,

conventionalism in Greek philosophy, and at a promising early attempt to parry the conventionalist's assault. The assailant is Parmenides, whose goddess enjoins the "man in the know" not to let "much-experienced habit" force him onto the path of nonsense, the path "fabricated" by "mortals who know nothing."³ The critic is a more shadowy figure: Philolaus the Pythagorean.

We are told that Plato once paid forty minae for Philolaus' book. "You exchanged a lot of silver for one thin volume," sneers the skeptic philosopher-poet Timon.⁴ And, indeed, if we look at Philolaus only in the light of standard critical accounts, Plato's alleged purchase strikes us, too, as extravagant. Almost invariably he is depicted as a crude and primitive thinker, an enthusiast of some mystical views about number of which we can make little philosophical sense. Crudeness of thought has even been used as a criterion of authenticity in assessing dubious fragments.⁵ I want to argue, in defense of Plato's judgment, that the

repr. 1965); and cf. other works cited below, n.79. For contemporary discussions of philosophical conventionalism, see, for example, W. V. O. Quine, "Truth by Convention," in *The Ways of Paradox* (New York 1966) 70-99; H. Putnam, "There Is At Least One A Priori Truth" (see below, n.103); B. Stroud, "Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation," in *Words and Objections*, ed. D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (Dordrecht 1969) 82-96. On conventionalism with particular regard to number and mathematical practices, M. Dummett, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics," *PhilRev* 68 (1959) 324-348, and in *Wittgenstein*, ed. G. Pitcher (Garden City 1966) 420-447; and B. Stroud, "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity," *PhilRev* 74 (1965) 504-518, and in Pitcher, 477-496.

³ Parmenides, DK 28 B 1.3, 7.3, 6.4-5; on all these passages see further below.

⁴ Timon, fr. 54 = DK 44 A 8 = Gell. 3.17.6:

πολλῶν δ' ἀργυρίων ὀλίγην ἡλλάξας βιβλον,
 ἔνθεν ἀπαρχόμενος τιμαιογραφεῖν ἐδιδάχθη.

(Timon's philosophical skepticism and his hostility to Philolaus may not be unconnected.) On the alleged purchase, and the controversy about the number of books written by Philolaus, see W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, trans. E. L. Minar, Jr. (Cambridge, Ma. 1972) 223-227; W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, I (Cambridge 1962) 330 ff.; A. Riginos, *Platonica* (Leiden 1976) 169-174.

⁵ Thus, for example, Erich Frank remarks (*Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer* [Halle 1923] 305): "This sterile repetition of the same ideas, while the argument makes no progress at all . . . is intolerable; it betrays a second-rate mind." Karl Reinhardt speaks of Philolaus' argument as "but a poor copy of the Eleatic original" ("The Relation between the Two Parts of Parmenides' Poem," trans. in *The Presocratics*, ed. A. P. D. Mourelatos [Garden City, N.Y. 1974] 293-317; from *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*). An early exception is A. Boeckh (*Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den*

genuine fragments,⁶ especially those dealing with our understanding of the world of nature, reveal a philosophical intelligence both original and profound. Set within a tradition of speculation about the limits of human knowledge, they adumbrate a response to Parmenides' denial of distinctions and denumerable plurality to what is, and to his associated claim that the world of our experience and speech is the product of human convention.⁷ Most critics of Parmenides replied only, or primarily, to his attack on plurality through the incoherence of *genesis ex nihilo*. Philolaus saw the importance of responding, instead, to the poem's more basic line of attack: the argument from the conditions of successful thought and discourse. His response brings to light some important issues that will be investigated more fully in the metaphysical writings of Plato and Aristotle. At the same time, Philolaus' argument has a distinctive form. Although it has been accused of being merely a cheap imitation of Eleatic methods of proof by refutation,⁸ it actually uses Eleatic techniques to a new, and anti-Eleatic, end. It would not be

Bruchstücken seines Werkes [Berlin 1819]), who speaks of Philolaus as "a point of light . . . whose radiance can to some extent illuminate the night" of the confusing tradition surrounding the history of Pythagorean thought (p. 3); Boeckh is, however, clearly more interested in the historical importance of the fragments than in their philosophical value. By far the most balanced recent treatment of the fragments is in Burkert (above, n.4), ch. 3, with bibliography and a comprehensive discussion of authenticity. Burkert defends Philolaus against some of the attacks on his intellectual caliber but is so preoccupied with establishing the authenticity of the fragments that he sometimes exaggerates their crudeness in an effort to show they cannot be post-Platonic. His summary seems overly condescending: "For Philolaus, philosophical ideas and specific items of scientific knowledge seem to have been more than a means of expressing and illuminating a preexisting picture" (p. 267).

⁶ With Burkert, I believe B 1-7 to be genuine, B 11-12 and 21 to be spurious; in general I accept his arguments against the challenges raised by Frank (above, n.5), by J. E. Raven (*Pythagoreans and Eleatics* [Cambridge 1948] 92-100, and, with G. S. Kirk, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* [Cambridge 1966] 307-318); and by I. Bywater ("On the Fragments attributed to Philolaus the Pythagorean," *JPhilol* 1 [1868] 21-53. A summary of critical opinion can be found in Burkert (above, n.4), 221, n.17; other useful criticisms of Frank and Bywater are made by R. Mondolfo in his Italian translation of Zeller-Nestle (*La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico* [Florence 1938, repr. 1950] 1-2, 367-382 = *RivFil* 15 [1957] 225-245, and by Guthrie, I (above, n.4) 330-333. I shall not recapitulate all of Burkert's arguments, but only indicate where I take issue with or wish to supplement them.

⁷ On the reasons for reading Philolaus' argument as a response to the Eleatics, see below pp. 82-83.

⁸ Cf. Reinhardt (above, n.5), n.2; the same view, though without the pejorative language, is repeated by Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4), 259-260, and n.104.

putting the case too strongly to call it our first example of the "transcendental argument," which knits together in a particular way an uncovering of the limits of human understanding and a validation of the categories that this understanding uses to interpret the world.

PARMENIDES AND THE POSTULATES OF MORTALS

Parmenides was not the first Greek thinker to worry about the limits of our knowledge, or to suggest that we make up what we think we know. But his attack is so radical that it is hard for it not to appear capricious or unmotivated. If we are to understand the importance of Philolaus' attempt to return us from radical philosophical doubt to our basic human beliefs, we should also try to see how the doubt, and the attack on convention, might be more than a philosopher's game — something that arises from human experience and human needs. One reason the *Clouds* is profound is that it shows us not only the excesses of philosophical ambition, but also the ordinary man's thirst for philosophy, his desire to get outside the conventions that hold him. The story of the origins of conventionalism in Greek thought needs thorough study; such a study would probably deepen our understanding of how and where skeptical doubt arises and how ordinary cognitive anxiety engenders philosophy.⁹ But even a cursory examination of early texts shows that Parmenides did not speak in a vacuum.

In assailing the authenticity of the Philolaus fragments, J. E. Raven has described the late fifth century as "a time when the critical inquiry, 'How is knowledge possible?' had barely been started, much less settled."¹⁰ Outrageous as a claim about the time of Socrates and Democritus, this remark would not even truly characterize the time of Parmenides. His predecessors, both poets and philosophers, show a keen interest in uncovering the limits of our knowledge, contrasting human cognitive capacities with those of the gods, and describing the admissible grounds for knowledge claims.¹¹ And we see in particular, in their

⁹ These are central themes of Stanley Cavell's *The Claim of Reason* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1979), a work which is important for any investigation of connections between philosophical and literary texts dealing with the problem of knowledge.

¹⁰ Raven, in Kirk and Raven (above, n.6), 311.

¹¹ Helpful discussions of the early material are: B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (New York 1960) ch. 7, 136–152; Guthrie, I (above, n.4) 397–402; and H. Fränkel, "Xenophanes' Empiricism and His Critique of Knowledge," in Mourelatos (above, n.5) 118–131, trans. from *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich 2nd ed. 1960) 338–349.

writings, signs of a tendency that Parmenides carried to its extreme conclusion: the tendency to denounce as "mere convention" an understanding of the world that is seen to be human, the product of our speech and society, and to search for a pure, nonanthropocentric truth. "We human beings make vain suppositions (*mataia nomizomen*), knowing nothing, while the gods accomplish all things according to their thought." So, in an early fragment (141-142), the poet Theognis expressed a cognitive despair whose natural outcome would be a search for divine wisdom to bolster, correct, or validate our merely human judgment. A poet might turn to Muses who "are at hand and know all things";¹² others had other ways of turning away from mortal ignorance; some, like Xenophanes, seem to have concluded that there is no escape.¹³ Clearly Plato was not the first to react to our anthropocentric assumption that man is the measure of all things with the sentiment that "nothing incomplete is the measure of anything" (*Rep.* 504 c). Early critics of mortal beliefs may have been less radical than Parmenides; none seems to have questioned the reality of distinctions and plurality. But they were already at work attacking the human basis of our claims to know. Heraclitus reacts to them with anger, urging men to listen to the *logos* that is common to all, the fabric of discourse and connected thought on which human ways of life are based. Attacking sages who claim to teach a "private wisdom" (B 2), he tells us that if we speak with understanding (*xun noōi*), we will acknowledge that we must rely on what is common to all (*xunon*), the way a city relies on its laws (B 114).¹⁴ Heraclitus makes it clear that our conventions are thoroughly anthropocentric: to

¹² Hom. *Il.* 2.484-486; cf. Hes. *Th.* 1-28, *Op.* 1-10. Hesiod's insight that divinities might be deceivers ("We know how to tell many false things as if they were true," *Th.* 27) seems to lead him to the verge of a more general skepticism.

¹³ The extent of Xenophanes' skepticism in B 34 is unclear. Fränkel (above, n.11) argues forcefully that the skeptical conclusion is limited to matters of which we can have no first-hand experience (see esp. p. 127 and n.38). This allows illuminating connections to be made with Xenophanes' praise of empirical inquiry in B 18, and with the truncated B 36; but Fränkel's interpretation depends on tendentious renderings of important cognitive words. For another recent view, see J. Leshner, "Xenophanes' Skepticism," *Phronesis* 23 (1978) 1-21.

¹⁴ Cf. also B 1, 2, 17, 50, 72, 73, 89, 129; on the interpretation of *logos*, and its connection with discourse, see my "Psuchē in Heraclitus, I," *Phronesis* 17 (1972) 1-17, with bibliography. The spirit of Heraclitus' program — if not always its detail — seems to me to have been admirably grasped by Nietzsche (in his essay "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks," but also, and more clearly, in the remarks on Heraclitus in the historical section of *Twilight of the Idols*, and in the Heraclitean epistemology of the essay, "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense"). On our faculties and the possibility of knowledge, see B 55, 116, and also 22, 35, 40, 101, 129.

a god, to a fish, the world will look a different way.¹⁵ And yet he urges us to trust ourselves, our language, our ways.¹⁶ To Parmenides, as to skeptical predecessors like Theognis and Xenophanes, such cognitive complacency is evidently unacceptable. It does not seem sufficient to say, "That is the way we human beings see the world." What if all human thoughts really are vain suppositions? What if we are all wrong in some fundamental way about the nature of reality? Then our only hope of access to truth might lie in ceasing to live and think like human beings, dissociating ourselves by the use of reason, our most godlike faculty, from all our merely human beliefs. We might need to question and reject even the most basic one: the belief that we can both affirm and negate, identify and distinguish.

From the very beginning of his poetic proem, Parmenides declares his opposition to a Heraclitean reliance on convention. The "man in the know,"¹⁷ the initiate drawn by the wise horses of the goddess, is taking his last leave of mortal communities before arriving at the place where he can abandon deceptive mortal ways for good and set out along the Way of Truth. His chariot races along "past all the cities" (1.3)¹⁸

¹⁵ Cf. esp. B 9, 61, 62, 102; also 23, 57. B 18 suggests that inquiry relies on our expectations: we make discoveries only on the basis of theory and conjecture. (This fragment, surprisingly, has not been mentioned by Sir Karl Popper in his discussions of pre-Socratic science: "Back to the Pre-Socratics," in *Studies in Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, ed. D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen, I [London 1970] 130-153; and *Conjectures and Refutations* [London 1963] 136-165.) On B 62 and 102, see my "Psuchē in Heraclitus, II," *Phronesis* 17 (1972) 153-170.

¹⁶ Any full treatment of early speculation about human knowledge would have to include a study of the earlier treatises of the Hippocratic corpus — especially, perhaps, the treatise "On Ancient Medicine." Because this material postdates Parmenides and was probably not known to Philolaus, I shall not discuss it here. The empiricism of these treatises is well discussed in G. E. R. Lloyd, "Popper vs. Kirk: A Controversy in the Interpretation of Greek Science," *Brit J our Phil Sci* 18 (1967) 21-38.

¹⁷ On *eidota phōta* (1.3), see D. J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides," in *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (Assen 1973) 1-15, at p. 3. Contrast, for example, J. Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt* (Assen 1964) 228, who argues that Parmenides is already on the way back. For a complete review of opinion, see K. Bormann, *Parmenides* (Hamburg 1971) 61-62; Bormann's own interpretation of the proem as a whole is, however, vulnerable to Furley's objections.

¹⁸ The reading *astē* is not in the manuscripts, as was pointed out by A. Coxon, "The Text of Parmenides fr. 1.3," *CQ* n.s. 18 (1968) 69. But there appears to be no viable alternative, and we should probably accept the emendation, especially in view of 1.27. See, however, the tempting suggestion of H. A. S. Tarrant, *Antichthon* 10 (1976) 1-7.

on its way to the place of his heart's desire (I.1), a place "outside of the beaten path of human beings" (I.27).¹⁹ This turns out to be the "gate of the ways of Night and Day," a peculiar place of some philosophical interest. It is usually supposed that Parmenides has traveled from darkness into the light, therefore from the night of error to the clarity of Truth. But David Furley has now shown that the maidens who escort the poet have come *into* the light themselves, and are taking him *from* the ordinary daytime world to a strange destination, outside our human paths.²⁰ It is a place well known in mythology, and known as a mysterious and fearful spot (cf. Hes. *Th.* 740 ff). At the very edge of the world, at the opening of a bottomless chasm, stands a place where Night and Day have their meeting place. Its essential character is that here all opposites are undivided, or one.²¹ All the familiar polarities of mortal discourse collapse into unity; our ordinary statements that make distinctions between day and night, light and dark, will no longer have their sense. It is a place that cannot really be coherently described in our language, since it abolishes what the language rests on; this, perhaps, is the reason why Parmenides only points, rather cryptically, to its main features. If one were a mere mortal, not "in the know," one might be tempted to say, as Philolaus, in effect, will say, that it is a world *oude phaton oude noēton*, neither sayable nor thinkable.

A goddess offers the well-prepared youth instruction that will lead him from erring mortal ways to the truth. Instead of the poet's nine Muses, Parmenides' teacher is a single divine being. Instead of revealing the contingent truths of human history, she shows her pupil the "unshakeable heart of persuasive truth" (I.29), the necessary laws and limits of reason.²² And, perhaps Parmenides' most important modification of the standard poetic drama of inspiration, she relies for her authority not on any empirical claims, but on the nature of thought itself. She claims no special authority in virtue of longevity or godlike

¹⁹ In the same way his proem, filled with words suggestive of change and plurality, seems to take *its* leave of the mortal conventions the poet will soon be forbidden to express. Note especially the frequency of "many-" compounds (I.2, I.4, I.14, I.18); the goddess uses such compounds only of the erring ways of mortals (7.3, 16.1), and of the struggle to overcome these (*poludērin*, 7.5). On Parmenides' vocabulary, see A. P. D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven 1970) ch. 1, who shows that of the very few words used by Parmenides but not found in Homer and Hesiod, a large proportion are these striking compounds.

²⁰ Furley (above, n.17), 1-5, with references.

²¹ All that follows this point is my own extrapolation of Furley's suggestion.

²² Cf. esp. Homer, *Il.* 2.484-486.

sensory powers. Her purely a priori argument is one that can be made and judged by any rational creature, and made all the better if he abstracts from all that is empirical, "lest mortal views distract" his intellect (8.60–61). "Judge by reason," she commands him, "the hard-hitting refutation" (7.5).²³

The argument of the Way of Truth has two strands. One uses a principle of sufficient reason to argue against the possibility of coming-to-be and of accretion to what is already. "What need could have spurred it, starting from nothing, to grow later rather than sooner?" (8.9–10)²⁴ This argument proved the focus of most of Parmenides' philosophical successors, who, accepting the principle and rejecting Parmenides' conclusion, held that there must have been an irreducible plurality at the beginning of things.²⁵ But the goddess has another more basic argument against *genesis* and change, one which gives her reason to dismiss the possibility even of an *original* plurality. The argument is stated flatly, though repeatedly; it is not at all obvious on what underlying assumptions it rests. But on it the success of the Way of Truth depends. For she undertakes to show what something must be like to be spoken of — to be an object of thought and an item mentioned in intelligible discourse.²⁶ And she concludes that it must be without *genesis* and destruction, without accretion, without change in place or time, without any divisions or distinctions. The sufficient-reason argument would, by itself, establish only a small part of this conclusion.

Remarks about the conditions of intelligent thought and successful discourse hold a prominent place in the poem and are used at crucial junctures to reject error:

This, I tell you, is a path that is entirely uninformative (*panapeuthea*). For you could not apprehend (*gnoiēs*) what is not — for it is not attainable (*anuston*) — nor express it in speech (*phrasais*) (2.6–8).

²³ Furley's translation (above, n.17) 9; Mourelatos, *Route* (above, n.19), shows that the ordinary interpretation, "much-contested," is implausible on morphological grounds (91, n.46).

²⁴ On this argument and its philosophical successors, cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," in Mourelatos, *Presocratics* (above, n.5), 271–292, at 279 ff (originally in *The Monist* 50 [1966] 317–340).

²⁵ Cf. esp. Anaxagoras B 1, Empedocles B 8.

²⁶ For this interpretation of the subjectless *esti*, see G. E. L. Owen's classic "Eleatic Questions," in Furley and Allen (above, n.15), II (London 1975) 48–81, at 55–61 (originally *CQ* 10 [1960] 84–102). The view is ably defended against subsequent criticisms (e.g., those of L. Tarán, *Parmenides* [Princeton 1964] notes to B 8) by M. C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Washington, D.C. 1972) 120 ff.

I shall not allow you to say or think (*phasthai s'oude noein*) that it is from what is not. For it is not sayable (*phaton*) or thinkable (*noēton*) that it is not (8.7–9).

It has been decided, as is necessary, to leave the one way as unthinkable (*anoēton*) and nameless (*anōnumon*) — for it is not the true way — and that the other is (*pelein*) and is true (8.16–18; cf. 8.34–36, 3, 6.1–2).

The argument moves from some very general assumptions about what successful thought and talk must be like to conclusions that radically assail the truth of all our mortal beliefs. What is taken to be impossible is “saying what is not.” The most promising way of understanding the argument is probably the one suggested by Montgomery Furth, in expansion of suggestions by G. E. L. Owen.²⁷ Parmenides is pursuing the implications of a model of successful thought and speech to which, ironically, men’s ordinary view of their language was (and perhaps still is) deeply committed. According to this model, any discourse about the world succeeds by touching or grasping what it is about; all speaking is understood to be like naming or referring. And if there is not a thing there for the name to hit, that piece of discourse is senseless, mere names thrown into the void.²⁸ Statements alleging distinctions and divisions within what is become impossible, as does coming-to-be, since both commit the speaker to negative predicative or existential statements — or, on the naming model, to referring to what is not. The *genesis* argument thus becomes subordinate to and part of the larger argument rejecting differentiation.²⁹

²⁷ Montgomery Furth, “Elements of Eleatic Ontology,” in Mourelatos, *Presocratics* (above, n.5), 241–270 (originally in *JourHistPhilos* 6 [1968] 111–132, Owen, “EQ” (above, n.26). On the significance of the word *elenchos*, cf. also (above, n.17) 9–10.

²⁸ For this assumption, cf. Owen, “EQ” (above, n.26), n.44, and Furth (above, n.27), 258–259. The assumption is probably at work in Xenophanes and some other early thinkers and seems to play a role in Plato’s early and middle dialogues; it is criticized in the *Sophist*. Heraclitus’ preoccupation with connections and *logos*, in opposition to the Homeric preoccupation with *epea*, may mark the beginning of a reaction against the grasping-naming model: see “*Psuchē* in Heraclitus, I” (above, n.14). A great deal of relevant early material is explored in Mourelatos, “Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naïve Metaphysics of Things,” in *Exegesis and Argument* (above, n.17) 16–48.

²⁹ Furth’s interpretation, unlike many, succeeds in explaining Parmenides’ emphasis on the conditions of discourse and in generating his extreme conclusions from a single and plausible assumption, without charging him with damaging equivocation. Mourelatos (*Route*, above, n.19) also focuses on the conditions of discourse, but tries to deny the extreme conclusion: the poem is said to rule out only negative examples of “speculative predication” — predication about the

Having argued a priori that what is must be such as no man has ever thought it to be, Parmenides' goddess must now say something about the persistence and pervasiveness of mortal error. About the value of mortal beliefs her judgment is unambiguous: they have no claim to validity at all. There is no true confidence (*pístis alēthēs*, 1.30) in them. Mortals are utterly confused, having no sure knowledge (*eidotes ouden*, 6.4), governed by helplessness (*amēchaniē*, 6.5), wandering without guidance along a backward-turning path (6.5–9). To tell their opinions is to present a deceptive ordering (*kosmos*) of words (8.52); and this entire *kosmos* is designated as "seeming" (*diakosmon eikota panta*, 8.60). The references to the "two-headedness" of mortals and to their "backward-turning" path presumably point to our foolish mistake in trying to have being both ways, to continue using both "it is" and "it is not."³⁰

Nor is there any evidence that the cosmology in the poem's second half is accorded a limited degree of approval.³¹ Of her intent to teach opinion as well as truth, the goddess says: "But nonetheless, you will learn this [mortal opinions] too — how the things-that-seem had to have genuine existence (*dokimōs einai*), being, indeed, the whole of things (1.31–32)."³² The opinions had to have reality for mortals, since

real or essential nature of something. His arguments for isolating this special sense of *esti* do not appear convincing; and, as Stokes cogently argues, although Parmenides' arguments do not *start* from unity, the argument against division and distinction is a general one, leading to unity as a conclusion (cf. Stokes, above, n.26, 141–143). To admit a plurality of *onta* would commit us to unthinkable/unsayable negative statements (Owen, "EQ" [above, n.26], n.44; and now Furley [above, n.17], 5–9). To be finally persuasive as an interpretation, Furth's argument would need to deal more fully with the relation between the two strands of argument, explaining why Parmenides shows such a particular interest in ultimate generation and destruction.

³⁰ So Owen, "EQ" (above, n.26), n.1, and pp. 56–57.

³¹ As is claimed, for example, by Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 39 (1899) 204–205; Coxon, *CQ* 28 (1934) 134–144; and perhaps Kranz's translation in *DK*. The consensus of modern critics is that mortal opinions have no claim to validity: see Furley (above, n.17), 5–9; Stokes (above, n.26), 144–148; Tarán (above, n.26), 202 ff, with bibliographical survey; Owen, "EQ" (above, n.26), 49–55; A. A. Long, "The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony," in Furley and Allen II (above, n.15 and n.26), 82–101, originally in *Phronesis* 8 (1963) 90–107.

³² Cf. Owen, "EQ" (above, n.26) 49–55 and Long (above, n.31) 83–84. I give here the translation defended by Owen (reading *per'onta* with DEF). Long reads *per'onta* and sees it as emphasizing how completely the world of mortal opinion is pervaded by error. As Owen notes, it is not the goddess in her own voice who calls the opinions genuine or reliable; she is summarizing the content of the false view she will present from the point of view of its believers.

they lacked the illumination of a journey to the outside of their lives. They were stuck with error, and had no choice but to trust it (cf. 8.39, *pepoithotes einai alēthē*). But this does not confer on the errors of those who "know nothing" any measure of objective reality. If there is any good reason for choosing the cosmology of the Doxa rather than some other, it is that it is the simplest version of the basic error of mortals: the decision to name two forms, where being is without distinctions.³³ Plurality once admitted, they might just as well have named a hundred. But if the deceptive simplicity of this "likely order" does not deceive Parmenides, it is unlikely that more elaborate, but equally false versions will (cf. 8.60–61).

With this talk of a *decision* to name two forms, we arrive at the feature of Parmenides' argument that will be of the greatest importance for our understanding of Philolaus' response. Earlier thinkers had already suggested that if human beliefs were not solidly grounded in reality or nature, they would have to be regarded as nothing but conventions.³⁴ Parmenides accepts and develops this suggestion, dividing all judgments into the true and the merely conventional or man-made. The forms erroneously named by mortals are said to be "set down" or "posited" by them (*katethento*, 8.39, 8.53). The activity of name giving, which receives stress in the Doxa, is taken to be the origin of error (8.38, 8.53, 16.9); and this process must be purely arbitrary, since for what is only a single name, at most, is appropriate. "They posited two forms in their minds for naming; . . . in this they went astray."³⁵ And, as we have observed, if all plural name systems are

³³ So Stokes (above, n.26), 147–148. Lines 8.53–54 are difficult, and have occasioned much controversy. The best recent discussions are Stokes, 144–148, and Furley (above, n.17) 5–6, both with references; they conclude that the force of *tōn mian ou chreōn estin*, 8.54, is that *neither* of the two forms originally posited by mortals should have been posited. They fail to grasp the underlying unity of Being, and set down, as the basis of cosmology, two polar opposites, each of which is defined with reference to its distinctness from the other (cf. 9.4: *epei oudeterōi meta mēden*). Both are, therefore, to be rejected.

³⁴ For the history of this antithesis, see Heinimann (above, n.2), and below, n.79. Parmenides' use of the antithesis has been noted by Reinhardt (above, n.5), 297, n.2; cf. also Heinimann, 49 ff, 88 ff.

³⁵ Accepting Furley's defense of *gnōmais* (a variant in Simplicius) at 8.53. On the single name, cf. L. Woodbury, "Parmenides on Names," *HSCP* 63 (1958) 145–160. At *Sophist* 244 c–d, Plato points to a dilemma about the relation of Parmenides' Being to its name: are there two things after all, the name and its object? If so, they are unthinkable; if not, either the name is a name of nothing, or what is cannot have a name. See the comments on this in Owen, "EQ" (above, n.26), n.54, and B. A. O. Williams, "The Legacy of Greece: Philosophy," *The Legacy of Greece*, ed. M. I. Finley (Cambridge 1980). A recent discussion

nonsense, it is hard to see how one can be preferred to any other. Similarly, the rejected way of discourse is said in fragment 6 to be a fabrication of ignorant mortals (*plattontai*, 6.4–5). And the same fragment concludes: “For them being and not-being have been conventionally supposed (*nenomistai*) to be one and the same” — again suggesting, with the use of *nomizō*, that the assumption is a mere convention, with no claim to objective validity. Fragment 7 tells us that what will tend to force Parmenides along the road of error is nothing more basic to human rationality, nothing more binding, than the force of habit: it is “much-experienced *ethos*” that constrains human senses and human speech along the unspeakable road.³⁶ Mortals have placed their trust in a thoroughly deceptive order created by their own acts of name giving; having done the naming, they believe that their names are names of real distinctions in things. But insofar as naming and thought are directed to anything real at all, they must be directed (though mortals are not aware of this) to the one, undifferentiated Being. What is, is unitary; all names we set down must really be names of a single thing.³⁷ There is

of this topic is J. Owens, “Naming in Parmenides,” in *Kephalaion: Studies . . . offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel*, ed. J. Mansfeld and L. M. de Rijk (Assen 1975) 16–25. I cannot, however, agree with his conclusion that the doctrine of naming vindicates the “reality and beauty” of the perceptible world.

³⁶ *Polupeiron*, “of much experience” might be construed with *ethos*, *hodon*, or *se*. The last seems to me the least likely. (Compare Owen, “EQ” [above, n.26] n.2.)

³⁷ I am accepting, at 8.38–39, the reading: τῷ πάντ’ ὀνόμασται / ὅσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, “with reference to this [sc. “what-is” from 8.37] all things have been named, as many as mortals have set down, believing them to be true.” The passage is difficult, and interpreters are divided between this reading (Woodbury, Mourelatos, Furley — above, nn.35, 19, 17) and . . . *onom(a) estai* . . . (DK, Tarán [above, n.26]). Manuscript readings vary between *onoma* (*ounoma*) *estai* and *onomastai* and *ounomastai*. In either case, we are being told that all the many names used by mortals, in the confidence that they refer to a plurality of *onta*, are in reality said with reference to the one, undifferentiated Being — the antecedent of *tōi* being *to eon*, the subject of *emenai*, which immediately precedes. It is not, as Woodbury alleges, strictly anachronistic to see an opposition between name and reality at this date; the opposition first occurs at *Od.* 4.710, and is frequently exploited thereafter (cf. Heinemann [above, n.2] 43 ff). But the reading *onoma estai* causes interpretive difficulty in other ways. (1) If we translate *onoma* as “mere name,” we are faced with the problem that the list that follows includes one item, *einai*, that is surely more than this — cf. B. Jones, “Parmenides’ ‘The Way of Truth,’” *JourHist-Philos* 11 (1973) 387–398. (2) *Katethento* at 8.55 takes as its object not the names but the “forms for naming”; *onomastai* would allow us to preserve the parallelism. (3) We will be faced with the acute problem that although fr. 2 tells us you cannot think of (*gnoiēs*) or speak of (*phrasais*) what is not, mortals will here be doing just

no intelligible or well-based distinction between one name and another.³⁸

What does a philosopher mean when he alleges that our beliefs about the world are mere conventions, simply something that we have set down for ourselves?³⁹ Before we can go further with Parmenides, we need to understand some of the possible implications of this antithesis between the conventional and the true. A return to our Aristophanic example will help us: "Wasn't it a man who first set down this convention, a man like you and me, who won over the people of his time by speaking? Well, then, is it any less open to me, too, to make a new convention for sons for the future, that they should beat their fathers in return?" Pheidippides' speech, despite its elements of philosophical burlesque, brings out very clearly several important elements of the conventionalist's claim about the beliefs (or practices) to which he ascribes conventional status.

(1) They are man-made (whether, as here, they are envisaged as explicitly invented and adopted at a particular time, or whether, as in many of the more serious discussions, they are seen as having formed themselves over a long stretch of human history).

(2) They are contingent, not necessary; they could be otherwise.

that; with *onomastai*, this difficulty is removed, since all thought and speech, even erring thought and speech, will be *really* pointing at what is. (This is confirmed by 8.35-36: "You will not find thought without what-is, to which it stands committed." On these lines, and related questions, see the useful analysis by K. von Fritz, "*Nous*, *Noein*, and Their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy," in Mourelatos, *Presocratics* [above, n.5] 23-85 [originally *CP* 40 (1945) 223-242, and 41 (1946) 12-34], at 45-49.) *Onomastai* involves some smaller difficulties of its own: the simple dative *tōi* for *epi tōi* is, as defenders admit, entirely unparalleled; the form *onomastai* for *ōnomastai* is odd, though it does occur, apparently, at B 9.1.

Myles Burnyeat, in a forthcoming paper, has made a suggestion that may solve the difficulty. Using 9.1 as a guide to Parmenides' construction with *onomastai* — the verb there has a double nominative, both subject and complement — he suggests that in 8.38 the subject comes from *to ge* in 37, i.e., *to eon*. It, *to eon*, "has been given all the names which mortals instituted from a conviction of their truth, viz. 'coming into being'," etc. "It is now only from within the beliefs of mortals that the names do in fact belong to the subject, with whose nature most of them are in contradiction." (*Tōi* is translated "wherefore.") See "Idealism and Greek Philosophy," in *Idealism — Past and Present*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures vol. 13.

³⁸ This does not really follow; but it is hard to see how Parmenides, for whom even the distinctness of *one* name from its object is an embarrassment (cf. n.35), could admit distinctions of sense among names of the single object that is.

³⁹ On recent conventionalism, see refs. in nn.1 and 9.

(This would frequently also be taken to imply that they are not eternally fixed — by the many Greek thinkers, at any rate, who would endorse some form of the principle of plenitude, that no possibility remains unactualized over an infinite time.⁴⁰)

(3) They have no claim to absolute or objective truth. To reveal them to be (mere) *nomos* is often to deny them a privileged status they might have been thought to claim. Conventionalism is thus frequently associated with skeptical denials that we can have access to the real truth — either about a restricted area of human inquiry, or about the universe as a whole. We also see in Parmenides, and in other Greek thinkers as well, an inference in the other direction: if our beliefs do not have a secure grasp on what is, then they must be merely conventional. The fifth-century Pythagorean Ecphantus “said that it was not possible to obtain true knowledge (*alēthínēn gnōsin*) of the things that are (*tōn ontōn*), but only to make distinctions (*horízein*) as is conventional (*hōs nomizein*).”⁴¹ These inferences, as we shall see, leave a number of possibilities unexplored.

Frequently associated with conventionalism are two further claims that are less obviously contained in the assertion that our beliefs (practices) are conventions; they are not implied by the preceding.

(4) They are completely arbitrary. No one set is better than any other; there is no good reason to prefer one set above another. (A weaker version of this claim might say only that there exist a certain number of intelligible alternatives, and that it does not matter which among these we choose.) This claim is stronger than any made by Pheidippides; he implies, indeed, that one’s own selfish desires give one good reason to alter a convention that would hinder their fulfillment. In fact, whenever conventionalism is held as a thesis just about the status of some subset of our beliefs, it is easy to argue that our true beliefs, the ones that really do make contact with the nature of things, can provide us with reasons to accept or reject various merely conventional beliefs. A moral conventionalist, for example, might hold that our knowledge of the natural desires of the human animal gives us reason to accept or reject various sets of moral principles — as promoting happiness, for example, or as

⁴⁰ On the role of this principle in early thought, see J. Hintikka, “Aristotle on the Realization of Possibilities in Time,” *Time and Necessity* (Oxford 1973).

⁴¹ On Ecphantus, see Guthrie (above, n.4), 323–424; and G. Vlastos’ review of Raven, *Pythagoreans* (above, n.6), in *Gnomon* 29 (1953) 29–35, at 32, n.1. Note the Eleatic contrast between true reality and convention, the use of philosophical terms like *onta* and *horízein*. It is of some interest that Philolaus’ attack might be further motivated by Eleatic sympathies in his own school.

too constraining to human impulses. But for a conventionalist who calls into question the grounding of all our beliefs, it is hard not to make the further claim of arbitrariness. If we have no route to an objective grasp of reality, what can be a good reason to hold or not to hold a particular set of conventions? Even internal inconsistency or disorder would be a drawback only in terms of known human aims and purposes that would be impeded by such chaos in the system of beliefs. And the very idea of consistency is being claimed by the philosopher to be internal to the system of convention; it cannot be employed as a standard by which to assess its adequacy.

(5) We can believe (do) otherwise. We are free to alter the beliefs (practices) in question for reasons of our own, or even for no reason.⁴² A belief (practice) might be called conventional just because it is man-made and contingent, and yet be seen to be so deeply rooted in human life that we, as a group or as individuals, are not simply at liberty to alter it.⁴³ (Even if we might have had different beliefs simply by being born into a different actual human society, as will often prove the case with moral beliefs, it is not clear from this alone that we are now at liberty to change them as we like.) But part of the philosopher's claim, "These beliefs (practices) are *only* (or *merely*) conventions," often turns out to be a claim that we can in fact put them aside and adopt others if we like. It is implied that there are clear and intelligible alternatives, and that it is up to us to choose. Pheidippides takes this freedom to follow directly from the man-made, contingent nature of moral beliefs; though it does not, it is an integral part of what many conventionalists would want to claim.

The antithesis between convention and truth did not arise very naturally, in the course of critical questioning about knowledge, as a claim about the status of all our mortal beliefs. Its natural development occurred in contexts where thinkers were locating differences among the various kinds of beliefs we hold and giving reasons to find some of them contingent, man-made, and/or replaceable, in contrast to others that

⁴² Compare Dummett's characterization of a "full-blooded" mathematical conventionalism (Pitcher [above, n.2] 427): "At each step we are free to choose to accept or reject the proof; there is nothing in our formulation of the axioms and of the rules of inference, and nothing in our minds when we accepted these before the proof was given, which of itself shows whether we shall accept the proof or not; and hence there is nothing which *forces* us to accept the proof."

⁴³ Cf. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason* (above, n.9) ch. 5, "Natural and Conventional"; Stroud, on the other hand ("Wittgenstein" [above, n.2]) uses "convention" to designate only that which we are always free to alter, contrasting this sort of convention with Wittgenstein's "facts of natural history."

seemed to be more deeply grounded, firmer, more necessary.⁴⁴ Thus empirical evidence of the widespread intersocietal differences in moral, political, and religious beliefs gave rise to a distinction between convention and nature that corresponded, roughly, to a distinction between the society-relative and that which is broadly shared by all human (animal) societies, and therefore apparently more deeply grounded in our human (animal) nature. If the Egyptians are people like us, in certain general ways, then (the argument goes) we can adopt their moral or political conventions in place of our own, if it turns out to suit our purposes; and we can no longer justify our peculiar practices just by saying they are right or true, or by claiming that they are grounded in (human) nature.

But Parmenides starts from no such empirical observations, only from the vague anxiety we feel when we wonder how it is possible for our thought and speech to grasp reality. Arguing entirely *a priori* from the conditions of successful discourse, he rejects all our ordinary beliefs as based on a single error, the countenancing of a plurality of forms, that renders all that follows utterly senseless and without foundation. From his account of the nature of what is, he proceeds without further argument to the endorsement of a strong conventionalism about all our beliefs, a conventionalism that advances all the claims distinguished above.

(1) They are man-made: mortals "set them down," "posited" forms for naming, "fabricated" the way of error.

(2) They are contingent: neither of the two forms "should have been," and the only time they "had to have genuine existence" was the time before men started judging by reason as the goddess urges, shaking off the bondage of constraining "habit."⁴⁵

(3) They are without claim to objective truth: mortals "know nothing"; in their name giving they "go astray"; their way is a "deceitful ordering of words," "not true," one that must not deceive the initiate into the Way of Truth.

(4) They are completely arbitrary: no one set is better than any other. (This has been argued above.)

(5) We can choose to do without them. This claim is the most radical

⁴⁴ For general discussions and examples, see the works cited in n.79 below.

⁴⁵ In contrast to these changing and contingent beliefs and practices, Parmenides describes Truth in terms that suggest necessity and immutability. Dike holds what-is in fetters that it will not slacken (8.13-14); "a powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of limit, that constrain it round about" (8.30-31); "Destiny has fettered it to be whole and unchanging" (8.37-38).

in the entire poem, and it is not directly argued. But the entire argument of the poem relies on it. The youth begins with a journey that takes him far from human paths; he is instructed not to follow habit, not to be taken in by the deceitful fabric of mortal convention. It is said that once we perform the rational operations demanded by the goddess we will come to know "the heart of persuasive Truth" — and then we will understand not only how mortal beliefs are in error, but also why they "had to have genuine existence" for those for whom they were the whole of things. We *can* come to understand our fundamental error. We *can* give up erroneous beliefs, even the fundamental one, the belief in a plurality of forms, on which all the others are based. The strong conventionalist, by his claim that we *can* do (believe) otherwise, means that we can choose to adopt other conventions. Parmenides means something stronger still: that we can choose to do without convention altogether, we can become, in thought, wholly other than we are. The poem's use of the language of religious initiation is not simply decorative, but fundamental to its meaning. By the use of human reason, we are to be converted away from our humanity.

It is crucial to see what a paradoxical claim this is. Many philosophers have endorsed a partial conventionalism about some of our beliefs; some have even endorsed all five points about beliefs (practices) in a restricted area. Still others would be willing to claim (1), (2), and (3) about all our beliefs; but they would be especially likely to stress the depth of convention in our human lives, to deny that it is up to us to choose and to change all the conventions by which we live. Parmenides, admittedly, says nothing about how we are to live by the Way of Truth, and the omission is not surprising. Perhaps he believes that its insights must be lost from view as soon as we return to the city again and begin to go about the business of living human lives.⁴⁶ But it remains clear that he believes we are capable, by the use of reason, of prying ourselves loose from all that mortals think and see — and that there is no good reason to choose one "false" way above another.

The philosopher eager to reply to Eleatic conventionalism must choose among several possible strategies. It will be useful to distinguish a few of these before turning to Philolaus.

(a) The mildest reply would be one that left untouched Parmenides' basic distinction between reality and convention, and his denial of objective truth to mortal beliefs, but attacked the claim that what we

⁴⁶ Cf. Hume's criticism of the ancient skeptics' claim that skepticism can be an ongoing way of life: *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, sec. 12, pt. 2.

say is a matter of *mere* convention in the sense urged by (4) and (5). One might argue that although our beliefs are man-made and contingent, without a claim to truth, it is not possible for us to dispense with them any time we choose to; they are, perhaps, forced upon us by the nature of our sensory apparatus — or just too deeply grounded in the nature of human history and current human practices to be susceptible of being uprooted.⁴⁷ The very deep-rootedness of our beliefs might then be urged as a reason why we should make the best of them, rather than strain to get to the point where we can adopt others. (This would not, of course, be good reason not to pursue Truth, if that could some day be found.)

(b) One might make the preceding argument and urge, in addition, that we reject (1): our beliefs might be contingent and subjective without being made by us. Facts about natural chemistry, or social geography, or the gods might have determined the way we think and see, without our creative participation.

(c) The philosopher might continue to acknowledge that our beliefs could be otherwise, and that they cannot claim to be true of things as they are in themselves, while nonetheless insisting that the only world available for inquiry and speech is the apparent world, the world of human belief. If there is a real world unlike the world given us in perception and thought, it will be unknowable by us.⁴⁸ (Within the sphere of human belief, he would then need to distinguish beliefs that appear to be fixed by the limitations of our nature from those that are conventional in a more full-blooded sense. Such a problem would lead naturally to a study of our cognitive apparatus.)

(d) Finally, the philosopher may claim that we can, in fact, using our human faculties, have at least some genuine objective knowledge of the world of nature, and that this knowledge does not, as Parmenides claims, show our ordinary beliefs to be radically in error. Empedocles made

⁴⁷ Parmenides probably could not accept replies like these, since it would seem to commit him to accepting the reality of the body, or of numerically distinct living beings. Though the poem gives every appearance of admitting both of these, the admission would not be consonant with a strict or literal interpretation of Parmenides' argument. On the difficulty of knowing how literally to read the poem, and how to understand its use of words and concepts its conclusion makes inadmissible, see Owen, "Plato and Parmenides" (above, n.24), and Williams (above, n.35).

⁴⁸ Some such thinking may be what underlies Gorgias' famous argument (B3) that what is, is unknowable. If directed, as it seems to be, against the Eleatics, it may amount to the claim that Parmenides' undifferentiated being is ungraspable by us as such.

such an argument in response to the Eleatic challenge — but by appealing to divine authority. (His claim, in fr. B 112, that he walks among men “as a god” is presumably not unconnected with the confident assertion in B 114: “O friends, I know [*oída*] that truth is in the words I speak to you.”) But a fifth-century philosopher would be more likely to be satisfied if some different, purely human line of argument could be developed.

Philolaus will present an argument that contains elements of both our third and our last lines of response. It is notoriously hard to decide where a philosopher’s views fit between these alternatives. In some cases, indeed, he may well want to say both that we are stuck with the world of our experience and that we have some objective knowledge of the world as it is. I think it will be clear that Philolaus wishes to claim that our knowledge, or some of it, is objective — though it will be a different, and more difficult, matter to say whether this claim, and the relevant sense of “objective” in it, makes his view in any way incompatible with position (c).

PHILOLAUS: THE FRAGMENTS ABOUT THOUGHT

The interpreter of these fragments must steer a delicate course between overcautiousness and anachronism. If he makes the fragments look too philosophically vital, he will be a target for those who, like Bywater, Raven, and Frank,⁴⁹ use interest and complexity as criteria of inauthenticity. If he is attempting to establish authenticity, he is often tempted to do so by showing that there is nothing exciting there. Thus even Burkert, whose sound philological judgment has done more than anything else in recent years to rehabilitate many of the fragments as genuine examples of late fifth-century thought, too often does so at Philolaus’ expense, proving the material early by claiming it to be crude, mystical, or lacking in philosophical awareness. Since my aim is to point out what is interesting and deep in the fragments, I expect to be challenged by both groups. It should, however, at least be clearer by now that Raven’s remarks about the problem of knowledge cannot be trusted. By this time, even in the absence of any other example of either ordinary or philosophical speculation on the subject, a compelling challenge to do epistemology had been extended to all by Parmenides’ radical conclusions. It was always foolish to assume that whatever is interesting in Greek philosophy is Platonic or later. Plato, and especially

⁴⁹ Above, nn.5 and 6.

Aristotle, make no secret of their debts to a philosophical and critical tradition. Nor need we assume that whatever is genuine and important in his predecessors would have been recorded by Aristotle;⁵⁰ on such a principle we must reject a great deal of Parmenides and Anaxagoras, almost all of Heraclitus — in short, much of what we accept and value in the pre-Socratics. One must indeed be cautious of reading later distinctions into early fragments, and suspicious of fragments whose vocabulary and expression seem indebted to work of Plato and Aristotle. But it is quite a different matter to say that a genuine fifth-century text cannot adumbrate a view which Plato or Aristotle develops in a different way, using different language, and to imply that real philosophical originality must be the private property of these two men. I shall try to indicate as carefully as space allows why I do not feel my interpretation of the fragments jeopardizes their claim to authenticity; for many other detailed arguments, the reader must consult Burkert's admirable treatment.

In what follows, I shall be reading Philolaus' arguments as a response to Eleatic conventionalism. Certainly they may be treated as providing us with an argument to use against Parmenides, regardless of Philolaus' own intentional target. But a strong case can also be made for the further claim that they are a deliberate response.

(1) First we can argue from the general history of Greek philosophy in this period. No major philosopher appears ignorant of the Eleatic challenge; indeed Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, most probably also Gorgias, are all concerned with it in a very central way. It is hard to believe that Philolaus would not have known Parmenides' poem, or, knowing it, would have written on knowledge without having its argument in view.

(2) When a philosopher takes great pains to deny a view, especially when it is an odd and counter-intuitive view, we are naturally inclined, if we do not assume him to be a rhetorical joker or a fool, to look for someone who had asserted that view as a possible target for his argument. When someone asserts the obvious, again, we look for a context in which the obvious has come into question. Nobody but the Eleatics denied the world of nature is composed of distinct, denumerable parts, or that our knowledge of that world was bound up with our ability to pick out those parts. When we combine this with the reflection that only the Eleatics had been at pains to deny that the world is a combination of the *perainon* and the *apeiron* — a much more specific claim, with

⁵⁰ Raven, in Kirk and Raven (above, n.6) 310–311. On Frank's version of this argument, cf. Guthrie I (above, n.4) 331–332.

rather specialized language — and that Philolaus is also at pains to examine this denial, arguing against both the Parmenidean and the Melissan alternatives, we have good reason to read him in the Eleatic tradition.

(3) Parmenides' argument, unlike other contemporary reflections about knowledge, begins not from some sifting of empirical evidence, but abstracting from experience, from the conditions of thought and talk. Philolaus' argument, unlike all other known replies to the Way of Truth, follows him, judging his *elenchos* by reason, as his goddess had urged.

(4) The technique of Philolaus' argument in B 2, as several critics have noticed, is characteristically Eleatic: it is a proof by refutation, beginning with a statement of alternative "ways," and ending with a single "way" remaining. This technique is found in all three Eleatic thinkers, and in no other examples of fifth-century epistemology.

(5) To these points we might add several smaller ones: Philolaus' preoccupation with the Eleatic favorites, *peras* and *apeiron* (as well as with their arguments about them — cf. (2) above); his interest in rehabilitating words like *phusis* and *kosmos*, which had fallen under Eleatic proscription; his self-conscious use of plural nouns and the past tense, often cited as evidence for an Eleatic connection in Anaxagoras.⁵¹ The opening of Philolaus B 1 contains in each of its words as obvious a challenge to Eleaticism as does the opening of Anaxagoras' book. And Anaxagoras' first fragment has been held by every major critic to be directed carefully and deliberately against Parmenides. We must at least say, I think, that the evidence for linking Philolaus with the Eleatics is no less strong, and quite probably a good deal stronger, than in this rarely disputed case.

Philolaus is commonly thought to have held that numbers are the principles of all things, and that knowledge is not possible without numbers. Putting his claims this way — and thinking of numbers the way we often do, as abstract entities, separable from bodies either in thought or in reality⁵² — this thesis is difficult even to comprehend and impossible to locate in any known critical exchange about our knowledge

⁵¹ Another kind of early affinity between Eleaticism and the concerns of Pythagorean philosophy is explored in Burkert, "Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras," *Phronesis* 14 (1969) 1–30; cf. also Lore (above, n.4) 277 ff, which criticizes some other attempts to connect the schools before the time of Philolaus.

⁵² Without endorsing this view, one can still admit that it is a prevalent one and has significantly skewed the interpretation of important Greek texts (cf. esp. the writings of J. Annas, to be discussed below).

of reality. A reexamination will show us more clearly both their philosophical value and their historical place. Such a study can best begin with fragments B 3 and B 4 — which, although not at the very beginning of Philolaus' book, and perhaps, in fact, to be joined to another of our extant fragments, provide us with a succinct statement of the connection Philolaus wishes to make between *arithmos* and *peras* and between both and the success of our cognitive activity.

For there will not even be an object of apprehension⁵³ at all [or, in the first place],⁵⁴ if everything is unbounded.

B 4 (from Stobaeus, *Eclogai*, I, 21, 7 b): καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὲν τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε οὐδέν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου.

And, indeed,⁵⁵ all objects of apprehension have *arithmos*; for it is not possible for us to think of or apprehend anything without this.

Both these fragments say something about the necessary conditions for human cognitive activity. They assume that a certain operation, *gignōskein*, actually takes place; and they infer from this something about what the world must be like, by arguing that on a certain conception of the world this operation would not be possible. We must, then, begin with the interpretation of *gignōskein*. And we must ascertain whether the premise that there are *gignōskein* and *gignōskomena* is one that begs any of the questions at issue, or one that can be accepted by Philolaus and the Eleatics alike.

If Philolaus had argued, "The world must be such-and-such; for otherwise we could have no certain knowledge," or "no sure knowledge of it through our own experience," a skeptical or Eleatic opponent would simply reply, "But we don't; so your point is simply academic." Or, in the case of Parmenides, "But we don't — not from our own experience; only by the argument of the Way of Truth and the revelation of the goddess — which prove, in fact, that the world must have a different character." But of the skeptical and critical remarks we have studied, not one denies that mortals *gignōskein*, or that there are *gignō-*

B 3 (from Iamblichus in *Nicom.* 7, 24): ἀρχὰν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ γνωσούμενον ἐσσεῖται πάντων ἀπείρων ἐόντων.

⁵³ On *gnōsoutēmonon* as passive, see Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4) 260 n.107, and Boeckh (above, n.5) p. 49. The meaning of *gignōskein* will be discussed below.

⁵⁴ On the adverbial use of *archan*, see Boeckh (above, n.5) 49 and n.1, and *LSJ* s.v.; relevant parallels include Hdt. 1.9, 2.28, 8.132, 3.39, 1.193; Soph. *Antig.* 92, *Ph.* 1239, *El.* 439; Antiphon 5.73; Pl. *Gorg.* 478 c.

⁵⁵ On *ga man*, see Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford 1954) 347 ff.

skomena. The word used to designate the kind of certain knowledge which is denied utterly to mortals is, consistently, *eidēnai*: *oudē ti idmen* in the *Iliad*; *eidotes ouden* in Theognis; *estai eidōs* and *ouk oide* in Xenophanes (B 34); *eidotes ouden* (B 6.7) in Parmenides. It is never said that mortals *gignōskein ouden*, or even *noousi ouden*. What can be said is that their *gignōskein* or *gnōsis* is accurate or inaccurate (Democritus B 8), true or false (Ecphantus 51.1), of the *onta* or not (Melissus B 8), divine or mortal (Philolaus B 6); that their *noos* or *noēma* is misguided (Parm. B 6.6), or takes the wrong path (B 7.2); not, apparently, that *noein* and *gignōskein* do not go on in them at all.⁵⁶

But this is not surprising, since neither *noein* nor *gignōskein* means "to know" or "to know with certainty," especially at the period in which we are interested. Both refer to cognitive activities which it is generally conceded we mortals perform, though with varying success. (Early Greek skepticism seems to have limited itself to questioning our cognitive relationship with problematic aspects of the world outside us; there is no suggestion that a thinker of this period ever questioned his own existence, or the fact that he thought, reasoned, apprehended; not even, in most cases, the fact that he had, or was, a body.) The particular activity that is most likely to be called *gignōskein* from an early date — as the fine studies by Snell and von Fritz have shown⁵⁷ — is the activity of apprehending an object, recognizing it, often identifying it. It would be chosen in preference to other cognitive words, von Fritz argues concerning Homeric usage, where stress is laid on the fact that a definite object is recognized and identified *as* something — especially after having first been seen as indefinite. Snell extends these conclusions to the sixth and fifth centuries as well: "The thing apprehended is grasped as a certain sort of object, in its What-it-is, e.g., I recognize an appearance as a tree."⁵⁸ We also find *gignōskein* used of reidentifying after a lapse of time, and of recognizing similarities between A and B on the basis of which we might classify them together, or give them the same name. Indeed, Snell's conclusion is that *gignōskein* is "most intimately bound up" with the activity of name giving.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ This cognitive and linguistic activity is directed at what is (cf. n.37 above, on 8.38–39). It fails, however (in Parmenides' view) to grasp it in its real or true nature: the *way* mortals do their thinking is radically misguided. See the helpful comments of von Fritz (above, n.37) 45–49.

⁵⁷ B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie* (Berlin 1924); K. von Fritz, "Noos and Noein in the Homeric Poems," *CP* 38 [1943] 79–83), and "Nous . . . in Pre-Socratic Philosophy" (above, n.37).

⁵⁸ Snell (above, n.57) 21. Cf., for example, *Il.* 16.333 ff, 11.110, 23.356.

⁵⁹ Snell, 23. On the addition of *noein* to *gignōskein* in B 4, see below.

Philolaus appears, then, to be starting with a premise that any opponent of his would be bound to accept: that *gignōskein* goes on. For Parmenides and Melissus, no less than he, agree that human beings have cognitive experience, that they recognize, classify, and name things. The Doxa of Parmenides is the story of a name giving; the activity is alleged to have been badly done (cf. 8.54), but the fact of the activity is never questioned. Never does Parmenides attempt to deny to mortals their experience of the phenomenal world; he simply denies that these recognizing, classifying, and namings have any reliable connection with external reality. Mortals' *nous* and *gignōskein* are functioning, but astray; they do not obey the conditions of genuine (or successful) thought. Philolaus' task will be to argue against Parmenides that the limits of our ordinary *gignōskein* reveal something about the real nature of the world.

B 3 insists that there will be no object of recognition — nothing to be picked out, sorted, experienced as a distinct particular, if the world is entirely *apeiron* — boundless, undifferentiated.⁶⁰ Parmenides has argued that to be a proper object of thought or talk, what is *must* be undifferentiated: "Nor is it divided [or: divisible — *diaireton*], since it all alike *is*."⁶¹ Nor is it in any way more here, which would prevent it from being continuous (*sunechesthai*), or in any way less, but all of it is full of being. Therefore it is all continuous (*suneches*) — for what is is in contact with what is" (8.22–25). To make distinction, to mark off A from B, is to commit oneself to saying and thinking what is not: "There is A here, but not there," "Theaetetus is sitting, therefore he is not flying." The only universe that one can think without being committed to absurdity is a unitary one, with no internal boundaries or demarcations. Of such a world one can say simply, "The whole of it is full of what is." Thought is "committed to what is" (8.35–6).⁶² If what is had distinctions or divisions in it, thought would be committed to think those distinctions — committed, therefore, to the unthinkable.⁶³

⁶⁰ On the early meaning of *apeiron*, see Ch. Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology* (New York 1960) 231 ff; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1968) s.v.; M. Kaplan, "Apeiros and Circularity," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 125–140.

⁶¹ For the translation of *homoion* as adverbial, see the convincing arguments of Owen, "EQ" (above, n.26), 58–59 and n.39, now defended by Stokes (above, n.26) 134–135 and n.89.

⁶² B 8.35–6; for the translation and interpretation, see Mourelatos, *Route* (above, n.19) 164–172.

⁶³ Parmenides wants, at the same time, to insist that his universe, though *internally* without divisions, is bounded as a whole (*en peirasi desmōn*, 8.26;

Against this, Philolaus' argument urges that the possibility of cognitive experience depends, in fact, on the falsity of Parmenides' conclusions: for there to be an object of recognition (*gnōsoumenon*), there *must* be distinctions in things. To *gignōskein* something is to set it off from other things, to distinguish and bound it, to be able to say what it is not, as well as what it is.

Now at this point Parmenides might respond by conceding that this may well be true of *gignōskein*, a peculiar cognitive operation performed by erring mortals — and yet that this gives us no reliable evidence about reality, since all mortal *gignōskein* distinctions might be falsely imposed on the unitary nature of being. If Philolaus insists that *gignōskein* is not, like *eidenai*, a success verb, and that what he means is that the very existence of *gignōskein* activity, conceded by Parmenides, presupposes distinctions in things, Parmenides might then just possibly be willing to give up *gignōskein* to maintain his argument about *noein* and its conditions. One particular cognitive operation we speak of cannot take place at all, because it violates the conditions of the primary one. But notice now how tenuous his position becomes. His argument is, no less than Philolaus', an argument about the conditions of thought; if he can be convicted of having produced an *unthinkable* universe, he will be defeated by his own criteria. His version of skepticism, with its deep respect for the genuineness of human thought and the commitment of thought to what is, cannot afford lightly to dismiss an opponent who argues that he himself is saying the unthinkable. A skeptic who was willing to grant that all thought is illusion and that the conditions of successful discourse and reflection are a matter of complete indifference to metaphysics would not be vulnerable in just this way. But Parmenides justifies his bizarre conclusions only in the name of thought; the most appropriate opposition is, then, one which charges *him* with undermining thought. If Philolaus can successfully establish not only a parochial claim about a single cognitive activity, but a broader claim about the conditions of thought in general, he will have dealt a serious blow to Eleatic monism.

peiratos en desmois . . . *to min amphis eergei*, 31; *en peirasi kurei*, 49; *peiras pumatōn, tetelesmenon* . . . *pantōthen*, 42–43). As these passages suggest (esp. the last), the implication of *peiras* is not that there is something else *from which* what is is being set off, but to emphasize its completeness, definiteness, and stability. (Cf. Owen, "EQ" [above, n.26], 64–68.) Parmenides wants to hold that thought's object must be definite and demarcated, without conceding that this implies distinctness *from*, therefore a plural universe. Melissus tries to gloss over this highly revealing paradox by making the universe altogether *apeiron*.

And it appears that Philolaus does, indeed, mean to enunciate a general thesis. I have stressed the particular implications of *gignōskein* in order to show that Philolaus' premise is one his opponents accept: *gignōskein* is not "certain knowing"; and to explain why *gignōskein* might have become, as it clearly is, the favorite cognitive word of a man preoccupied with making distinctions, classifying, and (it will emerge) counting. But B 4 leaves no doubt that he means to apply his argument as widely as possible to all of human thinking. For here, although he uses only the word *gignōskomena* to designate the objects of cognition, he uses both *gignōskein* and *noein* for the activity,⁶⁴ thus reminding us that, even should we choose to use Parmenides' term of choice for human thought, the same remains true of its conditions: there must be distinctions in things for that thought to grasp. But this runs ahead of our argument — for we have not yet established that the claims of B 4 are indeed similar to those of B 3.

B 3 is in certain obvious ways incomplete. We have had an argument which says that thought is possible only in a world with some distinctions or boundaries. We have not yet been told that every object of thought must be a distinct or bounded object, nor have we explicitly ruled out the possibility that the universe is indeed externally bounded, but internally without distinctions. The wording of B 3 may suggest that Philolaus had Melissus' completely unbounded universe uppermost in his mind; but B 4 will leave no doubt that the conclusion applies to the One of Parmenides as well.

"All objects of recognition have *arithmos*; for it is not possible for us to think of or apprehend [recognize] anything without this." So far we have encountered nothing particularly mysterious or mystical in Philolaus; instead a claim, both simple and cogent, about what thought and talk require. But in this fragment it is usually assumed that we meet some rather peculiar Pythagorean theory about the magical powers of numbers, conceived of as separate entities in their own right. I would like to argue that we should translate and interpret this fragment in the most straightforward and ordinary way — insofar as we can determine what the ordinary sense of it would have been at this time. It will emerge, I think, that it makes sense, and says something interesting, on this purely ordinary level, without the introduction of any extra doctrinal apparatus; indeed, that the importation of alien apparatus has obscured the philosophical importance of the text.

A claim is being made, once again, about the objects of *gignōskein* (and, it emerges, *noein* as well); only this time it is clearly a claim about

⁶⁴ Cf. Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4) 260 n.108.

what *every* object of thought must be like. It must have *arithmos*; and the reason for this (*gar*) is that *arithmos* is a necessary condition for both *noein* and *gignōskein*. The interpretation of the phrase *arithmon echonti* is clearly the pivotal point in the interpretation of this fragment — and, in fact, of Philolaus' epistemology. "Hat Zahl," reads the translation of Diels-Kranz, quasi-literally, but somewhat obscurely. "Contain number," reads Raven.⁶⁵ And the standard assumption about the fragment made by critics appears to be that something rather mysterious is being said about the role of numbers, abstract entities, as causes of our knowledge of the physical world. Thus Raven can argue that evidence that fifth-century Pythagoreans were concerned primarily with physical, and not abstract, phenomena should be understood to cast doubt on this fragment, which he calls "peculiarly Platonic" — implying, as he thinks it does, the existence of a special sort of stable reality.⁶⁶ Fortunately this is a situation in which the case for authenticity and the cause of philosophical merit can be advanced at one and the same time by a proper understanding of what *arithmos* and *arithmon echein* could mean in fifth-century philosophy.⁶⁷

English "number" and German "Zahl" are misleading as translations for Greek *arithmos*. We tend to think that in speaking of "number" or "numbers" we may be speaking of a certain sort of entity distinct from ordinary objects, using which we count, do mathematics, and so on. We also regard one and zero as numbers, as well as fractions, irrationals, and negatives. Asked for some examples of numbers, we might name 1, 2, 3, 0, $\frac{1}{2}$, -5 , $\sqrt{2}$, and the like. We would not be very likely to answer, "This row of chairs, this pile of apples." But for the Greek of the fifth century, asked to give examples of *arithmoi*, this would be the primary and most frequent sort of answer. As Aristotle remarks at *Physics* 219^b5–9, there are two senses of the Greek word *arithmos*: that

⁶⁵ DK 44 B 6, I 408; Raven in Kirk and Raven (above, n.6) 310.

⁶⁶ Raven, Kirk and Raven (above, n.6) 311.

⁶⁷ Burkert's work on this phrase (*Lore* [above, n.4] 260–266 and notes) provides an excellent basis for interpreting the fragment. It is somewhat surprising that Burkert himself stops short of ascribing a definite sense to B 4; and he even charges that Philolaus, having to hand material useful "in avoiding Eleatic *aporai* about being," "clearly did not recognize its significance" (267). This is the most disappointing result of Burkert's philosophical caution; one can use the conclusions of his philological investigation to better advantage. Other valuable studies of *arithmos* in early Greek thought are: Oskar Becker, *Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik, Klassisch-Philologische Studien* 17 (1957) 20 ff; Julius Stenzel, *Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1933) 25 ff; and now Julia Annas' rich and valuable commentary, *Aristotle's Metaphysics M and N* (Oxford, Clarendon Aristotle Series, 1976).

with which we count (*arithmos hōi arithmoumen*) and that which gets counted (*arithmos arithmoumenos*). It is the second sense which predominates by far in Aristotle's own usage and, even more obviously, in earlier writers. The most general sense of *arithmos* in ordinary Greek of the fifth century would be that of an ordered plurality or its members, a countable system or its countable parts. The notion of *arithmos* is always very closely connected with the operation of counting. To be an *arithmos*, something must be such as to be counted — which usually means that it must either have discrete and ordered parts or be a discrete part of a larger whole. To give the *arithmos* of something in the world is to answer the question "how many" about it. And when the Greek answers "two" or "three" he does not think of himself as introducing an extra entity, but as dividing or measuring the entities already in question. Aristotle claims that Greek *arithmos* is a relative term: it is always *of* something, and is not separable from that of which it is (cf. *Metaph.* 1092^b19 and *Peri Ideōn* fr. 4). (Thus zero is not an *arithmos*, even in Greek mathematics, since there is no such thing as a null group to be counted; there is a great deal of debate even about *one*, since we do not count the unitary.) To speak of things being *arithmoi*, or made of *arithmoi* is, then — as Aristotle points out in *Metaphysics I* (1053^b28 ff) — only to say that they are countable, classifiable, measurable: "If the things that are were colors, then the things that are would be an *arithmos* — but *of* something, and, obviously, of colors; and the unit (*to hen*) would be some particular color (*ti hen*), e.g., white." If we say that *onta* are *arithmoi*, we need be introducing no entities over and above the ordinary ones — indeed, no particular sorts of entities at all.⁶⁸ We imply only that we have some way of making divisions and doing counting, that we see the world as a plurality with discrete parts. Aristotle frequently associates *arithmos* with the divided (*diōrismenon*) as opposed to the continuous (*suneches*): see *Cat.* 4^b23, 36; *Ph.* 220^b3; *DA* 425^a19; and cf. *Parm.* 8.22–25. If a group is an *arithmos*, we use "many" and "few" of it, rather than "large" and "small" — *Ph.* 220^b2–3. Having *arithmos* is equated with having *peras* in the *Rhetoric* (1409^a31), in a passage where Aristotle also concludes that the clearly demarcated and measurable verse forms are the easiest to grasp and memorize. (Cf. also *Metaph.* 1032^b22, *Rhet.* 1408^b27 ff, where *arithmos* is connected with *gignōskein*, and *Metaph.* 1053^a18, where measuring and dividing are associated with *gnōrizein* of the *ousia*.)

I have begun with some of Aristotle's remarks about *arithmos*, since

⁶⁸ This point is stressed by Annas in her commentary, and also in her "Aristotle on Time, Number, and Motion," *PhQ* 25 (1975).

he reflects in a sensitive way about ordinary use and elaborates its distinctions more explicitly than other authors. But an examination of the pre-Platonic evidence substantiates his judgment. *Arithmos* is a plurality, or an item in such a plurality, designated as appropriate for measurement or counting. In Homer, *arithmos* is usually a group of men, considered as of a certain size — the connection with counting (*arithmein*) is strongly felt (*Od.* 4.45, 16.234, 246; cf. *Il.* 2.124). In Hesiod (fr. MW 278), to tell the *arithmos* is to say how many of something there are, to be able to count or measure. And to be able to tell the true *arithmos* — to give a correct answer to the “how many” question — is to have a praiseworthy kind of knowledge or grasp of that to which one’s attention is directed. As Burkert points out,⁶⁹ the Homeric use of *arithmos* has aristocratic connotations. The *andrōn arithmos* is contrasted with the *dēmos apeirōn* (the masses of the undemarcated; *Il.* 24.776; cf. *Od.* 11.449, *Il.* 2.202). To be an *anēr*, a heroic man, is to be a member of an orderly body, a nameable, recognizable individual standing in demarcated and recognizable relationships to other men. To be a member of the masses is to be a nameless nobody who could never be picked out as an object of thought or song. The *andrōn arithmos* is the accessible object of the poet’s thought and speech; one cannot grasp the obscure and nameless life of the many. To ask about the *arithmos*, is, from the time of Homer, to ask after that which is definite and there for grasping. To give the *arithmos* is to apprehend and to classify. The limits of the poet’s power are shown precisely in the sphere of *arithmein*: the Homeric poet cannot retain in his thought or speech the entire catalogue of ships,⁷⁰ just as in the Hesiod fragment only the superior prophet can tell the number of figs on the fig tree. Thus from the earliest texts (and fifth-century texts are fully consistent with these) we see the use of *arithmos* to mean that which is counted, and a close association between ability to enumerate and general cognitive capability, between numerability and knowability. Aristotle’s insistence that whatever is a primary *ousia*, a basic building block of our explanations of the world, must be *hen arithmōi* — one in *arithmos*, a countable, definite particular⁷¹ — is

⁶⁹ Burkert, *Lore*, 266.

⁷⁰ *Il.* 2.488; compare Epicharmus’ remarks on the centrality of counting in human life, *DK B* 56 (though the authenticity of this fragment has been questioned).

⁷¹ On the use of this phrase in the *Categories*, see Barrington Jones, “Individuals in Aristotle’s *Categories*,” *Phronesis* 17 (1972) 107–123; his application of these conclusions to controversies about the *Categories* is, however, questionable in the light of *Metaphysics Iota*, and has been effectively challenged by Annas in her “Individuals in Aristotle’s *Categories*: Two Queries,” *Phronesis* 19 (1974) 146–152.

the articulation of an assumption deeply held in the Greek tradition, and no doubt not in that tradition alone.

We are fully justified, then, in understanding Philolaus to mean by *arithmos* not a mysterious abstract entity, but that in the world which is counted or countable. (Aristotle tells us that it was Plato, and not the Pythagoreans, who first separated *arithmoi* from things; and even Plato has not lost the connection of *arithmos* with counting and the "how many" question, as Julia Annas has demonstrated in her penetrating study.⁷²) The question that remains is how we are to understand the whole phrase *arithmon echonti*. The easiest and most neutral translation would appear to be "has whatever makes something countable," "is countable," thus making the phrase roughly equivalent to "has *peras*" in B 3. Everything that is an object of cognition is a definite, bounded thing, which can be singled out, marked off from other things, and counted. It must be countable as part of an ordered system — for *arithmos* implies plurality, meaning either such a plurality or one of its denumerable elements. On this reading, fragment B 4 would be making much the same point as B 3, with several additions: it is now specified that *each* object of cognition must be distinct and countable; it is specified that the requisite sort of distinctness is a distinctness *from* something else — *peras* in the Parmenidean sense is ruled out, and a plurality made the condition of understanding; *noein* is added to *gignōskein* to give the argument clearer anti-Parmenidean force.

One could, however, argue for a stronger reading of *arithmon echonti*: has (in it) a countable plurality (of parts). In most occurrences of the phrase *arithmon echein* elsewhere, this sense is at least possible, sometimes preferable, *arithmos* is being used to designate the plurality, and not simply one of its elements.⁷³ The argument would then be that the object of thought must not only be itself denumerable, it must also have some *internal* articulation — to grasp X in thought is to divide it into its parts or kinds, and a particular which is internally boundless would not be graspable as such. In this case, B 4 would be making a rather different point from B 3, insisting not only that *arithmos*, ordered plurality, is the basis of our thought, but also that each object we grasp is grasped as a plurality of parts. On the weaker reading, we grasp Socrates as a definite particular, apart from other particulars, just in virtue of his being countable or one in number. On the second reading, the idea is probably that we cannot grasp Socrates just as such, but,

⁷² Annas, *Metaphysics M and N* (above, n.67) 49 ff — and esp. *Rep.* 525 cd, *Tht.* 195 d–196 b; *Epinomis* 990 c 6.

⁷³ See the evidence cited in Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4) 261 ff.

instead, as a part of the ordered group "man," which is the primary object of our cognition. This view would have close affinities with the method of definition by collection and division, espoused by Plato in later dialogues, but quite probably current at a much earlier date.⁷⁴ It would also foreshadow the Aristotelian doctrine that to grasp and classify a particular one must grasp it as a member of a kind: secondary substance is epistemologically prior, in the *Categories*, to primary substance. The *Metaphysics* (in one of the books on number) concludes that we know a particular not as such, but only as a member of a kind.⁷⁵ There is almost certainly no way to settle the matter between these two readings; and we should probably prefer the weaker reading for lack of sufficient evidence.

At this point I have sketched the main lines of Philolaus' assault on the Eleatic One: far from being the only possible object of thought, it does not meet the minimal conditions for being an object of cognitive experience. For that, distinctness and boundaries are required, and distinctness implies a plural universe. To grasp an object, we must grasp it as one item, different from others. Before turning to the difficult fragment B 6, in which Philolaus sketches the limitations and the achievements of human *gnōsis*, it will be worth seeing, more briefly, how this interpretation of B 3 and B 4 fits with and illuminates the

⁷⁴ The once common view that it is a complete innovation in Plato's later writings has now been frequently challenged: e.g., by Guthrie (*History* IV [Cambridge 1975] 431 n.1); R. B. Levinson, "Language, Plato, and Logic," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, ed. J. Anton and G. Kustas (Albany 1971) 259-284, at 270; J. S. Morrison argues that the method was current in the fifth century ("The Truth of Antiphon," *Phronesis* 8 [1963] 35-49). Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.5.12, which suggests it was Socratic. On the use of divisions in early Platonic works, see Paul Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (Chicago 1903, repr. 1960) 31 n.200, 51 n.371; E. R. Dodds, *Plato's Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) 226; J. M. E. Moravcsik, "The Anatomy of Plato's Divisions," in *Exegesis and Argument* (above, n.17) 324-348. The method is defended and linked with Aristotelian interests in analysis and linguistic inquiry (in a way which implicitly reveals its ties with earlier thought about language as well) by J. L. Ackrill, "In Defence of Plato's Division," in *Ryle*, ed. O. Wood and G. Pitcher (New York 1970) 373-392.

⁷⁵ The *aporia* of 1003^a6-17 (if the *archai* are universals, they won't be substance; if they are particulars, they won't be *epistētai*) is taken up at the end of *Metaphysics* M, 1086^b32 ff, where it is asked whether the conditions of *epistēmē* require separate abstract entities like Platonic forms — which had been argued to be objectionable on other grounds. Aristotle's solution is to say that the actual object of any actual cognitive activity is always some definite particular (*tode ti ousa toude tinos*, 1087^a18); but we grasp in the particular that which it shares with other particulars, and form a universal notion, which is the basis of *theōria*.

fragments which stood, apparently, at the beginning of Philolaus' book.⁷⁶

B 1: ἡ φύσις δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ ἀρμόχθη ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων, καὶ ὅλος <ὁ> κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα.

The nature of the ordered world has been fitted together from what is unbounded and what sets boundaries — both the whole ordered world and all the things in it.

Here the notion of *peras* is linked with two of the central terms in early Greek philosophy: *phusis* and *kosmos*. *Kosmos* here has the sense “ordered world,” “orderly assembly of things” — a sense which is close to the word's origins; this is underlined by the use of *harmochthē* to describe its composition. We should probably accept Heidel's *tō kosmō* for the *en tōi kosmōi* of the manuscripts⁷⁷ and see the entire phrase as meaning “the *kosmos* itself” or “the *kosmos* in its essential nature”⁷⁸ — for the phrase is picked up later by *holos ho kosmos*. The reading “in the *kosmos*” would not prepare us for the obvious point that Philolaus is here speaking of the *kosmos* as a whole, as well as of entities within it. (Cf. B 2's recapitulation: ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὁ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη; and, at the beginning of B2: τὰ ἑόντα πάντα.)

We should notice first of all the unabashed use of words implying plurality and change, words which Parmenides had not admitted into the Way of Truth. Both *phusis* and *kosmos* — the former suggestive of

⁷⁶ Cf. Diogenes Laertius VIII.85: *peri phuseōs hōn archē hēde*.

⁷⁷ W. A. Heidel, “Notes on Philolaus,” *AJP* 28 (1907) 77–81. Burkert's objections (250 n.58) are not convincing. Anaxagoras' *ta en tōi heni kosmōi* and other passages cited are parallel to *ta en autōi panta* — not to the *phusis* phrase, of which both *ta en autōi* and *holos ho kosmos* are exegetical. The phrase *ha phusis tō kosmō*, far from being suspicious, is the most common construction with *phusis*, and the most obvious way of talking about the real or essential nature of the *kosmos* as a whole. Aristotle makes a central question of cosmology one *peri tēs tou pantos phuseōs, eit' apeiros esti . . .* (DC 268^b11 ff) in a context which strongly recalls our present concerns; for similar expressions see *Metaph.* 984^b9, 987^b2, 1005^a33, *Pol.* 1267^b28, *Ph.* 189^a27. The title *peri phuseōs kosmou* is reported for Democritus (A2, A 31, B 56); cf. also Archytas B 1 (*peri gar tēn tōn holōn phuseōs*), Zeno A 1. Although there is no absolutely unassailable example of our precise phrase in pre-Philolaus material, Burkert's one Euripides fragment with the rival phrase should not seduce us into ignoring what the sense of the passage very plainly requires.

⁷⁸ The use of *phusis* to designate the real nature of X is central to the word's meaning and development (see works cited below, n.79); for “the *phusis* of X” as a periphrasis for “X” or “X in its essential nature,” cf. for example Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin 1870, repr. Graz 1955) 838^a8 ff.

essence as revealed in process, the latter designating an orderly arrangement of a plurality of elements⁷⁹ — are used by Parmenides only in connection with the false world-view of mortals.⁸⁰ Philolaus, however, asserts in his first sentence that the world is a *kosmos* and has a *phusis*, assertions one imagines he could hardly make at this date unless in conscious opposition to Parmenides and in confidence that he has some arguments against the Way of Truth.⁸¹ These words are joined by yet a third which has anti-Eleatic overtones: *harmochthē*. This word, and the associated *harmonia*, are usually used to speak of an *orderly* (or graspable) arrangement of plurality and presuppose opposition. Thus Heraclitus speaks of the hidden *harmoniē* in nature (B 54), and associates this with consonance or balance in diversity: "They do not understand (*ou xuniasin*) how, being at variance, it agrees with itself — a back-turning *harmoniē*, as a bow and a lyre" (B 51).⁸² Whatever the

⁷⁹ On *phusis*, cf. Benveniste, *Noms d'agent et noms d'action en indo-européen* (Paris 1948) 78; Douwe Holwerda, *Commentatio de vocis quae est ΦΥΣΙΣ vi atque usu praesertim in graecitate Aristotele anteriore* (Groningen 1955); Heinimann (above, n.2), esp. 89 ff; Kahn, *Anaximander* (above, n.60), 200–203; G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge 1954) 228 n.1; and Mourelatos, *The Route* (above, n.19), 60–63, where it is argued that Parmenides does, nonetheless, present a *phusis*-teaching: "What this pioneer understood is precisely that the quest for *phusis* = 'essence' does not have to be, indeed *could* not be, a quest for *phusis* = 'becoming.'" While it is true that Parmenides' teaching is in the pre-Socratic scientific tradition of the search for the essential nature, Parmenides' avoidance of the word *phusis* in the Way of Truth indicates that he felt that it retained (as is cogently argued by Benveniste and Heinimann) its associations with growth, becoming, and change. On *kosmos*, see Kahn, *Anaximander*, appendix; H. Diller, "Der vorphilosophische Gebrauch von ΚΟΣΜΟΣ und ΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ." *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (Munich 1956) 47–60, and Julia Kerschensteiner, *Kosmos: quellenkritische Untersuchungen zu den Vorsokratikern* (Munich 1962), who has a number of helpful comments on these passages.

⁸⁰ *skidnamenon pantēi pantōs kata kosmon*, 4.3; *manthane kosmon emōn epeōn apatēlon*, 8.52; *diakosmon eoikota panta*, 8.60; *eisēi d'aitherian te phusin*, 10.1; *peusēi . . . selēnēs phusin*, 10.4–5; *meleōn phusis anthropoisin*, 16.1. This last is the only case in which *phusis* may pick out something whose existence we *should* acknowledge; but this raises the problem, perhaps insoluble, of how to reconcile the denial that being has distinctions with the apparent concession that knowing subjects, and even their bodies, are real (cf. above, n.47).

⁸¹ Compare the similarly polemical opening of Anaxagoras' book (*homou panta chrēmata ēn*, cf. above, p. 83), where the plurals, the implication of dividedness (*apeira kai plēthos kai smikrotēta*) and the past tense are all in flat opposition to Parmenides' conclusions (cf. Owen, "Plato and Parmenides" [above, n.24] 276–277).

⁸² Cf. B 8; also B 10, 53, 80; cf. Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4) 257 n.90 for further evidence that *harmonia* presupposes opposition. For *phusis* in Heraclitus, see B 1, 123; for *kosmos* as ordered plurality, B 30. The prominence of the idea of

truth may be about the relationship between Parmenides and Heraclitus, the result of Philolaus' choice of vocabulary is to link him with the latter and to underscore his opposition to the former.

The fragment claims that both the ordered world as a whole and all particular things in it are composite: their elements are the boundless and that which imposes bounds.⁸³ The *apeiron*, as we have already seen from fr. 3, is the undemarcated, that which lacks definite boundaries and is therefore not a suitable object of thought. The *perainon* is, then, whatever imposes limits on the formless or boundless. Melissus argued from the boundless, distinctionless nature of being to its unity, saying, "If it should not be one, it will form a border against something else (*εἰ μὴ ἐν εἴῃ, περανεῖ πρὸς ἄλλο*, B 5)." Philolaus here explicitly asserts that his being is not *apeiron*: there are boundaries in it; it is a plurality, and a *kosmos*. We have, as Burkert has argued,⁸⁴ no reason to see here any reference to principles which are immaterial, abstract, or in any way peculiar. The statement is very vague, but I believe that more can be extracted from it than Burkert has found. It appears to be an attempt to describe in the most general possible way what the world will look like if it is to meet the minimal conditions for thought imposed by B 3 and B 4: it will have boundaries in it and therefore (as *perainon* implies) something that gets bounded. The world as a whole is, in its essential nature, a plurality, an orderly *kosmos*; and its individual parts (insofar as each will be accessible to *gignōskein*) are also definite and bounded. The fragment is vague but not for this reason uninteresting or meaningless. It is the most general possible description of Philolaus' alternative to the Eleatic One: a world which we can think. The fragment, thus interpreted, does appear to contain a vague anticipation of the Aristotelian terminology of form and matter: there is something which imposes structure and permits counting, as well as something indefinite which gets limited by this. But it seems completely misguided to argue, as have Raven and Frank, that any rapprochement between Philolaus and Aristotle opens the fragments to the charge of inauthenticity.⁸⁵ For

musical harmony in early Pythagoreanism makes the Philolaus fragment intelligible without insisting on a direct Heraclitean connection; the main point is that his use of the word underscores a quasi-Heraclitean opposition to Parmenides.

⁸³ On the active sense of *perainonta*, cf. Boeckh (above, n.5) 47–48, Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4) 253 n.71 and references.

⁸⁴ Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4) 253.

⁸⁵ Frank (above, n.6) 268 ff, 308–309; Raven, in Kirk and Raven (above, n.6) 310 ff; cf. Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4) 254–256, esp. n.85. Burkert is so anxious to deny the presence of anything that "goes beyond the Pre-Socratic picture of

what is salient about the fragment is its vagueness; it gropes, using ordinary language, toward a distinction which anyone familiar with the writings of Aristotle would have had sophisticated and precise means to express. It could not have been written by a post-Aristotelian.

We do not yet know how the anti-Eleatic assertion of B 1 is to be combined with the arguments of B 3 and 4; I have suggested that a plausible reading would be to see B 1 as stating a thesis which is then defended by appeal to the conditions of thought. B 2 provides a way of developing this suggestion.

B 2: ἀνάγκα τὰ ἔοντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα. ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐ κα εἶη. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὐτ' ἐκ περαίνοντων πάντων ἔοντα οὐτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δηλὸν τᾶρα ὅτι ἐκ περαίνοντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὃ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαίνοντων περαίνοντι, τὰ δ' ἐκ περαίνοντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων περαίνοντί τε καὶ οὐ περαίνοντι, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀπείρων ἄπειρα φανέονται.

Necessarily the things that are must be, all of them, either bound-setting, or unbounded, or bound-setting and unbounded. But they could not be unbounded only. Since, then, they are obviously neither entirely out of what is bound-setting nor entirely out of what is unbounded, it is therefore clear that the ordered world and the things in it are fitted together out of the bound-setting and the unbounded. And actual experience shows this too. For what is out of bound-setting [elements] sets bounds; what is out of both bound-setting and unbounded [elements] both sets bounds and does not set bounds; but what is out of unbounded [elements] will appear unbounded.

We have here an argument for the truth of B 1 — beginning, in typical Eleatic fashion, with an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities, and reaching the correct one by eliminating its rivals.⁸⁶ As most inter-

the cosmos as the proper ordering of something previously chaotic" that he does not give the fragment a definite interpretation of any kind. I agree with him, however, in rejecting Boeckh's interpretation (54 ff) that the "limiting" is to be equated with the One, the "unlimited" with the Indefinite Dyad. Diels/Kranz's rough equation of limiting with structure and unlimited with indefinite matter ("Stoff" I 407) as principles of actual, graspable things in the world is a little overbold, but closest to the truth.

⁸⁶ This is the procedure of Parmenides, and, even more elaborately, of Zeno (cf. esp. the reconstruction of his argument by G. E. L. Owen, "Zeno and the Mathematicians," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* [1957-58] 199-222, and Furley and Allen II (above, nn.15, 26, 143-165); also of Gorgias, fr. 3, at least in the Sextus version, which is, however, probably inferior to the version in ps.-Aristotle *MXG*. Cf. Reinhardt, 300; Burkert, *Lore*, 260 and n.104).

preters have noticed, there must be a lacuna somewhere in or after the sentence *apeira . . . eiē*. What most have supplied here is a statement to the effect that what is cannot be only *perainonta*.⁸⁷ This is possible, but Philolaus might well have taken it as self-evident that this possibility is ruled out: the *perainon* implies the existence of that which gets bounded. More important, it seems that we ought to supply (whether in addition to the traditional supplement or in place of it) some *argument* in support of *apeira . . . eiē*, if there is one to be found. The following sentence appears to form the conclusion of an argument: *toinun* surely indicates that *some* evidence has intervened. To see Philolaus as saying simply: "Either A or B or C. But not A (or B). Since, *therefore*, not A (or B), then C" — without any further justification of the rejection of the Melissan alternative A — is to credit him with alarming simplicity. Fortunately, an argument against A is available: fragment B 3, which argues that a universe entirely made up of *apeira* does not fulfill the conditions of thought. It may not be coincidental that B 3 is introduced with a *gar*; and we could slip it neatly into the lacuna (after *eiē*) without difficulty. (We might also add B 4 after B 3, since it completes that fragment's sense.) But whether or not B 3 was, historically, the very piece to fill this place, it shows us what sort of argument Philolaus must have had to eliminate the first alternative, and it shows us that the "epistemological argument," far from being an appendage to B 1 and B 2,⁸⁸ should be seen as an essential part of their argument.

Another feature of interest in B 2 is Philolaus' suggestion that there are two ways to argue to his conclusion: the initial argument by rejection of possibilities, and a second way (introduced separately with *de kai*) from experience — *ta en tois ergois*.⁸⁹ It is not stretching a point to see here some kind of distinction between arguments *a priori* and *a posteriori*. The first argument, if we have reconstructed it correctly, con-

⁸⁷ Thus both Diels/Kranz and Burkert write: ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον <ἢ περαίνοντα μόνον> οὐ κα εἴη.

⁸⁸ As in Burkert, who completes his examination of B 1, B 2, and B 6 (which he arranges sequentially), and then writes (260): "Philolaus also has an epistemological argument."

⁸⁹ This phrase has had various odd interpretations (see the complete summary in Burkert (above, n.4) 254, n.73). Boeckh (above, n.5) took it to mean "artifacts," as contrasted with works of nature; but surely the bare word *erga* is very unlikely to indicate this; Heidel (*AJP* 1970, 77), Kranz (*DK ad loc.*), and W. Nestle (*Philologus* 67 [1908] 544 f) agree that something like observation or actual experience is in question and is being contrasted with the principles of a strictly deductive argument. Burkert compares Anaxagoras; B 7, and effectively disposes, with evidence, of Frank's suggestion that expressions like *dēloi to ergon* are signs of a post-Aristotelian date (cf. also Heinimann, 43 ff).

tains no appeal to actual facts of experience or to anything learned from experience. It speaks a priori of the conditions for any experience whatever and infers from these some facts about the world. The second argument apparently seeks to confirm these conclusions by appeal to the *phainomena*. It is, unfortunately, very obscure. But we can, perhaps, understand it to be saying something like this: "We can see the truth of this, again, by examining our actual experience. For when we see things made of bound-setting parts, we always see them bounding something (*ta ek perainontōn perainonti*). When we see something made of parts which are boundless or indefinite, it just looks boundless or indefinite to us (that is, we cannot grasp it). The third, mixed, possibility is, then, the one on which we actually rely in seeing the world as we do."

Fragment B 6 adds little that is new to the substance of B 1-4; it does, however, contain a most interesting claim about the status of human claims to *gnōsis*. I shall analyze only the first half of the fragment, which is all that is directly relevant to Philolaus' epistemology:

B 6: *περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἀρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει· ἃ μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀΐδιος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἃ φύσις θείαν γὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνην ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν πλήν⁹⁰ γὰ ἢ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦν οὐθὲν τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γιγνωσκόμενον ὑφ' ἀμῶν γὰ γενέσθαι⁹¹ μὴ ὑπαρχούσας τὰς ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων.*

⁹⁰ On Badham's substitution of *plēn* for the *pleon* of the manuscripts see the arguments of Burkert, *Lore*, 250 n.61.

⁹¹ F has *gegnesthai* and *outheni*; I support the restoration of Usener and Diels. Burkert keeps *outheni* and writes *gignōskomenōn* and *gegenēsthai*. He objects to the Diels reading (above, n.5, 251 n.62) on the grounds that the passive is never expressed by *gignomai* and the present passive participle; indeed, he claims that the first comparable construction is one with a perfect participle at *NT Rev.* 16.10. Although, on the basis of a very incomplete survey of the evidence, I have not found a precise parallel with the present passive participle (there are a number of middles, and actives are not at all common, as Burkert seems to suggest they are), I have easily found a number of examples with the perfect participle. *Apotetrammenoi* at Thuc. 3.68 might be either middle or passive; clear passives are *diēnagkasmēnoi* . . . *gegonasi* at Pl. *Laws* 670 b, *beboēthēmenon egegonei* at *Ep.* VII, 347 e, *anēirēmēnos ginetai ho horismos* at Aristotle, *Top.* 154^b10-11, repeated at 155^a9; and a similar example, at 154^b22-23. This seems enough, at any rate, to impugn the credibility of Burkert's generalizations; much more would have to be done to complete the picture. As relevant evidence one must, I think, also note the very high frequency, in all periods, of *gignomai* with passive verbal adjectives in -*tos*, where a sense similar to the passive sense of this passage is expressed. (Especially relevant is *gnōtos an genoit' anēr* at Soph. *Inach.* fr. 255, 2; cf. *athaptos g.*, Aes. *Sept.* 1045; *genēsomai prosphthegktos*, Soph. *Phil.* 1067; numerous examples in Thucydides with *ekpustos*, *exaggeltos*, *kataggeltos*, etc. —

Concerning nature and harmony, this is the situation: the being of things, which is eternal, and nature itself, admit of⁹² divine and not human apprehension, except for the fact that it was not possible for any of the things that are also to come to be apprehended by us, if there were not the being of things, from which the ordered world is composed, that is, the bound-setting and the boundless.

We must, with Burkert, reject the suggestion that *estō* is to be identified with one or the other of the pair *peras-apeiron*. "*Estō* is not *apoios hulē*, but already differentiated into 'limiting' and 'unlimited.'"⁹³ Strictly, *ex hōn* refers back to *pragmata* only; but the sense is "If there were not this basic elementary nature-of-things, that is, their differentiation into limiting and unlimited." We might even see *estō tōn pragmatōn* as a periphrasis comparable to the one with *phusis* in B 1: "things in their being (or essential elements)."

The argument then runs as follows: Nature herself (*auta ha phusis*) and things in their real, eternal essence (*ha estō tōn pragmatōn, aidios essa*) are open only to godlike or divine, and not human, understanding. But there is one exception: the one thing we grasp with certainty about nature is that nothing that is could also be an object of experience for us if the basic nature of the world were not to be an ordered plurality, composed of the *perainon* and the *apeiron*. This fragment thus reasserts

note the high incidence in epistemological contexts.) One could also compare Pl. *Soph.* 248 c-d, which is all about *becoming* an object of *gignōskein*, and whether or not this is a *pathos*. The exact combination of words found in B 6 does not occur; but, more important, the sense does, and this shows that the notion of "becoming-apprehended" was by no means an unthinkable-unsayable. Besides, even the acceptance of Burkert's text would not entail, as he claims, that the fragment is about the conditions of the origin of the world, and *not* about the conditions of thought. It is all very well to point out that *ta gignōskomena* can mean something like "the known facts of the world of experience" in fifth-century medical writers; but for a writer concerned with Eleatic questions (as the confident Hippocratic empiricists were not), the addition of *gignōskomenon* to *eontōn* must surely be the conscious restriction of the argument to what becomes an object of thought for us. Even if we do render "none of the things which are *and* which are apprehended by us could have come to be," we would still be talking about our *experience* of the formed world and claiming understanding only of this. We might also understand the Burkert text as follows: "None of the things that are and are apprehended could have come to be [sc. *that*]"—could have come to be what we are considering them as—"unless . . ." (I owe this suggestion to M. Burnyeat.) Burkert's own interpretation does not indicate how human understanding is inferior to that of the gods; but to show this is clearly the point of the fragment.

⁹² On *endechetai*, cf. Kerschensteiner (above, n.79) 216–217.

⁹³ On *estō*, cf. Burkert, *Lore* (above, n.4) 255–257 and nn.85, 87.

the claims of B 1-4 that certain non-Eleatic conditions must be met in order for human thought to be possible. But it does something more: it concedes that our knowledge of the world in its real nature is limited by our human nature, and, indeed, that it is limited to a knowledge of our human limits. The only sure truth for mortals is a conditional truth of the form: "The world must be so if human beings are to have experience of it." And the truth of this conditional is, further, taken to provide us with a justification for talking of the world as if it is so — for in the rest of the fragment, as in B 1 and B 2, Philolaus simply asserts that the world is composed out of *perainonta* and *apeira* and justifies this objective claim with an appeal to the conditions of thought. Strictly, however, B 6 appears to limit our secure *gnōsis* to the proposition that such-and-such are the conditions of thought; there is no explicit claim that these conditions are met in actual fact. If we add the assumption, shared by Philolaus and the Eleatics, that we do think, we will get the stronger conclusion. But the use of *huparchousas*, rather than *ousas*, may even leave a doubt as to whether the objective *existence* of the plural world, or only our *beliefs* about it (its presentness-to-us, its being-there-for-us) is required.⁹⁴ This is a point to which we must return later, when we make our final assessment of Philolaus' argument.

As Burkert has shown, there are indeed a number of contemporary arguments like this one in form.⁹⁵ The inference "this would not be possible, unless" was not uncommon in the fifth century. But more closely related antecedents, applying this form of argumentation to the

⁹⁴ *Huparchein* is very difficult to pin down; at least two possibilities suggest themselves. (1) The nuance, as suggested, could be one of presentness-to or belonging; this is common in fifth-century texts, e.g. Hdt. 6.109, Th. 2.64, 2.45 (where *hē huparchousa phusis* means "the nature that belongs to you"). The claim to objective reality might be weakened by the use of a word commonly linked with presentness to an agent; if the philosopher who used this language were pressed to say whether he could distinguish the way things are apart from all thought from the way they are as objects of thought, he might not be willing, or able, to make the distinction. (2) But there are also numerous fifth-century passages in which *huparchein* has the sense of "be *already* in existence" and is contrasted with some sort of addition or later coming-to-be (cf. *LSJ* s.v.). This also might offer us a way of accounting for *huparchein* here and one that might involve no weakening of the existential claim. In any case, the verb, though not a technical term before the Stoics, is amply attested in fifth-century prose in the relevant senses. No suspicions of the fragment's authenticity can get their start from this word.

⁹⁵ Frank (above, n.6, 259-260) charged that we find here "a fully developed dialectical consciousness, to a degree . . . hardly possible before Plato." Burkert's eagerness to rebut this charge leads him, once again, to insist too little on the fragment's independent interest and force.

conditions of thought and speech, are more difficult to find. The poem of Parmenides, in its overall structure, has been argued to be the most important predecessor of this kind. (We might find the very first such example in Heraclitus 23 on the conditions for our use of one particular name, *dikē*.) Both Parmenides and Philolaus argue from the limits of human thought to some objective claims about the world. But Philolaus' argument differs, in that he combines a claim to a priori knowledge of the conditions of thought with an acknowledgment that those are the bounds of human understanding. Parmenides' poem contains no suggestion that human thought has limitations; he rejects the distinction between divine and mortal knowledge, insofar as the mortal is willing to forsake his humanity and become an initiate. Philolaus' argument thus anticipates, in a most striking way, the transcendental arguments of Kant — who holds, with him, that the proper reply to skepticism cannot be to appeal to facts *within* experience; it must be to produce an a priori justification of our categories of thought by showing them to be necessary for thought and discourse. And both conclude that we cannot have access to the world as it is in itself (*auta ha phusis*, the *Ding an sich*) apart from, or outside, our knowledge of the categories and conditions of experience.⁹⁶ The simplicity and even naiveté of Philolaus' argument must not mask from us its striking force. It is the only reply to Parmenides which matches that argument in boldness and philosophical power — and, indeed, the only one which has seen Parmenides' point and speaks directly to that point.⁹⁷

It was not an argument that remained without progeny — or at least

⁹⁶ Compare Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London 1953) A 737/B 765: "Through concepts of understanding pure reason does, indeed, establish secure principles, not however directly from concepts alone, but always only indirectly through relation of these concepts to something altogether contingent, namely, possible experience. When such experience (that is, something as object of possible experience) is presupposed, these principles are indeed apodeictically certain; but in themselves, directly, they can never be known *a priori* . . . But though it [sc. the principle of universal causality] needs proof, it should be entitled a *principle* (*Grundsatz*), not a *theorem* (*Lehrsatz*), because it has the peculiar character that it makes possible the very experience which is its own ground of proof, and that in this experience it must always itself be presupposed."

⁹⁷ It might be asked at this point whether Philolaus' failure to address himself directly to the Eleatic premise about the impossibility of saying or thinking what is not (and the naming/grasping model) does not seriously damage his argument. If we continue to accept this premise while also accepting Philolaus' argument that thinking is impossible without *arithmos*, the conclusion would have to be that there is no thinking, since its conditions are self-contradictory. But both Philolaus and Parmenides would, I think, assume it is indubitable that there is thought; thus, even if Philolaus' book contained no direct assault on the

(since direct influence cannot be proven) without successors. The lampoon cited at the beginning of this chapter suggested that Plato's *Timaeus* owed much to Philolaus' book. But as for the argument we have been considering, the most likely successor is the argument concerning the interweaving of forms in *Sophist* 251 d–252 e.⁹⁸ Philolaus' argument seeks to establish that grasping an object entails marking it off, distinguishing it from something else. Intelligent thought and discourse presuppose boundaries; and a meaningful positive statement entails negation. Parmenides' Being, if it is to be the name of an undifferentiated all, will describe or say nothing.⁹⁹ Similarly, Plato argues that there can be no *logoi* if all forms combine with all other forms. Statements about the world say something (cf. *legoien ouden*, 252 b 5) only if words are related in definite ways; some forms must combine. But if all forms combine with all other forms, no statement would rule anything out. And then all would be meaningless. The statement "Theaetetus is sitting" is meaningful only because it rules something out — indeed, many things ("Theaetetus is flying," "Theaetetus is not sitting," and so on). In a universe uniform in every respect, discourse could not proceed, since distinctions, the source of sense, would be absent.

The same argument is used by Aristotle to explain the necessity of the Principles of Non-Contradiction. It cannot be proven deductively, he tells us. It would be a mark of *apaideusia* — or lack of initiation, through education, into shared communal ways of life — to try to do this, "for

naming/grasping model, his argument that Parmenides' conclusion violated the conditions of thought would show us that *we* have to go back and find out what went wrong with Parmenides' argument. (It is sometimes tempting to believe that this was what Parmenides himself had in mind — that the *elenchos* is really an *elenchos* not of all mortal beliefs but only of the mistakes about the nature of language from which the argument to untenable conclusions gets its start.) And Philolaus' analysis of successful grasping as entailing distinction and negation points, as the similar passage in the *Sophist* more obviously does, to a way of revising the underlying Eleatic view of language: by distinguishing naming from predication.

⁹⁸ A useful analysis of this passage is in John Ackrill, "ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ," *JHS* 17 (1957) 1–6, repr. in G. Vlastos, ed., *Plato I* (Garden City, N.Y. 1970) 210–222.

⁹⁹ Cf. P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London 1952) 5: "We describe something, say what it is like, by applying to something words that we are also prepared to apply to other things. But not to all other things. A word that we are prepared to apply to everything without exception (such as certain words in current use in popular, and especially military, speech) would be useless for the purposes of description. For when we say what a thing is like, we not only compare it with other things, we also distinguish it from other things. (These are not two activities, but two aspects of the same activity.) (Ackrill's article, cited n.98 above, first drew my attention to this passage.)

it is *apaideusia* not to recognize of what one should seek a demonstration and of what one should not" (*Metaph.* 1006^a6–8). The perceptive man will see that we cannot demonstrate everything, and that the principle of noncontradiction plays a fundamental role in our conceptual scheme: it is the "most secure of all principles" (1006^a4–5). You cannot prove it; but you can show someone its fundamental role in the following way, by refutation (*elegktikōs* — the analogy with Eleatic methods of argument, the same ones we found in Philolaus, is striking).¹⁰⁰ Either your interlocutor makes a meaningful utterance or he does not. If he does not, you can discount him as an opponent, for "it is ridiculous to look for discourse to use against someone who has no discourse." If he does say something — something that is meaningful both for himself and for another (1006^a21), therefore something *definite* (*hōrismenon*, 1006^a25) — you can show him that he is making use of the principle he wishes to deny. To say something significant you have to set some boundaries (*horizesthai*), rule out something. The use of elenctic demonstration in *Metaphysics* closely resembles the anti-Parmenidean argument of Philolaus; the primary difference is that Philolaus' verbal emphasis is on cognitive experience, Aristotle's on significant discourse.¹⁰¹

THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT¹⁰²

It is now time to return to the claims of Parmenides and ask how far, and how convincingly, Philolaus has answered them. Parmenides'

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Ackrill, n.91, 206–207; and T. H. Irwin, "Aristotle's Discovery of Metaphysics," *RevMeta* 31 (1977) 210–229.

¹⁰¹ I do not discuss those portions of Philolaus' work which deal with more specific issues related to *arithmos*: the odd and the even, the nature of the unit, etc. It may occur to some readers that the existence of these explicitly mathematical passages casts doubt on my very general epistemological reading of the fragments I have discussed. I do not believe that this sort of objection would be telling. First of all, as Burkert pointed out, what impresses us about these fragments, as pieces of Pre-Socratic (and especially Pythagorean) science, is not their specificity, but their generality. Burkert, indeed, believes this to be a defect of Philolaus, a sign that he did not know how to develop truly scientific answers to Eleatic problems (see p. 260). I see it, instead, as a sign that foundational philosophical interests took, for him, precedence over the more narrowly defined specific problems. Second, if one is reluctant to believe that a thinker deeply interested in basic philosophical problems about experience and knowledge could also treat some more concrete scientific or mathematical problems, or even move from the one to the other within a single book, the entire history of philosophy, from Aristotle to Frege and Wittgenstein, is there to refute him.

¹⁰² A number of the points in this section receive illuminating discussion in Barry Stroud's "Transcendental Arguments," *Journal of Philosophy* 65 (1968) 241–256.

assault on mortal views had, it must be remembered, three distinguishable parts, to all of which Philolaus implicitly responds: (1) its skepticism, its distrust of the senses and of the entire edifice of ordinary opinion; (2) an a priori argument from the conditions of thought and talk to an undifferentiated One, utterly remote from human experience; (3) as a result of the sweeping rejection of *doxa* by the combination of (1) and (2), a new analysis of the status of ordinary beliefs: they are mere conventions, postulates set down by mortals, with no claim to real validity. According to Parmenides, any justification which mortals might try to produce for their beliefs and practices in answer to skeptical doubts would have to come from within the edifice of *doxa*, which can be shown by (2) to be based entirely on a fundamental mistake, which renders the entire structure "unsayable," "unthinkable." Thus, while the skeptic could remind you that you are operating within an edifice of thought, and refuse to accept as successful any justifications for the whole structure which are based on empirical practices and observations within that structure, Parmenides thinks that, by (2) he can do more: he can show you that the whole edifice is not just questionable, but nonsensical and false. The whole thing is a house of cards you have built for yourself, no decent place for a "man in the know" to make his home. Thus, far from being a thoroughgoing skeptic, he is confidently claiming secure knowledge based on a priori inference. This will be most important in assessing the effectiveness of Philolaus' response.

It is obvious that Philolaus wishes to rebut the third claim of Parmenides: that all our beliefs, including the fundamental belief in a plurality of forms, can be sheer convention. This he does via an attack on the Parmenidean analysis of the conditions of thought which forms the basis of (2). Far from being a postulate which we could well do without — and even further from being "unthinkable-unsayable" — the existence of plurality and distinctions in the world is a prerequisite of intelligent reflection and speech. We could not do without it and still have the same human lives. This might not, in general, bother Parmenides; but he remains committed to maintaining certain of our human practices — namely, thought and speech. He cannot help conceding, in fact he makes it central to his own claims, that whatever can be shown (a priori) to be their ground has an unshakeable position in a philosophical account of the world.

If, then, Philolaus has made plausible his claims about the conditions of thought, he has quite successfully met Parmenides on his own ground. And indeed, the very general claim that thought requires distinction making is a most plausible candidate for a ground-level a priori truth. Philolaus has little to say in its defense, if we compare his argument

with Aristotle's subtle remarks, or, to take a contemporary analogue, with Hilary Putnam's critique of conventionalism and his articulation of the place of a Minimal Principle of Contradiction in our thought and talk.¹⁰³ And yet it is a remarkable intuition, one that successfully challenges both Parmenides' monism and his assumption that our practices can be explained as mere postulates.

But the argument has limits, of which B 6 has suggested Philolaus was, at least to some extent, aware. First, he has established, at the very most, an *a priori* truth about what is necessary for thought. He cannot have established a timeless necessary truth about the world, since the beings for whose activities boundaries and plurality are necessary are themselves contingent, and not necessary beings. At one time, as all pre-Socratic cosmogonies (including the Pythagorean cosmogony reported by Aristotle and probably to be connected with Philolaus) suppose, there were no thinking mortal beings in the world; perhaps it will be that way again. So although no man can ever truly give Parmenides' description of the One, since it is false to the conditions of description, nonetheless it might have been or might someday become true. (Parmenides' only reason for thinking it true is, however, gone.) It is not clear whether this point was in Philolaus' mind. And yet it is certainly striking that he ascribes only to gods knowledge of how nature *eternally* is. Of eternal being we grasp only what bounds our lives. The *onta* are as they are; but if they are also to be *gignōskomena* for us, this is how they must be.

But what is the status of our claim to know even this much? We have seen that Philolaus moves from the claim that X is a necessary condition of thought to the confident assertion that X obtains. His argument works well *ad hominem* against Parmenides because of the way it meets Parmenides' own claims about thinking. But would it satisfy a full-blown skeptic who questioned the objective warrant for our beliefs and practices without advancing his own vulnerable claims to knowledge? Philolaus does not directly confront such an opponent. And yet, he appears inclined to a greater caution, in B 6 especially, than his strength against Eleaticism might prepare us to expect. He limits our knowledge of nature not to the *perainonta* and the *apeira*, revealed as conditions of experience, but to the fact that our experience would not be possible without the *huparchein* of these principles. It is not entirely clear that this adds up to an objective assertion of their existence. Could it be that we need only to *believe* in them in order to think or speak as we do?

¹⁰³ Hilary Putnam, "There Is At Least One *A Priori* Truth," *Erkenntnis* 13 (1978) 153-170.

Because no opponent has advanced a set of skeptical questions independent of the Parmenidean knowledge claim, Philolaus does not try to make this distinction; nor, clearly, is he very interested in distinguishing the objective existence of *arithmos* from its existence in human reason. He is a man with scientific and mathematical interests, desirous of reaching a place where he can pursue these interests free of the shadow of Parmenides. To the suggestion that the beliefs which ground our cognitive practices might not correspond to things "the way they are," and the associated demand that he say how they are apart from all discourse, he might well reply, with the brusqueness of Frege's defense of the "objectivity" of that which grounds our mathematical practices,¹⁰⁴ that this project is, as a project, incoherent. It asks us to imagine what is, *ex hypothesi*, unthinkable, to try to theorize while discarding the conditions of theory. This may well be only a partial answer to the skeptic; but Philolaus, without such an opponent, remains content with the ambiguity of *huparchein*.

Finally, we wonder how strong a claim Philolaus wishes to make even about thought itself. He has no argument which would show that *all* thinking beings depend on *arithmos*. In fact, B 6 twice emphasizes that we are speaking as *human* thinking beings (*anthrōpinēn gnōsin, gignōskomenon huph' hamōn*)—conceding that divine *gnōsis* of nature is different from ours, and claiming that ours approaches it in sureness only in this knowing of its own limits. The found conditions of thought are explicitly said to be conditions of *our* thought. God may be free in ways we cannot grasp. It thus appears that our knowledge of nature reduces to a Heraclitean self-knowledge. Instead of providing an external justification for human practices, Philolaus has, instead, shown us what these practices are, and what they rest on.¹⁰⁵ The argument asks how *we* work and what *we* require; it does not ask how other rational beings work, or whether we might have been different.

Heraclitus "sought out" himself (101, 113, 116), but wished to claim

¹⁰⁴ G. Frege, *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, 36: "Denn die Frage beantworten, was die Dinge unabhängig von der Vernunft sind, hiesse urtheilen, ohne zu urtheilen, den Pelz waschen, ohne ihn nass zu machen."

¹⁰⁵ L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe (Cambridge, Ma. 1956) V 18: "The limits of empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively known to be correct: they are ways in which we make comparisons and in which we act." And II 74: "The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure where there is no such thing as a justification and we ought simply to have said, 'That's how we do it.'" On these aspects of Wittgenstein's thought, see Barry Stroud's "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity" (above n. 2).

that the journey to the limits of our human faculties was an unending one: the soul, with its capacity for intelligent discourse,¹⁰⁶ has a "self-increasing *logos*" (115). "You could not find out the limits (*peirata*) of the soul — no, not even if you travelled the whole length of the road — so deep is its *logos*" (45). Philolaus tries to show us the *perata* of the soul — and to show us that these *perata* are the limits of our world. We would like to go outside these limits and imagine a world which is such that mere mortal men cannot grasp it. The persistent fascination of Parmenides' poem lies less in its claim to have articulated our cognitive experience than in its promise of liberation from all that is human, of a journey away from "the beaten path of human beings." But we find that we cannot turn away from this path just any time we want to. If we try, we will see, Philolaus suggests, that we are held there by the requirements of our human souls, requirements set forth in his limiting arguments.¹⁰⁷ That which is made out of the unbounded and the bounding both imposes limits and finds itself bounded. "There are *logoi* that are stronger than we are."¹⁰⁸

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¹⁰⁶ For the connection, and interpretations of these fragments, see my "*Psuchē* in Heraclitus, I" (above, n.14). Philolaus' doctrine of the soul, which has not been discussed here, almost certainly held that it, too, was composed of the limiting and the unlimited. For a full discussion, see Guthrie, *History* I (above, n.4) 306 ff.

¹⁰⁷ See Wittgenstein, *Remarks*, V 32: "The rule conducts you like a gangway with rigid walls." Cf. Stroud, "Wittgenstein" (above, n.2) 496.

¹⁰⁸ A saying ascribed to Philolaus by Aristotle, at *EE* 1225^a33.

This paper grew out of work in progress on Aristotle's replies to skeptical attacks on the basic "appearances" and on the question of whether (and in what sense) he believed there were a priori truths, either in science or in ethics. This now seems to form a part of a longer project on Greek views of contingency and practical rationality; and this background piece has therefore been "bounded off" as a separate discussion. I am very grateful to all those who helped me with their comments and questions on earlier drafts: especially to Julia Annas, Myles Burnyeat, Montgomery Furth, Terence Irwin, Alexander Mourelatos, G. E. L. Owen, Hilary Putnam, and Bernard Williams, and to audiences at Princeton University, March 1978, and at the University of Texas at Austin, May 1979.

A TROUBLESOME ANTITHESIS: LYSIAS 12.88

STAFFAN FOGELMARK

LYSIAS' twelfth oration is well known to generations of students as their first contact with Greek rhetoric, and as such it has received the careful attention of many scholars, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century when there seemed to be no end to the emendations proposed, mainly by German and Dutch philologists. Furthermore, if we are to believe Dover, the twelfth oration is the only authentic piece of Lysias' oratory to survive (although the authorship of this speech too has been questioned).¹ For these reasons one might perhaps expect the text of Lysias 12 to have been purged of flaws and problems. This is not so, however, and one of the most intriguing passages to which no entirely satisfactory solution has as yet been found occurs in § 88.

87 Ἀλλὰ τοὺς μάρτυρας ἄξιον ἰδεῖν, οἳ τούτοις μαρτυροῦντες αὐτῶν κατηγοροῦσι, σφόδρα ἐπιλήσμονας καὶ εὐήθεις νομίζοντες ὑμᾶς εἶναι, εἰ διὰ μὲν τοῦ ὑμετέρου πλήθους ἀδεῶς ἡγοῦνται τοὺς τριάκοντα σώσειν, διὰ δὲ Ἐρατοσθένην καὶ τοὺς συνάρχοντας αὐτοῦ δεινὸν ἦν καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐπ' ἐκφορὰν ἐλθεῖν.

88.1 καίτοι οὗτοι μὲν σωθέντες
πάλιν ἂν δύναιτο τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσαι·

88.2 ἐκεῖνοι δέ,
οὓς οὗτοι ἀπώλεσαν, τελευτήσαντες τὸν βίον πέρας ἔχουσι
τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τιμωρίας.

¹ K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley 1968) 193; A. Hecker, *De oratione in Eratosthenem trigintavirum Lysiae falso tributa* (Leyden 1848). Hecker marshalls a host of Greek and Roman authors in support of his theory, but what makes his essay worth reading are his numerous laconic and very acid remarks on the supposedly bad Greek of Or. 12 (see below).

In what follows I shall refer to other speeches in the *Corpus Lysiacum* in the traditional manner, i.e., without bracketing Lysias' name. This should not be understood as a questioning of Dover's standpoint.

88.3

οὐκ οὖν δεινὸν

εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀδίκως τεθνεώτων οἱ φίλοι συναπώλλυντο,
αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσασιν — ἥ που ἐπ' ἐκφορὰν
πολλοὶ ἤξουσιν, ὅποτε βοηθεῖν τοσοῦτοι παρασκευάζονται.²

In the main part of the speech Lysias has exposed the terror of the Thirty and has described not only their cruelty in private matters but also their treacherous conduct in the management of state affairs. In 85–86 he focuses on Eratosthenes' witnesses and reaches a climax in 87 and 88.3, where he contrasts the circumstances of the Thirty's supporters with those of the victims' friends: the supporters may now act openly and are even rash enough to appear before a court consisting of citizens who were once oppressed by the Thirty, whereas the victims' friends could not even take part in the funeral rites without risking their lives.³

So far everything is quite clear. But when we come to 88.1–2 we encounter difficulties. Does Lysias say that the victims can no longer take vengeance on their foes, or does he say quite the opposite, that is, that the victims have suffered the ultimate vengeance of their foes? To establish the true meaning of this passage may not be crucial to our understanding of the speech as a whole — although it must be important to know whether Lysias is saying one thing or the opposite — but there is a more fundamental issue at stake. Neither of the interpretations suggested above is correct, and one is less so than the other. Unfortunately, most of the scholars who have taken a stand on this passage have chosen the less correct version, which is also philologically quite unsound; in doing this they have also shown themselves insufficiently aware of a guiding principle regarding the disposition of a certain type of argument in Greek oratory as a whole.

Most scholars seem to agree that the meaning of 88.2 *τελευτήσαντες τὸν βίον* κτλ. is “having lost their lives they can no longer take vengeance on their foes” (lit. “they are beyond taking vengeance”). The reasoning behind this translation is that the context requires “vengeance on” since *πέρας ἔχουσι τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τιμωρίας* is placed in

² *καίτοι οὗτοι* in 88.1 is Markland's improvement on *καὶ τοιοῦτοι*; *δήπου* for *ἦπου* in 88.3 suggested by Sauppe, *ἥ που* by Emperius; for a more thorough apparatus see A. Westermann, *Quaestionum Lysiacarum pars tertia* (Leipzig 1865) 27, and Thalheim's *ed. maior* (below, n.7) ad loc.

I have excluded § 89 since this paragraph presents a new departure which has nothing to do with 87–88 (*καὶ μὲν δὴ πολλῶ ῥᾶον ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι ὑπὲρ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐπάσχετε ἀντειπεῖν, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὗτοι πεποιήκασιν ἀπολογήσασθαι*).

³ Cf. Aeschines 3.235 οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκφορὰς τῶν τελευτησάντων εἶων τοὺς προσήκοντας παραγενέσθαι.

antithesis to τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσαι, that is, the vengeance of the victims on the Thirty (a retribution that can no longer be exacted) is opposed to the possible destruction of the city by the Thirty. This may sound logical enough: certainly one would expect victims of the Thirty, if they had been alive, to avenge themselves on their enemies.⁴

But this interpretation involves serious difficulties. Apart from a number of problems of style and grammar which will be dealt with below, we have to consider the use of this same phrase elsewhere in the speech where τιμωρία παρά τινος can only mean "vengeance of," not "vengeance on." This occurs toward the end of § 96, where Lysias says that the Thirty considered their own rule to be proof against the vengeance of the gods — ἡγούμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν βεβαιοτέραν εἶναι τῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίας — ⁵ and in consequence some editors have deleted or bracketed παρά in 88.2.⁶

Nevertheless this interpretation ("vengeance on") has appealed to a considerable number of scholars, editors, and translators: I have recorded as many as forty who support it,⁷ but, by contrast, only six or

⁴ This is the argument presented by a number of scholars, e.g., J. Bake, *Scholica hypomnemata* II (Leyden 1839) 264 ("Sententia et oppositio perspicua est"); G. Meutzner, *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Paed.* (1865) 687 (review of Rauchenstein's 4th ed.); L. Kayser, *Heidelberger Jahrb. der Lit.* (1866) 787 (review of Frohberger's 1st ed.); H. Boblenz, *Kritische Anmerkungen zu Lysias Reden gegen Theomnestos, Eratosthenes, Agoratos* (Progr. des Gymn. Iever 1881) 11; Rauchenstein-Fuhr, 9th ed. (below, n.9) 51; and C. Gelders, *Lysias: Discours contre Ératosthène* (Brussels 1892) ad loc.

⁵ "Linguae leges violatae" according to Hecker (above, n.1) who does not like the *comparatio compendiaria*.

⁶ "Mutilum esse locum suspicor" says Dobree, *Adversaria* I (Berlin 1874) 217. (I have not had access to the 1831 Cambridge edition published posthumously by Scholefield.) The first scholar to suggest a deletion of παρά seems to have been Gebauer, although he did not follow his conviction in establishing the text (Frohberger-Gebauer, *Ausgewählte Reden des Lysias* I [Leipzig 1880] 289).

⁷ In chronological order: J. J. Reiske, *Oratores graeci* (Leipzig 1770-75) VI 474; Auger, *Oeuvres complètes de Lysias* trans. (Paris 1783) 53; G. S. Dobson, *Oratores attici* (London 1828) XIII 232; J. Bake (above, n.4); *Orateurs et sophistes grecs . . . traduction publiée par un membre de l'Université* (Paris 1842); A. Falk, *Die Reden des Lysias* (Breslau 1843) 151; O. Fibiger, *Kommentar til et Udvalg af Lysias's Taler* (Copenhagen 1850) 36; G. Meutzner (above, n.4); C. Müller, *Oratores attici* (Paris 1877) I 148; G. Gebauer (above, n.6); H. Boblenz (above, n.4); E. Ferrai, *Lisia, Orazioni scelte* (Turin 1886) 59; G. P. Bristol, *Ten Selected Orations of Lysias* (Boston 1892); C. Gelders (above, n.4); M. H. Morgan, *Eight Orations of Lysias* (Boston 1895) 67; W. H. Wait, *Lysias: Ten Selected Orations* (New York 1898); T. Thalheim, *Lysiae orationes* (Leipzig 1901) brackets παρά; K. Hude, *Udvalgte Taler af Lysias* trans. (Copenhagen 1903) 27 (cf. below, n.13); W. Kocks-R. Schnee, *Ausgewählte Reden des Lysias* 3rd ed. (Gotha 1904); C. D. Adams, *Lysias: Selected Speeches* (New York 1905)

seven who favor the other alternative ("vengeance of").⁸ The confusion over this passage becomes even more acute when we realize that some reputable scholars have found it so awkward that they have abandoned their original conviction to support the alternative view; Rauchenstein changed his mind twice.⁹

122; P. Vogel, *Schülerkommentar zu Lysias' Ausgewählten Reden* (Leipzig 1905); H. Windel, *Lysias' Reden, Auswahl für den Schulgebrauch* (Leipzig 1905); M. Fickelscherer, *Ausgewählte Reden des Lysias* (Leipzig 1910); E. Sewera, *Lysias' Reden gegen Eratosthenes und über den Ölbaum* (Leipzig 1912); C. Canilli, *Lisia: Orazioni contro Agorato e contro Eratostene* 2nd ed. (Rome 1913) 88–89; W. R. M. Lamb, *Lysias* trans. (Cambridge, Ma. 1930); I. Bassi, *Lisia: Le orazioni contro Eratostene e contro Nicomaco* 6th ed. (Turin 1932); G. Calzavara, *Lisia: L'orazione contro i trenta tiranni* (Milan 1932); G. Cammelli, *Lisia: Contro Eratostene* (Naples 1933); G. Campagna, *Lisia: Contro Eratostene* (Turin 1952) 62; M. Fernández-Galiano (below, n.10) 247; A. Kleffner, *Lysias' ausgewählte Reden* 4th ed. (Münster 1953); U. Albin, *Lisia: I discorsi* (Florence 1955) 87–88; M. Hombert, *Lysias: Choix de discours* 3rd ed. (Brussels 1960); G. Wolgast (below, n.20) 226; L. Gernet-M. Bizos, *Lysias: Discours I–XV* 5th ed. (Paris 1964) 178; M. Bizos, *Lysias: Quatre discours* (Paris 1967) 122; cf. Kayser, Dobree, Herwerden (nn. 4, 6, 12).

⁸ In chronological order: H. Frohberger (below, nn.9, 13); P. H. Söderbaum, *Oratio Lysiae in Eratosthenem* (Upsala 1869) 27; W. A. Stevens, *Select Orations of Lysias* (Chicago 1884) 138; P. Cavazza, *Orazione contro Eratostene* (Bologna 1885) 102; A. Masson-J. Hombert, *Lysias: Discours choisis* (Paris 1894); N. Vianello, *Le orazioni di Lisia* (Turin 1914) 241. This also seems to be the opinion of Kühner-Gerth II.I 336 n.3. Re notes 7 and 8: it should be pointed out that I have been unable to obtain copies of some, probably relevant, commentaries and translations which could have changed my figures.

⁹ Dobree (above, n.6) seems to have been the first scholar to be in doubt as to the true meaning of this passage. He finds that the context calls for "vengeance on," whereas the actual phrasing of the passage points in the opposite direction. In his 1856 translation of Lysias (*Die erhaltenen Reden des Lysias*) F. Baur took a stand for "vengeance on" (166–167) only to change to "vengeance of" in the next edition of his translation (Stuttgart 1867, 203). What made him change his mind was probably Frohberger's review of Rauchenstein's 3rd edition (see below) in *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Paed.* (1860) 422–423 and his edition of 1866 (below, n.13), in which he repeats his arguments in favor of "vengeance of." The impact of Frohberger's review seems to have been considerable: in his first three editions of *Ausgewählte Reden des Lysias* (1848, 1853, 1859) Rauchenstein was a champion of "vengeance on," but after Frohberger's review in 1860 he adopted Frohberger's opinion in his 4th ed. (1864) only to change back again to his original interpretation in his 5th ed. (1869) influenced by Kayser (above, n.4). After Rauchenstein's death in 1879 Karl Fuhr took over as editor from the 8th ed. on (1880) and supported "vengeance on." Fuhr's opinion can be traced in the Greek text: in the 8th ed. he prints *παρά* without inhibition, in the 9th ed. (1883) he puts *παρά* within brackets, and in the 12th ed. (1917) *παρά* is deleted. (I have not seen editions 10–11.)

Major emendations have been suggested to remedy what is thought to be a flaw in the text. Weidner suggested τοῦ βίου πέρας ἔχουσι τὴν παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τιμωρίαν, while Gebauer wanted to replace παρὰ with κατὰ and add καί after πέρας ἔχουσι. Since, according to Wecklein, the words appear to contradict the underlying sentiment, Lysias must actually have written πέρας ἔχουσι τῆς παρ' αὐτῶν τιμωρίας (παρ' αὐτῶν → παρ' α(ὐ)τῶν → παρὰ τῶν → παρὰ τῶν <ἐχθρῶν>). The most recent suggestion is that of Fernández-Galiano: πέρας ἔχουσι <τόν θάνατον> τῆς παρὰ κτλ.¹⁰

For my part I am convinced that the text is sound but that if we wish to understand what Lysias is saying in 88.1–2 we shall have to come to grips with the two words which have caused this dispute, namely πέρας and τιμωρία (+παρά).

We have seen that “vengeance on” is the version favored by most scholars who tend to understand πέρας as meaning “beyond” or the like, taking it as an adverb or an improper preposition. Although it is true that πέρας is sometimes used as an adverb it is only as a synonym for τέλος, while there is practically no evidence for its use as an improper preposition governing the genitive case.¹¹ To get around this problem various textual alterations have been proposed. Herwerden’s ἀπόρως ἔχουσι has not found favor with any editor;¹² a better suggestion is Hude’s πέρα or πέρα (“ultra poenam positi sunt” = “non possunt iam poenas . . . repetere”), but this leaves us with much the same problem as does the interpretation of πέρας as an improper preposition, since this presupposes in the verb (ἔχουσι) a meaning which it normally does not have.¹³ Therefore πέρας/

¹⁰ Weidner: I have not myself seen Weidner’s 1888 ed. but cf. Thalheim (above, n.2), 135–136; Gebauer, above n.6; Wecklein, *RhM* 36 (1881) 143; M. Fernández-Galiano, *Lisias: Discursos* I–XII (Barcelona 1953) 247.

¹¹ “πέρας ἔχειν heisst nicht ‘über etwas hinaus sein’” (Frohberger [below, n.13] 219); “πέρας ἔχειν τινός pro exclusum esse aliqua re non graecum est; aliquid latet aliud” (C. M. Francken, *Commentationes Lysiacae* [Utrecht 1865] 81).

¹² H. v. Herwerden, *Analecta critica ad Thucydidem, Lysiam, Sophoclem, Aristophanem* . . . (Utrecht 1868) 58. Both Gebauer (above, n.6) and Hude (below, n.13) were unconvinced by Herwerden’s emendation.

¹³ K. Hude, “Ad Lysiam,” *Nordisk Tidsskrift for Filologi* (1897–98) 56. For criticism of ἔχειν + adverb or preposition here see Frohberger (above, n.9) and Bizon (above, n.7). Frohberger, who believed in “vengeance of” (above, n.9), suggested <τὸ> πέρας (= “the highest degree”) with a reference to Din. 3.16, where τὸ πέρας means “supreme power.” For some reason Frohberger gave up this idea in his edition of some of the speeches (*Ausgewählte Reden des Lysias* [Leipzig 1866]) but was still troubled by the antithesis and suggested that a couple of words may have dropped out between τὸν βίον and πέρας; this idea did not please Rauchenstein (see his review of Frohberger’s edition in *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Paed.* [1866] 653).

πέρα/πέρα as an adverb or improper preposition is hardly a viable alternative.

The few scholars who prefer "vengeance of" rather than "vengeance on" have a much stronger case in that they take πέρας for what it is, that is, a noun.¹⁴ Their understanding of the passage leads them to opt almost unanimously for "highest degree" (sc. of τιμωρία) as the proper meaning of πέρας; Rauchenstein paraphrases it τὸ ἔσχατον πεπόνθασιν (4th ed., above, n.9) and εἰς τοῦσχατον ἀφιγμένοι εἰσὶν (8th ed., Fuhr?).¹⁵ This meaning obviously suits "vengeance of" much better than "vengeance on," and support for it comes mainly from four passages in the orators: Isoc. 4.5 ὅταν ἡ τὰ πράγματα λάβῃ τέλος καὶ μηκέτι δέη βουλευέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢ τὸν λόγον ἴδῃ τις ἔχοντα πέρας and 5.141 ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ταῦτα πέρας ἔχειν, Lycurg. 60 περὶ τὰς πόλεις συμβαίνει πέρας ἔχειν τὴν ἀτυχίαν, ὅταν ἀνάστατοι γένωνται, and D. 21.109 τί γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς πέρας ἂν φήσῃε τις εἶναι κακίας. Yet, the metaphoric significance is secondary and has developed from the basic meaning of πέρας, which is "limit, boundary" as in Plb. 10.32.6 πέρας εἶχε τὸ πρᾶγμα (cf. D. 20.91), and a close look at the quotations listed above will perhaps suggest that here too the basic notion of "limit" is predominant.¹⁶ In § 5 of the *Panegyricus* πέρας may be qualitative but it stands as a counterpart to τέλος in the previous sentence and refers rather to the orator's store of arguments, and in § 60 of the Leocrates speech Lycurgus says that the misfortune of a city reaches its limit when it is destroyed; this is corroborated by πόλεως ἐστὶ θάνατος ἀνάστατον γενέσθαι (cf. πέρας τοῦ βίου) in the next sentence. But if it is

¹⁴ πέρας + another noun or infinitive in the genitive case seems to have two functions: it is either subjective-possessive (πέρας τοῦ βίου = ὁ βίος ἔχει πέρας) or exegetical as in D. 40.40 πέρας τοῦ διαλυθῆναι and Th. 7.42. πέρας τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου (cf. τέλος ἀπαλλαγῆς Hdt. 2.139.1, νόστου τέλος Pi. N.3.25, Od. 22.323, τέλος γάμοιο Od. 20.74, τέλος θανάτοιο Il. 3.309, 5.553, etc.). Lysias had to avoid τέλος after τελευτήσαντες in 88.2 for reasons of style. (I am grateful to Professor Jerker Blomqvist, of Upsala, for discussing this and some other points with me.)

¹⁵ "Jene aber haben durch ihren Tod den höchsten Grad der Rache der Feinde erfahren" (Frohberger, above, n.9); "das äusserste Mass der Rache" (Frohberger, above, n.13); cf. Frohberger's review in *Philologischer Anzeiger* (1872) 83 of Rosenberg's book on interpolations in the Leocrates speech; "poena omnium maxima ab adversariis affecti sunt" (Söderbaum, above, n.8); "coll' aver perduta la vita hanno provato il colmo della vendetta de' nemici" (Cavazza, above, n.8); "hanno subito dai nemici l'estrema vendetta" (Vianello, above, n.8).

¹⁶ See Meutzner (above, n.4). For the Aristotelian definition of πέρας see *Metaph.* 5.17 (1022a).

difficult to assess the exact meaning of *πέρας* in these passages, the first three examples certainly cannot be treated as parallels to *πέρας* in Lysias 12.88, since they include no genitive counterpart to *τῆς τιμωρίας*. The fourth passage (D. 21.109) does offer a comparable example, where *πέρας* obviously preserves its basic meaning of "end, limit, boundary" — *τί πέρας κακίας* can only mean one thing. In fact this basic meaning of *πέρας* would seem to be the only one that meets all the requirements of our passage without presenting any further problems; such an interpretation is confirmed by relevant parallels such as A. *Pers.* 632 *πέρας κακῶν* (= *ἄκος κακῶν*), which can only mean "limit, end," and also E. *Andr.* 1216 *οὐκ ἔχων πέρας κακῶν*, "no period to my woes" (Wodhull, 1809).¹⁷

The fact that two of the three passages quoted above are found in poetic texts should not disqualify them as parallels to *πέρας τῆς τιμωρίας*, since in them *πέρας* preserves its basic meaning of "limit, boundary," and besides, *πέρας κακίας* was obviously acceptable to Demosthenes. *Πέρας* is not a strictly poetic word (it does not occur at all in our Sophoclean text), and if *ἔχειν πέρας τῆς τιμωρίας* seems daring we should bear in mind that "the epideictic element in XII is substantially larger than might be expected in a forensic speech."¹⁸ It is easy to agree with Hude when he says that *πέρας* in 12.88 cannot mean "highest degree." Gebauer is equally emphatic when he states that here *πέρας ἔχειν* can only mean *πρὸς τέλος ἀφίχθαι*; this *πέρας* (= *τέλος*) should be related both to *τελευτήσαντες τὸν βίον* and to *τιμωρίας* (cf. E. *Antig.* 176 Nauck *θάνατος γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νεικέων τέλος / ἔχει*). What Lysias is saying then is that having lost their lives the victims of the Thirty have also reached the limit of *τιμωρία παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν*; they can no longer be touched (*θάνατος* equates *πέρας*; cf. E. *Andr.* 1216 *οὐκ ἔχων πέρας κακῶν διαντλήσω πόνους ἐς Αἶδαν*).¹⁹

¹⁷ Cf. Epicur. 3.133 *τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας . . . εὐσυμπλήρωτον . . . τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν κτλ.*: "the limit of good things is easy to fulfil," etc. (C. Bailey, *Epicurus: The Extant Remains* [Oxford 1926] 91); here, as so often, *πέρας* is accompanied by *τέλος* (not cited). For the Demosthenes passage cf. D. 16.26, 18.145; for *πέρας κακῶν* in tragedy cf. E. *Or.* 511, *Alc.* 890 (*ἀλγέων*; cf. *Hel.* 534 *πημάτων τέλος*); without genitive attribute: *Supp.* 112 *πέρας οὐδέν (ἐστιν)*, *Hel.* 1139 *μακρότατον πέρας*; cf. below, n.19.

¹⁸ Dover (above, n.1) 64. In 12.87 *ἐπιλήσμων* is nonforensic as is *συναπολλύναι* in 88.3, and in 93 there are as many as three nonforensic words; cf. Dover, 68. A nonforensic vocabulary need not be poetic but the element of show and artistry in it is more marked; cf. Blass (below, n.60), 1.400 ff.

¹⁹ Hude (above, n.13); Gebauer (above, n.6), 88. *πέρας* need not be the end of a continuing or cumulative process but can also designate a borderline *οὐ ἔξω μηδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν πρώτου*; *ἀρχή* is a kind of *πέρας* (see Aristotle, above, n.16).

Having thus established a meaning for *πέρας* in 88.2 we must now turn to *τιμωρία*. As I may have hinted above, all those scholars who prefer "vengeance on" as the true meaning of the passage seem to have approached the text with preconceptions. This would explain their surprise when they note that the text offers *παρά* where *κατά* should be the only possible preposition, for instead of adjusting their interpretation to fit the demands of the text they cling to their original opinion based on what they expect to find in the passage. And when text and interpretation seem incompatible there is always a way out: the victims' revenge on the Thirty is expressed "in ungewöhnlich feierlicher Ausdrucksweise."²⁰

The problem is easily solved. "Vengeance on" is *τιμωρίας ποιεῖσθαι* or, more often, *ἡ κατά τινος τιμωρία*, or simply using the genitive without *κατά*.²¹ Those who support "vengeance on" have looked in vain for examples of *παρά* = *κατά*. In his fifth edition, after changing his mind a second time (above, n.9), Rauchenstein was confident that he had found an example to disprove the evidence of a host of unanimous witnesses. This is Lys. 2.10 οὐχ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐπαρθέντες μείζονος *παρὰ* Καδμείων τιμωρίας ἐπεθύμησαν κτλ. But in this passage, as Frohberger has pointed out (above, n.13, 219), λαβεῖν is implied by ἐπεθύμησαν, to which *παρά* is closely attached, and this is also the case in 22.18 μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖτε *παρὰ* τῶν ἀρνούμενων δίκην λαμβάνειν. If more evidence is required Frohberger's reference to Arist. Rh. 2.3.13 should be decisive: *ἡ παρ' ἄλλου ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία*.²²

The truth is that there is not one single instance to support *τιμωρία*

²⁰ G. Wolgast, "Zweigliedrigkeit im Satzbau des Lysias und Isokrates" (dissertation, Kiel 1962) 226.

²¹ *τιμωρίας ποιεῖσθαι* D. 22.55 (cf. 20.154, 21.30), Lys. 12.100; *ἡ κατά τινος τιμωρία* D. 18.274, 19.272, 21.26, 23.219, Din. 1.47, 105, Aeschin. 3.223; *ἡ τούτων τιμωρία* Lys. 28.11; *ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων τιμωρία* Th. 2.42.4; *ἡ τῶν ἀδικούντων τιμωρία* Lycurg. 10. But: X. Cyr. 4.6.8. *τιμωρεῖν* τοῦ παιδός and E. Or. 425 *τιμωρία πατρός* mean "vengeance for." "Vengeance on" is very often expressed verbally, but there seems to be no difference between *τιμωρεῖν* and *τιμωρεῖσθαι* in Greek orators; see Kayser (above, n.4) 786. For more examples see LSJ.

²² Cf. Lys. 12.70 [sic] *ταχεῖαν παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν τιμωρίαν κομειῖσθε* (cf. § 100 ὅσοι δ' αἶν *παρὰ* τούτων δίκην λάβωσιν). Dobree (above, n.6) seems to have been the first to stress the significance of the verb in expressions like *τιμωρίαν, δίκην παρά τινος λαβεῖν, κομίσασθαι* etc.; cf. D. 21.76 *παρὰ τοῦ τὴν τιμωρίαν ὧν ἐπόνθ' ἀποδοθῆναι προσήκει*; For more examples of *παρά τινος δίκην λαμβάνειν* see Lys. 12.60, 82, 84. Kayser (above, n.4), who strongly supported "vengeance on," criticized Frohberger's objection to Lys. 2.10 but without producing evidence of any kind to the contrary (unless we accept "grammatische Grille" and "verkehrte Deutung" as arguments).

παρά = "vengeance on." On the contrary, all the examples one can find — and they are numerous — produce the same evidence, namely that ἡ παρά τινος τιμωρία can mean one thing only, and that is "vengeance of."²³ This is perhaps not very surprising; a skilled Greek orator would hardly have chosen an obscure expression at the risk of being misunderstood, and in antiquity Lysias was known for his clarity, σαφήνεια (D.H. *Lys.* 13). As a matter of fact, there is evidence of this in the twelfth oration: in τὸ παρ' ὑμῶν δέος (§ 66) the preposition has obviously been added to avoid confusion.²⁴

We can now see that "vengeance on" is an unacceptable interpretation, although it has the support of most scholars, and that without doubt Lysias is speaking of "the vengeance of the foes." This interpretation has appealed only to a handful of scholars, but all of them have gone astray in their attempt to grasp the overall meaning of the passage, mainly because, with the single exception of Stevens, they have chosen to understand πέρας as meaning "the highest degree" rather than "limit, boundary line." Yet, some of them have felt that in making this antithetic comparison between the Thirty and their victims Lysias has left something to be understood and tacitly supplied by his audience; after all, as it is expressed the antithesis is far from self-evident. In his review of Frohberger's first edition (above, n.13) Rauchenstein tentatively suggested οὐδὲ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἔξουσιν, and before him Frohberger (above, n.9) thought that Lysias was trying to say that, since the victims had suffered the ultimate τιμωρία at the hands of the Thirty, the jury should see to it that the perpetrators did not get away with less themselves. As I hope to show, neither of these suggested developments is correct.

We can now establish the literal sense of 88.2: Lysias says that, since the victims are dead, they can no longer be reached by the vengeance of the Thirty.²⁵ Through their death (τελευτήσαντες τὸν βίον) they have

²³ Isoc. 8.120 ὑπομένουσι καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίας (cf. 18.3); Lycurg. 15 εἰ τὴν παρ' ὑμῶν οἶτος διαφύγοι τιμωρίαν (cf. 126, 148); D. 25.17 ἐπὶ τὴν παρ' ὑμῶν ἄγεται τιμωρία; X. *An.* 2.6.14 τὸ τὴν παρ' ἐκείνου τιμωρίαν φοβεῖσθαι; Lys. 12.96 (see above); cf. Lycurg. 79 οὗτ' ἂν ἐκφύγοι τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν (cf. Th. 1.69.5). Another alternative is τιμωρίας τυχεῖν (D. 18.85, 21.34, 24.119); for more examples see *LSJ*.

²⁴ See Kühner–Gerth, above, n.8.

²⁵ τιμωρία clearly has wider connotations than our "revenge, vengeance" and can also mean "punishment" (cf. ὁ ἐαυτὸν τιμωρούμενος) but the difference may not have been great: both concepts depend on moral and legal support. In this speech τιμωρία and τιμωρεῖσθαι occur several times and always have the same meaning, "vengeance." It is unlikely that Lysias would have given τιμωρία one meaning in § 88 and another in the rest of the speech.

reached *πέρας* in more senses than one: *πέρας* is the end of life (D. 18.97 *πέρας μὲν γὰρ ἅπανιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου θάνατος*), but here, since it is qualified by *τῆς τιμωρίας*, it is also the boundary line which puts them out of reach of the Thirty's vengeance (in this sense *πέρας* can perhaps be said to acquire some of the meaning of the adverb "beyond").

Yet the meaning of the words is not always the same as the underlying ideas. If we are going to do better than all those scholars who support "vengeance on" as the true interpretation of this passage, we would be wise to find out where they went wrong. How is it that so many reputable philologists have been taken in by Lysias' phrasing of the antithesis in 88.1-2? I think the answer has been given above: they have postulated an antithesis to meet their own definition of this figure of speech (above, n.4). But if we have a closer look at the antithesis *ἀπολέσαι τὴν πόλιν* — *τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τιμωρίας*, we will realize that it is false and defective in tense as well as in object. The statement made in 88.1 *πάλιν ἂν δύναιτο τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσαι* is hypothetical; any fulfilment of it would take place in the future and could not possibly give the victims (*ἐκεῖνοι*) cause for revenge as they would already be dead; if the threat of *πάλιν ἀπολέσαι* is carried out it can only affect Lysias and his contemporaries (Lysias is addressing a jury), since the dead cannot be subjected to a future terror. Consequently the real antithesis is not between the Thirty (*οἱ τοὶ μὲν*) and their victims (*ἐκεῖνοι δέ*) — the dead are only mentioned here as a *tertium comparationis* — but rather between the Thirty and their potential victims (contemporary Athenians and members of the jury), and, on another level, between the victims-to-be and those of the past.

To understand Lysias' mode of thought in 88.1-2 and the form in which it is expressed we shall have to consider briefly one of the most fundamental traits of Greek language and thought, namely that of antithesis. To state the obvious, the use of antithesis seems to be germane to all discourse; we find it in every Greek author from Homer onwards, but in some genres this means of expression has developed even further into a structural principle. It is eminently suited to the discourse of dualistic Greek philosophy, but it is also a *sine qua non* for the argumentative prose of Greek rhetoric.²⁶

²⁶ For early Greek philosophy and its recurrent appeal to pairs of opposites see G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge 1966). For the role and function of antithesis in Greek rhetoric see J. E. Hollingsworth, *Antithesis in the Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus* (Menasha 1915); S. Wilcox, *The Destructive Hypothetical Syllogism in Greek Logic and in Attic Oratory* (New Haven 1938); and J. J. Bateman, "Some Aspects of Lysias' Argumentation," *Phoenix* 16 (1962) 157-177.

Lysias, no less than other orators, excels in the use of antithesis, *ισόκωλα*, *πάρισα*, and the like.²⁷ Reiske called him *antithetorum venator*, and every reader of the twelfth oration is likely to agree: the string of antitheses seems endless, and Lysias' fascination with this form of expression narrowly avoids monotony. But the twelfth oration seems to stand apart from the other Lysianic speeches. We have seen above that the epideictic element is substantially larger than might be expected; in addition to this, Hollingsworth, who has made a thorough comparative study of the subject, considers *Or.* 12 to be Lysias' most highly antithetic speech.²⁸

It is agreed that arguments presented in antithetic form are easy to follow and appeal to the orderly mind. What we tend to forget is that not every antithesis in ancient Greek oratory subscribes to our modern concepts of logic. Of course we expect paratactic clauses like *οὔτοι μὲν . . . ἐκεῖνοι δέ* to be antithetic not only in form but also in content. But they do not have to be: "Wir sind ja gewohnt, eine so strenge formelle Gegenüberstellung nur dann zu setzen, wenn jedes einzelne Glied einzeln und vollwichtig für den Zusammenhang in Betracht kommt. Der Grieche aber gebraucht diese strenge formelle Gegenüberstellung ohne Rücksicht auf die logische Bedeutsamkeit des einzelnen Vorstellungsinhaltes oft und oft einfach der Form wegen, und dieses Interesse für die Form ist es denn auch, was ihn so beschäftigen kann, dass die Bedeutung des Vorstellungsmaterials nicht näher angeschaut und gewürdigt wird."²⁹ If a Greek orator cares more for orderly form than for orderly thought it goes without saying that his mode of thought can be analyzed only through his own chosen expressions. Perhaps the most fascinating feature of the Greek mind is its inclination for the irrational, which has laws of its own. This mode of thought prefers parataxis to hypotaxis; paratactic clauses give greater scope for the reader/listener

²⁷ See G. Gebauer, *De hypotacticis et paratacticis argumenti ex contrario formis* (Zwickau 1877) 389, Frohberger-Gebauer (above, n.6) 12 and E. Kemmer, *Die polare Ausdrucksweise in der griechischen Literatur* (Würzburg 1900) 62 ff.

²⁸ Reiske (above, n.7) V 438; Hollingsworth (above, n.26) 30. For Lysias' excessive use of antitheses see R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus* (London 1893) I. 167; J. Girard, *Études sur l'éloquence attique* (Paris 1884) 45; and E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (Berlin 1909) 120; "von einer Art hat er sich nicht frei gehalten: von dem Schmuck antithetischer und paralleler Satzbildung. Es war ihm vielmehr diese Art zu denken und zu schreiben so gleichsam zur andern Natur geworden." (Blass [below, n.60] I. 404 f). Lysias seems to have had a weakness especially for very pointed and drastic antitheses; a good example is 12.79 which closely resembles 34.11, a passage famous even in antiquity (see Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.19).

²⁹ Kemmer (above, n.27), 66–67. For a formal analysis of the antithesis in § 88 see Hollingsworth (above, n.26) 43.

to arrange the material for himself than do hypotactic clauses. This is rather "eine konkrete Denkweise," which cares more for visual and horizontal relationship than for stringency of logic.³⁰

Compared to Greek logic, rhetoric is less precise but more lively and more versatile.³¹ The logic of rhetoric follows its own pattern: "Lysias' arguments usually cluster together like little piles of stones, and unity is simply the extrinsic one of association, like that of the buildings on the Acropolis."³² One of the most powerful factors in what we tend to consider the distortion of logic is emotion. Greek orators (at least before Demosthenes) rarely build up the same pathos as do their Roman counterparts. Yet we should not forget the ultimate aim of rhetoric: to persuade the audience with all the means available. Sudden inspiration, spontaneity, improvisation (premeditated or not) — these all spring from emotion, and are reflected in the use of *anacoluthon*, irregular or defective parallels and antitheses, and the like.³³ In this respect Lysias

³⁰ See Gebauer (above, n.27) 79. "Bei der konkreten Denkweise, wo die Phantasiethätigkeit, die im Gegensatz zum rein logischen Denken keine Gesamtvorstellungen in ihre organischen Bestandteile zu gliedern hat, sondern gleichsam nur horizontal die einzelnen Vorstellungen successive äusserlich aneinanderreihet, besonderen Einfluss hat und auch den ganzen Charakter der Denkhätigkeit modifiziert, da können um so leichter Vorstellungen von sich aus auf günstigen Assoziationsbahnen seitwärts reproduzierend wirken und die gerade Gedankenrichtung etwas abbiegen und ablenken; bei der konkreten Denkweise, welche die Anschaulichkeit mehr schätzt als rein logisch abstrakte Bezeichnung, da vermögen sich ferner auch die kopulativen Verbindungen konkreter Einzelglieder mit um so grösserer Zähigkeit zu behaupten; bei der konkreten Denkweise, die mehr Sinn und Bedürfnis hat für sinnlichen Schmuck der Sprache, da gewinnen schliesslich auch erst die Reproduktionen aus Gründen der Form ihre eigentliche Bedeutung" (Kemmer [above, n.27] 69).

³¹ See Wilcox (above, n.26) 21a-39, "The Expression in Attic Oratory as compared with the Expression in Logic."

³² Bateman (above, n.26) 160; cf. Wilcox (above, n.26) 23 and Kemmer (above, n.27) 69: "Bei der konkreten Denkweise neigt überhaupt der ganze Charakter des Denkverlaufs mehr zum Verweilen, so dass die einzelnen Vorstellungen um so leichter Zeit und Gelegenheit finden, sich von der Seite in den Gedankenverlauf einzudrängen."

³³ "Oratores enim potissimum abrepti vigore orationis et caussam, quam dicunt, magis quam verba curantes, interdum etiam commotionem animorum vel plausum potius sectantes, quam singula verba ad arcta quaedam disciplinae praecepta accommodantes, saepe obliti ea, quae primo dixerant, orationem aliter conformant quam exspectabatur, et structuram verborum ab inchoata diversam alligant aut prorsus abruptunt. Sed talia corrigere esset vim oratoriam subvertere velleque ipso scriptore accuratorem esse" (C. F. Scheibe, *Observationes in oratores atticos* [Halle 1836] 18). For the illogical development of thought see Wilcox (above, n.26) 45-64; A. P. Dorjahn and W. D. Fairchild, "Extemporaneous Elements in the Orations of Lysias," *CB* 43 (1966) 17 ff.

is no exception and even in *Or.* 12 one does not have to look far to find irregular antitheses: in 87 *δεινὸν ἦν . . . ἐλθεῖν* is supposed to correspond to *ἡγοῦνται . . . σώσειν*, and this irregularity is emphasized still further by the use of *διά* governing different cases in the parallel clauses;³⁴ again, a few lines further on (88.3) Lysias launches an *ἀπροσδόκητον* with little regard for the natural run of the *μέν . . . δέ* clauses. But it would be tedious to list further examples of irregular antitheses in Lysias, even in *Or.* 12, since this is a fairly common feature, although it is difficult to establish a pattern for its function; the possibility of variation is very great.³⁵

If it is clear that false and defective antitheses are a fairly common feature of Greek rhetorical style we may then ask why in such cases the orators chose this mode of expression when the material obviously was not suited to it. One possible answer has been given above in the quotation from Kemmer, namely the great importance attached to the purely formal characteristics of language and style. Another explanation may be the deep significance of polarity in Greek thought and language. Although polar expressions can be said to be antithetic in form they do not qualify as antitheses proper (the two parts are not opposed to each other but join to make a whole), but both devices seem to be off-shoots of the same tree, namely the strong dualistic tendency of Greek thought. The reason for mentioning polar expressions here is that they too can be wrongly constructed, the most interesting kind of polarity being the one in which one half does not fit. The Greeks were so geared to thinking in dualistic terms that they very often felt compelled to add a second unit or counterpart just to make a statement formally complete, even though it may have contributed nothing to its total meaning. Pindar

³⁴ The latter feature in particular has irritated some scholars; Hecker is adamant in his verdict "*parum Graece*" (above, n.1), and Dobree suggested *τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος* (above, n.6). But the text is sound: we can find the same irregularity in 25.33 (*δι' ἐτέρους . . . δι' ἄλλων*), and there is a difference in meaning between *διά* + genitive and *διά* + accusative: *durch . . . wegen* (Rauchenstein, 5th ed., 50), "through . . . because of" (Stevens, above, n.8). For more examples of this kind of variation see Gebauer (above, n.27) 143.

³⁵ The *ἀπροσδόκητον* in 88.3 gains even more force if we reject Sauppe's emendation *δήπου*. Other examples of irregular antitheses in *Or.* 12 are found in 38 (*πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐνίοτε ἐξαπατῶσιν*), 81 (discussed by C. Scheibe, "*Lectiones Lysiacaе*," *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Paed.*, suppl. 1 [1855] 317) and 32 (see A. Weidner, "Zu Lysias," *Neue Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Paed.* [1888] 310-311: "Die Antithese . . . ist nicht nur lahm . . . sondern entschieden falsch"). For false and defective antitheses in general see Hollingsworth (above, n.26) 7, 39, 45 (Lysias), 59, 68; Wilcox (above, n.26) 80-83, 85.

does this in *O.* 3.44–45 τὸ πόρσω δ' ἐστὶ σοφοῖς ἄβατον / κασόφοις, to take just one example.³⁶ For dualistic thinking antithetic and polar constructions are probably the best vehicles of expression, and such organized and orderly forms of presenting arguments are sometimes used at the expense of logic. The antithetic form of expression is in fact so attractive that it sometimes appears to have been forced upon the argument irrespective of its suitability to the particular context. This is what seems to have happened in the problematic passage in 88.2; when we left our discussion of it we had just realized that the formal antithesis οὔτοι μέν . . . ἐκεῖνοι δέ did not conform to the true antithesis of thought and argument.

For a proper understanding of 88.2 we shall have to start at 87. There we find the following antithesis: (a) διὰ μὲν τοῦ ὑμετέρου πλήθους ἀδεῶς ἡγοῦνται τοὺς τριάκοντα σώσειν, (b) διὰ δὲ Ἑρατοσθένην καὶ τοὺς συνάρχοντας αὐτοῦ δεινὸν ἦν καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐπ' ἐκφορὰν ἐλθεῖν. This antithesis is repeated in the same order in 88.1–2, where σωθέντες refers to the same people who are the object of σώσειν in a, whereas τελευτήσαντες refers back to τῶν τεθνεώτων in b. Paragraph 87 contrasts the situation of the Thirty with that of their victims (and of the victims' friends). From a purely formal point of view, this is also the case in 88.1–2 (the friends of the victims play an important role again in 88.3): οὔτοι μέν, which takes up τοὺς τριάκοντα in 87, has its logical continuation in ἐκεῖνοι δέ, which in turn refers to τῶν τεθνεώτων in 87. After decrying the almost sacrilegious behavior of the Thirty in 87, Lysias obviously decided to use this fundamental and attractive antithesis (the murderers . . . their victims) in 88 as well, where the contrast between οὔτοι μέν and ἐκεῖνοι δέ is further accentuated by σωθέντες and τελευτήσαντες, which go on to stress the difference between the Thirty and their victims. But one cannot help getting the impression that Lysias is here indulging his skill at elaborate antithesis: after ἀπολέσαι in 88.1 he simply cannot resist ἀπώλεσαν in 88.2 to emphasize still further the difference between οὔτοι . . . ἐκεῖνοι.³⁷ But in this passage

³⁶ Cf. Heraclit. B 30 κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν; S. *El.* 1294–95 σήμαιν', ὅπου φανέντες ἢ κεκρυμμένοι / γελῶντας ἐχθρὸς παύσομεν τῇ νῦν ὁδῷ (ambush is of course the only alternative intended); for more examples see Isoc. 4.185 and Pl. *Euthphr.* 8e. From this type of polar expression we should distinguish formulae like φέρειν καὶ ἄγειν, λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν and the like, and also *polysyndeta* for rhetorical ends; see Kemmer (above, n.27) 8, 11–12, 14, 35 ff, 40–41, 62 ff, 68.

³⁷ The antithesis ἀπολέσαι . . . ἀπώλεσαν, forming a chiasmic center with σωθέντες . . . τελευτήσαντες on either side, seems to have a certain emphasis; it also forms part of another chiasmic formation, where ἐκφορὰ occupies the central place,

so rich in antitheses and chiasmic formations (see below and n.37), what comes after *τελευτήσαντες τὸν βίον* does not seem to fit in anywhere or to be in any way structurally related to what precedes or follows, apart from the temporal antithesis previously noted. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Lysias was carried away by the string of his own antitheses. Only too late did he realize that he would have to end it with some statement that would help him out of his immediate difficulty even if it confused the basic logic of the passage, or at least what we take to be its basic logic, since we expect *οὔτοι μὲν* in 88.1 to serve as a preparation for *ἐκεῖνοι δέ* in 88.2, but in this we may be wrong. Perhaps the problematic ending of 88.2, added of necessity to maintain the structural balance, is intended not so much as a conclusion but as a preparation for yet another sentence which Lysias does not spell out but leaves to his audience to supply (since 88.3 obviously does not continue the thought of 88.1-2). This, I think, is the logic of the passage, and even if it does not meet our standards and concepts of logic it may still be very shrewd rhetoric, and we do not know where in the speech Lysias may have made a pause for the sake of effect. Therefore let us first keep in mind what we have said about the true antithetic relationships in 88.1-2, and then let us try to reconstruct Lysias' line of thought by a paraphrase (with a slight inversion of the sentence order), filling in what he left to be understood by the jurors: "Since the victims are dead they can no longer be reached by the vengeance of the Thirty; now, if these men are released they will again be able to destroy the city — *but this time, gentlemen of the jury, you will be their victims and bear the brunt of their vengeance!*"

This, or something very much like it, I believe to be what Lysias meant to say and what, in a way, he did say, although he suppressed the latter part of the statement. In this case 88.2 is no real antithesis to 88.1 but rather a preparatory foil for the true antithesis and climax of the passage, which perhaps gains in force through its very omission. Taken in this way, the two antitheses correspond exactly to the scheme of antitheses laid out above. On the one hand, there is a strong antithesis between the Thirty and their victims-to-be (*πάλιν ἂν δύναιντο τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσαι*), and on the other, between the victims of the past and those of the future; the dead are untouchable and can suffer no more at the

since in 88.3 *τοῖς τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσασιν . . . ἐπ' ἐκφοράν* corresponds to 87 *ἐπ' ἐκφοράν . . . 88.1 τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσαι*. This seems to imply that "destruction of the city" is a central theme in this passage (as is the fate of the dead); it has already been mentioned in 85 *ἡγούμενοι πολλὴν ἄδειαν σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι . . . τοῦ λοιποῦ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται*.

hands of the Thirty, whereas the opposite is true for future victims. However, this second antithesis has no role of its own but serves rather to raise the emotional pitch, since it indirectly increases the contrast between the jurors (who else would be the victims?) and the Thirty. Taken in this sense, 88.2 is not an antithesis to 88.1 but runs parallel to it, hinting at what the jurors and other Athenians can expect if they release the accused. Again, the stress is on ἀπολέσαι (cf. n.37), and πέρας ἔχουσι κτλ. is no longer out of place but fits very well into the overall pattern. Very skillfully Lysias has managed to complete the formal antithesis οὗτοι μὲν σωθέντες . . . ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τελευτήσαντες (plus ἀπολέσαι . . . ἀπώλεσαν), but at the same time he has created another and much more forceful contrast: that between the Thirty and their future victims.³⁸

Why then did Lysias omit what a modern reader might describe as the “punch line”? In my view there may have been several reasons for this. I have hinted above that Lysias may have entangled himself in a net of antitheses from which he felt he had to make a hurried escape. There is in fact some support for this view: we shall very soon see that in 88.3 Lysias was apparently very anxious to resume the line of thought he had dropped at the end of 87. But his main reason for using this sophisticated rhetorical device, a kind of ἀποσιώπησις one might say, was probably its great effect on the minds of the hearers, since what is only hinted at is much more exciting and elusive to the imagination than a string of explicit, factual statements. The omission of syllogisms is not rare in Greek orators, although the most common types are less complicated and also less sophisticated than the one in Lysias 12.88.1–2.³⁹

³⁸ The antithesis of form does not always reflect the antithesis of thought and one would like to agree with Wilcox when he states (76, above, n.26) that “in appraising an antithesis we must determine whether its elements are opposed in thought as well as in expression.” What may perhaps have deceived so many scholars in this passage is that it exhibits an example of correlative form but copulative thought, to use Kemmer’s distinctions (40, above, n.27). Hollingsworth (34, above, n.26) speaks of a variety “wherein the objects contrasted . . . are not themselves inherently antithetical, but serve as a nucleus for antithetical statements.” It cannot be denied that 88.1–2 presents an antithesis of form, but the antithesis of thought in fact is quite different and goes far beyond the implications suggested by the strictly formal expression.

³⁹ “. . . illa, quam dixi, *libertas cogitandi loquendique* Graecorum oblitterata est a librariis aut ab interpretibus tum maxime, quum ea omissa sunt, quae . . . per se intelligerentur possentque facile ex omnisententiarum connexionē erui” (Scheibe, above, n.33, 14); ἡ μὲν πολλάκι καὶ τὸ σεσωπαμένον εὐθυμίαν μείζω φέρει, to use Pindar’s words (*I. I.* 63). For the ἀποσιώπησις see H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (Munich 1960) § 887–889; Greg. *Cor. Ad Herm.* π. μεθ. δειν.7.

If the omission of the punch line in 88 is a rhetorical device of the first order, we should not fail to acknowledge the presence of yet another rhetorical stratagem in this passage. For Lysias it is not enough to accuse the opponent and to plead his own case as persuasively as possible, since he also shows a tendency to implicate the jurors in his antitheses and thereby directly involve them in the situation, as Bateman has demonstrated. In such cases the temporal contrast is between past and present, or between present and future (particularly under different circumstances). There is perhaps no need to describe the effect of this shrewd device; let us simply state that 88.1-2 presents us with an excellent example of this ingenious artifice and that it meets every requirement of Bateman's definition. The temporal contrast is there, as are the different circumstances, while the involvement of the jurors has already occurred in 88.1 *πάλιν ἂν δύναιτο τὴν πόλιν* (= *ὑμᾶς*) *ἀπολέσαι*. But the point is that if we accept the approach I have advocated above, the rhetorical effect will be dramatically increased through the omission of the punch line (which, if it had been pronounced, would have eloquently described the coming fate of the jurors).⁴⁰

We can also find support for this interpretation in the particles in 88.1-2. It has been stated above that the antithesis in 87 is in fact repeated in 88.1-2 as far as purely formal criteria are concerned. This is confirmed by *καίτοι* (88.1), which cannot be understood here as an adversative particle but keeps its original continuative sense (*σωθέντες*, although being "rhetorically" opposed to *τεθνεώτων* in 87, takes up *σώσσειν* which precedes *τεθνεώτων*: "Now, if these men should be released . . .").⁴¹ But one result of my interpretation of 88.1-2 has been shown to be that a major theme in this passage is "the destruction of the city" (sc. in the future) and what this would mean to the jurors, that is, the antithesis *οὗτοι μὲν . . . ἐκεῖνοι δέ* is only formal and does not reflect the true antithesis of thought. This means that 88.2 plays a subordinate role and serves mainly as a foil for 88.1, where *ἀπολέσαι τὴν πόλιν* is stated plainly and explicitly. One might perhaps object that this does not accord with what we know of antithetic *μὲν . . . δέ* clauses.

⁴⁰ See Bateman (above, n.26) 163, 165, 167, who gives examples from the speech against Nicomachus (*Or.* 30). The contrast between the dead and those who are going to die occurs elsewhere in *Or.* 12: *οὐδ' οἱ τεθνεώτες αὐτοὺς ἐλύπουν οὐδ' οἱ μέλλοντες ἀποθανεῖσθαι* (§ 56).

⁴¹ *καίτοι* might also have a syllogistic value if we accept the interpretation offered above which would mean, to use Denniston's words, that "the conclusion of the syllogism is left to the imagination" (*The Greek Particles*, 562); for the interrelation between adversative, continuative, and logical sense see Denniston 561. Cf. Gebauer (above, n.27) 86 ff, 272 n.4; Dover (above, n.1) 58.

This need not be so, however. Although the stress is usually on the *δέ* clause, "cases, however, are not lacking where the *μέν* clause bears the weight," as Denniston put it — and he is not alone in his opinion: "... (*μέν*) aptissime adhiberi videtur ad inferendum id, quo tamquam fundamento nititur tota conclusio," says Gebauer, and Wolgast states that in unexpected antithetic correlations of *μέν* . . . *δέ* clauses the stress is usually on the *μέν* clause.⁴²

In the discussion which precedes my presentation of arguments in favor of a new approach to 88.1–2, I have pointed out that *πέρας* and *τιμωρία* are the key words and that they have caused their interpreters much concern. But this passage presents other problems which have worried some scholars and to which no satisfactory solutions have yet been found. However, if we accept the interpretation I am proposing we shall find that these other problems not only disappear but in fact may also be converted into positive support for it.

I have mentioned above that Rauchenstein changed his mind (on *τιμωρία*) not only once but twice. What led him back to his first opinion ("vengeance on") was an observation made by Kayser. In his criticism of "vengeance of the Thirty" Kayser remarked quite correctly that nowhere in *Or.* 12 does Lysias say that the Thirty took vengeance on the victims as if they had done something to deserve such a punishment. He was therefore inclined to adopt "vengeance on the Thirty" as the correct interpretation and, accordingly, to declare that the antithesis is made between the Thirty, who could once more destroy the city, and the dead, who are no longer able to take vengeance on their enemies. In this he was mistaken, but his fundamental observation on *τιμωρία* seems valid and worthy of respect. I have suggested (above, n.25) that *τιμωρία* / *τιμωρεῖσθαι* carries the same basic notion everywhere in this speech, that is, vengeance. Now it is obvious that whatever Eratosthenes and his colleagues did to Lysias' brother and the other victims it could not be described as vengeance, since there was nothing actually to avenge. On the contrary, *τιμωρία* presupposes a legal or moral justifi-

⁴² Denniston (above, n.41) 370, Gebauer (above, n.27) 104, Wolgast (above, n.20) 144; for other examples of this phenomenon in *Or.* 12 see 47 and 87, where the *δέ* clause simply enhances the rhetorical effect of the *μέν* clause. Kemmer (above, n.27) 40–41, speaking of *kopulative Gegensatzverbindungen* mentions a similar phenomenon in polar expressions, when the first member receives "eine grössere Betonung" resulting in a *Hebung*, and accordingly, a *Senkung* in the second member.

The temporal division in 88.1–2 corresponds to Gebauer's definition (105) "res, quae ad praesens (futurum) tempus spectat, priore membro continetur, res praeterita posteriore."

cation of the act, and if the Thirty could have referred to their own villainous conduct as a case of *τιμωρία* Lysias could hardly have hoped to achieve much by taking Eratosthenes to court.⁴³

There is in fact support for this view elsewhere in the speech, although it seems to have escaped Kayser. In § 6 Lysias says that Theognis and Peison suggested to their colleagues that action be taken against the metics, since some of these were *τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἀχθόμενοι*; in this way they would have an excellent pretext for appearing to take revenge while in reality making money (*καλλίστην οὖν εἶναι πρόφασιν τιμωρεῖσθαι μὲν δοκεῖν, τῷ δ' ἔργῳ χρηματίζεσθαι*). We learn two things from this passage: first, that political dissension could be taken as an excuse for *τιμωρία*, although we are in no position to judge the validity of this argument in a free Athenian court at this time, though probably the outcome would depend on the actions taken by the parties (after all, the code of ethics urged the Greek to love his friend and hate his enemy); second, that Lysias does not endorse the *τιμωρία* pretext (*δοκεῖν*) of the Thirty. In § 4 he states that his family has been living in the city for many years without offending or taking offense from anybody. This is probably intended to mean that passive dissension could not be taken as grounds for *τιμωρία*; since his family abstained from political activity there could be nothing to provide grounds for revenge (cf. § 20 οὐ τούτων ἀξίους γε ὄντας (sc. ἡμᾶς) τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ πάσας <μὲν> τὰς χορηγίας χορηγήσαντας, πολλὰς δ' εἰσφορὰς εἰσενεγκόντας, κοσμίους δ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παρέχοντας καὶ πᾶν τὸ προσταττόμενον ποιοῦντας, ἐχθρὸν δ' οὐδένα κεκτημένους, πολλοὺς δ' Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων λυσαμένους τοιούτων ἡξίωσαν οὐχ ὁμοίως μετοικοῦντας ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ἐπολιτεύοντο).

It seems obvious then that the Thirty could not refer to *τιμωρία* as an excuse for their murderous activities either in § 6 or in § 88, since according to Lysias' own words in §§ 4–6 there was nothing to avenge. And, as I have stated above, had the Thirty been able to offer *τιμωρία* as their defense Lysias' case would have simply disappeared (cf. § 34 δεῖ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, Ἐρατοσθένην δυοῖν θάτερον ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἀπήγαγεν αὐτόν, ἢ ὡς δικαίως τοῦτ' ἔπραξεν. οὗτος δὲ ὁμολόγηκεν ἀδίκως συλλαβεῖν, ὥστε ῥαδίαν ὑμῖν τὴν διαψήφισιν περὶ αὐτοῦ πεποιήκε). Even if the city-state had taken over jurisdiction and punishment, the old moral code was still upheld and widely respected: not only did *τιμωρία* provide grounds in relevant cases; it was a duty to take revenge.

⁴³ "Nirgends sagt Lysias, die Dreissig hätten sich an ihren Gegnern gerächt, als ob sie die von ihnen vollzogene Strafe verdient hätten; dadurch würde er mit sich selbst in den ärgsten Widerspruch gerathen" (Kayser, above, n.4).

In fact, Lysias, like other orators, frequently urges the jurors to take vengeance on the accused.

Here we are faced with a problem. Kayser seems to be right when he states that nowhere in the speech does Lysias say that the Thirty took vengeance on Polemarchus and the others. True, Theognis and Peison seem to have made an attempt to legalize their actions by referring to *τιμωρία*, but in § 6 Lysias rejects this as false and a mere pretext (cf. § 14 ἀδικῶ δ' οὐδέν, χρημάτων δ' ἔνεκα ἀπόλλυμαι). It is obvious that Lysias has to be consistent throughout the speech and push this issue hard, that is, that there can be no talk of *τιμωρία* as an excuse (cf. § 20 οὕτως εἰς ἡμᾶς διὰ τὰ χρήματα ἐξημάρτανον, ὥσπερ ἂν ἕτεροι μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων ὀργὴν ἔχοντες / § 23 τὸν ἀδελφὸν γάρ μου, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, Ἐρατοσθένης ἀπέκτεινεν, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ ἀδικούμενος οὔτε εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὀρών ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ παρανομίᾳ προθύμως ἐξυπηρετῶν). But how then shall we explain *πέρας τῆς τιμωρίας* in § 88, where it is not the Thirty but Lysias himself who refers to *τιμωρία παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν*? Certainly it would be absurd for Lysias to reject a reference to *τιμωρία* in § 6 only to acknowledge it in § 88 (which furthermore would probably deprive him of his case).

We can now see that “vengeance on,” which should have been rejected in the first place for a number of reasons, and “vengeance of,” as understood by the minority (above, n.8), are both impossible, though at least the latter version does not violate grammar.⁴⁴ The only possible solution seems to be the one suggested by the new approach: “Gentlemen of the jury! The victims of the Thirty are dead and can no longer be reached by their vengeance; so if you release the defendants, they may again be able to destroy the city, *and then they will take vengeance on you*” (sc. *for this trial*). This interpretation alone will satisfy the demands of content and grammar. Lysias obviously would never admit that the Thirty might be right in using *τιμωρία* as an excuse for their past activities, but certainly he would grant them this right after taking them to court, thereby risking their lives. If the Thirty are acquitted and wish to take revenge for the trial, they can do so only on the living — the dead are now safely out of reach. Still, this leaves us with a somewhat awkward problem of logic in that Lysias seems to admit that the dead could after all become the victims of *τιμωρία*. But perhaps we

⁴⁴ When I discussed the meaning of *πέρας* (“highest degree” or “limit”) I remarked that Stevens alone (above, n.8) chose the correct alternative. But Stevens also deserves respect for having seen that in 88.1–2 “there is plainly no antithesis . . . as the sentence is completed,” which is truer than he realized. Obviously it did not cross his mind that the sentence was not completed.

should not apply such strict principles of logic to a text which was meant to be heard only once and certainly not to be analyzed in great detail some two thousand years later. Moreover, if Lysias was entangled in his own antitheses we should perhaps be generous to him in his attempts to bring this problematic passage to a close. Still, in a way it may have its own logic, since if there had been no victims in the first place there would have been no trial; consequently the victims too, if they had remained alive, could have become the object of the Thirty's τιμωρία.⁴⁵

A minor point, but one still of some interest, is the structural function of πέρας. It is quite clear that πάλιν in 88.1 and πέρας in 88.2 are antithetic, but this fact fails to emerge clearly in most interpretations; the words may (or may not) be correctly translated but the antithesis usually does not make much sense *qua* antithesis. But if we accept the interpretation I have suggested, the antithesis will be very pointed, since πέρας will then be antithetic not only to πάλιν but also, and perhaps primarily, to the omitted clause ("the dead have reached πέρας — you have not"). In another way too the new interpretation can help clear up a misunderstanding concerning πέρας and its meaning. We have a choice between "boundary line" and "highest degree." I have already presented arguments in favor of the former meaning, but the decisive criterion should be the antithetic function of πέρας. If we translate "highest degree" there will be no antithesis at all in relation to πάλιν, yet this antithesis is very real — against the second chance (πάλιν) of the Thirty stands the πέρας of the victims; they will, luckily, have no chance to become the object of the Thirty's vengeance.

Another point which has troubled some scholars is τῶν ἐχθρῶν in 88.2. "Quare ἐχθρῶν generaliter? quare non τούτων?" asked Dobree, and Wecklein even suggested an emendation, ἀντῶν.⁴⁶ These objections to ἐχθρῶν are understandable if one starts from an interpretation other than the one suggested above, that is, if one takes for granted that in 88.1–2 the very clear antithesis of form also reflects an antithesis of thought ("vengeance on"). In close-knit parallel clauses like those in 88.1–2 one would have generally expected a pronoun to maintain the parallel structure of οὗτοι μὲν . . . ἐκεῖνοι δέ, whereas ἐχθρῶν may seem

⁴⁵ The reasoning in this part of the article depends on whether we shall accept Kayser's view or not. But if we cannot show that τιμωρία in 88.2 is given a different meaning from its usual one we shall have to agree with Kayser's conclusion that Lysias nowhere in the speech refers to the past actions of the Thirty as instances of τιμωρία.

⁴⁶ Dobree, above, n.6; Wecklein, above, n.10.

to extend beyond the self-contained unity of the two clauses. From this point of view *τούτων*, or perhaps even better the more neutral *αὐτῶν*, would have preserved the inner unity of structure and meaning by describing the Thirty as the enemies of the dead only. However, if we apply the new interpretation we will find *ἐχθρῶν* relevant, and far superior to a pronoun. I have tried to point out that the real antithesis is between the Thirty and the audience; if this is so, *ἐχθρῶν* transgresses the formal sentence structure by making the Thirty as much the enemies of the audience as they were of their victims in the past, whereas the use of *αὐτῶν* would have described the Thirty as hostile to some third persons only. Consequently there may be a point here: "The enemies of the victims cannot reach them any longer; *but they can still reach you and me, gentlemen of the jury — now they are our enemies.*"

Another major problem is Lysias' choice of tense in 88.2: why *ἔχουσι* instead of the imperfect or the aorist? Our new interpretation offers a solution to this which is, to my mind, completely satisfactory and thereby strengthens its case still further.

At the beginning of my analysis of 88.1-2 I pointed out that *οὗτοι μὲν . . . ἐκεῖνοι δέ* corresponds to *διὰ μὲν . . . ἡγούνται . . . σώσειν — διὰ δὲ . . . δεινὸν ἦν . . . ἐλθεῖν* in 87. The similarity in antithetic structure is so striking (*σώσειν* echoed by *σωθέντες, τεθνεώτων* by *τελευτήσαντες*, and so on) that we may reasonably take it to be intentional. But there is one flaw in the parallel structure: while *σωθέντες . . . δύναιτο ἂν . . . ἀπολέσαι* correctly takes up the future tense of *σώσειν* in 87, *ἔχουσι* breaks the parallel tense structure (*δεινὸν ἦν* in 87). This is the more remarkable since the thematic parallel remains unbroken: in the *διὰ δέ* clause in 87 we hear of the victims' funeral (*ἐκφορὰ τῶν τεθνεώτων*) in past tense (*ἦν*), but in the parallel *ἐκεῖνοι δέ* clause in 88.2 we learn of the present situation of the victims (*τελευτήσαντες . . . πέρας ἔχουσι*). The importance of this disregard for consistency is further accentuated by the fact that in the very next sentence (88.3) Lysias speaks again of the funeral and reverts to the imperfect tense. The present tense *ἔχουσι* is therefore flanked by two sentences in the imperfect tense, although all three deal with the fortunes of the dead and related matters.

Again Dobree seems to have been the first to recognize the problem and to suggest *εἶχον* in order to put the sentence on a par with *δεινὸν ἦν* and *συναπώλλυντο*, since *ἔχουσι* can in no way be understood to refer to the past. Frohberger applauded Dobree but was reluctant to accept *εἶχον*, since this would be "(eine) gewaltsame Aenderung," and instead supposed a lacuna in the text. Frohberger also realized that not even *εἶχον* would produce the necessary antithesis to *πάλιν ἂν δύναιτο τὴν*

πόλιν ἀπολέσαι in the μέν clause. In the opposite camp we find Bake, Cavazza, and Ferrai, who tried to defend the present tense by a reference to a supposed durative effect in πέρας ἔχουσι, and Boblenz and Fuhr, who found ἔχουσι less grating when linked to the preceding potential δύναιτο ἄν.⁴⁷

We can now see, however, that its significance is quite different and that the choice of the present tense here is highly relevant and very precise. When Lysias apparently refers to the dead in the present tense, he is in fact making a statement about himself and his contemporaries: "The dead are out of reach now *but you and I are not*." Lysias is not interested in the victims' present situation other than as a foil for his own fate and for that of his fellow citizens (the jurors). Better than anything else the present tense describes here the danger that would possibly confront the city, Lysias himself, and his supporters among the jurors, should they let Eratosthenes and his men escape their punishment. The threat embedded in the present tense is hardly diminished by the contrasting use of the imperfect tense in the clauses which flank it, both of which mention the ἐκφορά of the dead, that is, of the very same men who are the formal subject of ἔχουσι.

So far my discussion of the implications of the new interpretation has been restricted to particular problems in the text of 88.1-2 which all seem to have been solved through the new approach, a fact which perhaps indirectly confirms its propriety. Yet another piece of supporting evidence, of equal importance, remains to be discussed, namely the relationship of our passage to its immediate context in the speech. In the arguments which I put forward above to support my interpretation of 88.1-2 I tried to analyze the role of this passage and found that Lysias seems to have overdone the antithetic phrasing and, for reasons of formal consistency, was forced into a blind alley, so to speak. As a result the antithesis of form does not correspond to the antithesis of thought in 88.1-2. If this supposition is correct we can expect Lysias to have tried to return as soon as possible to the sound path of argument which he apparently left in 87 only to go astray in the antitheses of 88.1-2. As a matter of fact this is exactly what does happen in 88.3, where Lysias

⁴⁷ Dobree, above, n.6; Frohberger (above, n.13), 219: "Mit Recht bemerkt auch Dobree, dass mindestens ἔχον corrigiert werden müsse; denn wie δεινὸν ἦν und συναπώλυντο in den entsprechenden Gliedern der vorhergehenden und folgenden Antithese beweist, kann hier von dem Zustande der ἐκεῖνοι nur in Beziehung auf die Zeit, wo die Dreissig in dieser Weise das Trauerceremoniell störten, die Rede sein." Bake, above, n.4, Cavazza, above, n.8, Ferrai, above, n.7, Boblenz, above, n.4, Fuhr (in Rauchenstein's 9th ed.), above, n.9.

resumes the argument of 87; structurally 88.1-2 is an excursus standing more or less isolated between 87 and 88.3 (although 87 leads into the opening of the labyrinth of 88.1-2). To make this clear I shall try to point out a number of structural units.

(a) The choice of words at the end of 87 and at the beginning of 88.3 is not coincidental: οὐκ οὖν δεινόν in 88.3 obviously takes up δεινόν ἦν at the end of 87. This is perhaps an empty pun, since δεινόν in 88.3 is formulaic and does not have the same meaning as it does in 87. However, Lysias often takes to simple punning and in fact has made a pun on δεινόν once before in 87, since δεινόν clearly echoes ἀδεῶς.⁴⁸

If the actual phrasing of the relevant parts of 87 and 88.3 gives unmistakable hints that 88.3 continues where Lysias broke off this should become even clearer when we find that 87 and 88.3 together form a specific type of argument which Gebauer has studied in detail. This is a case of *argumentum e contrario*, which is described by Gebauer thus: "Per contrarium duae sententiae hunc in modum inter se comparantur, ut aut absurdum aut turpe esse (fuisse) significetur in certa quadam rerum condicione vel facere aliquid non facereve vel dicere negareve vel opinari non opinarive." This form of argument is particularly common in Lysias and Isaeus, and Bateman, referring to an almost identical passage in Lys. 30.31-35, describes the particular antitheses employed in the argument as "Lysian clichés."⁴⁹ *Argumentum e contrario* can appear in various forms but Lysias' favorite δεινόν εἰ κτλ. is particularly suited to his emotional form of argument, which is often expressed by means of antitheses.⁵⁰ This is also the case in our passage where the thematic as well as emotional build-up in 87 reaches its climax, not in 88.1-2, but in 88.3 as is eloquently demonstrated by the *anacoluthon*.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Puns based on *alpha privativum* are very common in Lysias just as in other orators; see Gebauer (above, n.27) 140-141. In 88.1 we may encounter another example of Lysias' weakness for *paronomasia*, since I think we are right in taking πάλιν . . . πόλιν as an intended sophistication. It is difficult to decide what is a κακόζηλον and what is not (see Kayser's review of Francken in his "Jahresbericht" in *Philologus* [1867] 333), but Lysias is not incapable of more subtle punning: for example, the pun in § 33 οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡμῖν παρῆναι οὐκ ἐξῆν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι becomes obvious only when one realizes that παρ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι equals παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, which echoes ἡμῖν παρῆναι.

⁴⁹ Gebauer (above, n.27) xxvi; Hollingsworth (above, n.26) 31-32; Bateman (above, n.26) 161-162. For the treatment of this form of argument by Greek and Roman rhetoricians see the references given by Bateman, 161 n.11.

⁵⁰ For the twofold function of the *zeugma* and its variations in *contrario paratactico quod per εἰ infertur* see Gebauer (above, n.27) 154, 156.

⁵¹ The emotional and thematic antitheses are the same in 88.3 as in 87 (below, b-e). The emotion in δεινόν εἰ is further accentuated by δήπου (or ἤπου/ἤπου as

It may not be amiss to point out too that the indignation expressed by δεινὸν εἰ κτλ. does not refer to what has happened in the past but to what might occur in the future.⁵² Only in this respect is there a real link between 88.1–2 and 88.3, since we have reached the conclusion that the apparent reference to the past in 88.2 in fact turned out to allude indirectly to the future. In this way 88.1–2 does fit in after all but in every other respect 88.3 is the direct continuation of 87;⁵³ in fact, 88.1–2 could have been excluded altogether without impairing either sense or style — to some scholars an exclusion might even seem to be an improvement.

(b) τῶν μὲν ἀδίκως τεθνεώτων οἱ φίλοι συναπώλλυντο (88.3), describing the danger encountered by the friends of the victims, takes up δεινὸν ἦν (sc. τοῖς φίλοις) καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐπ' ἐκφορὰν ἐλθεῖν (87).⁵⁴

(c) In 88.3 the antithesis is still between the dead (and their friends; see b) and the Thirty (and their friends; see c); 87: διὰ δὲ Ἐρατοσθένην καὶ τοὺς συνάρχοντας αὐτοῦ — τῶν τεθνεώτων; 88.3 (chiastic): τῶν μὲν ἀδίκως τεθνεώτων — αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσασιν.⁵⁵

in the manuscripts [cf. Hude], which would produce a very harsh *anacoluthon* here) as Gebauer has noted (above, n.27) xxvii; cf. G. de Budé, *De Lysia glossulam τὸ ἀνακόλουθον quoties in Lysiae oratione in Eratosthenem usurpatur . . . scripsit Vidus de Budé* (Le Puy 1935; pages unnumbered). For a similar *anacoluthon* involving δεινὸν εἰ + μὲν . . . δέ clauses see § 36.

⁵² “. . . omnino θαυμαστὸν εἰ, δεινὸν εἰ, et similia omnia cum futuro coniunguntur ubi admirationem aut indignationem aut huiusmodi quid movet, non id quod quis fecit aut facit, sed id quod factururus esse videtur” (C. G. Cobet, *Novae lectiones* [Leyden 1858] 639).

⁵³ Some scholars seem not to have realized the full consequences of this simple fact; hence the bewilderment caused by the form and tenor of speech in 88.3. “Sententia verborum subsequentium absurda” is Hecker’s laconic remark (above, n.1); “Peculiaris est locus,” says Gebauer (above, n.27) 66, who discussed it under the caption *praemittitur enunciatio primum* (what troubled him most was perhaps the *anacoluthon*; Gebauer prefers *Emperius’ ἦ ποῦ*). On p. 191, Gebauer refers to 88.3 as an example of *contraria quae ex introitu aliquo suspensa sunt*; on p. 263 he cites it again to show that “in hypotactica contrarii forma *anacoluthia* admissa est”; on p. 85 it is used to demonstrate yet another point. Wolgast (above, n.20) 118, correctly classes 88.3 under “Die Wirkung beim Vergleich” (as distinct from “Die Wirkung der Pointe,” which presents the same fact in two antithetic clauses).

⁵⁴ The imperfect *συναπώλλυντο* only describes the risk taken by the friends; δεινὸν ἦν in 87 would have been a very tame description if the friends had actually been executed. For this not uncommon use of the imperfect see H. Engelskirchen, *De temporum usu Lysiaco* (Bonn 1913) 13.

⁵⁵ For the argument in 88.3 as compared with 87 see K. Schön, *Die Scheinargumente bei Lysias* (Paderborn 1918) 91.

(d) The difference in ἐκφορά is the major theme in 88.3, probably occasioned by the last words in 87, τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐπ' ἐκφορὰν ἐλθεῖν; cf. 88.3 (τῶν τριάκοντα) ἐπ' ἐκφορὰν πολλοὶ ἤξουσιν. Moreover, the antithesis in 87 between the attempts to save the Thirty (μέν clause) and the risk run by the friends of the victims at the funeral (δέ clause) is repeated chiastically in the corresponding μέν . . . δέ clauses in 88.3, where συναπώλλυντο (μέν clause) takes up δεινὸν ἦν . . . ἐπ' ἐκφορὰν ἐλθεῖν (δέ clause) in 87 and βοηθεῖν (dependent on the δέ clause) takes up σώσειν (μέν clause) in 87.

(e) ὁπότε βοηθεῖν τοσούτοι παρασκευάζονται in 88.3 echoes τοὺς μάρτυρας . . . οἳ τούτοις μαρτυροῦντες κτλ. in 87, which in turn refers back to 84 ἐτέροις πεπίστευκεν, 85 ἐτέρων συμπραττόντων / ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν οἰόμενοι σωθήσεσθαι / οὐ τούτοις ἤκουσι βοηθήσαντες, and 86 τῶν συννερούντων αὐτοῖς.⁵⁶

The conclusion that must be drawn from this evidence is that the thought and language of § 87 is continued and brought to a climax in 88.3, and that 88.1–2 does not function as an intermediary link between the two related passages, since 87 could well have continued in 88.3 without intermission. This does not mean that 88.1–2 stands completely isolated between the two interrelated passages, but quite naturally it is linked more closely with 87, since sense demands some transitional connection, than it is with 88.3, which simply begins where 87 broke off. In 88.1 σωθέντες takes up σώσειν in 87 and forecasts what might be the result of this hypothesis: the Thirty may again ἀπολέσαι τὴν πόλιν. This thought leads to its emotional antithesis (what the Thirty did to their victims): ἀπώλεσαν. And this is where Lysias finds himself with an antithetic οὗτοι μέν . . . ἐκεῖνοι δέ construction which he cannot successfully conclude in a way that is logically impeccable. I have tried to show that Lysias does find a way out which satisfies the demands of rhetoric, if not of logic, but this emergency solution results in an ending to 88.2 that cannot be used for further discourse and does not lead over to 88.3. In fact, apart from the temporal implications pointed out above, the sole thematic link between 88.1–2 and 88.3 comes late, namely in the δέ clause, where αὐτοῖς δέ τοῖς τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσασιν (88.3) seems to echo τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσαι in 88.1, which is a statement made before the antitheses seemingly went out of hand in 88.2. Furthermore, there is reason to think that Lysias chose the elaborate phrase in 88.3 only in an effort to have at least one thematic link with the structurally rather superfluous 88.1–2, since αὐτοῖς τοῖς

⁵⁶ σῶζω . . . ἀπόλλυμι and τιμωρέω . . . βοηθέω are frequent combinations in antitheses; see Hollingsworth (above, n.26) 71, 73.

τὴν πόλιν ἀπολέσασιν is nothing but a sophisticated circumlocution for τοῖς τριάκοντα and therefore constitutes no real thematic link with 88.1 after all; it is only a catchword to fool the listeners by the similarity of sound.⁵⁷ Consequently we may say that virtually every point of thought and language in the passages discussed demonstrates that 88.1–2 is an excursus and that in 88.3 *Lysias* resumes the argument where he broke off in 87. This specific thematic structure provides yet further support for the interpretation of 88.1–2 which I have advocated.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ A mere mention of the Thirty can hardly be considered in itself to provide a link between two passages, since the Thirty appear in one way or another in virtually every sentence in this part of the speech. Furthermore, points c and d show that those antitheses in 88.3 in which the Thirty are mentioned reflect the phrasing not of 88.1–2 but of 87.

⁵⁸ If there seem to be no strictly philological arguments against my interpretation of 88.2 one can perhaps predict an objection of another kind: it could be argued that *Lysias* is not likely to have spoken as I have suggested in 88.2, since such a warning of the possible future actions of the Thirty (τιμωρία) could frighten the jurors into releasing *Eratosthenes* (in which case *Lysias* would have counteracted the main purpose of the trial). It seems to be widely accepted that, among the jurors and Athenians at large, sympathies and feelings regarding the Thirty were still divided (see *Rauchenstein*, "Ueber das Ende der Dreissig in Athen," *Philologus* [1855] 599–600, and *F. Ferckel*, *Lysias und Athen* [Würzburg 1937] 47, 124; *H. Stedefeldt*, "Ueber die Tendenz des *Lysias* in den Reden gegen *Eratosthenes* und *Agoratos*," *Philologus* [1870] 242–243, thinks that *Lysias* makes use of the widespread hatred of the Thirty). From this point it is possible to argue in both directions; one might equally well suggest that, if *Lysias* felt that he had a weak case and suspected that the jurors would not condemn *Eratosthenes* on the evidence produced, he might resort to emotional arguments like a prediction of future terror should the Thirty be set free. Also, we have to consider the possibility that *Lysias* may perhaps make use of both kinds of argument.

Yet there is much to be said for the emotional approach. *Rauchenstein* (598) points out that some of the Thirty were no longer alive, and probably *Eratosthenes* and *Pheidon* were the only ones to be present at the trial (for the rhetorical ἤκουσιν ἀπολογησόμενοι in 22, cf. ἤκει ἀπολογησόμενος in 84). The main purpose of 85–90 is to discredit *Eratosthenes*' witnesses and sympathizers but this passage also seems to me to establish a contrast: "Their victims were helpless, whereas you are not"; admittedly, this is not in the text but could well have been there (cf. 81 ὁ μέντοι ἀγὼν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου τῇ πόλει καὶ Ἐρατοσθένει), and 91 νυνὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὑμᾶς ἀναγκάζει παρὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν γνώμην ψηφίζεσθαι should bear some weight; the solitary μέν, stressing νυνί, presupposes an alternative which has been left out: the victims did not have much of a chance to get the upper hand (cf. *F. A. Müller*, *Observationes de elocutione Lysiae*, I, *De anacoluthis* [Hal. Sax. 1877] 6). In 87 πλῆθος may have been chosen to give the jurors self-confidence but also to remind them of their obligations to the people, as in 91 μηδ' οἶεσθε κρύβδην τὴν ψήφον εἶναι· φανεράν γὰρ τῇ πόλει τὴν ὑμετέραν γνώμην ποιήσετε, and in 94 *Lysias* stresses that the jurors are free to take action: ἀνθ' ὧν ὑμεῖς νῦν ἐν τῷ θαρραλέῳ ὄντες κτλ. (cf. 35). But we do not have to look far for evidence

Let us retrace our steps to the beginning of this article. There I suggested that the majority of scholars, by taking τιμωρία παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν in 88.2 to mean "vengeance on the foes," show themselves unaware of a central principle in Greek oratory regarding the arrangement within the speech of a certain type of argument. In fact, I think it is possible to demonstrate that Lysias simply could not have been talking of "vengeance on the foes" in 88.2. Let us suppose for argument's sake that every fact I have pointed to in support of my interpretation is mere philological delusion; let us also suppose that Lysias did intend the words in 88.2 to mean "vengeance on." If so, he would hardly have cut short what he had just begun to say, because if his real message was to be "but these who are dead can no longer take vengeance on their foes" he would more or less have been compelled to continue the thought in stirring and emotive terms like "therefore, lend them your arms and help them to exact the retribution that is due to them." But Lysias does not do this, and we ought to be convinced that he had good reasons for not speaking of "vengeance on the foes" in 88.1-2.⁵⁹

In antiquity Lysias was particularly famous for his ἡθοποιία, and when it came to saying the right thing at the right moment he was a master; in fact, we have his own definition of his approach in these matters.⁶⁰ But it is also known that his art of rhetoric is based less on

to counter the argument that Lysias would not have said anything to disquiet the minds of the jurors: what could have been more disturbing than the prediction in 88.1 that the Thirty may again destroy the city if they are released (especially after the eloquent description of the past terror)? In fact, similar forebodings appear elsewhere in the speech: ἡγούμενοι πολλήν ἄδειαν σφίσιν ἔσσεσθαι τῶν <τε> πεπραγμένων καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ ποιεῖν ὃ τι ἂν βούλωνται, εἰ τοὺς μεγίστων κακῶν αἰτίους λαβόντες ἀφήσετε (85). ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσσεσθαι βούλομαι λέγειν, τὰ πραχθέντα ὑπὸ τούτων οὐ δυνάμενος εἰπεῖν (99; cf. 98).

⁵⁹ I do not think it can be argued that Lysias simply left his audience to supply the continuation of this thought; as I have suggested above, this is a natural thing to do when making comparisons ("they are out of reach now — how about you?"), but here we would have an exhortation to take revenge and would therefore expect an imperative clause, which probably would be the last mood of speech to be omitted.

⁶⁰ "ἡ γὰρ γλῶττα, κατὰ Λυσίαν τὸν ῥήτορα, νοῦν οὔτε πολὺν, οὔτε μικρὸν ἔχει· ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ᾧ μὲν πολὺ, πολὺς, ᾧ δὲ μικρόν, μικρός" quoted by Greg. Cor. in the preface to *De dialectis*; see also F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit* (Leipzig 1868) 1.383-398. When Hermogenes distinguishes between three kinds of δεινὸς λόγος and decides that the second type (λόγος which is δεινός without seeming to be so) is the one by which the orator best realizes his aim he points to Lysias as an obvious exponent (see G. Lindberg, *Studies in Hermogenes and Eustathios* [Lund 1977] 105-107; cf. D. Chr. 18.11, Blass, 1.391). For Lysias' ἡθοποιία see D.H. *Lys.* 8 and Dover (above, n.1) 76 ff.

fact than on emotional argument.⁶¹ We do not have to go outside *Or.* 12 to find examples of his inclination for the emotional; in 36 and 83 Lysias tentatively suggests that not only the Thirty should be disposed of but their children too. In ancient Greece this mode of thought was highly relevant, and the *τιμωρία* concept belongs to the same sphere of emotional rhetoric; in its imperative form it can be said to be the apogee of such rhetoric. Above I have pointed to the fact that *τιμωρία* was not merely an excuse for striking back, but rather an obligation whenever one's relatives had been murdered: there would be no rest and peace for the souls of the dead until retribution had been exacted, and this religious obligation fell on the sons and nearest male relatives of the dead.⁶² Even if the city-state had formally taken over the punishment of the individual, the Athenians, for all their supposed rationality, were not unsympathetic to this view, as is obvious from several of the extant speeches of the Attic orators. Lysias, for one, is explicit: *προσῆκει δ' ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἅπασι τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . ἀποθνήσκοντες γὰρ ἐπέσκηψαν καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἅπασι τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν κτλ.* (13.92)

Even if the *τιμωρία* argument seems to have belonged more or less to the stock repertoire Lysias could hardly have failed to make excellent use of it in this speech, particularly after his eloquent description of the terror of the Thirty to which many of the jurors and their relatives had been subjected (cf. § 84). In fact, their obligation to avenge themselves on the Thirty would have formed an argument of great emotional impact, especially if launched at a high point of the speech; and I think we can take it for granted that Lysias would not have diminished its great power by introducing it at the wrong moment. Such an argument borders on the religious: it reminds man of his obligations to the dead, to his forefathers, and also to the gods. It is hard to imagine an argument with a more powerful appeal to the emotions. Even a mediocre orator would realize at once where this appeal would be most effectively used: it should be saved for the final climax of the speech when passions have been roused to a maximum. And this is precisely where Lysias does introduce this argument: *ὅσοι δ' ἂν παρὰ τούτων δίκην λάβωσιν (ἡγήσονται οἱ τεθνεῶτες) ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τιμωρίας πεποιημένους* (§ 100), followed immediately by the famous ending *παύσομαι κατηγορῶν*, the asyndetic *ἀκηκόατε, ἐωράκατε, πεπόνθατε, ἔχετε*, and the final imperative *δικάζετε*. We can rest assured that Lysias would not have wasted

⁶¹ See Bateman (above, n.26) 159; Schön (above, n.55) 112–115.

⁶² See E. Rohde, *Psyche* 4th ed. (Tübingen 1907) 264–265.

this brilliant rhetorical conceit by using it in the wrong part of the speech. The appeal for revenge belongs to the *peroratio* (ἐπίλογος).

This is not to say that the term *τιμωρία* or *τιμωρεῖσθαι* cannot appear in other parts of a speech as well, but whenever it does it has another function: if it is part of the narration or the argument it is not usually expressed as an exhortation, as it almost always is in the *peroratio*.⁶³ A closer look at Lysias' disposition of his arguments in *Or.* 12 will show that this holds true and that every instance of *τιμωρία* (in this speech) before the *peroratio* is nonexhortative.⁶⁴ Moreover, it is possible to show that Lysias takes care not to waste his resources, since there are several instances when he could have used the *τιμωρία* argument but apparently chose not to. By holding emotions in check until the *peroratio* begins he achieves a much greater effect when he at last resorts to this argument.⁶⁵

We shall be in a better position to judge Lysias' art as an orator and to understand why he reserves the *τιμωρία* argument for the climax if we study his highly skillful application of it at the end of the *peroratio*. Lysias' talent for increasing excitement and tempo toward the end of his speeches is well known; in this oration the great climax is beginning to build up in § 99.⁶⁶

⁶³ The exhortation need not be expressed by means of the imperative but can also be suggested indirectly (indignant questions, *χρή, προσήκει*, and the like). In *Or.* 12 exhortative *τιμωρία* occurs twice in the *peroratio*: apart from the occurrence in § 100 (where the actual form may not be hortative whereas the tenor of the statement in fact is) it also occurs in 94 καθ' ὅσον δύνασθε καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς τιμωρήσασθε. We shall find that this is in no way exceptional, and in this speech it is scarcely irrelevant, since Lysias here addresses two parties, those from Peiraeus and those from the town. For the disposition of this type of argument see below, n.71.

⁶⁴ §§ 6, 70, 88 (*τιμωρουμένους* in 35 is an emendation but would not change anything anyway). There has been some dispute as to where the *peroratio* begins in *Or.* 12. Some scholars seem to labor under the mistaken impression that a long speech must have an excessively long *peroratio* and therefore propose a beginning relatively early on in the speech. It should be obvious, however, that the *peroratio* begins in 92, where we find the typical phrasing of *peroratio*: βούλομαι . . . ἀναμνήσας καταβαίνειν . . . ἵνα . . . τὴν ψῆφον φέρητε . . . σκέψασθε κτλ. 94: τιμωρήσασθε, ἐνθυμηθέντες μὲν . . . ἐνθυμηθέντες δὲ . . . ἀναμνησθέντες δὲ . . . 95: ἀναμνησθήτε . . . 96: ἀνθ' ὧν ὀργίσθητε μὲν . . . ἀναμνήσθητε δὲ κτλ.; cf. Bizos (above, n.7) 123, Frohberger-Gebauer (above, n.6) 23.

⁶⁵ Before the beginning of the *peroratio* Lysias only makes use of nonemotional concepts like *δίκην λαμβάνειν*, *δίκην δοῦναι*, etc. (§§ 29, 36, 60, 79, 82, 83, 84 *δίκην λαμβάνειν*, 26, 35, 37, 82 *δίκην δοῦναι*, 34 *διαψήφισις*, 36 *κολάζεσθαι*, etc.); in most of these cases *τιμωρία* would not *per se* have been out of place.

⁶⁶ "Dans ses péroraisons, il y a souvent de la fermeté, quelquefois de l'énergie, surtout une argumentation ingénieuse et pressante," says Girard (above, n.28) 7.

Lysias charges the Thirty with three great crimes: they have sinned against the gods, they have destroyed the city, and they have committed murder.⁶⁷ Beginning here Lysias increases the rhetorical pathos step by step to reach a climax at the very end of the speech. The mention of the murder as the last of the charges in 99 makes it possible for him to introduce again a favorite rhetorical device mentioned above: *οἷς* (= the dead) *ὑμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ζῶσιν ἐπαμῦναι οὐκ ἐδύνασθε, ἀποθανοῦσι βοηθήσατε*. Here Lysias widens the scope and involves the jurors in the situation as he has done before, and he does it in forceful terms: apart from the juxtaposed pronouns and the conjunction the sentence consists of five verb forms, with a pronounced antithesis between *ζῶσιν* and *ἀποθανοῦσι*.⁶⁸ In the next sentence Lysias builds the emotional tension up to a climax by presenting two emotive but highly sophisticated arguments: the dead are supposed to be listening to the trial, and they will know how the jurors have cast their votes; and they will consider those jurors who acquit the Thirty to have condemned them — the dead — to death, but those who pass a death sentence on the Thirty to have taken vengeance for them (*τιμωρίας πεποιημένους*). In this context the *τιμωρία* argument fits in perfectly and achieves its maximum effect against a background of old religious and moral codes. The emotive idea of endowing the dead with the faculty of physical feeling is highly studied and deliberate; although it is in fact a variation of a similar concept according to which the gods will know how the jurors have

Wolgast (above, n.20) 227, remarks that in both addresses, to people from the town and from Peiraeus, Lysias begins gently but goes on to increase the vigor of his oratory in the form of some very pointed antitheses toward the end of each section (especially noticeable in the "town party" address); see also W. Voegelin, *Die Diabole bei Lysias* (Basel 1943) 160.

⁶⁷ Lysias seems to score by stating the charges indirectly, since in this way he both stresses his own efforts and makes it possible to refer to his brother and the other victims as *οἱ τεθνεῶτες*, which gives them an almost religious significance and brings them a step closer to *οἱ γονεῖς*; this would make his charges correspond to the set combination of accusations; cf., e.g., Lycurg. 15 *θεοί, γονεῖς, πατρίς* (cf. D.Chr. 12.10). For the Thirty's *ἀσέβεια* see §§ 18–21, 87–88, 96, and Voegelin (above, n.66) 159–161.

⁶⁸ Lysias avails himself of the same device in the *peroratio* of Or. 13, in which the Thirty also play a role: *ὑμεῖς τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νυνὶ δὴ, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπέθνησκον, οὐχ οἱοί τε ἦσθε ἐκείνοις ἐπαρκέσαι διὰ τὰ πράγματα τὰ περιεστηκότα, νυνὶ, ἐν ᾧ δύνασθε, τιμωρήσατε τὸν ἐκείνων φονέα* (§ 93). For *τιμωρέω* . . . *βοηθέω* see above n.56. The exhortation in 12.99 to help the dead (sc. to take revenge; cf. § 100) very much corresponds to the omission suggested above. For the phrase cf. *οἷς ὑμεῖς δηλώσατε* (§ 60).

voted, in this context it also expands the statement at the end of § 91, where Lysias reminds the jurors that the whole city will know how they have voted (μηδ' οἴεσθε κρύβδην τὴν ψήφον εἶναι· φανεράν γὰρ κτλ.).⁶⁹ And the awkward and pathetic notion that the dead can be sentenced to death a second time should have struck the audience as particularly bold after Lysias' remark in § 37 that even if the Thirty were to die twice for each of their crimes they could not be considered to have given full satisfaction, an idea to which he returns in § 84.⁷⁰ In short, this is the perfect setting for the *τιμωρία* argument with its religious and emotional connotations, and it is easy to understand why Lysias restricts the use of it to the *peroratio*, since only here can he take advantage of its maximum rhetorical potential.

When Lysias in this speech reserves for the *peroratio* the demand for vengeance he simply conforms to what seems to be a general principle, for obvious reasons, as we have seen.⁷¹ The *τιμωρία* argument naturally cannot be used in every type of case, but its occurrence is frequent enough (mainly in cases *κατά τινος*); for example, we find it in Alcidas, Antiphon, Dinarchus, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Isocrates, Lycurgus, and Lysias. For obvious reasons Isaeus makes no use of the *τιμωρία* argument in his surviving orations, nor does Aeschines (none of his three extant orations concerns a capital charge which would offer

⁶⁹ For examples of the conceit "the gods will know how you vote" see, e.g., Lycurg. 146 and D. 19.239 (both with *κρύβδην*). For the idea that the dead have senses and feelings like the living see K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford 1974) 243–246. By the same token the dead will know of and rejoice in the achievements of the living, as is obvious from Pindar, O. 14.21–24, O. 8.77–83, etc. (cf. N. 4.85–86). Yet another variation on this theme is offered by Lysias in lighter vein at the opening of Or. 7: *δοκεῖ μοι δεῖν καὶ τοὺς μὴ γεγονότας ἤδη δεδιέναι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι*.

⁷⁰ Again the *peroratio* of Or. 13 shows a remarkable similarity in the application of this particular device: *εἰ γὰρ ἀποψηφιεῖσθε Ἀγοράτου τουτουί, οὐ μόνον τοῦτο διαπράττεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ὁμολογεῖτε ὑμῖν εὖνους εἶναι, τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ ταύτῃ θάνατον καταψηφίζεσθε* (§ 93). For the remarkable word order in 37 see Dover (above, n. 1) 89–90; did Lysias use this *κακόφωνον* in 37 so that his audience would recall it in 100?

⁷¹ It has been stated above that exhortative *τιμωρία* usually does not appear outside the *peroratio*. It can happen though that an orator makes a start head-on and exploits the *τιμωρία* argument in the *exordium*. This is the case in Lys. 13, where an exhortation is suggested by *προσῆκει* in § 1. The same admonition returns in very similar words at the beginning of the *peroratio* in § 92 (this scheme resembles the ubiquitous "ring composition" of archaic lyric poetry; and we know from Pindar how important it is to have a brilliant opening [cf. O. 6.1 ff], a rule which seems to have been observed in most genres, including those of history and oratory).

the most suitable opportunity for the use of this particular device), and this applies to Andocides as well.⁷²

We have found then that structural principles of Greek rhetoric as well as philological evidence and features of style and thought combine together to demonstrate that Lysias is not speaking of "vengeance on the foes" in 12.88.1-2. Furthermore, this same evidence gives positive support to the interpretation suggested in this article. Finally, the new interpretation helps solve a number of secondary problems which have been overlooked by most scholars but which are of significance for a correct understanding of this passage.

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⁷² Some speeches are too short to display the usual pattern of division; in such cases I have included speeches which introduce the argument toward the end. I have not distinguished between cases of "vengeance on" and "punishment of" (although the "punishment" concept is weaker and does not always carry all the connotations of "vengeance"), since more often than not it is impossible to determine to what exact extent either notion prevails; structurally, however, they seem to conform to the same pattern (for the lack of difference between τιμωρεῖν / τιμωρεῖσθαι see above, nn.21 and 25): Alcidas 1.187.9 (Reiske), Antiphon *Tetr.* 1.1.11, 1.3.11, 2.3.12, 3.1.7, 3.4.11, Dinarchus *Dem.* 113, *Arist.* 20-21, Demosthenes 19.343, 21.227, 26.23-24, 45.87, 46.28, 50.65-66, 59.126, Hyperides *Phil.* 9-10, 12, *Dem.*(?) col. 39, Isocrates 20 passim, Lycurgus 146, Lysias 6.53, 13.93, 95, 97, 27.15-16, 28.15, 29.13, 30.33, 35. That Isocrates exploits this device so little certainly depends on the fact that most of his orations are nonforensic (but see 4.185), and to some extent this also holds true for Demosthenes. There are also some instances of the τιμωρία argument used in a "passive" way (even by Isaeus, 4.31): Antiphon 1.29, 5.93, 95, *Tetr.* 2.2.11, 2.4.8, Demosthenes 24.217, Herodes Atticus 178.12 (Reiske), and Lysias 15.12 and 31.24, 26.

THE BASIS OF STOIC ETHICS

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I

THE origins of Stoic ethics are not open to easy view. The historical break conventionally marked by the deaths of Alexander the Great in 323 and Aristotle in 322 has long discouraged the drawing of lines of influence from the Classical to the Hellenistic period. In presentations of the history of philosophy, the tendency to see discontinuity has been strengthened by the idea that after Aristotle philosophy was decadent and undistinguished, far beneath the level of past achievements. This idea has been strengthened in turn by the paucity of evidence about Hellenistic philosophy, which itself renders difficult the drawing of any historical lines at all. Understanding of the origins of Stoic doctrine has also been thwarted by the nature of the evidence that does remain. It is predominantly doxographical: bits and pieces giving what our sources and their sources believed to be the highlights of Stoic thought, rather than sustained reports of the Stoics' positions and the arguments for them. The result is that we often cannot tell which of their views the Stoics thought central and which they thought peripheral. No philosopher ever regards all his beliefs as on a par: some are basic while others are part of the superstructure of corollaries and elaborations. But the nature of our evidence about early Stoicism hinders us from drawing this distinction. In consequence there is a blurring of the historical as well as the philosophical picture. Not knowing in many instances which beliefs the early Stoics took as basic to their doctrine, we are poorly situated to tell which of their agreements and disagreements with previous thinkers seemed to them vital and which were taken by them to be less crucial. Thus, the clearer we can make the structure of their philosophical doctrine, the better informed we can be about which historical connections are most important.

Although the scholarly situation has improved in recent years, work on the Stoics is still heavily under the spell of the doxographical tradition, in many ways continued by von Arnim's influential collection of Stoic remains, the *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*. It is a pressing task

to break with this expository tradition — while making use of it — and instead to present as more than a mere heap of scattered dicta a philosophical doctrine that in antiquity was renowned for its organization and cohesiveness (Cic. *De Fin.* III.74).

In the field of ethics and moral psychology, it is probably Pohlenz who has made the most elaborate effort in recent times to discover the basic forces in Stoic thought.¹ According to Pohlenz's account, the direction of thought of the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno of Citium, was set by his opposition to Epicurus, and especially to his views about the good for man and the motives governing human action.² Epicurus advocated a kind of hedonism, both as an ethical and as an empirical psychological doctrine. That is, he held both that human beings ought in some sense to pursue (a certain sort of) pleasure and that they do in fact pursue it, although they often fail in their pursuit through ignorance and bad strategy.³ Moreover, Epicurus thought that his claim that pleasure ought to be pursued could be bolstered by showing, not merely that all human beings do strive for it, but also that they do so from birth.⁴ The reasoning behind this idea was that infants' strivings are not yet influenced by the opinions and conventions of adults and can therefore be viewed as in some important sense "natural."⁵

According to Pohlenz, Zeno agreed with Epicurus on the matter of method, inasmuch as he agreed that in order to discover what is good for a man one must discover what men strive for naturally and from earliest infancy.⁶ But he differed with Epicurus, Pohlenz says, over what he regarded as a misguided assimilation of men and lower animals: Zeno, thinking of man as by his nature different from animals, refused

¹ The summing up of Pohlenz's views is made in *Die Stoa*, 4th ed. (Göttingen 1970-72), which builds upon earlier articles and monographs by him, to be cited below. On the origins of Stoicism in general, see I, 9-36 and for ethics, 111-123, 159-167.

² Ibid. 113. Though I shall be disagreeing with much of Pohlenz's account, I shall remain neutral on his claim that Zeno was concerned to attack Epicurus.

³ Diogenes Laertius X.128-129, 131; J. Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge 1972) 121 (on the fact that Epicurus did not thus distinguish between ethical and psychological hedonism), and A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (New York 1974) 61-64.

⁴ D.L. X.137; Cic. *De Fin.* II.31-32.

⁵ D.L. X.137, 127-129, and Pohlenz, I 111-119 passim. Both Epicurus and Eudoxus before him made the further claim that all animals pursue pleasure (see Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X.2, 1172b9-15).

⁶ In the light of Pohlenz's views on this point (p. 113), it is difficult to see how he can say (p. 118) that it was Zeno who first formulated the question "Welches ist der Urtrieb der menschlichen Natur?"

to identify man's fundamental spring of action with something, namely pleasure, that was common as well to nonhuman creatures. This identification, Pohlenz continues, would in Zeno's eyes fail to take proper account of the fact that the peculiar essence of man is his reason, by the possession of which he surpasses beasts and approaches divine status.⁷ The argument appears to be that in Zeno's view, first, the goal or *telos* must be in some sense the fulfillment of man's nature, and, second, man's nature must involve what distinguishes him from other beings.⁸ Thus, Zeno would have been anxious to attribute to human beings as their natural and earliest aim not pleasure, but something more appropriate to their special position among animals.

At this point, Pohlenz introduces the factor that in the Stoic view of moral development occupied the place in Epicureanism of the infant's pursuit of pleasure. It is what is called *oikeiosis*, which is impossible to translate into English (Cicero used *conciliatio*, *commendatio*, and associated words) but which can be roughly paraphrased by something like "a process of taking something to oneself, or accepting or appropriating it or making it one's own."⁹ The proper idea can be gained, in fact, only by understanding the whole theory of development within which the term has its place. An important part of the idea, however, is that living things initially pursue not pleasure but self-preservation and the maintenance of their own existence, whether accompanied by pleasure or not. To this end they avoid what is inimical to their self-preservation and are attracted to what abets it, and this attraction, and the behavior to which it leads, constitute *oikeiosis*. Tied in this way to the notion of self-preservation, *oikeiosis* was a vital component in the Stoic view of the development of human moral psychology.¹⁰ Indeed, Pohlenz goes so far as to call it "der Ausgangspunkt wie der feste Grund der stoischen Ethik."¹¹

So far, however, the claim that men are subject to *oikeiosis* at the beginning of life is not enough to distinguish men from beasts, because we find it expressly stated that other living things aim at self-preserva-

⁷ *Die Stoa* 113, 115, 118-119.

⁸ See pp. 113-119, esp. p. 118, "das spezifische Wesen des Menschen." Pohlenz has in mind principally Zeno's explanation of the *telos* as *ἁμολογουμένως ζῆν*; see section VII.

⁹ On this problem of translation, see S. G. Pembroke, "Oikeiosis," A. A. Long, ed., *Problems in Stoicism* (London 1971) 115-116.

¹⁰ That the notion of *oikeiosis* goes back at least to Chrysippus is fairly clear, but it is less certain than Pohlenz believes that Zeno had it; see nn.92-93.

¹¹ *Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie*, Abh. d. Gött. Ges., phil.-hist. Kl., 3. Folge 26 (Göttingen 1940) 11.

tion just as humans do.¹² Therefore, Pohlenz undertakes to show how *oikeiosis* as applied to human beings must involve something peculiar to them. It may be true that every animal aims at self-preservation, but what counts as self-preservation depends on what sort of self you have. The distinguishing fact about human beings, the account continues, is that they have *logos* or reason,¹³ and therefore the urge for self-preservation in human beings must, at least when the reason has developed fully, manifest itself in a life in accordance with reason. In this way, the account concludes, Zeno will have given due attention to the special status of human beings as rational creatures.

This account of Zeno's preoccupations provides the origins of Stoic ethics with a firm historical setting. In the first place, the Stoics are seen as reacting to the hedonism of Epicurus and producing a rival account of human motivation. In the second place — and this is a fact that Pohlenz does not emphasize — they turn out to hold views having interesting affiliations with Aristotelian ethical doctrine. Like Aristotle's view (in many parts), the Stoic view turns out to be what is sometimes called a "self-realizationist" view;¹⁴ that is, it fixes upon certain features of a human being that are thought to constitute its somehow essential nature and urges that those features be developed. We see this line of thought in Aristotle's use in ethical discussions of the question what it is to be a man.¹⁵ On the present account of *oikeiosis*, our drive for self-preservation, combined with our discovery that we possess reason, leads to a desire to develop our reason and to lead life in accordance with it, so as to preserve and to develop our true selves. This coincidence of outlook would not obliterate all difference between Stoic and Aristotelian ethics.¹⁶ But it would give us a historical connection between Aristotle and the Stoics,¹⁷ and it would satisfy our need to understand the background of Stoic ethical thought.

¹² D.L. VII.85; *De Fin.* III.16 with *Die Stoa* 114–116. See also the remains of the *oikeiosis* doctrine of the Stoic Hierocles, which deal with animals as well as with men (ed. von Arnim, *Berliner Klassikertexte*, IV (Berlin 1906)).

¹³ This translation of *λόγος*, while not the only possible one even in a Stoic context, is the one which is relevant here, i.e., to *Die Stoa* 116–119.

¹⁴ H. Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, 7th ed. (1907) 90, 95.

¹⁵ Esp. *E. N.* 1178a7, 8, 1178b5–7, with 1097a34, b22 ff. (The argument runs differently, however, at 1177a14–16, b28–29; cf. W. K. Frankena, *Three Historical Philosophies of Education* (Glenview, Ill. 1965) 22–25.)

¹⁶ See esp. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 15 (1968) 72–85, esp. 74–76, 79–82.

¹⁷ Without, however, going as far as von Arnim did, when he maintained that the Stoic view of moral development was due, through Polemo, to Theophrastus (*Arius Didymus' Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik* [Vienna 1926], esp. 131–137,

Unfortunately, however, this historical setting is not one that the early Stoics will fit. At least in the early Stoa, the ethical doctrine was not a self-realizationist one. There was indeed a self-realizationist view with which the Stoic view tended later on to be confused and which may even have been taken over by Stoics in the time of Panaetius and after. But early Stoicism pursued a different line of thought.

In demonstrating this fact it will be useful to start late and move backward toward the beginning. A mistaken reading of the evidence from Cicero is an important factor in perpetuating the self-realizationist interpretation of Stoic ethics (and in fact in some of his writings Cicero fell into the same misinterpretation). But the advantage of using Cicero is that he does provide something more than fragments: he provides an extended description of Stoic views on human moral development and a debate about them. A careful reading of his discussion will enable us to distinguish the Stoic view from a quite different, genuinely self-realizationist view with which it tended to be conflated. But once we see that, despite blurring, the distinction between these two views could still be registered in Cicero's time, we shall be encouraged to look further back, to see if we can find independent support for attributing to the earliest Stoics that same view that is recorded as Stoic in Cicero. The account in Cicero does indeed follow firmly the early Stoic tradition of Chrysippus and Cleanthes, perhaps with certain additions. Moreover we shall see that whatever ethical view the earliest Stoics (including Zeno) may have held, it was certainly not a self-realizationist view. When these facts become apparent, we shall find the way open to proper understanding, through further research, of how Stoic ethics arose.

II

The scene shifts, then, to the first century B.C., where we find a discussion directly pertinent to these themes in Books III-V of Cicero's *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*. In Book III we see a sketch of Stoic ethics, with considerable attention to *oikeiosis* and moral development; in Book IV the Stoic doctrine is attacked, with the same focus; and this attack is followed in Book V by an exposition of another ethical doctrine,

157-161); Dirlmeier followed with an argument to much the same effect, with particular emphasis on the notion of *oikeiosis* ("Die Oikeiosislehre Theophrasts," *Philologus* suppl. 30 [1937]). The idea was effectively rebutted by Pohlenz, *Grundr.* 1-81.

in many ways similar to the Stoic one, but apparently following the views of Antiochus of Ascalon, one of Cicero's philosophical teachers.¹⁸ Like Book IV, Book V is in large part motivated by a desire to attack Stoic views and is launched from the same point of view (cf. below, section V). The line of attack has two major parts that are of interest here. One is that Stoic ethics are very largely derived, even purloined, from the ethics of the Academy and the Peripatos.¹⁹ The other is that what changes the Stoics did make were merely terminological, or such as to result in obvious falsity or inconsistency, or both.²⁰

The attack contained in these two books is centered on the doctrine of *oikeiosis*, and more particularly on the Stoic claim to be able to explain how moral motivation develops in human beings to make us capable, as time goes by, of prizing what is claimed in fact to be our good. Antiochus, if it is he, maintains that in spite of appearances to the contrary, what the Stoic doctrine lacks is precisely a coherent account of how a developing human being could really be motivated to accept and abide by Stoic ethical views, that is, how what they regard as the human good could ever be valued by anyone developing as they describe human beings as developing.²¹

Antiochus' own disagreement is not directed at the Stoic account of early development. For that part of their view appears to him to be correct, and indeed to be identical with the views he takes himself to have accepted from "the ancients" of the Academy.²² What he disagrees with the Stoics about is essentially their view of human good, what is good for a man.²³ He believes that they, in common with himself, accepted the idea that a man's initial impulse is to preserve himself and to act in accordance with his nature; and he holds that once they accepted this idea, they should have gone on to recognize action in accordance with human nature as *itself* the human good.²⁴ The Stoics, however, seem to him to have gone off the track in their story of moral development and to have ended with a view setting up something quite

¹⁸ *De Fin.* V.7-8. Antiochus is represented as believing himself to be, and indeed as being, in essential agreement with "ancient" Academics and Peripatetics (those mentioned by name are Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor, and Aristotle).

¹⁹ Both of which are said to be in important respects identical with each other; IV.24, 56; V.7, 14, 22.

²⁰ IV.56, 60-62, 72-74; V.22.

²¹ IV.26-29, 43-45, 46-48, 68-71.

²² IV.45; V.7.

²³ IV.26-29; V.15-17.

²⁴ IV.25-26, 29-31, 46-48, 78-79; V.15-17.

different as the human good and moreover something whose achievement was at variance with the initial impulse that they themselves posited.

The Stoics did in fact advance a view of the good according to which the only good was, as some translations say (cf. n.34), virtue, namely a certain state of the soul which was in a certain way independent of the goals of a human being at his initial stage of development. They believed that most if not all the things for which human beings naturally and initially strive are not themselves good in the strict sense.²⁵ Rather, they held that, roughly speaking, the things that human beings naturally strive for are merely "preferable" (*προηγμένα*), whereas their opposites are "dispreferable" (to use a term that matches the clumsiness of the Stoic term *ἀποπροηγμένα*). This view has always seemed rather strange, and modern scholarship has not, in my opinion, managed to make sense of it, if indeed there is sense to be made of it. Moreover their view of the good did indeed place a severe strain, as Antiochus saw, upon their account of the development of human moral motivation, and produced a problem with which they had to reckon.²⁶ They came to be seen as having mistakenly grafted their view of the good onto an account of the initial stages of human development which it could not fit, and Antiochus believed that their notion of *oikeiosis* ought naturally to have led them to a quite different view of the good, namely one of the sort that he himself adopted.

III

From the foregoing it appears that Antiochus regarded the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis*, in its initial stages, as identical with his own views on early human development. Many modern scholars also tend to think of the theories of development in *De Fin.* III and V as strongly similar to each other and even sometimes not to distinguish them from each other.²⁷ But although there are indeed important similarities, it be-

²⁵ For this view and some of its attendant problems, see, e.g., Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* 189-199.

²⁶ We do not know, in fact, who originated this line of objection to the Stoic account. (I suspect that the question is in a way pointless, since I think that the originator of the account, whether he was Zeno or Chrysippus or someone else, must from the start have been aware of the possibility of this sort of objection, so obvious is it.) For the idea that Posidonius criticized Chrysippus for depicting the psychologies of children and adults as implausibly different from one another, see Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* I, 199-200.

²⁷ Thus one finds Pohlenz, among others, citing Book V without any warning as evidence for claims about Stoic doctrine (e.g., *Grundfragen* 95).

hooves us to look carefully at the differences too. We shall see that Book III exhibits an account of development crucially different from that of Book V and one that throws more light than has been perceived on the way in which the Stoics thought that their notion of the good was related to their theory of *oikeiosis*.²⁸

Let us look now at Book V. The account of development is launched in c. 24, where the first claim is that every animal acts for its own preservation (*ut se conservet*) and also both to preserve itself and to be in the best condition in accordance with nature (*se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit*). The redundancy of this description seems to betoken some uncertainty,²⁹ and it is unclear here, and in the next chapters, whether the impulse to keep oneself in the best possible condition, in addition merely to surviving, is coordinate and coeval with the impulse to self-preservation, or instead succeeds it and is somehow based upon it.³⁰ In any case, it is evident that on this account, the desire for perfection of one's self and its parts is an element of an animal's motivation, on this view, from a very early stage.³¹

After some arguments in support of this first point (cc. 27-33), we are then presented with the observation that since each person's "nature" is dear to him (this being regarded as one way of putting the first point), we need to know what the nature of a man is (*quae sit hominis natura*, c. 34). The idea is that if one is going to preserve oneself and perfect oneself, one needs to know just what the self is that needs to be preserved and perfected. The account of one's "nature" is expected to tell us the answer, and is accordingly presented in cc. 34-45. It informs us what the various faculties of a man are, both those of his body and those of his soul (*animus*),³² while insisting that the perfection of the human being as a whole requires that his body "obey" (*parere*) his soul, and be judged in some sense less important than it is.³³

²⁸ See section IV.

²⁹ See N. Madvig, ed., *M. Tullii Ciceronis De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum Libri Quinque*, 3rd ed. (Copenhagen 1876) ad. loc. 644-645.

³⁰ The former interpretation is recommended by c. 43 (. . . *is animi appetitus a principio fuit ut ea quae dixi quam perfectissima natura haberemus* . . .). One might argue that c. 37 (*Nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse, carioresque quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles*) tends the opposite way, though it could also be read so as not to do so. See also c. 41 and II. 33-34.

³¹ See also cc. 26, 34, 35-36, 39-40, 41, 46-47.

³² See cc. 34, 37.

³³ Cc. 34, 38 (*ita fiet ut animi virtus corporis virtuti antepnatur* . . .).

On this basis an account of the motivation underlying the moral virtues (*honesta*) is developed,³⁴ these virtues being in particular justice, bravery, temperance, and prudence (c. 67). In conformity with the account so far, it is said that we have even as children certain impulses to virtuous actions that are like sparks or seeds of the virtues, which develop later (it is not said just how) with the acquisition of greater knowledge.³⁵ The point is that these impulses represent faculties that we have from birth and whose development is part of the process of perfecting the person as a whole.³⁶

At c. 46, a new turn in the argument is announced. Up to now, it is said, its basis was in the *prima commendatio naturae*, the first attraction (*oikeiosis*) of nature. Now, however, not merely the fact that each of us is dear to himself, but the fact that each part of our nature, both body and soul, possesses a faculty of its own, will be used to show that when we exercise such faculties we are acting in the highest degree willingly and of our own accord.³⁷ The force of this contrast is unclear enough for Madvig to have declared that there really was no contrast at all, and that Cicero seems *non satis attendisse ad continuationem et tenorem disputationis Antiochi*.³⁸ It is more likely, however, that Cicero is trying to be faithful to an articulation in his source for Antiochus' line of thought that he did not fully understand, than that he is introducing an articulation of his own. What ultimately worried the author of the argument was, quite plainly, the fact that he wishes to commend various virtues *even when* they are inimical to self-preservation and self-love, and what he wishes to show is that our impulses toward the exercise of these virtues

³⁴ In another context I would not be content with this translation of *honestum* or associated Latin and Greek words, but for present purposes it will do, since discussion of the notion expressed by "moral" will be unnecessary.

³⁵ See c. 43, *virtutis quasi germen* and *virtutum quasi scintillas*. Cf. Aristotle on φυσικὴ ἀρετή, esp. *E. N.* 1144b1ff., 1151a18.

³⁶ Esp. c. 44. It is always a problem for such views to say why the perfection of the uniquely human faculties exploited in, say, burglary and embezzlement are not to be developed.

³⁷ This difficult sentence reads: *Nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summe (summa MSS) nostra sponte moveamur*. The phrase "when we exercise such faculties" must be the force of *in his rebus*. *Summe* is good enough for the impossible *summa* (cf. Madvig 690-691), though I suspect that the corruption is deeper, and that we may have lost a clause between *summe* (or *summa*) and *nostra*. Alternatively, Cicero may be translating an original that is very compressed, or may be compressing heavily himself.

³⁸ Madvig 688-689.

are nevertheless natural to us, and therefore (in accordance with his principle that what is aimed at by a natural impulse is part of our good)³⁹ that acting in accordance with those impulses is a part of our good even though they run counter to our impulse toward self-preservation. The break at c.46 prepares the way for the attack on this problem.

The break accordingly marks the beginning of a discussion of a new sort of motivation. Up to this point, we have been seen to wish to possess virtues (of both body and soul) because of our recognition, however inexplicit, that possessing them is part of the preservation and development of our nature. Now, however, it is claimed that we aim at possessing them *propter se*, for their own sakes,⁴⁰ without regard to considerations of self-love.⁴¹ Thus, for example, we have two motivations to be just: one is our reflection (particularly, as c. 43 remarks, once we have attained a certain awareness of what our nature is) that to be just is to exercise a faculty that is a part of our nature; the other is an attraction to justice *tout court*, without regard to the fact that it is a part of our nature. Analogous pairs of types of motivation exist for each virtue.⁴²

It is important here to avoid confusion. When one is impelled to be just by the *second* motivation, one's reason for being just, as it presents itself to one, is not that being so is a part of one's nature, much less that being so is conducive to one's self-preservation or self-perfection. Rather, one is simply attracted by the idea of being just, merely for its own sake. However, being thus attracted to and motivated by justice for its own sake is itself a part of one's nature, and it is for this reason that being thus motivated by justice is claimed to be a part of our good.⁴³ The difference between the first and the second motivation, therefore, is the difference between being just because being so is to perfect one's nature, and being just for its own sake, as one's nature in fact demands that one be, but not because it does so demand.

This distinction having been made, Antiochus is in a position to say

³⁹ Cc. 89 (*bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est, quod contra, malum*), 66, 15-17.

⁴⁰ Cc. 47, 60.

⁴¹ Cc. 58-61, 47, 63-64, 55.

⁴² Hence the apparent repetitiousness of cc. 46-72 as against cc. 34-44 (and esp. cc. 65-67 vs. 38, 43), noted by Madvig, *ibid*, and mistakenly taken by him to be pointless.

⁴³ Hence the emphasis on the naturalness of virtue in cc. 58-60, 65-66, long after the new *argumentandi genus* has begun in c. 46, and in spite of the claim there that it will not be based upon the *prima commendatio naturae*, which was the impulse to self-preservation and self-perfection.

that different natural impulses can come into conflict, as in particular when the impulse to self-preservation conflicts with the impulse to be just. Examples of such conflicts appear in c. 64, and they are said to be resolved by the fact that the happiness arising from moral virtue is sufficient to swamp all rival considerations.⁴⁴ But all the impulses at work here are claimed to be natural to man, and the entire basis of the ethical view outlined in Book V is based upon the claim that the development and realization of human nature, that is, of the impulses and faculties that nature has engendered in human beings, is the human good.

IV

To the wary eye it takes only a little care in the reading of Book III to see that the structure of its argument is quite different from that of Book V. In brief, the point is that Book III does not rest ultimately upon a self-realizationist doctrine as does Book V, and that the account of moral development in the former contains a crucial idea entirely lacking in the doctrine of Antiochus in the latter.

The first step of the account of development in III indeed looks the same as that of the account in V: all animals are said to strive for self-preservation (c. 16, *ad se conservandum*) and to avoid what is inimical to that end. As a part of this striving they are said to have "sense of self" (*sensus sui*), without which they would not be able to strive for self-preservation.⁴⁵ What is distinctly lacking, however, is the insistence of Book V that coordinate with, or arising immediately out of,⁴⁶ the impulse to self-preservation is a desire for perfection of one's parts and of oneself as a whole. Indeed, the injunction to make oneself or one's parts "perfect," while frequent in Book V, is conspicuously absent from Book III.⁴⁷ The same can be said of the idea, basic to Book V, that in order to follow the injunctions of nature, the first thing that we must do is to determine what the nature of man is (V. 34). Man does indeed have a special place in the scheme of Book III,⁴⁸ to which we shall later turn (section VIII), but that place is not accurately represented by saying that on its doctrine, a person's good is simply the development

⁴⁴ Cc. 71-72, 76 ff. I leave aside the question whether the view involved ultimately is paradoxical or self-contradictory.

⁴⁵ C. 16; cf. D.L. VII.85.

⁴⁶ Cf. n.30.

⁴⁷ In Book V see cc. 26, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39-40, 43, 44, 59-60. (The occurrence of *perfectio* at III.32 obviously has nothing to do with the present matter.)

⁴⁸ See cc. 21 and, in a different connection, 63, 66, 67-68.

of human faculties. While Book III does indeed recommend much that Book V would count as such development, the recommendation as it is presented in III is founded on importantly different considerations.

After the brief treatment of self-preservation and the sense of self in cc. 16–17, we are told that at an early stage we think that *καταλήψεις* too are to be adopted for their own sakes (*propter se*). What *καταλήψεις* are is a difficult problem concerning Stoic epistemology (Cicero, somewhat at a loss, here suggests *cognitiones*, *comprehensiones*, and *perceptiones* all as possible translations). But the claim is evidently that we somehow value knowledge, and the account continues by saying that we also value *artes*.⁴⁹ It would appear from the phrase *propter se* that this esteem of knowledge is not regarded as derived from the impulse to self-preservation, and it is immediately said as well that in addition to those parts of the body possessing usefulness (*utilitas*), there are others, such as the peacock's tail, bestowed by nature not for their usefulness (*nullam ob utilitatem*) but as a sort of ornamentation (*quasi ad quendam ornatum*). But rather than continue as Book V would have, by maintaining that, since these things are natural to our makeup, it is part of our good to develop and exploit them, the argument proceeds in a quite different direction.

In c. 20 it is said that what is correctly called good begins to arise and be understood at a stage at which one's *selectio* (and *reiectio*) of things becomes *constans consentaneaue naturae*.⁵⁰ The *selectio* in question has to do with "appropriate acts" or *officia* (Cicero's translation of *καθήκοντα*),⁵¹ the first of which is said to be to preserve oneself *in*

⁴⁹ The Greek must be *τέχναι*, which is explained by the Stoics with the phrase *σύστημα καταλήψεων* and the like; see SVF I.73; II.56, 731.

⁵⁰ This period (*Initiis . . . possit dici*) is preceded by one concerning the notion of what is *aestimabile* that does not clearly fit into the context in which Cicero has placed it; see A. Lörcher, *Das Fremde und das Eigene in Ciceros Büchern De finibus bonorum et malorum und den Academica* (Halle 1911). (In general, however, Lörcher far overestimates the incoherence of Book III and Cicero's responsibilities for the difficulties that it does contain; see R. Philippson, review of Lörcher, *Philologische Wochenschrift* [1913] 598–617, esp. 599.)

⁵¹ Following Rackham I use "appropriate act" to render *officium*. Though clumsy, it is less misleading than others. "Duty" is unsatisfactory, carrying too many misleading modern connotations. Long's translation, "function" (*Hellenistic Philosophy* 188–189, 187) is in my opinion inaccurate and based on a mistaken interpretation of Stoic ethics. His argument for it employs claims about the normal meaning of the Latin word *officium*, which can easily enough mean "function," but are not to the point. Because Cicero is using the word as a term of art to translate the Greek *kathekon*, what we really need is a translation of that word (in technical Stoic contexts), one that will fit into the philosophical doctrine which, even as of Cicero's time, had its primary formulations in Greek.

naturae statu and the second to seize what is in accord with nature and to reject the contrary. The long period constituting c. 21 is intended to explain this idea (note *enim*). The first *conciliatio* (*oikeiosis*) of a man, it says, is to things that are in accord with nature; but as soon as the man has understanding (*intelligentia*) or, better, cognizance (*notio*) and sees the order and, so to speak, harmony of conduct (*rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam*), he values this order and harmony far more than all the other things that previously attracted him. Moreover, it is said, he realizes through the use of intelligence and reason (*cognitio* and *ratio*)⁵² that in this order and harmony lies that highest good that is to be praised and sought for its own sake.

It is not difficult to see that this passage, which describes the turning point in a person's understanding of and attraction to the good, does not express the same self-realizationist view that we have seen in Book V. The crucial event here is not a realization by the person of what his own nature consists in, but rather an awareness of the "order and harmony of conduct"; and his understanding of the good does not involve the understanding of how he may preserve and develop his own self, but rather how he may keep himself in a state of *ὁμολογία* with nature, notably through such things as the performance of *honeste facta*.⁵³

Commenting on this passage, Madvig was worried by the fact that although the word *officium* occurs first in the clause *primum est . . . officium*, the phrase *cum officio selectio* a few lines later seems to suggest that only at a later stage does a person actually perform *officia* (Madvig 372; cf. H. Rackham, trans., *Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass. 1931) 238n.). If one does think that only what is done at the later stage can be an *officium*, then one will take the first occurrence of the word to be misleading. In fact, however, the Stoics saw no need for a creature to have reached any maturity or mental power before it could perform *officia* or *kathekonta*. A *kathekon*, in their view, was something that, when done, had a plausible defense (*εὐλογον ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν* in D.L. VII.107, and *εὐλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει* in Stob. *Ecl.* II 85, 14–15, SVF I.230), but this did not require that the creature who had done it be actually in a position at the time to give that defense, as is shown by the fact that they allowed *kathekonta* to be performed by plants and lower animals as well as men (*loc. cit.*).

⁵² *Intelligentia* and *notio* are Cicero's suggested translations of *ἐννοια*; *cognitio* and *ratio* must respectively translate *κατάληψις* and *λόγος*. Cicero's frequent need here to translate and even to explain terms from Stoic epistemology (cf. also n.49) indicates that his immediate source at this point was a work presupposing, or perhaps containing at an earlier point, some epistemological material.

⁵³ The Stoic idea of *honestum* as the sole *bonum* is picked up later, as in cc. 26, 58, but it does not loom large in this book. When it does appear it is connected,

This difference between Books III and V established, there remains the further question what exactly the "order and harmony of conduct" is. It is an order and harmony of conduct (*rerum agendarum*). This means that it is not the full universal order that the Stoics claimed to be manifest in the workings of nature as a whole, as alluded to in c. 74 and dwelt on in Book II of the *De Natura Deorum* (see n.56 and section V), and which we shall observe playing an important role in early Stoic thought (sections VI–VIII). But what conduct is involved? The Stoics claimed to see order and harmony (*συμφωνία*) variously exhibited in human action. For example there is the methodical and ordered character of *ἐπιτηδεύματα*, "pursuits," and *τέχναι*, "arts" (n.49 and Stob. *Ecl.* II 67, 5–12 Wachsmuth = SVF III.294); there is the *ἀντακολουθία τῶν ἀρετῶν*, the reciprocal implication of the virtues under which a man having one virtue has them all (D.L. VII.125–126 = SVF III.295 with 296 ff); there is the *ὁμονοεῖν* and *συμφωνεῖν* of all good men (Stob. *Ecl.* II 93, 19–94, 6 = SVF III.625 and II 108, 5–25 = SVF III.630); there is the fact that virtue or *ἀρετή* is explained as a *διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον* (Stob. *Ecl.* II 59, 4 = SVF III.262; cf. Clem. Al. *Paed.* I.13, p. 160P., SVF III.293); and there is the fact that a city or *πόλις* is said to be a *σύστημα* of citizens (cf. n.49) to which the whole *κόσμος*, an *ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα*, is comparable (Stob. *Ecl.* I 184, 8–11, SVF II.527, with Ar. Did. *ap.* Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* XV.15, pp. 817–818, SVF II.528). All these, and combinations thereof, are in some degree possible candidates for being the order and harmony of conduct mentioned here, though no one of them is irresistibly compelling, since none of them is thrust upon us by the context. Another possibility, which does arise from the context, is that the conduct in question consists in those very actions that the person performs, at the initial stage of preserving himself *in naturae statu* and of seizing what is in accord with nature. The order exhibited in this conduct would simply be the striking fact already noted, that one is so constituted by nature as to seek by impulse the very things that will preserve one's natural state. One's relationship to one's environment is in this sense an orderly one, in showing a fit between one's natural

in a manner standard for Stoics but too involved to be discussed here, with the notion of *ὁμολογία*, as in c. 21. Associated with this notion is the phrase *constans consentaneaue naturae*, in which Madvig (pp. 373, 375) rightly took *constans* to express self-consistency, and *consentanea naturae* to have to do with consistency with nature. (That these two ideas were linked by the Stoics is well known; see Stob. *Ecl.* II 75, 11–76, 8, Madvig 374–375, and Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* I 116–118; see section VII.)

impulses and one's best chances for survival.⁵⁴ It would, then, be this order that impresses itself on the developing person's mind, leading to the understanding that in order of this sort lies the good,⁵⁵ and preparing the way for later comprehension of the order of nature as a whole, the only thing that is strictly perfect.⁵⁶

But whichever sort of order lies behind Cicero's words here, the difference between this account of human moral development and the one in Book V remains. The point of the present account is not that our good consists in satisfying natural impulses (nor, certainly, that we gain pleasure from so doing). Nor is it that one must discover one's own nature in order to develop one's true self. It is that there is an arresting pattern in conduct, which we notice as we develop, and to which we are

⁵⁴ "It was not likely," says D.L. VII.85 (with von Arnim's addition of ἀντῶ), "that nature would estrange (ἀλλοτριῶσαι) an animal from itself, nor that, once it had made the animal, it [nature] would neither estrange it nor render it dear to itself (οἰκειῶσαι)." The point must be that it is not likely that there would not be *oikeiosis*, given that nature operates by *design* (see section VI), an assumption which D.L.'s source is taking as established already.

⁵⁵ Perhaps the point is strengthened by the phrase *qua inventa selectione* in c. 20, although difficulties plaguing the sentence in which it occurs make putting much weight on it inadvisable. (I assume that Madvig and subsequent editors have been right to read *qua* here for the more widely attested *quae*, but even this could be questioned if the text were supposed to be more deeply corrupt than it appears — not an impossibility.) If *inventa* alludes to a process of *becoming aware of*, then it may be being claimed here already that one's new awareness of the principle of selection and rejection, which one formerly followed by natural impulse, helps lead to a later understanding of what is truly good. But this will not be so if (as the anonymous reader points out and as Reid interprets) *inventa* instead means simply that the procedure has been *arrived at* or *acquired* (cf. *De Fin.* I.23). Against this latter interpretation there is the following: we know from c. 16 that the *officia* described in *primum est officium . . . contraria* are performed immediately from birth (cf. n.51), so that it would be very odd to speak of the principle of selection involved as arrived at or acquired. However we interpret this word, severe problems remain. Some kind of *selectio* and *reiectio* is *inventa*. But then something follows (*sequitur*), apparently described by the phrase *cum officio selectio*. But it would be very strange if this *selectio* were the same as the one just mentioned, which it seems to follow. But if it is different, then what is the difference? Its being in some sense *cum officio* whereas the other was not? But this hypothesis seems to conflict with the fact, just noted (and see n.51) that the person has been performing at least certain *officia* all along. The upshot is unclear, and there seems to be confusion in the passage. Fortunately, however, the main point of the view of moral development is clear enough for our purposes without the evidence of this sentence.

⁵⁶ See the sentence of the *De Nat. Deor.* cited in n.78, along with section VI, and Plut. *St. Rep.* 1054e-f (SVF II.550); Cic. *De Nat. Deor.* II.38-39 (SVF II.641).

attracted (at least if everything works out properly⁵⁷) more than to anything at which our impulses were initially directed. By contrast to what we now esteem as good, all other things are said not to be sought for their own sakes (*propter se expetendum*). In standard Stoic terminology, these things are said to be "indifferent" (*ἀδιάφορα*), even though some of them, that is, those in accord with nature, are "preferred" and others "dispreferred" (cf. p. 149) and on that account have respectively "value" (*ἀξία*, *aestimatio*) and "disvalue" (*ἀπαξία*).⁵⁸

The theme of harmony is harped on throughout the book, and we do not lose sight of the idea that the universe forms an orderly system, and that orderliness is something to which we are attracted. Thus, in c. 18 we have already been told that we esteem *artes* in part because they contain an element of the rational and the methodical (*quiddam . . . ratione constitutum et via*).⁵⁹ In c. 23, our *appetitus animi*, or *ὁρμή*, and our *ratio* are said to be given to us *non ad quodvis genus vitae sed ad quandam formam vivendi*. The same theme fits, too, with the claim in cc. 33–34 that the notion of goodness differs from that of value not in degree but in kind (*genere, non magnitudine*). Rather than be seen as one valuable thing among others, goodness is regarded as attaching to the arrangement and structure of everything else. In the same vein, the end of the book emphasizes that what attracts one about the Stoic system is its marvelous structure and astonishing order (*admirabilis compositio . . . incredibilisque . . . ordo*), and the fact that it is so *compositum*, *compactum*, and *coagmentatum* (c. 74). The same theme appears when the social bonds among human beings are discussed (cc. 62–71). In c. 63 (cf. c. 66), the relationship of one man to another is compared to that among different parts of a human body, some of which are said to be created for the sake, not merely of themselves, but of others (presumably we are

⁵⁷ Not everything always works out properly or at least not everything seems to from a limited human perspective (see, e.g., Plutarch *St. Rep.* 1050f = SVF II.1181). But the whole problem of evil, and of imperfect moral development, is skirted in *De Fin.* III.

⁵⁸ On the general idea, see with cc. 20 and 34, SVF III.117–168; Long, *Hell. Phil.* 189–204. Just what the distinction between goodness and value really amounts to is a question that can be ignored here.

⁵⁹ For the notion expressed by *via*, see the Stoic definition of *φύσις* as *πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν* (D.L. VII.156), rendered by Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.* II.57) through the words *ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via*; see also Cicero's remark just afterwards (II.58) that nature is *artificiosa* on the ground that *habet quasi viam quandam et sectam*, and in particular Quintilian's report that according to Cleanthes, *ars est potestas viam, id est ordinem efficiens*. Also pertinent are SVF I.72, 73 (cf. n.49), 497 (*ὁδῶ καὶ συμφώνως*) — cf. *ordo et concordia* in *De Fin.* III.21; II.413. See section VI.

meant to think, for example, of the fact that the hands carry food to the mouth, so that the whole body is nourished).⁶⁰ In c. 64, the fact that we put the common advantage of man before our own is said to be a "natural consequence" (*natura consequi*) of the fact that the universe is, as the Stoics claim, a common city and state of both men and gods, which is ruled by the gods but of which each of us is a part.⁶¹

By clear and emphatic contrast, this theme of order and harmony is not a part of the argument in Book V, either in the discussions of the virtues or in the account of human nature. By the same token, the emphasis on the idea of perfecting oneself as a human being and of knowing one's nature in order to do so, which occupies a prominent place in Book V,⁶² finds no counterpart in Book III, except in the thoroughly incidental invocation of the maxim *se noscere*, among other such sayings, in the coda of the book in c. 73.

This is not to say, of course, that Book III has no place for any desire to do what is in some sense suited to human nature. Mention of this sort of consideration is rare in Book III, but it does occur, late, in c. 73. Even here, however, it has no special place of its own:

Nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa.

Nor can anyone judge truly of what is good and bad unless he knows the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and whether or not man's nature accords with nature in general.

The injunction to exploit one's own nature as a human being is here derived from a more general injunction to conform to nature as a whole (see section VIII).

V

In no other work is Cicero so concerned as he is in the *De Finibus* to distinguish between an ostensibly orthodox Stoic position and the position of people like Antiochus, and so it is not surprising to find that the distinction is in many other places quite blurred. Let us survey the

⁶⁰ Cf. Plato *Rep.* 462c-d and SVF II.1013; cf. section VIII.

⁶¹ *Mundum autem censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unumquemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem . . .*; cf. SVF II.527, 528.

⁶² Cc. 24, 34, 37, and see n.47. Note the emphasis in c. 26 on the fact that the nature in question there is different for each species — an idea which is absent from Book III (see section VII).

situation in other works and then return to reexamine the distinction as it appears in the *De Finibus*, to see what questions are to be asked about it and what conclusions are to be drawn.

The blurring of any such contrast is particularly noticeable in the more philosophical portions of the *De Re Publica* and the *De Legibus*. There, Cicero is anxious to show that justice is in some sense natural rather than arbitrarily conventional, but he is not much interested in details of moral psychology or its development.⁶³ In *De Legg.* I.54, Antiochus is cited for the view that Zeno differed from older philosophers only in his terminology (see also c. 38), a view we have seen in *De Fin.* V. This fact does not show that the whole of the former book is written under Antiochean influence, but it does show that it is not written entirely without it. Moreover, that the book does not represent orthodox Stoicism is shown by, *inter alia*, the fact that in c. 60 prudence is concerned with the selection and rejection of goods, whereas we know that the Stoic view was, at most, that it would have to do with the selection of natural and preferred indifferents.⁶⁴ On the other hand, in c. 23, we have the Stoic idea that the universe is a common polity of men and gods.⁶⁵ The *De Re Publica* gives us even less that is clear cut. In I.39, for example, the talk of the common good is not sufficiently spelled out for one to pinpoint its source. The *Academica* are infertile territory for the present investigation, since they contain no exposition of Stoic ethics, and there is in them nothing suggestive of the salient ideas of *De Fin.* III.⁶⁶ With regard to the issues we are examining, the *Tusculan Disputations* (as we would expect from the warning at V.82–83) present a philosophically eclectic picture, and moreover they too, while very much occupied with questions of psychology and motivation, say little about its early development. An example of the former point: in V.37–39 there is a passage that in its emphasis on the desirability of being a perfect specimen of one's kind reminds one of *De Fin.* V, and that acknowledges agreement with Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Polemo.⁶⁷ In V.70, on the other hand, Cicero is perhaps following

⁶³ See esp. *De Rep.* III.32 ff; *De Legg.* I, passim.

⁶⁴ Stob. *Ecl.* 76, 9–13; 82, 11–84, 1; 84, 24–85, 11; Plut. *De Comm. Not.* 1060b–e (SVF III.141–142, 124–125, 128; I.192; III.146).

⁶⁵ *De Fin.* III.64 and above, section IV.

⁶⁶ *Ac.* I.23 is reminiscent of the doctrine of *De Fin.* V, as one would expect it to be, since it is in a section expounding the views of Antiochus (c. 14); it also contrasts the *vita beata* with the *vita beatissima* in the way that is crucial to the Antiochean argument against the Stoics in *De Fin.* V.81 ff.

⁶⁷ C. 37: . . . *in suo quidque genere perfectum esse voluit*; c. 39: *Et, si omne beatum est, cui nihil deest et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatam est, idque*

something like the line of thought in *De Fin.* III.20 ff, though he drops it after only a little discussion.

More interesting is the case of the *De Officiis*, since it purports to be largely inspired by Panaetius, a Stoic of the second century B.C. who, however, is usually recognized to have made substantial changes — though we do not know just what all of them were — in Stoic teachings.⁶⁸ The views that we have seen in *De Fin.* III are by and large not present in the *De Officiis*. The reason is unclear. It need not be that Panaetius disbelieved them; it could as easily be the fact that the *De Officiis* is neither much concerned with the early development of morals and moral psychology, nor with the concept of goodness as opposed to that of *officium*. Moreover, the extent to which this focus is the result of Panaetius' idiosyncratic outlook, rather than simply the announced subject-matter of the work, is another question I do not profess to be able to answer. I think it important, however, that although *De Off.* I.14 attributes to human beings a naturally implanted sense of order, propriety, and moderation (*ordo, quod deceat, modus*), these notions not only do not here play the crucial role in which we saw them at *De Fin.* III.20 ff, but moreover are merely said to be "combined" (*conflatur*) with other impulses, such as the efforts to gain truth and to be free from domination, so as to yield the notion of moral goodness (*honestum*).⁶⁹ This would be strange as even a very compressed description of the process discussed in *De Finibus* III, and so I am inclined to think that Panaetius' picture of moral psychology may well be different from the one presented there. This suggestion would also fit with the fact that in c. 105, it is said that in every inquiry concerning *officia* one should always be mindful of the degree to which man excels the lower animals, and in c. 107 it is said that all morality and propriety (*honestum decorumque*) is derived (*trahitur*) from that nature of ours by which we excel those same beasts.⁷⁰

The same suggestion, however, tends to be confirmed by a comparison of what Panaetius says about the end or *telos* with what Posidonius is known to have said about it somewhat later. Our report says that in the opinion of the former, the end is "to live in accordance with the starting

virtutis est proprium, certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, id est, cum Aristotele, Xenocrate, Speusippo, Polemone.

⁶⁸ See in general the treatment of Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* I 191–207. On the debt of the *De Off.* to him see II.60, III.7.

⁶⁹ Cf. n.34.

⁷⁰ On the matter of the *duae naturae* in Panaetius, see Rist, "The Innovations of Panaetius," *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) 187–191.

points given to us by nature";⁷¹ Posidonius on the other hand said that it was to live with regard for and knowledge of the truth and arrangement of the universe, and insofar as possible assisting in the promotion of it.⁷² It has been said that compared with Panaetius, Posidonius can be seen to be returning to the view of the older Stoics, in insisting on a connection between human activity and the organization of the universe as a whole, while Panaetius is apparently quite indifferent to this aspect of Stoic teaching.⁷³ And indeed it is possible, though I do not think it certain, that in Panaetius' ethical theory the idea of accord with the nature of the universe as a whole was somehow submerged.

It may be true, too, that in Panaetius' philosophizing the fading of this idea brought with it, in his ethics, an emphasis on the idea of man's uniqueness in nature, and the importance of his exploiting the qualities by virtue of which he possessed it. We have just seen one sign of this idea, in *De Off.* I.105, 107, and Panaetius has certainly been regarded as having stressed it.⁷⁴ Moreover, later Stoicism sometimes stressed it too, as we may gather from Seneca's remarks about the need for knowing the nature of man⁷⁵ and from passages by Epictetus in a similar vein.⁷⁶ But the history of this matter in later Stoicism is not my concern here.⁷⁷

Of all Cicero's philosophical works, the one closest to the standpoint of *De Fin.* III is Book II of the *De Natura Deorum*, which is devoted to expounding Stoic theology. It is claimed here that perfection is to be strived for in all areas,⁷⁸ but it is also emphasized that, as was standard

⁷¹ τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς, *Clem. Alex., Strom.* II.xxii, 129, 4. On ἀφορμαί here see Rist, 188–189.

⁷² τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν καὶ συγκατασκευάζοντα αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ δύνατον, *Clem. Alex. loc. cit.*

⁷³ See B. N. Tatakis, *Panétius de Rhodes* (Paris 1931) 163 ff with 164 n.2; E. Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme* (Paris 1910; 2nd ed. 1950) 225–226; Rist 186–187.

⁷⁴ Thus Rist, 200 and, in a rather different way, Pohlenz, e.g., *Die Stoa* I 204–205.

⁷⁵ *Ep. Mor.* 121.3, 14 (though notice that the latter comes from the mouth not of Seneca but of the interlocutor).

⁷⁶ See, e.g., *Diss.* II.vi.14, I. xxviii.20–21, III.i.24 ff, though note that in certain ways I.ix goes in a rather different direction, more like that of *De Fin.* III.

⁷⁷ Nor am I concerned with the, to my mind, quite different question whether Stoics after Chrysippus began to adopt a more relaxed attitude toward the so-called indifferents (see I. G. Kidd, "Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man," Long, ed., *Problems in Stoicism* 150–172).

⁷⁸ *Neque enim dici potest in ulla rerum institutione non esse aliquid extremum atque perfectum*, c. 35.

Stoic doctrine, only the universe as a whole is perfect⁷⁹ and that strict perfection in human beings is ruled out,⁸⁰ although a man is able to contemplate and imitate the perfection of the universe as a whole, of which he is a part.⁸¹ But although this book thus jibes with *De Fin.* III in not describing or prescribing an effort toward self-perfection independent of the order of nature as a whole,⁸² it says little about the motivation resulting from a man's appreciation of the natural order or any part thereof. The closest it comes is c. 153: "Having looked upon [celestial phenomena], the soul reaches knowledge of the gods, from which arises piety, to which is joined justice and the other virtues, from which is constituted a blessed life equal and similar to that of the gods."⁸³ This account, concise as it is, shares with *De Fin.* III.20 ff and 73 a concern with the impact made upon men's minds by the orderliness of the universe;⁸⁴ but the account is too compressed for one to say that it uses this concern in the same way, and of course the characteristic terminology and setting of *oikeiosis* are lacking.

We come finally to *De Finibus* IV, which clearly aligns itself with Book V. From c.19 onward, its theme is the question why Zeno diverged from the older philosophers when he allegedly had nothing significantly new to say and why, after accepting the beginning of Polemo's account of human moral development, he then groundlessly disagreed with him about later stages, in denying genuine goodness to the things aimed at by our primary impulses, so as to emerge with the paradoxical position parodied by the ironic exclamation, "So to live in accordance with nature is to depart from it!"⁸⁵ This complaint, of course, is the prelude to the theory of Book V, which purports to be Antiochus' adaptation of Polemo's views, freed from unwanted distortions. Moreover, like Book V, this book views nature as impelling us primarily to preserve

⁷⁹ Ibid.: *ceteris naturis multa externa quo minus perficiantur possunt obsistere, universam autem naturam nulla res potest impedire, propterea quod omnis naturas ipsa cohibet et continet*; cf. cc. 37-39; Plut. *De St. Rep.* 1054e-f = SVF II.550; and Long, *Hell. Phil.* 170, 180.

⁸⁰ C. 39: *Nec vero hominis natura perfecta est, et efficitur tamen in homine virtus; quanto igitur in mundo facilius . . .*

⁸¹ C. 37: . . . *ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est quaedam particula perfecti*; cf. c. 140.

⁸² C. 35, *universam . . . naturam*.

⁸³ . . . *Quae contuens animus accedit ad cognitionem deorum, e qua oritur pietas, cui coniuncta iustitia est reliquaeque virtutes, e quibus vita beata existit par et similis deorum . . .*

⁸⁴ Note the words *finitus, cognitae, predictae*.

⁸⁵ IV.41: *Ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura discedere*; see also cc. 44-45.

and perfect our nature as members of our kind.⁸⁶ Not only did Book III take a quite different turn in cc. 20 ff, but it most particularly did not introduce any drive toward perfection at the initial stage of development, in the manner in which Book V did.⁸⁷

In the light of these facts, what is preeminently noteworthy is the fact that Book IV should claim that the Stoic account of moral development coincided with that of Polemo (for our purposes, the one expounded in Book V) even through its initial stretch, when the two accounts differ so crucially. And this point leads to another, namely to the question why the crucial turn taken by the account in Book III at c. 20 ff should be almost completely ignored both in the criticism of Stoicism in Book IV and in the directly competing account in Book V. It is not quite completely ignored, however, because in IV.42, it is said of the Stoics:

. . . sic isti, cum ex appetitione rerum virtutis pulchritudinem aspexissent, omnia quae praeter virtutem ipsam viderant abiecerunt, obliti naturam omnem appetendarum rerum ita late patere ut a principiis permaneret ad fines, neque intellegunt se rerum illarum pulchrarum atque admirabilium fundamenta subducere.

This passage registers the crucial turn taken by the Stoic account, but only in the most cursory way. What it leaves unexplained and unanswered is the Stoic contention that their theory of *oikeiosis* really does, in the manner represented in III.20 ff, explain how a human being can make the transition from the initial impulses implanted by nature to the later attraction to virtue. As we saw in section IV, the Stoics think that this transition is made via the appreciation of a certain pattern or order in conduct, possibly consisting in the fact that following natural impulses is conducive to survival. But the Stoic claim that the transition is in some such way to be made intelligible is not confronted with any directness by the anti-Stoic account of Book IV; and for the most part the book simply expresses surprise at the Stoics for turning away from the primary impulses (c. 19) and proceeds as though the Stoics had never attempted to make clear even wherein they disagreed with Polemo's story of moral development (c. 45). So we must ask why it is that Antiochus, or anyone else, could have given such meagre attention to the ways in which the Stoic account differs from the one advanced in Book V.

⁸⁶ See cc. 32–39, esp. c. 37, and the opening sentence of the account in c. 16.

⁸⁷ See section IV.

One possible explanation is guile — and the desire to make the Stoics look unoriginal and inept. Perhaps this is correct, at least in part. But perhaps, too, there was genuine misunderstanding. Certainly the picture in Book IV of Stoic doctrine is consistent in presenting it as an attempt to base moral psychology on the same principles that Antiochus employed. Thus, in c. 33 it is suggested that Chrysippus' own account of the good for man was arrived at by reflection on the question what that part of him was by which he surpassed other animals and on the view that the good must have to do with the use of that part, namely the soul.⁸⁸ It is not clear that critics of Stoicism would have wished to go this far without some warrant from Stoic texts, and we ought to consider what that warrant might have been. The first point to notice is that Panaetius may well have adopted a doctrine quite like the one that Antiochus is criticizing, which did place stress on the uniqueness of human nature and the desirability of perfecting it. So there would be an excuse for Antiochus' taking this doctrine to be at least a standard Stoic one. But this explanation will get us only so far, because the Stoics whom Antiochus is attacking include Chrysippus himself, and indeed Book IV directs its fire as far back as Zeno.⁸⁹

We are now at the point at which we must ask how far back into the origins of Stoicism we can reasonably trace the doctrine of *De Fin.* III. If it is not an early Stoic view, and especially if it is an aberrant Stoic view, then Antiochus cannot be severely faulted for failing to hit it when aimed at Stoicism proper. If, on the other hand, Book III is moderately faithful to early Stoicism, then what we see in discovering that it is may help us explain why Antiochus failed to represent it correctly.

VI

To what extent does *De Finibus* III represent a doctrine of *oikeiosis* held in the early Stoa? The evidence is in large part indirect, but we can have some confidence that the book does present the views of Chrysippus and perhaps even, to a lesser extent, those of Zeno.

In the first place, we can be fairly certain that Chrysippus had the notion of *oikeiosis* and a theory surrounding it. The point is generally accepted, on the basis of Plut., *St. Rep.* 1038a–c, D.L. VII.85–86, and the fact that the notion was almost universally viewed in later times as

⁸⁸ See esp. . . . *Tale enim visum est ultimum Stoicorum* . . . , which might simply be Antiochus' interpretation, rather than a faithful report of Chrysippus' view.

⁸⁹ IV.3, 14, 19.

a central part of Stoic ethics.⁹⁰ That it was part of Zeno's doctrine is somewhat less certain, and it is less certain still that Zeno employed the term itself. Philippson and Pohlenz argued that Zeno did have the notion,⁹¹ but the evidence for Zeno's use of the term is slim.⁹² To some extent the argument for attribution of the theory of *oikeiosis* must fall back fairly heavily on the centrality that the notion was accorded in the school that Zeno founded, and the fact that without *oikeiosis* there would have been little Zenonian ethics for Chrysippus to have inherited.⁹³ At any rate we shall be on the safe side if we accept that Chrysippus employed the notion but remain agnostic about Zeno.

Our question, then, is whether Chrysippean *oikeiosis* followed the line of thought described in *De Fin.* III, and particularly whether it followed that course in the crucial respects in which it diverges from what we find in *De Fin.* V. Here the evidence becomes indirect. The crucial point to notice is that the idea of the order and harmony of

⁹⁰ See Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* II, 65–66, and *Grundfr.* 7–8.

⁹¹ In, respectively, "Erste Naturgemässe," 450 ff, and *Grundfr.* 1–9, with *Die Stoa*, loc. cit. The strongest evidence for attributing the notion to Zeno is probably Cic. *Ac.* II.131 (SVF II.181), and Plut. *Adv. Colot.* 1122c; see Pohlenz, *Stoa* II 65.

⁹² The term *oikeiosis* is never directly associated with Zeno's name, even at SVF I.197 (which, nevertheless, is frequently used as support for the attribution of the idea to him, as in *Die Stoa* II, 65, and Philippson 450, though the latter is cautious there). The Latin *conciliatio naturae*, however, is used in connection with Zeno's name at *Ac.* II.131 (cf. n.91), though one might entertain some doubt whether the *quod*-clause in which it occurs is meant to be a direct attribution to Zeno.

⁹³ Thus Pembroke 139–140, who also cites the fact that a (perhaps somewhat different) use of the verb *οἰκειοῦν* is associated by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* VII.12 = SVF I. 356) with Aristo of Chios, a pupil of Zeno (though in important respects a maverick). There is no support available, on the other hand, from the *Mantissa* ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, 150, 28–33 Bruns (SVF III.183), cited by Philippson in this connection, p. 455. These lines say that according to some Stoics *oikeiosis* is directed toward oneself, whereas the *χαριέστερον δοκοῦντες λέγειν . . . καὶ μᾶλλον διαθροῦν* say that it is to one's *σύστασις καὶ τήρησις*, which is what we find at D.L. VII.85. Philippson takes these lines to show that some Stoic, probably Chrysippus, revised the notion of *oikeiosis* in response to the difficulty, arising from a claim of Aristotle's, that one cannot be *φίλος* to oneself. This being the case, Philippson suggests, an earlier Stoic must have advanced a doctrine of *oikeiosis* that neglected this point. That earlier Stoic, he concludes, must have been Zeno. But this argument fails. Plut. *St. Rep.* 1038b–c reports Chrysippus speaking in the manner condemned by Alexander, and the latter's judgment of the superiority of the one way of describing *oikeiosis* over the other (which itself probably was influenced by Aristotle, as Philippson says) need reflect no change within Stoicism.

nature as a whole was a part of Stoicism from the beginning, not merely in Chrysippus, but before him in Cleanthes and Zeno as well. Thus, we have Cicero's testimony that according to Zeno *natura* is *artificiosa*, *quod habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur*, and that *ipsius . . . mundi . . . natura* is *plane artifex, . . . consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium*; and Aëtius ascribes to Zeno the view that *εἰμαρμένη* can equally well be called *φύσις* or *πρόνοια*.⁹⁴ Likewise, Sextus says that Zeno held *τὸ πᾶν* to be *κάλλιστον . . . κατὰ φύσιν ἀπειργασμένον ἔργον*.⁹⁵ And the same idea and related ideas are even more firmly attributable to Chrysippus. He is cited by Cicero for the idea that only the universe (*mundus*) is lacking in nothing, whereas everything else, even man, is imperfect (*De Nat. Deor.* II.37–39), and he is cited along with Zeno by Diogenes Laertius for saying that *ὁ ὅλος κόσμος* and the *οὐρανός* is the *οὐσία θεοῦ* (VII.148 = SVF II.1022). Moreover, the idea that the universe is an ordered and perfect whole is consistently treated by the sources as Stoic doctrine.⁹⁶ Clearly it was already an important part of the position of Cleanthes, before Chrysippus, a fact noted by Pohlenz.⁹⁷

It is also easy to see the notion of orderliness entering into Zeno's thought in connection with his idea about politics. If the reports of Plutarch and Athenaeus are correct, Zeno placed some emphasis in his *Politeia*, reported to be his first work, on the idea of *ὁμόνοια* and the like, and on the desirability of there being *εἰς βίος . . . καὶ κόσμος* for all men.⁹⁸

We saw that the crucial fact about the doctrine of *oikeiosis* in *De Fin.* III, in contrast to Book V, was the vital role played in it by the developing human being's perception of order and harmony, ultimately within the universe as a whole. We have a doctrine of *oikeiosis* as far back as Chrysippus. We also have stress on the idea of the orderliness of the universe. Let us ask ourselves how likely it is that the latter did not

⁹⁴ Cic. *De Nat. Deor.* II.58; Aët. *Plac.* I.27.5 (=SVF I.171, 176; see in general on this idea in Zeno SVF I.171–177); cf. n.59.

⁹⁵ *Adv. Math.* IX.107 = SVF I.110. Likewise, the *κόσμος* is *ἔμφυχος* and *νοερός* (IX.104 = SVF I.111, and in general SVF I.109–114).

⁹⁶ Thus, e.g., SVF II.1009 (Aëtius *Plac.* I.6), 1027 (I.7, 33) with D.L. VII.156 and *De Nat. Deor.* II passim, with n.59.

⁹⁷ "Kleanthes' Zeushymnus," *Hermes* 75 (1940) 117–123, esp. 119–120. See also Cleanthes' hymn (SVF I.537) esp. ll. 2, 7–8, 12, 24, and Clem. *Strom.* V.8, 48 (SVF I.502), which says that the sun *οἶον πλήσων τὸν κόσμον εἰς ἑναρμόνιον πορείαν ἄγει* (cf. the *concordia* of *De Fin.* III.21).

⁹⁸ SVF I.262, 263. Cf. also Stob. II, 103, 24 ff, 150, 5–10, on the unsociability of the *φᾶνλος*, and above n.61.

somehow figure in the former. The answer is plainly that it is highly unlikely. If we want direct evidence of a connection in Chrysippus' thought between the *kosmos* and morality, Plutarch quotes from him the words (*St. Rep.* 1035c = SVF III.326):

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως. ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὀρθῶς τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν,

It is impossible to find another source of justice or source of its development than the one coming from Zeus and the common nature; for it is thence that everything of this sort must have its source, if we are to speak rightly about what is good and what is bad,

and (SVF III.68):

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως οὐδ' οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως,

nor is there any more proper road by which to arrive at the account of what is good and what is bad, nor at the virtues nor at happiness, than the one which leads from the common nature and the arrangement of the universe.

These remarks occur in a passage aiming to show how crucial for ethics Chrysippus regarded the fact that "the universe is unified and finite and is held together by a single power (τὸ συνέχεσθαι μίᾳ δυνάμει τὸν κόσμον ἓνα ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένον). That the bearing of this idea upon ethics should not have been linked to the doctrine of *oikeiosis* is most implausible.

Notice several things that I am not saying. I am not saying that everything in *De Finibus* III is derived from Chrysippus. After all, the book contains references to more recent authors. Nor am I attempting to say who or what was the chief source of the book.⁹⁹ Nor, further, am

⁹⁹ Many attempts have been made to trace it, and candidates range from Chrysippus down through Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus to Hecato. See esp. Madvig 827–831; R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften* I–III (Leipzig 1877–83) esp. II, 2, 1; M. Schäfer, *Ein frühmittelstoisches System der Ethik bei Cicero* (Munich 1934); von Arnim, SVF, I xxviii–xxix. On the view that the source is a doxographical one, see von Arnim, *ibid.*, and Philippson, review of Schäfer, *Philologische Wochenschrift* (1936) 593–606. My thesis is fully compatible with saying that the overlay of views and terminology later than those of Chrysippus is considerable. For example (as Soreth points out to me) it is entirely possible — though not, I think, certain — that the phrase *ad extremum constans selectio* has come from the *telos* formulae of Diogenes of Babylonia and Antipater of Tarsus: see D.L.

I maintaining that the *rerum agendarum ordo et concordia* in *De Fin.* III.21 must be the same as the cosmic order that the early Stoics believed in (indeed, I have denied that this is the case), nor even that that particular *ordo et concordia*, whatever precisely it is, can be unequivocally recovered from the fragments of the early Stoics. What I am maintaining is that some notion of order played an important role in Stoic ethics throughout the period from the beginning of Stoicism to the time when the ideas of *De Fin.* III were formulated. I mentioned in section IV several different contexts in which the Stoics used the notion of order in connection with human activity. Because of the Stoic doctrine that there is an informing and organizing force that penetrates the whole cosmos, and their view that everything that happens can, rightly viewed, be seen to fall under the cosmic order, it seems reasonable to suppose that the restricted sorts of order mentioned in section IV are to be regarded as parts of that all-inclusive order. This is especially so since terms like *δμόνοια*, *συμφωνία*, *σύστημα*, *κόσμος* and *ὁδός* are repeated from one context to another, each being applied to both cosmic and human matters. We have no explicit record that Chrysippus included in his account of *oikeiosis* a stage like the one described in *De Fin.* III.21, at which the developing human being notices and is attracted by an order and harmony of conduct. But he must have supposed that there was *some* point at which a person comes to appreciate the cosmic perfection that he and Zeno believed in (on Cleanthes see section VIII). It is not at all unlikely, therefore, that there was a preliminary stage on the way to this appreciation of the cosmic order such as *De Fin.* III.21 pictures. (Compare III.21 with III.73: together they show that to notice the order and harmony of conduct in the former is only to begin to understand the good, a complete comprehension of which does not come without a knowledge of the *ratio naturae et vitae etiam deorum* and of whether or not human nature is in agreement with [*conveniat*; cf. *convenientia* for *ὁμολογία* in c. 21] *natura universa*.) On the other hand perhaps the preliminary stage was a post-Chrysippean invention designed to fill in the account of development, which found its way into Cicero's hands. In either event, the picture of development in *De Fin.* III is squarely in the tradition of early Stoic views on the topic.

But before we accept this conclusion, we must reckon once again

VII.88; Stob. II 76, 9 (SVF III Diog. 45, 44); Clem. Alex. *Strom.* (Stählin) II 183, 4-6 (SVF III Antip. 58); and Soreth, "Die zweite Telosformel des Antipater von Tarsos," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 50 (1968) 48-72.

with Pohlenz's quite different account of what early Stoic views on these matters were like. It says that the crucial step in *oikeiosis* in a human being is the understanding of what it is to be human by contrast to all other, nonhuman, animals. What is the evidence for seeing this idea (which we saw at work in *De Fin.* IV–V but not in III) in the works of the earliest Stoics? Pohlenz offers none. The fact may seem surprising, but it is nevertheless the case that in his discussion in *Die Stoa* of early Stoic views on these matters, and in the notes to that discussion (I, 114–116; II, 64–67), documentation is offered for attributing this idea neither to Zeno nor to Chrysippus nor to any other Stoic of that period. Nor is such documentation forthcoming in other discussions by him or other scholars.

What evidence there is for Pohlenz's account comes in a different form, in his interpretation of Zeno's ideas about *telos*. According to Pohlenz (*Die Stoa*, I, 116–118) Zeno regarded the *telos* as living in accord, in effect, with one's specifically human nature. Now if this is correct, then it would of course be natural enough, in spite of contrary indications, to think that a Zenonian doctrine of *oikeiosis*, if there was such a thing (cf. n.92), would indeed, as Pohlenz claims it did, give central importance to the idea of a stage at which the developing human being gained an understanding of what his specifically human nature was. And if that were the case, then Pohlenz would be correct, and it would turn out that *De Fin.* V gives a more accurate picture of the early Stoics' views on *oikeiosis* and moral development than Book III.

But Pohlenz's story of early Stoic views about the *telos* is wrong.

VII

According to Diogenes Laertius (VII.87–89), Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus all held that the *telos* was *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν* (the first equating this to *κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν*, and the last equating *τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν* in turn to *τὸ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν*). Chrysippus is also reported here to have expounded the *telos* by the (clearly fully equivalent) variant *τὸ ἀκολουθῶς τῇ φύσει ζῆν*, with the added explanation (SVF III.4):

ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ τε τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὡς ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι· εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὖροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν.

After a sentence on Diogenes Babylonius and Archedemus, the account continues (= SVF I.555):

Φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ἢ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, ὃ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους.

Note in passing that this passage clearly corroborates our view of the importance which Chrysippus attached to the idea of order and harmony in his ethics.

Our other chief source on this matter, Stobaeus, presents a somewhat different story, at least with regard to Zeno, and this is the story that Pohlenz, along with probably most interpreters, accepts. At *Ecl.* II, 75, 11-76,1 (SVF I.179), we have it that Zeno's *telos* was simply τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, explained as (the explanation fairly clearly purports to be Zeno's or fully in his spirit) καθ' ἓνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων κακοδαιμονούντων. We are then told that subsequent figures, προσδιαρθροῦντες, added the phrase τῇ φύσει, the first such figure being Cleanthes, while Chrysippus then explained the enlarged formula meaning (as in D.L.) ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων.

Pohlenz, I have said, accepts this story. He accepts, that is, that Zeno's explanation of the *telos* was simply ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, without τῇ φύσει (*Die Stoa*, II, 116-117), in the sense of "ein in sich einstimiges Leben." It is quickly apparent, however, that he believes not only that this would for Zeno require a human being to live in accord with his reason (*logos*),¹⁰⁰ but also that although it does not appear in his *telos*-formula, Zeno did stress the idea of the κατὰ φύσιν βίος, meaning by φύσις here "die spezifische menschliche Natur."¹⁰¹

This belief rests upon a reading of the passage from Diogenes Laertius that was advanced by Hirzel and continued by Pohlenz.¹⁰² For our purposes, the essential part of the argument rests on the preceding chapter, c. 96, where it is said that because in contrast to plants and animals, *logos* is given to τοῖς λογικοῖς κατὰ τελειοτέραν προστασίαν,

¹⁰⁰ This is plausible enough, though one need not accept Pohlenz's claim here that Zeno, because he was not a native speaker of Greek, would have had to attend to the etymology of the word ὁμολογουμένως and would have made something of the presence of the element -λογ-.

¹⁰¹ *Die Stoa* II 117, ll. 24-26, 39-40, and "Zenon und Chrysipp," *Nachr. von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil.-hist. Kl., II, 9 (Göttingen 1938) 173-210, esp. 199-202.

¹⁰² R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen*, II.1 105-118; Pohlenz, "Zenon und Chrysipp" (see n.101).

therefore for such things κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν is τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν.¹⁰³ Clearly a special position is being allotted to man, by virtue of his possession of reason,¹⁰⁴ and this fact might appear to indicate that the drift of the Stoic view of the *telos* was indeed toward the idea of living in accordance with specifically human nature. In fact, however, we shall shortly see that the meaning of this passage, in spite of its superficial similarity to Pohlenz's account, is something importantly different (pp. 52–53). For now, however, the important point is simply that the passage does not support the attribution to Zeno of the view that it is of cardinal importance to a man to live somehow in accordance with his specifically human nature. This chapter, continuing directly from c. 85, is governed by the plural verb φασί, and it is only at the beginning of c. 87 that Zeno is mentioned.¹⁰⁵ No matter what the end of c. 86 means,

¹⁰³ The sense is clear enough, in spite of the textual difficulty in the penultimate clause of the chapter.

¹⁰⁴ The plural τοῖς λογικοῖς is no doubt designed to make room also for gods — cf. *De Nat. Deor.* II.154–167, *De Fin.* III.64; Seneca *Ep.* 76.9 (=SVF III.200a) — or perhaps simply *the god* — cf. SVF I.154, II.1027, 1031–1032.

¹⁰⁵ Hirzel wished to show that except for a parenthetical remark or two, all of cc. 81–88 is due ultimately to Chrysippus. One of his related aims was correct: to show that Zeno's *telos* formula was, as Stobaeus has it, ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν rather than the ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν that D.L. attributes to him. This is already established well enough by other arguments that Hirzel advances (p. 112): the fact that in c. 89 ἀρετή is said to be διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη, along with ὁμολογίαν a few lines further on; the fact that at the beginning of c. 89 Zeno is not mentioned when explanations are given of the meaning of *physis* in the *telos* formulae of Cleanthes and Chrysippus; and the fact that it is far easier to see how τῇ φύσει could have been added to Zeno's formula than it is to see how it could have been deleted in such a way as to yield Stobaeus's account. But Hirzel went further, and developed an account of cc. 85–88 that is of enormous and needless complexity, and that requires us to suppose that Chrysippus adapted the *telos* formulae of both Zeno and Cleanthes, simply in order to provide a (rather shaky) demonstration that the *telos* is ἀκολουθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν (pp. 110–111). As part of this account (pp. 113–115), Hirzel maintains that at the end of c. 86, Chrysippus is making use of material genuinely due to Zeno, but the only argument for this claim is the fact that in c. 87 D.L. claims to be citing Zeno's formula from a work entitled Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως. I think that Hirzel is correct in seeing traces of an argument in cc. 87–88, but those traces provide no support for the attribution to Zeno that is at issue.

Hirzel was chiefly concerned to show that Cleanthes had added the phrase τῇ φύσει to Zeno's formula and thus to vindicate Cleanthes against the charges of lack of originality and of relapsing into Cynicism (pp. 105, 117). In "Zeno und Chrysipp," on the other hand, Pohlenz concentrated on trying to show that Zeno had originally stressed specifically human *physis* and that Chrysippus had altered his doctrine by introducing an "external factor," namely the deity or the nature of the universe as a whole. (See esp. his pp. 201, 202; the idea is that

therefore, we are left without any good reason to think that Zeno developed his view of the *telos* from, or grounded it upon, a claim about the specific nature of human beings. The consequence of this fact is that we are likewise without good reason for thinking that Zeno's view of *oikeiosis*, if indeed he had one, was as Pohlenz describes it, or that any crucial step in it involved the understanding of such a nature on the part of the developing human being.

VIII

About Zeno's views on these subjects we may reasonably claim to know three facts. First, he believed that the universe is an organized whole. This fact is entirely left out of account by interpretations like Pohlenz's, which seek to rest Zeno's ethics principally on considerations

Zeno believed that the end was a kind of self-consistency of a rational being, whereas Chrysippus, Pohlenz thinks, first insisted that the consistency involved must be a consistency with some outside thing, such as nature.) Pohlenz too wished to connect the end of c. 86 with Zeno, but was obliged to admit that the idea that is central to his reconstruction of Zeno's view, namely the idea that the life *κατ' ἀρετὴν* is the *Inhalt* of the life in accordance with *logos*, was not present there. He therefore found it necessary to see a break between c. 86 and c. 87, which he took to be the result of some tinkering with the tradition by Chrysippus, who, he believes, was trying to alter the records of Zeno's views to make them appear more like his own. Unfortunately for his argument, however, the admission of the break eliminates his argument for attributing to Zeno the content of the end of c. 86. Far better, then, to admit that that break occurs because what follows it is a report of Zeno's views, whereas what precedes it (and is reported, to repeat, by plural verbs) is not.

The extant evidence concerning Cleanthes is also an embarrassment to Pohlenz's story, for, as we just saw, he wishes to maintain that Chrysippus was the first to introduce an "external factor" into Zeno's *telos* formula. But Cleanthes is reported by both D.L. and Stobaeus to have introduced the fuller version of the formula, namely *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*. At this point, therefore, Pohlenz's story requires a further complication. He has to claim that it was, oddly, *Chrysippus* who first raised *Cleanthes'* formula to the status of a "Schuldogma" (whatever that would entail), because he, Chrysippus, was moving further away from Zeno in the direction suggested by the fuller *telos* formula (p. 203). The oddity is compounded when one realizes, moreover, that the evidence of D.L. (cc. 87–89), in no way contradicted by Stobaeus or any other source, is flatly that in Cleanthes' interpretation of the fuller *telos* formula *φύσει* meant nature as a whole (*τὴν κοινὴν, τὴν τῶν ὅλων*), whereas in Chrysippus' view it ought to mean *both* that *and* human nature (*ιδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην*, c. 89; cf. section VIII).

Such are the difficulties which arise on the reading of Hirzel and Pohlenz. In fact, matters are much more straightforward and comprehensible.

about human nature. Second, we know that Zeno wrote a work entitled *Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως* (D.L. VII.87, SVF I.552). This fact shows that Zeno used the notion of human nature somehow in his view, but it does not show that he used it in the particular manner that Pohlenz describes. Third, we can be quite certain that Zeno's description of the *telos* was the one that Stobaeus gives (see n.105), to live *ὁμολογουμένως*, that is, in some sense consistently, and it seems equally certain that his reason was what Stobaeus also gives, *ὡς τῶν μαχομένων ζώντων κακοδαιμονούντων* (75, 13-76, 1, SVF I.179).

We would like to be able to fit these facts into a coherent picture of Zeno's ethics as a whole. From what evidence we have to go on, we can well suspect that he believed that the end of *ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν* is aided by an understanding of the structure and order of the whole universe, and perhaps by an understanding of how that orderliness and harmony can be introduced into the soul.¹⁰⁶ This understanding would no doubt require an understanding of human nature, and particularly of human psychology. Whether Zeno to this end employed a theory of *oikeiosis* we cannot be sure (cf. section VI).

If Cleanthes really made the innovation in the *telos*-formula that Stobaeus attributes to him, then he made a very important change indeed. The ultimate end was no longer, as for Zeno, to live without internal conflict, but rather to live in accordance with the organized nature of the universe of which Zeno had already spoken. That is, an understanding of that organization is no longer thought of as a means to the end of some sort of harmony within one's own life. Rather, the ultimate end is thought of as the fitting of oneself somehow into that larger plan. It is not reported to us why Cleanthes adopted this view, and I shall refrain from speculating on the reasons here. What is important for our present purposes is that the testimony concerning Cleanthes furnishes no support for the idea that the beginnings of Stoic thought were characterized by any sort of exclusive concern with human nature, as opposed to the nature of the whole, organized universe.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ This is not to say that Zeno need himself have carried out any very extensive investigations or even conjectures into what exactly the structure of the universe is, and it can perfectly well be that thoroughgoing work on physics had to await Cleanthes or subsequent figures.

¹⁰⁷ We do not know whether Cleanthes meant actively to deny that the *telos* is to live in accordance with some kind of specifically human nature. He may have meant to do so; for one might take certain lines of his Hymn to Zeus (SVF I.537), such as ll. 17, 20-21, 26 ff, to be suggesting that there are bad features of human nature that can come into conflict with the plan of nature as a whole, and that when this happens the right course is to follow the latter.

Notice, however — and this point is of some importance — that neither Zeno nor Cleanthes needs by any means to have ignored the notion of human nature (indeed, we know from the title of the former's *Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως* that he made some room for it). For it is perfectly possible to say that the *telos* is to live consistently, either somehow with oneself or with nature as a whole, and at the same time to assert that the manner in which human beings should do this is to act in accordance with that faculty of theirs, namely reason, that distinguishes them from animals. In particular, one could well think that it is by using reason to apprehend the organization of the universe that a man could live self-consistently or in accordance with nature, and one could acknowledge that only human beings, of all animals, can do this.

We cannot be sure that Zeno or Cleanthes held just this view, but we do know that Chrysippus went further in this direction. From D.L. VII.87–89 it is clear that he neither regarded living “consistently” as the end to be served by knowledge of the workings of nature as a whole (as Zeno seems to have done), nor regarded life in accord with nature as a whole as the ultimate end (as Cleanthes apparently wished to do). Rather he actually identified a “consistent” human life, viewed as a life in accordance with human reason, with a life in accordance with nature as a whole, so that living in accordance with human nature and living in accordance with the plan and organization of the universe simply came to the same thing.¹⁰⁸ Why did he believe this? Most likely because he believed that the rational order of a human being is a part of the organization of the universe (D.L. VII.88, *μέρη γὰρ αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου*), in the sense that whatever fits with the one fits with the other. It is in the light of this identification that we should see the end of D.L. VII.86, which Pohlenz wished to fasten upon Zeno (see section VII), but which is better read as the expression of Chrysippus' view (or the view of his followers) that acting in accordance with universal nature is to be identified with different sorts of behavior in different creatures, and with rational behavior in man. Moreover, a psychological corollary of the same view can be seen in what we learned from *De Fin.* III. The understanding of nature of both sorts, as we saw

¹⁰⁸ He did not merely say, that is, that the two are compatible with each other. This point is clear from the fact that τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν is said to be ἴσον . . . τῷ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν (87), and that the desired εὖροια βίου occurs when one's own δαίμων is in συμφωνία with ἡ τοῦ τῶν ὄλων διοικητοῦ βούλησις. See also Galen, *Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 450–451 (Müller; SVF III.12), which, as Soreth points out to me, shows that Posidonius too believed that Chrysippus' *telos* formula was equivalent to the formula ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν.

it operating in *oikeiosis*, is the understanding of orderliness and harmony, and the appreciation of this order in the one sort of nature is impossible without the appreciation of it in the other.¹⁰⁹

Though we lack the evidence necessary for certainty, it seems likely that Chrysippus, when he maintained that following human nature and following nature as a whole came to the same thing, was making a claim that had, in the long run, important though (no doubt) unintended effects, one within the Stoa and the other upon the interpretation and history of its doctrine down to the present day. The former can probably be observed in the views of Panaetius, who seems to have adopted a stance stressing the uniqueness of human nature.¹¹⁰ It is easy to see Chrysippus' insistence on his point, that following human nature was compatible with (and indeed tantamount to) following universal nature, as a precursor of Panaetius' idea, in that Chrysippus had given a firm place to the notion of human nature within the Stoic view of the *telos*.

The second effect of Chrysippus' views is that the Stoic doctrine became perilously easy to misinterpret, in just the way in which it actually was misinterpreted by Antiochus (see section V). Once Chrysippus had assimilated the life in accordance with nature as a whole and the life in accordance with human nature, the way was open for interpreters to think that the latter was the more important to Stoicism (especially if they thought of Panaetius as an accurate representative of the Stoic tradition). It then became easy to think of Stoicism as a doctrine that emphasized reason simply because it was the distinguishing feature of mankind and to lose sight of the fact that the original importance of reason for the Stoics lay in the fact that, as they thought, it is by means of reason that we apprehend order in ourselves and in the universe. By the same token, it became tempting to regard the doctrine of *oikeiosis*, just as Antiochus is seen to regard it in *De Fin.* V, as a failed attempt to provide psychological underpinnings for a self-realizationist ethics such as he himself advocated. But this was a misinterpretation of that doctrine, and of early Stoic ethics in general.

The correct picture of the ethics of the early Stoa is quite different from the one that Pohlenz paints and is far closer to the evidence.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ The understanding and appreciation of order is treated as the same throughout, notwithstanding the fact that only the universe as a whole exhibits an orderliness which is perfect (*De Nat. Deor.* II.37-39).

¹¹⁰ Seen in this context, Panaetius' development of the notion of different human *personae* (*De Off.* I.107 ff, 97 ff), each with its own uniqueness, is simply an extension of the same line of thought.

¹¹¹ In its general spirit, my picture is nearer to that of interpreters like Bréhier, loc. cit., and H. Gomperz, *Die Lebensauffassung der griechischen Philosophen*

Stoicism was not in its early stages a doctrine that laid its primary emphasis on the distinguishing features of human nature (though it was far from ignoring these). Pohlenz's suggestion that it was amounts simply to a perpetuation, for quite different reasons, of the mistake that Antiochus made. Rather, the stress was on the idea of orderliness, harmony, and internal consistency, as the early Stoic *telos* formulae demonstrate. Moreover although Zeno and Cleanthes must have viewed human reason as crucial in the effort to apprehend and institute such harmony, the evidence is that Chrysippus was the first Stoic to maintain directly that acting in accordance with human nature was itself a part of the end of life,¹¹² which was still construed by him, nevertheless, as centrally involving accord and harmony with the order of the universe (. . . κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν, D.L. VII.88).

I now return briefly to a theme sounded at the beginning of this article. The understanding we have now reached of the true basis of early Stoic ethical thought makes possible a clearer understanding of its relation to prior Greek ethical systems. The crucial notions have been that of a universal cosmic order, and that of a human tendency first to appreciate local manifestations of that order and then to appreciate that order (sections IV and VI). The background of these notions is too large a topic to be covered here, but a few programmatic remarks are in order. Consider first Aristotle. One can say without too much oversimplification that he is strongly concerned with the desirability of developing, exploiting, and acting in accordance with what is peculiar to the human species.¹¹³ There is, however, hardly a hint in his works

(Leipzig 1904) esp. 198 ff, 203 ff. In spite of the existence of this divergent tradition, Pohlenz's account has raised, on the relevant counts, little objection. It is followed by P. M. Valente, *L'éthique stoïcienne chez Cicéron* (Paris 1956) 100, 110, and also, with respect to *oikeiosis* and *De Fin.* III.20–21, by Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* 188 (though on pp. 179–184 Long seems to me much closer to the truth). One recent writer following the correct tradition is H. Reiner, "Die ethische Weisheit der Stoiker heute," *Gymnasium* 76 (1969) 330–357, esp. 353–354.

¹¹² Chrysippus' role, therefore, turns out to be virtually the diametrical opposite of what Pohlenz portrays it as being (see esp. "Zenon und Chrysipp" 199 ff). Chrysippus' reputation (perhaps in part deserved) as something of a logic chopper, along with his apparent identification of *πάθη* with *κρίσεις* (whatever precisely he meant by it — see, e.g., D.L. VII.111 = SVF III.456), have apparently had the effect of convincing many commentators that he was non- or anti-"humanistic." If he was so, however, he was not so in a sense that bears upon the present discussion.

¹¹³ E.g., E. N. 1097b24 ff, esp. 34, 1177b27–28, 1078a2–8.

of the idea that a human being should give special thought to how he and his species fit into the general scheme of the universe, or that reflection on this matter is at all crucial to ethics.¹¹⁴ Consider now Plato. Again to simplify, we can say that the notion of order and harmony is of undeniable importance in both his metaphysics and his ethics and is in certain places applied directly to specific ethical problems (for example, at *Gorg.* 503d sqq., *Rep.* 443c–e, 462c–d, 500b–e). Moreover to some extent, as in the *Timaeus*, he does see the sensible world as informed by order, though an order far inferior to what is manifested in the intelligible world by the Forms. For the Stoics, on the other hand, it is the sensible world itself that exhibits perfect order, and this order and the appreciation thereof become central elements of their ethical doctrine. This is not to say that of Plato and Aristotle the former was the more important influence on Stoic ethics. The situation is too complicated for that to be an adequate account of the matter. The point is rather, for the present, that now that we see what the leading ideas of early Stoic ethics really were, we can be more clearly aware of where we should look for precursors.¹¹⁵

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¹¹⁴ Something of the idea appears in *Met.* XII.10, 1075a11–25, 37–1076a4, perhaps, and perhaps also in the *De Philos.*, frs. 12a, 12b, 13, 17 Ross, though there is room to argue that Aristotle did not believe in a universal order, at least of a teleological sort, at all (see D. M. Balme, *Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I* (Oxford 1972) 94–98, and W. Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik*, 2nd ed. (Göttingen 1970) ch. 16). (It is a further question whether Aristotle could have thought that the universe was an orderly whole, in some sense, without thinking that it was governed by an all-embracing *telos*.) However this may be, there is no significant application of the idea of universal order to ethical problems, either in the *Met.* or — where one would expect it if anywhere — in *E. N.* X.6–9 or *E. E.* VIII.3. (The idea of these passages is not primarily that order should be preserved, but that a certain other feature of activity should be developed and maximized; cf. the related point made by W. F. R. Hardie, “The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics,” *Philosophy* 40 (1965) 277–295.)

¹¹⁵ My work on this essay has been supported by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Center for Hellenic Studies. I am indebted for various helpful comments to Professors Albert Henrichs, Marion Soreth, and Zeph Stewart, and to an anonymous reader for the *HSCP*, who have greatly helped me to avoid error. For remaining mistakes I am of course responsible.

NEW COMEDY, CALLIMACHUS, AND ROMAN POETRY

RICHARD F. THOMAS

IN 1895 Friedrich Leo,¹ observing thematic similarities between Roman comedy and Roman elegy, suggested the following scheme for the development of the latter genre: in the Hellenistic period a class of Greek love elegy came into being, a poetic form heavily influenced by Greek New Comedy (particularly noticeable in the parallel between the young lover of comedy and the elegiac poet/lover). This Hellenistic elegy then provided the direct model for the Roman elegists — hence the parallels between Roman comedy and elegy.

This thesis was severely weakened by the persuasive demonstration of F. Jacoby² that in all probability a Hellenistic elegy, comparable to that produced in Augustan Rome, did not exist. E. Reitzenstein³ further damaged the theory by showing that Alexandrian and, more specifically, Callimachean influence on Propertius, Tibullus, and Ovid was a stylistic, rather than a thematic one. The predominant critical view today, quite correctly, is that Roman love elegy, while it is indebted, like all Roman poetry, to previous poetic expression, is to be granted a greater degree of originality than Leo allowed.⁴

This article resurrects Leo's general pattern, but with important distinctions, and without the central fallacy of assuming a lost Hellenistic elegiac tradition. His theory, that there is a clear line of development from New Comedy to Alexandria, and subsequently to neoteric and

¹ *Plautinische Forschungen*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1912) 140–157; cf. 143–144.

² "Zur Entstehung der römischen Elegie," *RhM* 60 (1905) 38–105.

³ "Zur Stiltheorie des Kallimachos," *Festschrift Richard Reitzenstein* (Berlin 1931) 23–69; for a convenient summary of the arguments against the existence of a Hellenistic elegy, see H. E. Butler and E. A. Barber, *The Elegies of Propertius* (Oxford 1933, repr. Hildesheim 1969) *xlvi*–*l*. Against the influence of comedy, cf. G. Luck, *Die Römische Liebeselegie* (Heidelberg 1961) 38–42.

⁴ Especially since the poetry of Cornelius Gallus has been recognized as occupying an important position between the poetry of Catullus and the neoterics and that of the extant elegists. On this, and generally on the internal development of Roman elegy, see D. O. Ross, Jr., *Style and Tradition in Catullus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969) 163; *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry: Gallus, Elegy and Rome* (Cambridge 1975) *passim*.

Augustan verse, will be examined in two separable, but broadly connected studies.⁵

THE REJECTION OF DRAMATIC POETRY

Ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθῳ
χαίρω, τίς πολλοὺς ᾧδε καὶ ᾧδε φέρει·
μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης
πίνω· σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.
Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλὸς καλός — ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν
τοῦτο σαφῶς, Ἥχώ φησί τις· ἄλλος ἔχει.

(Callimachus *Epigr.* 28 Pf.)

Although this epigram is acknowledged as one of the most important and influential statements of Callimachus' polemical poetic theory,⁶ no satisfactory interpretation of it has yet been reached.⁷ The problem rests in the apparent incongruity between line 3a (μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον) and the rest of the poem. Giangrande, taking these words as a rejection of the promiscuous lover, found the point of the poem in the final couplet: "the emphatic σὺ δέ evidently opposes Lysanias to the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, Lysanias, who, precisely because being the opposite of a περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, is loved by Callimachus. However the poet's infatuated self-deception concerning the boy's fidelity is soon revealed by Echo."⁸ The poem thus concludes with *Selbstironie*; Callimachus' Lysanias turns out to be exactly the same as the lover whose promiscuity had earlier elicited his disapproval.

The first shortcoming of this interpretation is that the phrase καλὸς καλός (l. 5) is hardly the opposite of περίφοιτος, an antithesis required if Giangrande's reading is to be accepted.⁹ If such irony was intended

⁵ In particular, Leo's claim that the Roman poets had some degree of familiarity with Attic comedy (p. 144) seems perfectly acceptable; the importance of this point will become clearer as we proceed.

⁶ Examples of the epic *recusatio* in Augustan poetry, with specific reminiscences of this poem, need hardly be documented; e.g., of lines 1-2: Horace, *A.P.* 132 (cf. C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: The "Ars Poetica"* [Cambridge 1971] *ad loc.*); of line 4: Horace *Odes* 1.1.30-32; 2.16.39-40; 3.1.1. See W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom*, Hermes Einzelschriften 16 (1960) 103 ff; 110; 223; also Ross, *Backgrounds* 131-132.

⁷ For a full bibliography, see the latest study of this epigram: P. Krafft, "Zu Kallimachos' Echo-Epigramm (28 Pf.)," *RhM* 120 (1977) 1, nn.1 and 2. Relevant treatments will be discussed below.

⁸ "Callimachus, Poetry and Love," *Eranos* 67 (1969) 39-40.

⁹ So L. P. Wilkinson, "Callimachus *A.P.* xii.43," *CR N.S.* 17 (1967) 6.

to be the point of the poem, Callimachus did a poor job of indicating it. An even greater objection to this view is that it takes no account of the intervening material (οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης / πίνω· σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια); "it (the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος) should be at the end of the list, not sandwiched between the highway and the common drinking place."¹⁰

The most valiant attempt to resolve this problem was made by Wilkinson, who suggested a transition by interpreting κρήνη as an "erotic metaphor, carrying on περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, which does thus come as the climax of the list and lead quite naturally into the last couplet."¹¹ No word of the rest of line 4 (σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια) in relation to this?

Can Wilkinson's claim for κρήνη in *Epigram* 28 stand? It has been recognized that the Callimachean lines are in part drawn from some verses of Theognis:

"Ἔστε μὲν αὐτὸς ἔπινον ἀπὸ κρήνης μελανύδρου,
 ἡδύ τί μοι ἐδόκει καὶ καλὸν ᾗμεν ὕδωρ.
 νῦν δ' ἤδη τεθόλωται, ὕδωρ δ' ἀναμίσγεται οὔδεις
 ἄλλης δὴ κρήνης πίομαι ἢ ποταμοῦ.
 (Theognis 959-962)¹²

These lines are clearly intended in an erotic sense; it is Wilkinson's claim that we should read the metaphor in Callimachus' poem in the same sense.

At this point, by way of digression, an important distinction should be made. The poetry of Callimachus, as we would expect in the case of a scholar-poet, is in many aspects eclectic; it is not sufficient, however, to point out the "sources" of his poetry and assume that Callimachus' intent is identical to that of his predecessors. After all, it was precisely from the shackles of the full tradition of Greek poetry that the Alexandrians strove so consciously to free themselves. A brief examination of the sources of the *Aetia* prologue or the end of the *Hymn to Apollo* shows that this is nowhere more the case than in his use of metaphor. Whatever the verbal reminiscence of archaic and classical Greek literature, his constant concern is in the creation of new and exclusive metaphor.

With this in mind, Wilkinson's claim for *Epigram* 28.3-4 ("drinking

¹⁰ A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page, *Hellenistic Epigrams* II (Cambridge 1965) 156; also Wilkinson (above, n.9) 5; Krafft (above, n.7) 16 ff.

¹¹ Wilkinson 5.

¹² R. Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolion: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der alexandrinischen Dichtung* (Giessen 1893) 69.

was a common metaphor for satisfying sexual need"¹³) can be considered. In a poem which is in other respects patently a major statement of literary theory there can be no latitude in the interpretation of this metaphor; its force must be both literary and polemical. To fully understand the significance of the phrase οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης / πίνω we must see it in combination with Apollo's injunction to the poet at *Hymn* 2.108–109:¹⁴

Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ
λύματα γῆς καὶ πολλὸν ἔφ' ὕδατι συρφετὸν ἔλκει.'

The reference to an unqualified spring in *Epigram* 28 must be seen both through this passage and through the lines of Theognis from which it ultimately derives purely on the level of diction; like that of Callimachus in the passage just cited, Theognis' spring had also been muddied (ὕδωρ δ' ἀναμίσγεται οὐδὲι, 961). In *Epigram* 28, then, Callimachus is quite clearly rejecting the common spring — a metaphor for exhausted, imitative verse. This is elaborated and enforced by the statement which follows: σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια. Wilkinson's silence on these words is not surprising; again, the significance can only be literary.¹⁵ Thus no solution has been reached. If the latter part of the couplet is of a literary nature (as it must be), then it seems legitimate to assume that the problem rests in our reading of the earlier part (μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον).¹⁶

The answer is to be found in New Comedy, There the word περιπατεῖν (or περίπατος) is used extensively (far more frequently than it appears in any other genre), with varying shades of meaning. First, it may mean quite simply "to walk about" (perhaps with a somewhat colloquial flavor) and was used thus to describe action within or outside the con-

¹³ Wilkinson 6; in general terms, of course, this claim is quite unobjectionable; see W. Headlam, *Herodas: The Mimes and Fragments* (Cambridge 1922) ad 1.25; also Krafft (above, n.7) 17 n.56.

¹⁴ See Wimmel (above, n.6) 222–225.

¹⁵ And so it was taken by those poets on whom it made an impression (see above, n.6); also Catullus 95.10 (at *populus tumido gaudeat Antimacho*) and W. Kroll (*C. Valerius Catullus* 3rd ed. [Stuttgart 1959]) ad loc.

¹⁶ Before proceeding we can dispose of another suggested source for this half-line: ἐχθαίρω δὲ γυναῖκα περίδρομον, Theognis 581 (cf. Reitzenstein [above, n.12] 69). As in the case of Theognis 959–962, verbal reminiscence does not imply the same poetic purpose. The fact is that *Epigram* 28, like Theognis 579–582, is cast in the form of a priamel; for this observation, cf. A. Henrichs, "Callimachus *Epigram* 28" in this volume. For Callimachus, however, the meaning behind the poetic form is what we are concerned with; we will see that he uses the conventional form in a new sense.

text of the play.¹⁷ Less generally, the word may serve as a virtual stage direction, reflecting or motivating action taking place on stage. So when Menander¹⁸ wrote:

(Demeas)

ἀλλὰ περιπάτησον ἐνθαδὶ

μικρὰ μετ' ἐμοῦ.

(Nikeratos)

περιπατήσω;

(De.)

καὶ σεαυτόν γ' ἀνάλαβε.

(*Sam.* 587–588)

he intended the characters to walk about on stage as they carried on their discussion;¹⁹ the effect is thus similar to that achieved with the device of the *servus currens*.

In a somewhat more colored sense, *περιπατεῖν* can imply a degeneracy of sorts, being used to describe the activities of drunkards, pimps, and the like.²⁰ But it is a more specific development of the word which is most important for our purposes. It frequently appears in the works of Menander in the context of the young lover's vigil before the house of his beloved.²¹ *Misoum.* A7 is of particular interest: *περιπατῶ τ' ἄνω κάτω*. The erotic nature of the situation is stressed throughout (*φροντίδες τ' ἐρωτικάι*, 3–4; *ἐρῶντα*, 5; *ἐρωμένην*, 9). In addition, the address to Night as witness to Thrasonides' anguish (line 1) and his description of his

¹⁷ Cf. Alexis 148 K; Antiphanes 39 K; 221 K; Philemon 119 K; Kock III *adesp.* 347; Euphron 2 K; Bato 5.14 K; Menander, *Aspis* 55; *Dysc.* 755; *Peric.* 306; *Sam.* 601; 178 Koerte; 313 Koerte; *P. Didot* 2.11 = Koerte I 145.

¹⁸ In all categories it can be seen that Menander uses the word most.

¹⁹ In this sense, cf. Aristoph. *Lys.* 709 (the only appearance in Old Comedy); Alexis 147 K; 204 K; Men. *Georg.* 85 (where there is an additional stage direction: *τί περιπατεῖς τρίβουσα τὰς χεῖρας*); *Epitr.* 229; *Peric.* 180; *Misoum.* 296 (*συμπεριπατήσω*).

²⁰ So Alexis 87 K; 177 K; Anaxandrides 34.5, 8 K; Dromo 1 K; Aristophon 10.8 K; Antiphanes 83 K; Menander, *Samia* 607 perhaps belongs in this category, although there are serious problems with both punctuation and interpretation in this line; cf. Gomme and Sandbach, *ad loc.*

²¹ Menander, *Dysc.* 266 (of Sostratus' substitute courters); *Misoum.* A1–A19; fr. 9 Koerte; *Phasma* 35; *Peric.* 299; 346 (here see L. Koenen, "Ergänzende Bemerkungen zu Menanders Perikeiromene 345" *ZPE* 15 [1974] 215: "Menander kannte nicht nur den *servus currens*, sondern, wie sich zeigt, auch einen *amator currens* vor dem Hause der Geliebten." The statement of Gomme and Sandbach ["The phrase must be metaphorical," *ad loc.*], as Koenen points out, is incorrect in the sense in which they mean it); *Theoph.* 21 (see below, n.24); *Sam.* 124. Although there is some variation among these examples, there is a common denominator in the amatory connotations underlying all of them.

stand before the closed doors (πρὸς ταῖς ἐμμαντοῦ²² νῦν θύραις ἔστηκ' ἐγώ, 6) set the whole sequence firmly in the tradition of the paraclausithyron. Again, at A17, the word appears, this time in the speech of the slave Getas, as he refers to his master's activity:²³

ὁ δ' ἐμὸς δεσπότης
ὥσπερ θέρους μέσου περιπατεῖ φιλοσο[φῶν
τοσοῦτ'.

And third, later in the same speech of Getas to Thrasonides:

τί οὐ καθεύδεις; σύ μ' ἀποκναίεις περιπατῶν.

(*Misoum.* fr. 9 Koerte = A 21)

Here the new papyrus (O20) definitely situates the previously independent fragment.

From all these instances a sure conclusion can be made: the verb *περιπατεῖν* (or its nominal equivalent *περίπατος*) could, with no additional explanation, refer to the frustrated antics of the comic lover, either in the situation of a paraclausithyron, or in general terms. Moreover, if we can glean from the scant remains of New Comedy so many examples of the word, it is safe to assume that it was, together with the various activities it implied, a commonplace within the genre.

With the pervasive nature of this term in mind, we should now return to *Epigram* 28.3. The whole problem disappears if we see this line as a reference to the precise comic stereotype discussed above. Callimachus' *περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος* is the frustrated lover who wanders about in New Comedy, and Callimachus' disdain for this character is representative of his rejection of that genre, precisely because it deals in such commonplaces (*δημόσια*). We can freely translate: "I also hate (along with bad epic) comedy and all its stereotypes."

²² As E. G. Turner points out (*The Papyrologist at Work*, GRBS Monograph 6 [1973] 18), Menander has given the setting a humorous touch by placing Thrasonides, the *exclusus amator*, outside the door of his own house.

²³ For this instance, see now E. G. Turner, "The Lost Beginning of Menander, *Misoumenos*," *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 63 (1977) 320-321. Turner is to be commended for his swift publication of the scrap which partially preserves A12-A19 of this famous prologue; henceforth it will be called O20, the title he gives it in accordance with Sandbach's system of notation for the papyri of Menander.

There is the additional point at A17 of *φιλοσοφῶν*; this can only be a play on the philosophical sense of *περιπατεῖν*, a sense of which Menander was certainly aware. For this meaning elsewhere in comedy, see Bato 5.14K.

There is no problem with Callimachus' substitution of *περίφοιτος*²⁴ for *περιπατῶν*. For one thing, we would expect Callimachus to prefer a close synonym, rather than merely to repeat the conventional term (such repetition is, after all, the object of his criticism). In addition, of course, there is the more practical consideration that the elegiac couplet will admit no variant of *πῆριπᾶτ-*. Moreover, Callimachus elsewhere uses the simple verb *φοιτίζειν* in a sense close to that of *περιπατεῖν* as applied to the lover of New Comedy, although the exact erotic overtones are somewhat different:

*φοιτίζειν ἀγαθοὶ πολλάκις ἡίθεοι
εἰς δ' αὖρους ἐθέλουσιν.*

(*inc. sed. fr. 500 Pf.*)

Pfeiffer is certainly correct in claiming for *ᾄροι* its more specific meaning "talking about love."²⁵

The possible objection to allowing *ἐρώμενον* to have middle force can be answered first with the point that there is no reason *prima facie* why it should not. Generally, of course, we are told that *ἐράω* and *ἔραμαι* are active in meaning, while *ἐράομαι* is passive, and it is true that the participle *ἐρώμενος* (which, incidentally, appears nowhere else in the corpus of Callimachus) is elsewhere passive. There are, however, sufficient examples of *ἐράομαι* used as a middle (as well as of instances where

²⁴ The fact that Callimachus elsewhere uses *περίφοιτος* as a term descriptive of a hetaira (*Epigr.* 38) in no way works against this interpretation; for, in Menander also, the single instance of *περιπατεῖν* applied to a woman carries precisely this implication (see n.21):

*"ἢ σὺ τί λαβοῦσα στέφανον ἔξω περιπατεῖς;
μαίνει; τί οὖν οὐκ ἔνδον ἐγκεκλειμένη
μαίνει;"*

(*Theoph.* 21-23)

The implications are quite clear (cf. also *ἱππόπορνε*, 1.19). I follow the line allocation of E. W. Handley ("Notes on the *Theophoroumene* of Menander," *BICS* 16 [1969] 93-94) and the Oxford text, against Koerte and D. L. Page (*GLP* 248). A. Grassi ("Inediti di Eugenio Grassi," *Atene e Roma* N.S. 6 [1961] 146) and Handley rightly place a question mark after *μαίνει* in line 22.

²⁵ "*ᾄροι* sunt 'colloquia, confabulationes' omnis generis, nonnumquam amantium," Pfeiffer, *ad loc.* Also see here for the initial claim that the fragment was from the story of Acontius and Cydippe (as well as for the rebuttal of this claim). In fact, there is an instance of simple *φοιτᾶν* applied to Acontius precisely when he is in his most unrequited state (i.e., when he takes refuge in the country):

ἄγραδε τῷ πάσῃσιν ἐπὶ προχάνησιν ἐφοῖτα.

(*Aetia* 3 fr. 72 Pf.)

the forms of ἔραμαι and ἐράομαι appear to lose their strict distinction) to allow, purely in grammatical terms, such a force for Callimachus' ἐρώμενον.²⁶ These "irregular" instances are not merely irrational but are appropriate in the context of meaning. As Apollonius Dyscolus comments on Sappho 16.4:²⁷

τό γε μὴν ἐρᾶν ὁμολογεῖ τὸ προσδιατίθεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου. διὸ καὶ δεόντως ἢ Σαπφῶν ἐπιτεταμένῳ μᾶλλον ὀνόματι ἐχρήσατο.

Or, to put it less prosaically, φλέγεται πῦρ πυρὶ καιόμενον (Meleager *Anth. Pal.* 12.109.4).²⁸ Along these very lines, it is not irrelevant, I think, that in the Loeb edition Callimachus' ἐρώμενον is rendered "lover," in the Budé "amant." In final support it may be pointed out that we should in no way be surprised at such licence in Callimachus, who elsewhere shows great willingness to disregard strict differentiation of voice.²⁹

What are the advantages of this reading? The thematic unity and balance of the first four lines of *Epigram* 28 can now be seen to respond clearly to the obvious grammatical structure:

- 1 Rejection of genre (epic); metaphorical
- 2 elaboration of grounds for rejection.

²⁶ Definite instances are: Plut. *Mor.* 753 A; Philostr. *Gym.* 288 K (cf. Gow *ad Theoc.* 1.78); also *PGM* XXXVI.148. Possible examples, or ones which at least demonstrate a breakdown in the distinction between ἔραμαι and ἐράομαι: Sappho 16.4 L-P (cf. Bergk *PLG* I 4th ed. [Leipzig 1878] *ad* Pind. *Pyth.* 4.92: "Ἐρᾶται apud Sapph. fr. 13 indicativus est" — whereas ἔρᾶται in Pindar is probably a Doric subjunctive of ἔραμαι); Homer, *Il.* 16.208; Theoc. 1.78; 2.149 (accented ἐρᾶται in P. Antinoae). For all this, see Gow *ad Theoc.* 1.78, who, although he concludes, "for the present it seems safer to regard both [forms in Theocritus] as eccentric forms of ἔραμαι," does not exclude the possibility (and even suggests it for 2.149) of their being forms of ἐράομαι. The suggestion of K. J. Dover (*Theocritus: Select Poems* [London 1971] *ad* 1.78) that Theocritus at least thought the form at Sappho 16.4 to be indicative (even if it is subjunctive) could apply equally well for Callimachus, whose epigram (as has been noted [by A. Henrichs, above, n.16]) has formal affinities to Sappho's priamel.

²⁷ *Synt.* 3.172, p. 419 Uhlig.

²⁸ For this concept in epigram, see Gow-Page, *Hellenistic Epigrams* II 641; also Gow *ad Theoc.* 7.118.

²⁹ So *δυσσεύς*, *Hymn* 4.138 ("windswept" rather than regular, active meaning, "ill-blowing"); *πεύκη* . . . *ἦψας* (for *ἦψας*), *Hymn* 3.116. For these and numerous other, similar examples (including *φλέω* used in active and middle, both times with active meaning, and in the same poem), see F. Bredau, *De Callimacho Verborum Inventore* (diss. Breslau 1892) 75-77; F. Lapp, *De Callimachi Cyrenaei Tropis et Figuris* (diss. Bonn 1965) 110-111. We are dealing quite simply with Callimachean *variatio*.

- 3 Rejection of genre (comedy); metaphorical
- 4 elaboration of grounds for rejection.

Criticism of a specific component of comedy (the *περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος*) leads into a general statement of the deficiencies of dramatic art: its conventions are repetitive and are accessible to, and employed by, all playwrights (hence οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης πίνω). Moreover its appeal is blatant, the very opposite of the exclusive, recondite art espoused by Callimachus (hence *σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια*) — drama, after all, is the *ποίημα δημόσιον par excellence*.

So we come to the final couplet, where a transition occurs from literary to purely personal statement (paralleled, incidentally, by a somewhat similar personal intrusion into the literary theme of *Epigram* 59 — see below). If we do not require Lysanias to be the opposite of the *περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος* — and we need not if the phrase amounts to a literary metaphor — then the alleged compositional problems are no more, and line 5 will stand as Callimachus' personal statement of preference, line 6 as an ironic undercutting of it.³⁰ All this in the overall setting of a priamel (see n.16).

Epigram 28.1–4 is, then, a summary of the poet's major polemical poetic theory; the genres of epic and drama³¹ were those which he found most unacceptable. His attitude toward the former (for example, in *Aetia* 1 fr. 1; *Hymn* 2.105–112; *Epigr.* 8) has been well documented and can be taken for granted. However, for reasons which will concern us later, his stance toward drama has received less attention. It will be useful to review the evidence for this; much will not be new, but perhaps a different focus can be given to it.

A general attack on drama, without specific reference to any particular feature, can be found in *Epigram* 59:

Εὐδαίμων ὅτι τᾶλλα μανεῖς ὠρχαῖος Ὀρέστας,
 Λεύκαρε, τὰν λίαν οὐκ ἐμάνη μανίαν
 οὐδ' ἔλαβ' ἐξέτασιν τῷ Φωκέος ἄτις ἐλέγχει
 τὸν φίλον· ἀλλ' αἰ χῆν δρᾶμ' ἐδίδαξε μόνον,
 ἦ τάχα κα τὸν ἐταῖρον ἀπώλεσε· τοῦτο ποιήσας
 κήγῳ τῷς πολλῶς οὐκέτ' ἔχω Πυλάδας.

³⁰ Those who would separate the final couplet from the first two (along with Haupt, Mackail, and, cautiously, Gow-Page) might find additional support in all this, although, if a contrast is no longer needed between lines 3 and 5, such a position is also weakened.

³¹ From the passages which follow, it is valid to make the broader step from criticism of comedy to criticism of dramatic art in general.

The paraphrase of Gow-Page³² ("the way to lose your friends is to write drama") is certainly correct; but at this point we are not told why this is so. In *Epigram* 48, however, the criticism is more explicit, and the terms are in fact close to those used in *Epigram* 28:

Εὐμαθίην ἡτεῖτο διδοὺς ἐμέ Σῆμος ὁ Μίκκου
ταῖς Μούσαις· αἱ δὲ Γλαῦκος ὅκως ἔδοσαν
ἀντ' ὀλίγου μέγα δῶρον. ἐγὼ δ' ἀνὰ τῇδε κεχηνώς
κεῖμαι τοῦ Σαμίου διπλόον ὁ τραγικός
παιδαρίων Διόνυσος ἐπήκοος· οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν
ἱερὸς ὁ πλόκαμος, τοῦμόν ὄνειρα ἐμοί.

Speaking is a tragic mask of Dionysus, placed in dedication on a school-room wall. The pupils' tedious recitation from popular tragedies (ἱερὸς ὁ πλόκαμος, Eur. *Bacch.* 494) elicits from the mask a yawn of boredom,³³ twice as wide as that of the Samian Διόνυσος κεχηνώς. The criticism, then, is similar to that observed at *Epigram* 28.3-4; there it was the monotony of thematic repetition within the genre of comedy which removed the art form from the class of poetry acceptable to Callimachus. In *Epigram* 48 it is the monotony of tragic recitals (and we should keep in mind Euripides' popularity in the Hellenistic period) to which he objects. In short, in both cases we are dealing with poetic δημόσια — this is the motivation for Callimachus' rejection.

A further, tentative suggestion can be made, which perhaps brings the two passages even closer together. We noted above that the most developed picture of amatory περίπατος comes at the beginning of Menander's *Misoumenos* (A1-A19). E. G. Turner has concluded that the first discovered papyrus of the three which preserve these lines (*P. IFAO* 89) is in all probability written in a school hand.³⁴ This is not altogether surprising, because, as Turner points out, "For the sub-

³² *Hellenistic Epigrams* II 211. This poem introduces an interesting question of the chronology of Callimachus' literary production. If the *Suda* is to be believed, Callimachus wrote σατυρικά δράματα, τραγωδία, and κωμωδία. On the evidence of *Epigram* 59.5-6, we may suggest that he experimented with drama at an early stage, but, with the evolution of his poetic theory, subsequently found such forms unacceptable. This later stage would then be reflected in *Epigrams* 28 and 59. *Iambi inc. sed.* fr. 219 Pf. may also imply a late realization of the deficiencies of drama: οὐ πρῶν μὲν ἡμῖν ὁ τραγωδὸς ἤγειρε (οὐ πρῶν = "not just now," i.e., "some time ago").

³³ Cf. Aristoph. *Ach.* 30; that this is the significance of κεχηνώς . . . τοῦ Σαμίου διπλόον is beyond doubt; see Gow-Page, *Hellenistic Epigrams* II 182-183; also the Loeb edition of Callimachus, *Hymns and Epigrams*, ed. A. W. Mair (London 1921, rev. 1960) ad *Epigr.* 49 (48 Pf.).

³⁴ So E. G. Turner (above, n.22) 15-20.

ject of the exercise, writing or dictation, the schoolmaster chose a well-known anthology piece, the brilliant opening of Menander's play."³⁵ It does not, then, seem fanciful to make the following observation: in *Epigram* 48 Callimachus expressed his scorn for schoolroom recitations of purple patches from tragedy, just as, in *Epigram* 28, the very topos which he disdained is precisely the type which could (and did?) find its way into the anthologies, and thence into the classroom.

A final passage from Callimachus should be considered:

ἤ τις τραγῶδος μοῦσα ληκυθίζουσα.

(*Iamb. inc. sed. fr.* 215 Pf.)

This is generally seen as a reference to the bombastic nature of tragic poetry.³⁶ If this is so, then there is a suggestion of criticism of the lofty style, along the same lines as in the *recusatio* of the *Aetia* prologue (μηδ' ἄπ' ἐμεῦ διφᾶτε μέγα ψοφέουσιν αἰοιδὴν / τίκτεσθαι, *Aetia* 1 fr. 1.19–20). However, the precise meaning of the verb ληκυθίζειν, appearing here for the first time (and coined by Callimachus?), requires investigation. Its meaning is usually considered to be "to make a booming sound, as if declaiming into a λήκυθος"³⁷ — certainly this is the sense of Horace's adaptation (n.36). Yet, in the present context, Callimachus obviously had in mind Aristophanes' famous phrase ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν (*Frogs* 1200 ff), the tool with which Aeschylus brought destruction on the prologues of Euripides. Of the various meanings suggested for this phrase the sense of bombast is definitely ruled out as being inappropriate for Euripidean drama.³⁸ One sense in which Callimachus could have taken Aristophanes' passage, on the other hand, is highly appropriate to the type of criticism we have observed elsewhere in his poetry: "Aristophanes is mocking the alleged triviality of Euripides' subject matter with this contemptuous list of commonplace articles."³⁹ Such a

³⁵ Ibid. p. 18. Although *P. IFAO* 89 has been dated to the third century, we can assume from the high incidence of quotation from the passage in earlier authors (cf. Turner 18–19) that the hypothetical anthology in which it appeared was produced at an early stage.

³⁶ So, at any rate, Horace "translates" it at *Epist.* 1.3.14: *an tragica desaevit et ampullatur in arte*: see Pfeiffer *ad Callim. Iamb. inc. sed. fr.* 215.

³⁷ Cf. Phryn. *Praep. Soph.* p. 86 de Borries.

³⁸ Cf. J. Henderson, "The Lekythos and *Frogs* 1200–1248," *HSCP* 76 (1972)

140.

³⁹ W. B. Stanford, *Aristophanes, The Frogs*, 2nd ed. (London 1968) *ad* 1202–03. Although I tend to favor this interpretation, there is no need to become involved in the extended debate these lines have elicited; our concern is merely in the way in which the earliest of scholars dealing with the passage may have read it.

reading of the verb *ληκυθίζειν* is, moreover, supported by the next occurrence of the word; Strabo is writing of the discussions of the early Peripatetics, who were without the advantage of books: *μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν*, 13.1.54 (translated in the Loeb edition: "able only to talk bombast about commonplace propositions"). In this context, as well as in the fragment of Callimachus, *ληκυθίζειν* seems to imply triviality or commonplace as much as bombast.⁴⁰

Let us turn to Rome. One point is clear from the beginning: in the expression of polemical theory in Roman poetry, there is an imbalance between the adaptation of the epic and the dramatic *recusationes*.⁴¹ Tracing Callimachean poetic theory in neoteric and Augustan verse, we tend to miss the opposition to dramatic poetry. This neglect by the Roman poets can, I believe, be easily explained in terms of the "pressure" to produce epic. Whether this pressure is a real one or a poetic fiction to which the poet is able to accommodate the Callimachean *recusatio* need not concern us. What matters is that it resulted in a focus on Callimachus' statements against the writing of epic. Nevertheless, we would expect to find an emergence in Roman poetry of the theory we have been considering.

Cicero, of course, did criticize comic poetry in the following terms:

itaque video visum esse nonnullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem . . . potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum, apud quos, nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis.

(*Or.* 67)

The reference to *cotidianus sermo* is not really on the same level as Callimachus' criticism; Cicero is merely pointing out that in terms of diction comic poetry is much like everyday speech.⁴²

⁴⁰ The sense of bombast for *ληκυθίζειν* seems to be a late development (brought about by Horace's modification of the word?); here see C. H. Whitman, "*Ληκύθιον Ἀπώλεσεν*," *HSCP* 73 (1969) 112, n.8.

⁴¹ With the important exception of Ovid (*Amores* 3.1 — Elegy vs. Tragedy in a contest for the poet's favor), who in so many ways stands apart from the national concerns of the Augustan poets; here see my note, "Ovid's Attempt at Tragedy," *AJP* 99 (1978) 447-450.

⁴² A source has been sought for the statement of Cicero; although Aristotle claimed that the iambic meter was close in rhythm to speech (*Rhet.* 1408 b 32 ff) he specified no genre. W. Kroll (Cicero, *Orator* [Berlin 1913] ad 67) cites other authors who make the same suggestion: Horace *Satires* 1.4.45-48; Schol. Hephaest. 115.13; Strabo 1.18. B. L. Ullman ("Horace on the Nature of Satire," *TAPhA* 48 [1917] 116-117) proposed Philodemus, *On Poetry* 72 and 73 Hausrath as the source for Horace; we shall see, however, that for Horace at least (as would be expected) Callimachus is a more likely source.

What of the lines from Horace's *Satires* cited by Kroll? It is evident that Horace was drawing from *Orator* 67:

idcirco quidam comoedia necne poema
esset, quaesivere, quod acer spiritus ac vis
nec verbis nec rebus inest, nisi quod pede certo
differt sermoni, sermo merus.

(*Sat.* 1.4.45-48)

So far quite traditional, although with a small but important addition (*rebus*). In the *exemplum* which demonstrates this point, Horace makes an interlocutor object:

“at pater ardens
saevit, quod meretrice nepos insanus amica
filius uxorem grandi cum dote recuset,
ebrius et, magnum quod dedecus, ambulet ante
noctem cum facibus.”

(ll. 48-52)

Thus the admirer of comic conventions; Horace, on the other hand, rests his case: *numquid Pomponius istis / audiret leviora, pater si viveret?* (ll. 52-53). Through this *exemplum* Horace developed the theory he had observed in the *Orator*; there the question was one of diction and tone (*quod incitatus feratur*, *Or.* 67). Horace, however, extended his criticism to content, and, more important, the very feature he chose as being representative of the tedium and mundanity of comic stereotypes was the youthful *περιπατῶν* — the very same object of Callimachus' disdain (*meretrice . . . insanus amica . . . filius . . . ebrius . . . ambulet⁴³ ante noctem cum facibus*). Moreover, Horace's reply to the interlocutor is in effect the same as Callimachus' elaboration at *Epigram* 28.4; Pomponius represents a type from everyday life. Horace, then, found this feature unacceptable precisely because it is a commonplace (*δημόσιον*). By way of general support, it should be noted that this criticism appears in a poem which is in other ways directly indebted to Callimachean poetic theory.⁴⁴

⁴³ In Roman comedy, the simple verb *ambulare* is used as the translation of *περιπατεῖν*: Plaut. *Cas.* 768; *Curc.* 288; *Men.* 276; 706; *Most.* 451; Terence seems even closer: *defessu' sum ambulando*, *Adelph.* 713; *ut me ambulando rumperet*, *Hec.* 435 (cf. *Men. Misoum.* fr. 9 Koerte, *σύ μ' ἀποκναίεις περιπατῶν* [above, n.21]).

⁴⁴ E.g., line 11, *cum flueret lutulentus* (cf. Callim. *Hymn* 2.108-109); lines 9-10, *in hora saepe ducentos, / ut magnum, versus dictabat stans pede in uno* (cf. *Aetia* 1 fr. 1.3-4, 17-20). See W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom* (above, n.6) 156 ff, 222-233. This also applies for the poem's companion piece, *Satire* 1.10,

The claim is, then, that Horace saw Callimachus' rejection of the *περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος* as we have, and that in *Satire* 1.4 he used this same feature as an *exemplum* of the mundanity of comedy. This suggestion can now be tested by turning to the literary epistles. First, *Epistle* 2.1.168-171:

creditur, ex medio quia res accersit, habere
sudoris minimum, sed habet comoedia tanto
plus oneris, quanto veniae minus. aspice, Plautus
quo pacto partis tutetur amantis ephebi

Again, it is the nature of Horace's criticism of Plautine drama, together with the first of the examples he uses, which is significant; the burden on the comic writer is greater because he draws his material from commonplaces of the genre (*ex medio quia res accersit* = τὰ δημόσια). To demonstrate this, Horace first gives the case of the love-struck youth (*amantis ephebi*).

The *Ars Poetica* contains material by far less partisan than that in his other works. The influence of Callimachus appears to have retreated as he drew from more conventional literary theory.⁴⁵ Most notable in this is the fact that epic and dramatic poetry suddenly seem to be respectable genres. This does not, however, imply that Horace necessarily turned away from Callimachean aesthetics; an *Ars Poetica* simply requires recognition of traditional poetic forms. In fact we shall see that what-

where, apart from the repetition of *lutulentum* (50) and an attack on hasty writing (56-64), there is a certain amount of Callimachean/neoteric polemical language (*inepte*, 2; *turgidus*, 36; *ludo*, 37; *molle atque facetum*, 44; *comis et urbanus*, 65). Moreover, in that poem, Horace expresses his satisfaction with having a few, select readers (*contentus paucis lectoribus*, 74), shuddering at the alternative:

an tua demens
vilibus in ludis dictari carmina malis?
non ego.

(74-76)

This fate (predicted by Horace in the well-known lines, *Epist.* 1.20.17-18) was precisely that to which Callimachus had condemned Euripides' *Bacchae* in *Epigram* 48. This, then, will be the lot of the bad artist:

Demetri, teque, Tigelli,
discipularum inter iubeo plorare cathedras.
(*Sat.* 1.10.90-91)

⁴⁵ For now, there is no need to involve ourselves with possible sources — Aristotle, Neoptolemus of Parium, etc.; see C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge 1963), henceforth *Prolegomena*, Part II, "The Traditions of Literary Criticism and the *Ars Poetica*."

ever modifications were necessitated by the exigencies of this poem, in at least one passage Callimachus was still very much in Horace's mind.

After considering the question of appropriate diction in tragedy and comedy (89-118), Horace begins a new section, treating character and subject matter suitable for drama and epic (119-152).⁴⁶ Our concern is with the point of transition between these two genres:

difficile est proprie communia dicere, tuque
rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus
quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus.
publica materies privati iuris erit, si
non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem,
nec . . .

(A.P. 128-133)

So some of the most difficult lines of Latin poetry, particularly the first: "apart from *est* each word is controversial."⁴⁷ There is no need here to review the vast critical treatment of line 128; it has been thoroughly covered by C. O. Brink, who favors the Aristotelian concepts of τὰ καθόλου (*communia*) and καθ' ἑκάστων (*proprie*),⁴⁸ agreeing with Orelli, Heinze, and others: "It is hard to lend individual features to general concepts" (*Prolegomena* 106).

The other most prevalent view is that *communia* is to be taken as being equivalent to *publica materies* (131): "It is difficult to say things that are common property in a way that makes them one's own."⁴⁹ The *-que* of the following *tuque* will then have adversative force: "It is not easy . . . but you are better occupied doing that than (inventing new subject matter)."⁵⁰ The line will remain controversial, but there seems

⁴⁶ For this division, cf. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: The "Ars Poetica"* (Cambridge 1971), henceforth *The "Ars Poetica," ad loc.*

⁴⁷ Brink, *The "Ars Poetica"* 204; O. A. W. Dilke (review of *The "Ars Poetica," JRS* 62 [1972] 160) would make even *est* controversial, emending to *et*.

⁴⁸ *Prolegomena* 103-108; *The "Ars Poetica" ad loc.*; App. 1 432-440; he claims, however, that the wording behind Horace's *communia* / *proprie* is τὸ κοινόν / τὸ ἴδιον (*The "Ars Poetica"* 205-206). For this latter reading, see also P. White, "Horace A.P. 128-30: The Intent of the Wording," *CQ* n.s. 27 (1977) 191-201.

⁴⁹ So G. Williams, following a number of other scholars (see Brink, *The "Ars Poetica"* 432-435), in a review of Brink's *Prolegomena* (*JRS* 54 [1964] 190); also, after his emendation (above, n.47), the conclusion of Dilke.

⁵⁰ Williams (above, n.49) 190, who refers to Kühner-Stegmann 2.6, 27-28 and L-H 660 (= Stolz-Schmalz 2.481) for instances of *-que* (as well as of *et*, *atque* and *ac*) with adversative force, particularly following a negative clause (implied in *difficile est*); the debate over the degree of adversative force allowed by these particles will doubtless continue, but I can see no good reason for excluding A.P. 128 purely on these grounds.

on the surface to be nothing which excludes this second reading. In offering additional support for it, the passage can be related to others with which we have been dealing.

Brink has noted that at *A.P.* 119–152 Aristotle's *Rhetoric* fails us, and is replaced, "though less extensively," by the *Poetics* (*The "Ars Poetica"* 194–195). He has also observed that the metaphor at line 132 (*non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem*) is Callimachean — indeed, it comes precisely from *Epigram* 28 (οὐδὲ κελεύθῳ / χαίρω τίς πολλοὺς ὦδε καὶ ὦδε φέρει, *Epigr.* 28.1–2).⁵¹ Horace in fact gives further acknowledgment of this poem four lines later: *ut scriptor cyclicus olim* (cf. ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, line 1). Brink claims of these instances: "As so often, therefore, when H. makes use of Callimachean language, he turns it upside down; he employs it to affirm what Callimachus had denied" (*The "Ars Poetica," ad 131 ff.*).

How does all this relate to *A.P.* 128? In *Epigram* 28 Callimachus summarized his major poetic theory in rejecting the two genres of epic and drama. Horace appears elsewhere to have recognized Callimachus' rejection of both genres. In the *Ars Poetica* at the point of transition between his treatment of drama and epic, Horace modified his predecessor's metaphorical criticism of epic (*Epigr.* 28.1–2 = *A.P.* 132). Now if, as seems possible, the *communia* of *A.P.* 128 can refer to those elements which are commonplace to the genre,⁵² then it is plausible to take the whole line as Horace's modification of Callimachus' unqualified rejection of drama at *Epigram* 28.4:

σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.

Thus the whole of *Epigram* 28.1–4 is contained in these transitional lines of the *Ars Poetica* (128–133). At least for the purposes of the *Ars Poetica*, Horace does not completely exclude drama and epic as viable literary pursuits, but he does indicate the major difficulty in such pursuits (a difficulty which, in his earlier, more solidly Callimachean poetry, had led him to virtual rejection of the genre). If the poet gives commonplaces an individual touch, such poetry will be acceptable.

⁵¹ Brink, *The "Ars Poetica"* ad 132; as he notes, *Aetia* 1 fr. 1.27–28 also provides a parallel.

⁵² Additional support for *communia* = δημόσια can be found in Porphyry's comment on *Epist.* 2.1.168; we noted that Horace there referred to the burden placed on the writer of comedy, because of the genre's dependence upon topoi (*ex medio quia res accersit*). Porphyry elaborates:

creditur, inquit, quia comoedia communia sectatur,
atque de medio, minus habere difficultatis.

(Porph. ad *Epist.* 2.1.168)

Or, put much the same way: *quoniam de communibus rebus comoedia loquitur* (Pseudo-Acron ad loc.).

This, then, is the final stage; in the *Ars Poetica* we can detect a new, specifically Roman departure from Callimachean poetic aesthetics. Callimachus, reacting against a long and rich poetic tradition, rejected wholesale all that had (of necessity) become commonplace in that tradition. Not so the Augustans; their poetry was one whose techniques were just reaching their peak. In this development, the traditional was acceptable so long as it contributed to overall individuality.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A METAPHOR

καὶ ποιήσατε τὴν δεῖνα, ἣν ἔτεκεν ἡ δεῖνα,
ἀγρυπνεῖν, ἀεροπετεῖσθαι, πεινώσαν, διψῶσαν,
ὑπνου μὴ τυγχάνουσιν, ἐρᾶσθαι ἐμοῦ τοῦ δεῖνα.

(PGM XXXVI.147)

ἀγρυπνεῖτω ἡ δεῖνα δι' ὅλης νυκτός τε καὶ
ἡμέρας, ἕως θάνῃ, ἥδη ἥδη, ταχὺ ταχὺ.

(PGM XII.394)

The *Ἀγρυπνητικόν* is one of the most common spells found among Greek magical papyri. As in the above examples, a prayer is made that the subject be incapable of sleeping because of dwelling on the caster of the spell. So common is this that the verb *ἀγρυπνεῖν* may be used without qualification to mean "to be in love" (*ποίησον τὴν δεῖνα ἀγρυπνοῦσάν μοι διὰ παντός [αἰώνως]*, PGM IV.2966).⁵³

The same word, with precisely the same significance, finds literary expression in New Comedy and in Greek epigram, generally in situations related to the *paraclausithyron*.⁵⁴ Especially in the case of New

⁵³ Other instances: IV.2943, 3274; VII.374-76, 652, 888; XII.16, 376-78; LII.20; LXX.25. See also R. W. Daniel, "Some *φυλακτήρια*," *ZPE* 25 (1977) 148. Although none of these papyri is early, we are justified in assuming that the spell existed in the Hellenistic period, not only because of its numerous later appearances (not to mention the commonness of the theme), but also because its exact counterpart appears in a demotic papyrus of the third century A.D., whose contents may be two hundred years earlier: F.Ll. Griffith and H. Thompson, eds., *The Demotic Magical Papyrus of London and Leiden* (London 1904, Oxford 1921) Col. 21.40, "Take away her sleep by night, . . . let her not sleep."

⁵⁴ It may be relevant for the *ἀγρυπνητικόν* that there appear to be close parallels between Roman and Egyptian *paraclausithyra*; so A. Hermann, *Beiträge zur Erklärung der ägyptischen Liebesdichtung*, Akad. Berl., Inst. für Orientf. 29 (1955) 135 ff. For this, and for other Egyptian themes alluded to in Roman poetry, see L. Koenen, "Egyptian Influence in Tibullus," *Illinois Classical Studies* 1 (1976) 127-159.

Comedy, ἀγρυπνία is just one of a number of elements (including περίπατος) which have affinities to that literary tradition.⁵⁵

From what remains of Menander's *Phasma*, it seems clear that at one point Pheidias' paedagogus is chiding his young master for his listlessness, mistaking for mere petulance what are, in fact, the unmistakable symptoms of frustrated love:

ὅταν δ' ἀγρυπνεῖν εἴπῃς, τίς ὁ [βίος σου σκοπῶν
τὴν αἰτίαν γνώσει· περιπατεῖς [
εἰσηλθες εὐθύς, ἂν κοπιάσῃς τ[ὰ σκέλη·
μαλακῶς ἐλούσω· πάλιν ἀναστ[ὰς ἐνέφαγες
πρὸς ἡδονήν· ὕπνος αὐτὸς ὁ βί[ος ἐστὶ σου.

(Men. *Phasma* 34–38)

The symptoms are quite clearly those of a person in love; the audience will have recognized the topos and seen the truth where the paedagogus was deluded. There is an additional point to these lines: the speech is made in reaction to an actual complaint of Pheidias (ὅταν . . . εἴπῃς, 34; ἔσθ' ἣν διήλθες, 40). This being the case, we can, I think, assume that Pheidias delivered a speech containing, among other elements, the terms περιπατεῖν and ἀγρυπνεῖν (or at least synonyms for these words). This speech will doubtless have been along the same lines as the prologue to the *Misoumenos* and may even have been delivered in the setting of a paraclausithyron.⁵⁶

Since that prologue is the *locus classicus* of the paraclausithyron in New Comedy,⁵⁷ we should also examine it from the standpoint of

⁵⁵ Cf. F. O. Copley, *Exclusus Amator: A Study in Latin Love Poetry*, APhA Monograph 17 (1956) 1; as Copley points out, the paraclausithyron does not necessarily constitute a literary form but is rather a thematic topos which is easily appropriated by various genres.

⁵⁶ The point that the speech of the paedagogus is a reaction to an earlier lament by Pheidias is made by E. G. Turner ("The *Phasma* of Menander," *GRBS* 10 [1969] 313); his reluctance to suggest that this earlier speech actually occurred on stage (while it is true that reconstructing lost plays can be a hazardous business) seems overly cautious, in that such speeches (like that made in the *Misoumenos* prologue) were clearly so common in New Comedy.

⁵⁷ The topical aspect of the address to Night (A1–A3) has been well covered. It occurs first in tragedy: Eur. *Electra* 54; *Hec.* 68; *Andromeda* fr. 114, p. 393 N; also in Old Comedy: Aristoph. *Thesm.* 1065; elsewhere in New Comedy: *P. Antinoop.* 15 (probably Menander's *Apistos*; cf. C. Austin, "Pap. *Antinoop.* 15," *CR n.s.* 17 [1967] 134). That the lover's address to Night (with her attendant celestial phenomena) was a commonplace of New Comedy is clear from Plaut. *Merc.* 3–5:

non ego item facio ut alios in comoediis
<vi> vidi amoris facere, qui aut Nocti aut Dii
aut Soli aut Lunae miserias narrant suas.

ἀγρυπνία.⁵⁸ In the fragments we have, the actual word does not appear; however, its sense is spelled out (ἐξὸν καθεύδειν . . . , Ag). Two other fragments, assigned to the opening scenes,⁵⁹ suggest that there was an extended dialogue on Thrasonides' sleeplessness. Both are addressed to the suffering lover by his slave Getas (the pattern is the same as in the *Phasma*), who, as we now know,⁶⁰ entered at line A15:

τί οὐ καθεύδεις; σύ μ' ἀποκναίεις περιπατῶν.

(*Mis. fr.* 9 Koerte)

εἴσελθε κἄν νῦν, ὦ μακάριε.

(*fr.* 11 Koerte)

Thrasonides was clearly making much of his inability to sleep, and this will no doubt have been closely related to his amatory predicament. So the concept of ἀγρυπνία is present, and it can at least be suggested that the actual term occurred in the missing lines.

In spite of the fragmentary nature of the evidence, there is justification for assuming that the lover's wakefulness, erotic ἀγρυπνία, was a commonplace in Greek New Comedy, as well as in its Roman counterpart.⁶¹ This is in fact confirmed by Plutarch, who, discussing the tendency of those involved in court cases to continue talking about their experience afterwards, states:

πολλῷ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ χαρὰ τῆς κωμικῆς ἐκείνης ἀγρυπνίας λαλίστερον.

(*Plut. de garr.* 513 E)⁶²

This is much like the *recusatio* of Aristophanes, *Clouds* 537–562; of course, neither keeps to his claim. For most of the above information, see F. Leo (above, n.1) 151; also L. Koenen, "Nochmals: Der Prolog des Misoumenos Menanders," *ZPE* 6 (1970) 100.

Along with ἀγρυπνία, the address to Night also found its way into the paraclausithyron of epigram, as we shall see below (cf. n.63).

⁵⁸ See above, pp. 183–184, for the importance of the prologue in understanding the concept of the περίπατος.

⁵⁹ Cf. Gomme and Sandbach 443, for the attribution of both fragments to the opening scenes; this is confirmed by O20 (see E. G. Turner [above, n.23] 322–323).

⁶⁰ From *P. Oxy. ined.* (=O19), the second papyrus preserving the prologue of the *Misoumenos*; for a text, see E. G. Turner (above, n.22) App. 48–50.

⁶¹ Cf. Plaut. *Curc.* 181 ff for an elaborate treatment of the *amator vigilans*; also *Poen.* 323; Turpilus p. 124, fr. 5 Ribbeck, *vigilans virginem* (cf. ἀγρυπνοῦσάν μοι, *PGM* 4.2966).

⁶² This is in reference to Men. *Epiclerus* fr. 152 Koerte, a passage which appears to deal with the (non-amatory?) ἀγρυπνία of an old man; cf. Koerte, *ad loc.*; also Ribbeck, *CRF*, 3rd ed. (Leipzig 1898) 106, fr. 1, for Turpilus' translation of these lines in his *Epiclerus*; cf. line 3, *me curae somno segregant*.

The topical nature of the term is even more evident in epigram. Perhaps the most interesting instance occurs in a poem by Meleager:

λίσσομ' Ἐρως, τὸν ἄγρυπνον ἐμοὶ πόθον Ἑλιοδώρας
κοίμισον, αἰδεσθεῖς Μοῦσαν ἐμὴν ἰκέτιν.

(*Anth. Pal.* 5.215.1-2)

Of particular significance is the fact that the poem is cast in terms of a prayer, representing a sort of apotropaic reversal of an Ἀγρυπνητικόν (additional evidence for a much earlier existence of the actual charm than indicated by the examples which appear in *PGM*?). The theme obviously appealed particularly to Meleager,⁶³ who in another case inverted the conventional concept:

Ἄστρο καὶ ἡ φιλέρωσι καλὸν φαίνουσα Σελήνη
καὶ Νύξ καὶ κώμων σύμπλανον ὀργάνιον,
ἄρά γε τὴν φιλάσωτον ἔτ' ἐν κοίταισιν ἀθρήσω
ἄγρυπνον λύχνῳ πόλλ' ἀποδυρομένην;
ἢ τιν' ἔχει σύγκοιτον;

(*Anth. Pal.* 5.191.1-5)

The situation is one of a conventional paraclausithyron, with the address to Night (and her components, Stars and Moon), already observed in Menander, and condemned as a commonplace by Plautus.⁶⁴ Also an important feature is the presence of a lamp (λύχνῳ) as a witness, here of the imagined joy of the girl,⁶⁵ elsewhere of the pleasures of the beloved and the poet's rivals.⁶⁶ However, Meleager has given the topos an artful touch, for he is wakeful outside the house of his beloved

In connection with Plutarch's use of *λαλίστερον*, it is of interest that the wakeful Thrasonides refers to his own chatter (*λαλεῖν*, *Misoum.* A14).

⁶³ See *Anth. Pal.* 5.152; 5.165; 5.166; 12.72 (*ἄνπνος*). Other instances where ἄγρυπνία is either present or implicit: *Anth. Pal.* 5.309, where the verb ἄγρυπνεῖν is, by extension, assigned as a quality of Eros. Interesting, although not an epigram, is *Lyrica Adespota* 177-180 Powell (B. P. Grenfell, *An Alexandrian Erotic Fragment* [Oxford 1896]), in which there is rather a fine address to Night: Ἄστρο φίλα καὶ πότνια Νύξ συνερῶσά μοι (l. 11); cf. Powell *ad loc.* for citation of the similar address at *Anth. Pal.* 5.191.1-2 (cited as 5.190 [Stadtmüller] by Powell); see also 5.5; 5.164.

⁶⁴ Above, n.57; note the addition by Plautus of *Dies* and *Sol*; of course, this does make the ἄγρυπνία more intense, as is the case with the Ἀγρυπνητικόν cited above: δι' ὅλης νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, *PGM* 12.394.

⁶⁵ So Asclepiades, *Anth. Pal.* 5.7; Meleager, *Anth. Pal.* 5.165; 5.166; 5.197; Philodemus, *Anth. Pal.* 5.4; Marcus Argentarius, *Anth. Pal.* 5.128.

⁶⁶ Mel. *Anth. Pal.* 5.8.6, λύχνε, σὺ δ' ἐν κόλποις αὐτὸν ὄρεῖς ἐτέρων.

(conventional), wondering whether she is within, suffering from ἀγρυπνία, or whether she is in the company of some rival.⁶⁷

So much for epigram. A tantalizing occurrence of the word appears at *P. Berol.* 21243 (*ined.*), col. II.2:⁶⁸

ἄρας τὰς χεῖρας π[ρὸς τ]ὰ ἄστρον καταστρέλλετω [± 9]. δεῖνα καὶ. [3-5]
καὶ νύξ μέλαινα καὶ στάσις καὶ ἀγρυπνία καὶ ἐμῇ [± 9] δοκρεμῶι ὑπ[3-5]
χρησ ἴδῃ πρὶν ἥλιον

(ll. 1-3)

Most of the elements associated with the paraclausithyron are present here: the prayer to the Stars and to Night, standing (before a door? στάσις; cf. Menander, *Mis.* A6, πρὸς ταῖς ἐμᾶντοῦ νῦν θύραις ἔστηκ' ἐγώ), and, most important for our purposes, ἀγρυπνία. Is it possible that this part of the papyrus (late first century B.C.) preserves a fragment of New Comedy, especially in light of the fact that it appears to be metrical?⁶⁹

Callimachus found this topos, and, as we might expect, employed the word with a different application:

Ἡσιόδου τό τ' ἄεισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος· οὐ τὸν αἰοιδῶν
ἔσχατον, ἀλλ' ὀκνέω μὴ τὸ μελιχρότατον
τῶν ἐπέων ὁ Σολεὺς ἀπεμάξατο· χαίρετε λεπταὶ
ρήσιες, Ἀρήτου σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης.

(*Epigr.* 27 Pf.)⁷⁰

Our concern is only with the last two lines;⁷¹ Callimachus took a word regularly used to describe the absorbed state of the *exclusus amator* and

⁶⁷ A similar variation occurs at Meleager, *Anth. Pal.* 5.166. The point is not so much that these poems do not really constitute paraclausithyra (so E. K. Borthwick, "Meleager's Lament: A Note on *Anth. Pal.* 5.166," *CP* 64 [1969] 175), but rather they demonstrate the poet's attempt to give variety to a commonplace motif; cf. also above, n.55.

⁶⁸ I am extremely grateful to Dr. William Brashear of the Ägyptisches Museum in Berlin for permission to make use of his preliminary transcription of this papyrus.

⁶⁹ Iambics, restoring crasis to the second line: καγρυπνία.

⁷⁰ I follow Pfeiffer's acceptance of Ruhnken's emendation, σύμβολον; additional support for this is given by Ross (*Backgrounds* 29 n.2), who points out that λεπταὶ ρήσιες may be an acknowledgment of Aratus' "λεπτός acrostic" at *Phaen.* 783-787 (see J. M. Jacques, "Sur un acrostiche d'Aratos," *REA* 62 [1960] 48-61), which can be seen as Aratus' σφραγίς (= σύμβολον).

⁷¹ For the debate over μίμησις and ζήλωσις in this poem, see E. Reitzenstein (above, n.3) 42-48.

applied it to the poetry of his admired contemporary, Aratus.⁷² So carefully crafted is that poetry (λεπταὶ ῥήσιες) that it causes for the poet the same symptom induced in the lover.

We may now observe the influence of this epigram in subsequent poetry. Theocritus twice uses ἄγρυπνία/ἄγρυπνος; first, in the Tenth Idyll:

οὐδαμά νυν συνέβα τοι ἄγρυπνήσαι δι' ἔρωτα;

(Theoc. 10.10)

All quite conventional; in fact, one of the magical papyri contains a somewhat similar statement (ἄγρυπνοῦσα ἐπὶ τῷ ἔρωτί μου, PGM VII.888). In the Twenty-Fourth Idyll, Theocritus again uses the word (the only other instance), but here the meaning is less straightforward:

γράμματα μὲν τὸν παῖδα γέρων Λίνος ἐξεδίδαξεν,
υἱὸς Ἀπόλλωνος μελεδωνεύς ἄγρυπνος ἦρως.

(Theoc. 24.105-106)

Whatever the difficulties with γράμματα,⁷³ the Callimachean sense is clearly intended here; Linus, in his role as teacher, qualifies, just as Aratus did: "The epithet ἄγρυπνος indicates the labored polish demanded of the new poets of Alexandria, a title of distinction."⁷⁴ From this point, the concept is fixed with the new, poetic significance bestowed on it by Callimachus.

As with the previous study, we should now examine the Roman synthesis. We can begin with the well-known adaptation of the neoteric poet, C. Helvius Cinna:

haec tibi Arateis multum invigilata lucernis
carmina, quis ignes novimus aetherios.

(Cinna, fr. 11.1-2 Morel)

We noted above that ἄγρυπνία and λύχνος appeared together in epigram as conventional components of erotic imagery. Not so in Callimachus' epigram on Aratus, however. Cinna, in drawing from that epigram,

⁷² Although most of the instances in epigram are later, Callimachus must have been familiar with the erotic significance as found in New Comedy and inherited by the epigrammatists. The only other example of the word in the corpus of Callimachus is quite conventional (*Pannychis* fr. 227.5 Pf.).

⁷³ See Gow (on Theoc. 24.105) for the observation that γράμματα is unusual in that traditionally Heracles received no such education from Linus; rather, he was the hero's music teacher. Cf. also Ross, *Backgrounds* 22.

⁷⁴ Ross, *Backgrounds* 22.

clearly intended *invigilata* to have the same poetic significance as Callimachus' σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης. It may be significant that Cinna has introduced lamps (*lucernis*), which are so prominent in Greek epigram in the context of amatory ἀγρυπνία.⁷⁵ But the most important point about Cinna's lines is that they represent the first direct reference by a Roman poet to the striking metaphor of Callimachus.

With Catullus 50, we have a new development. More than any other of his poems it contains the language of neoteric poetic preference (for example, *otiosi*, *lusimus*, *delicatos*, *versiculos*, *lepore*, *facetiisque*, *iucunde*).⁷⁶ After recapturing the *ludus poeticus* of the previous evening, Catullus tells Calvus of his experience on departing:

atque illinc abii tuo lepore
incensus, Licini, facetiisque,
ut nec me miserum cibus iuaret
10 nec sompnus tegeret quiete ocellos,
sed toto indomitus furore lecto
versarer, cupiens videre lucem,
ut tecum loquerer simulque ut essem.
at defessa labore membra postquam
15 semimortua lectulo iacebant,
hoc, iucunde, tibi poema feci,
ex quo perspiceres meum dolorem.

(Cat. 50.7-17)

In general terms, little need be said of this poem, "which equates the writing of this [i.e., neoteric] poetry with the sensations and mental state of being in love."⁷⁷ Each of the symptoms is conventional for an

⁷⁵ This point can only be on the level of suggestion, since some mention of lamps would not be out of place in the context of literary wakefulness.

⁷⁶ The significance of such vocabulary, and the importance of this poem, can now be taken for granted; see H. Wagenvoort, "Ludus Poeticus," *Les Études Classiques* 4 (1935) 108 (for an English version, see *Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion* [Leiden 1956] 30); Ross, *Style and Tradition* 104-112; specifically on poem 50, see P. Pucci, "Il Carme cinquanta di Catullo," *Maia* 13 (1961) 249-256; more recently: V. Buchheit, "Catull c. 50 als Programm und Bekenntnis," *RhM* 119 (1976) 162-180.

⁷⁷ Ross, *Backgrounds* 9; generally, see W. Kroll (above, n.15) *ad* 50.8. The point is quite simply that the poet takes a delight in blending the two motifs, although some would see in this poem either parody (C. W. Macleod, "Parody and Personalities in Catullus," *CQ* n.s. 23 [1973] 294), or indications of "a strong intellectual, rather than erotic, friendship" (W. C. Scott, "Catullus and Calvus [Cat. 50]," *CP* 64 [1969] 171) — although, of course, this element is present.

erotic context, but we need only be concerned with Catullus' inability to sleep (ll. 10–17), the theme which is developed to the virtual exclusion of the others — lack of appetite and the image of the inflamed lover receive a perfunctory line each.

Catullus, then, relates his *ἀγρυπνία* in precisely the terms applied in New Comedy and epigram to the frustrated lover. In particular, just as the successful lover prays for the postponement of dawn (*Anth. Pal.* 5.137, 5.172, 5.223, 5.283), so the unrequited lover, absent from the object of his desire (Catullus here, *cupiens videre lucem*, l. 12), prays for its arrival (*Anth. Pal.* 12.72). This motif is best expressed, again by Meleager, in a poem where both elements are present:

Ὅρθρε, τί νῦν, δυσέραστε, βραδὺς περὶ κόσμον ἐλίσσῃ,
 ἄλλος ἐπεὶ Δήμοῦς θάλπῃθ' ὑπὸ χλαϊδί;
 ἀλλ' ὅτε τὰν ῥαδινὰν κόλποις ἔχον, ὥκὺς ἐπέσσης,
 ὡς βάλλων ἐπ' ἐμοὶ φῶς ἐπιχαιρέκακον.
 (*Anth. Pal.* 5.173)

When Demo lies with the poet's rival, dawn comes slowly, swiftly when with him.⁷⁸ Catullus also tosses half-dead on his bed (*membra . . . semimortua*, l. 15), a motif which is also conventional, and may in fact be indebted to an amatory epigram of Callimachus:

ἡμισὺ μὲν ψυχῆς ἔτι τὸ πνέον, ἡμισυ δ' οὐκ οἶδ'
 εἴτ' Ἔρος εἴτ' Αἰδὼς ἥρπασε, πλὴν ἀφανές.
 (*Epigr.* 41.1–2)⁷⁹

Why the emphasis on *ἀγρυπνία* in Catullus 50? The conclusion cannot be avoided: in a way much more harmonious than Cinna, Catullus has effected a combination of the two separate metaphors expressed by this word. On the one hand he has stated his suffering precisely in the terms of erotic *ἀγρυπνία*. At the same time, however, the cause of this wakefulness is no lover, but rather the verse of his friend and poetic contemporary, Calvus (*tuo lepore . . . facetisque*, ll. 7–8). Where Aratus' *σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης* referred to the poet's own sleeplessness⁸⁰ — the condition of *writing* carefully crafted poetry — for Catullus this *ἀγρυπνία* is the effect such poetry has upon the receptive audience. But the picture

⁷⁸ The preceding poem (*Anth. Pal.* 5.172) deals with the same theme, although the mythological *aition* of Zeus and Alcmene replaces the personal setting of 5.173.

⁷⁹ On the feeble attempt of Q. Lutatius Catulus to adapt this epigram (p. 43 Morel), see Ross, *Style and Tradition* 144–151.

⁸⁰ This is made explicit by Cinna: *multum invigilata lucernis* (p. 89 Morel).

is not quite as simple, for Poem 50 is itself the *σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίας* of Catullus:

at defessa labore membra postquam
semimortua lectulo iacebant,
hoc, iucunde, tibi poema feci,
ex quo perspiceres meum dolorem.

(ll. 14-17)

An imperfect following *postquam* often implies causality, rather than mere temporal sequence;⁸¹ the poem is thus the product of Catullus' *ἀγρυπνία*.

Catullus' wakefulness is, then, the pivot of the poem; it is initiated by Calvus' poetry — a mark of the excellence of that poetry — and it provides in addition the incentive for his own most heavily programmatic poem. Poetic acknowledgment and programme go hand in hand. Behind all this is the consummate fusion of the previously separate metaphors with which we have been concerned.

Finally we may consider Propertius:

O iucunda quies, primo cum testis amori
affueram vestris conscius in lacrimis!
o noctem meminisse mihi iucunda voluptas,
o quotiens votis illa vocanda meis,
5 cum te complexa morientem, Galle, puella
vidimus et longa ducere verba mora!
quamvis labentis premeret mihi somnus ocellos
et mediis caelo Luna ruberet equis,
non tamen a vestro potui secedere lusu:
10 tantus in alternis vocibus ardor erat.

(Prop. 1.10.1-10)

With distinctions, the situation has affinities with other amatory settings I have referred to: the poet tells us that it is night-time, the moon is there, and most important, he is sleepless (7-10). To paraphrase, according to the predominant critical opinion⁸² that this poem (together with 1.5 and 1.13) is addressed to a Gallus other than the poet Cornelius: "How wonderful it was, what a delight to bring back to mind the night I played the voyeur, Gallus, as you and your girl were making love."

⁸¹ Cf. C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus: A Commentary* (Oxford 1961) *ad loc.*, "when the verb indicates not an event but a state of things." See Kühner-Stegmann, 2.356.

⁸² So Rothstein, Enk, Butler and Barber, Camps, A. Schmeisser (*A Concordance to the Elegies of Propertius* [Hildesheim 1972] s.v. *Gallus* — she admits not even the Gallus of 1.20), M. Hubbard (*Propertius* [New York 1975] 25).

Ridiculous on this level alone;⁸³ from the rest of the *Monobiblos* we expect something more subtle of Propertius.

What if, following some scholars,⁸⁴ we see the poet Gallus as the addressee of 1.10? "Can it refer, on one level, to experiments in amatory elegy Gallus may recently have been writing, experiments 'predicted' by Propertius in 1.5? The first ten lines, in fact, are reminiscent of Catullus' evening of poetic experimentation with Calvus in poem 50."⁸⁵ This is, I think, certainly the case; the only way to make satisfactory sense of the poem (particularly in light of what must be deliberate reminiscence of Catullus 50) is to see it as a reference to the poetry of Gallus.

If this is so, we can look specifically at the effect this "observation" of Gallus and his *puella* has upon Propertius:

quamvis labentis premeret mihi somnus ocellos
et mediis caelo Luna ruberet equis,
non tamen a vestro potui secedere lusu:
tantus in alternis vocibus ardor erat.

(ll. 7-10)

Again *ἀγρυπνία*, and again the blending of the poetic and the amatory

⁸³ This is indicated, I think, by the embarrassed silence of those who see the poem only in these terms. Enk has three lines of summary (the shortest for any poem in the *Monobiblos*), and paraphrases, rather preposterously, *Propertius, qui Gallo amico suo permittente eius amoribus testis adfuit, gratias agens . . .* (*ad loc.*); Butler and Barber have four; Camps makes the puzzling and incorrect claim that the situation is similar "to that of Catullus XLV, in which the poet is witness of a friend's amour" (*ad loc.*).

⁸⁴ Chiefly L. Alfonsi ("L'Elegia di Gallo," *Riv. di Fil. N.S.* 21 [1943] 54) and Ross (*Backgrounds* 82-84; 102). Only one argument against this can be considered: the assignation of *nobilitas* and *priscae imagines* (1.5.23-24) to Gallus, who is of equestrian status (incidentally, there is no attested noble bearing the name); Alfonsi's claim that this can be seen as rhetorical exaggeration, based on Gallus' actual importance (p. 54) seems perfectly acceptable. If, as seems to be the case, Horace was able to inject royal blood into the veins of Maecenas (*Odes* 1.1.1; thence it becomes a poetic topos; *Odes* 3.29.1; Prop. 3.9.1; Martial 12.3.2. Neither epigraphical evidence nor the only help we can get outside poetry, *equestri sed splendido* [not *regio*] *genere natus* [Velleius 2.88.2], supports this view), then we should allow Propertius to make a *nobilis* of Gallus, if this permits him to make more forcefully the point of love's unconquerable power. For the claim that the couplet in Propertius may be a reference to a passage of Gallus' poetry, see H. Tränkle, *Die Sprachkunst des Properz und die Tradition der lateinischen Dichtersprache*, Hermes Einzelschriften 15 (1960) 23; Ross, *Backgrounds* 83, 95 n.3.

⁸⁵ Ross, *Backgrounds* 83.

metaphor, just as we observed it in Poem 50 of Catullus.⁸⁶ We should see the passage on both levels, and realize the appropriateness of the metaphor to both. Propertius has taken the additional step, moreover, of imposing this fusion of the two metaphors upon his broad elegiac theme.

For the motif we have traced, then, Propertius 1.10 is a highly significant poem. The amatory poetry of Gallus (whatever its nature) is credited with inducing ἀγρυπνία; inasmuch as it is the "correct" type of poetry, it causes in Propertius the same wakefulness which Catullus, drawing from the amatory tradition as well as from Callimachus' epigram to Aratus, had associated with the neoteric verse of Calvus. At this point the metaphor can be seen to constitute a means of exclusive acknowledgment between contemporary writers of Alexandrian, neoteric, and Augustan verse:

Callim. <i>Epigr.</i> 27	Callimachus of Aratus
Catullus 50	Catullus of Calvus
Propertius 1.10	Propertius of Gallus

Purely in the Roman context, it is by no accident that Propertius' poetic catalogue at the end of Book II closes with the following four poets:

haec quoque lascivi cantarunt scripta *Catulli*,
 Lesbia quis ipsa notior est Helena;
 haec etiam docti confessa est pagina *Calvi*,
 cum caneret miserae funera *Quintiliae*.
 et modo formosa quam multa *Lycoride Gallus*
 mortuus inferna vulnere lavit aqua!
 Cynthia quin etiam versu laudata *Properti* —
 hos inter si me ponere Fama volet.
 (Prop. 2.34.87-94)⁸⁷

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⁸⁶ There is an interesting similarity between these lines and *Aen.* 4.80-83, where Virgil describes the ἀγρυπνία of the love-struck Dido:

post ubi digressi, lumenque obscura vicissim
 luna premit suadentque cadentia sidera somnos,
 sola domo maeret vacua stratisque relictis
 incubat.

⁸⁷ While this volume was in production, two developments occurred:

On p. 199: P. Berol. 21243 has now been published (Wm. Brashear, "Ein Berliner Zauberpapyrus," *ZPE* 33 [1979] 261-278); the text remains as in the preliminary transcription.

On pp. 183–184: p. 197, I saw the text of the new fragments of the *Misoumenos* prologue (above, n. 23) at the last minute. In that they contain two new instances of the verb *περιπατεῖν*, the preceding argument is only supported. The first instance (A17) has been included in my text. The second (O19 fr. C, 1. 6), which remains unplaced, seems to be the same in nature as the example at *Mis.* fr. 9 Koerte (= *Mis.* A21). See Turner (above, n. 23) 330–331.

At p. 197 I suggested that the term *ἀγρυπνία* may have occurred in the prologue; so far this is still not the case, but a close synonym, the adverb *ἐγρη[γ]ορώς*, does now appear (A22). Its precise function here is not fully clear, but it is in the vicinity of reference to Thrasonides' sleeplessness.

CALLIMACHUS EPIGRAM 28: A FASTIDIOUS PRIAMEL

ALBERT HENRICHs

ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθω
χαίρω τὶς πολλοὺς ὦδε καὶ ὦδε φέρει·
μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης
πίνω· σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.
Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλὸς καλός· ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν
τοῦτο σαφῶς ἤχῳ φησί τις "ἄλλος ἔχει."

TIME and again these clever and poignant lines have suffered because their critics failed to consider the formal models which inspired them. The alleged structural difficulties disappear, and the poem's artistic form and thematic unity emerge, once we realize that Callimachus adopted the literary device of the so-called priamel for the overall structure of his emphatic declaration of dislike.

A priamel ("introduction") is "the figure in which a series of three (occasionally more) paratactic statements of similar form serves to emphasize the last."¹ In the case of love poetry, which alone interests us here, a statement describing other people's preferences in catalogue form (A) introduces the poet's own preference, love (B). It is not uncommon for an erotic priamel to proceed from the particular ("Some like honey") to the general ("Others like anything sweet"), or vice versa (from "Love is sweetest" to "I speak from experience").

An early example will illustrate this convention. In one of the finest priamels ever written, Sappho (fr. 16 L-P) asks the question, "What is best (κάλλιστον)?" In her answer, other men's specific preferences (A: some like the cavalry, others the infantry, still others the navy) are followed by a general description of her own preference (B: ἔγω δὲ κῆν' ὅττω τις ἔραται). After two stanzas which dwell on the mythical exemplum of Helen's love, Sappho restates her personal desire in more specific terms, and with explicit mention of the name of her beloved:

¹ M. L. West on Hesiod *Erga* 435-436. There are two useful collections of priamel texts: W. Kröhling, *Die Priamel (Beispielreihung) als Stilmittel in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung*, Greifswalder Beiträge 10 (1935); U. Schmid, *Die Priamel der Werte im Griechischen von Homer bis Paulus* (Wiesbaden 1964).

(B) I miss Anaktoria, who is lovable and pretty, and prefer her to (A) the splendor of the whole Lydian army. The ring has closed.

Between the archaic period and the Hellenistic era, the priamel lost much of its original vigor. More often than not, formal elaboration conceals poverty of content. But some Hellenistic examples are more attractive than others. Asclepiades' priamel (*A.P.* 5.169), for instance, is a pleasant variation of a traditional gnomic riddle, *τί τὸ ἡδιστον*?²

ἡδὺ θέρους διψῶντι χιῶν ποτόν, ἡδὺ δὲ ναύταις
 ἐκ χειμῶνος ἰδεῖν εἰαρινὸν Στέφανον·
 ἡδίων δ' ὅποταν κρύψῃ μία τοὺς φιλέοντας
 χλαῖνα, καὶ αἰνῆται Κύπρις ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων.

Again, two specific preferences which the poet does not share (A) are put in contrast with what he considers the ultimate pleasure (B).³ Finally, Propertius managed to turn a thematically plain but carefully wrought priamel into a literary manifesto (2.1.43-6):

navita de ventis, de tauris narrat arator,
 enumerat miles vulnera, pastor ovis;
 nos contra angusto versantes proelia lecto:
 qua pote quisque, in ea conterat arte diem.

Comparison with Asclepiades (one of Callimachus' targets, and inspirations) and Propertius (the Roman Callimachus), both perfectly good poets, shows how accomplished is the balance of traditional form and thematic innovation in *Epigram* 28. In fact Callimachus' use of the priamel is so subtle that he has outwitted his modern critics, who apparently have not recognized it.⁴ What then makes Callimachus' priamel so different?

In point of phrasing, his question was not: what do I like best? Rather, with an ironic twist typical of him, he frustrates our expectations by asking: which thing is worst? As long as we keep this fundamental difference in mind, the pattern of the priamel is unmistakable, and driven

² See M. L. West's references on *Theogn.* 255-256 (so-called *Epigramma Deliacum*); M. Gronewald, *ZPE* 19 (1975) 178 f.

³ On *A.P.* 5.169 see Ed. Fraenkel, *Agamemnon* II 407 f (on *Ag.* 899-902); Gow and Page *ad loc.* Nossis *A.P.* 5.170, the epigram which follows in the Palatine Anthology, is similar (*Ein gleiches*, in Beckby's edition).

⁴ No treatment of *Epigr.* 28 that I am familiar with recognizes it as a priamel (see most recently P. Krafft, *Rhein. Mus.* 120 [1977] 1-29). On the other hand, W. Kröhling (above, n.1) 18 catalogs its first couplet as an incomplete priamel but does not consider the rest of the poem.

home in a climactic series of verbs which underscore the poet's dislike, culminating in the painfully unpoetic and vulgar *σικχαίνω*.⁵

- A, specific { I dislike (ἐχθαίρω) "cyclic" (bad) epic poetry
 I dislike (οὐδὲ . . . χαίρω) the trodden path
 I dislike (μισέω) the male prostitute⁶
 I dislike (οὐδὲ . . . πίνω) the public well
- A, general I dislike (σικχαίνω) "pleasures shared by the mob"⁷
- B, specific But I do like Lysanias,⁸ however, . . .

Callimachus did not invent the negative priamel.⁹ It had plenty of precedent, for example in the *Odyssey* (14.222 ff), in Tyrtaeus (12 West), and especially in Archilochus fr. 114 West (cf. fr. 19),

οὐ φιλέω μέγαν στρατηγὸν οὐδὲ διαπεπλιγμένον
 οὐδὲ βοστρύχοισι γαῦρον οὐδ' ὑπεξυρημένον,
 ἀλλὰ μοι μικρὸς τις εἴη . . .

But the exact model which inspired Callimachus' diction in *Epigram* 28. 3-4 has fortunately survived in the corpus of extant Theognidea, and the two couplets in question (579-582 West) are clearly an excerpt from

⁵ *Σικχαίνειν* (or usually the middle) is one's reaction to something that makes him sick. The expression was a favorite of Hellenistic prose writers (Phrynichus *Ecl.* 198 Fischer condemns it, advising instead ἀλλ' ἐρεῖς βδελύττομαι ὡς Ἀθηναῖος) and enjoyed a very long life in Egypt as is illustrated by its occurrence in the Cologne Mani Codex and its survival as a Greek loanword in Coptic texts (A. Henrichs and L. Koenen, *ZPE* 32 [1978] 142 n.200).

⁶ "Gassenhure," as Wilamowitz put it (below, n.19). In deviation from the accepted interpretation, R. Thomas suggests taking *περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον* as the "peripatetic lover" of New Comedy, with the stereotype character substituting for the genre (this volume). But both the *γυναικα περίδρομον* of *Theogn.* 581 (see below) and common usage tell against his suggestion. In a homosexual context, *ὁ ἐρώμενος* is certain to equal *ὁ παῖς*, as it is in the only other occurrence of that participle in the notorious Book XII of the Palatine Anthology (Straton *A.P.* 12.10.3 οὐδ' οὕτω φεύγω τὸν ἐρώμενον). Compare the striking coinage *ἐρωμένιον*, "darling" (Antiphanes *A.P.* 11.168.4). *Ἐρώμενος* is clearly a technical and prosaic term, and Hellenistic poets elsewhere preferred the less explicit *ἡίθεος* (e.g., Callim. *Hymn.* 2.49, fr. 23.4, fr. 500; Theocr. 12.21; and numerous instances in Book XII of the Anthology), or occasionally Spartan vocabulary (Callim. fr. 68; Theocr. 12.13 f). By contrast, a lesser poet could invoke Dionysus as τὸν ἐρώμενον *Κυθήρης*, "Aphrodite's favorite" (*Anacreontea* 38.6 Preisendanz).

⁷ So Gow and Page.

⁸ For *σὺ εἰ καλὸς καλός* being tantamount to *ἐρῶ σου* see G. Giangrande, *Eranos* 67 (1969) 35 n.10; Krafft (above, n.4) 13 f nn.42-43.

⁹ "Negationsanapher" is Schmid's term (above, n.1).

a fuller priamel:¹⁰

ἐχθαίρω κακὸν ἄνδρα, καλυψαμένη δὲ πάρεμι,
 σμικρῆς ὄρνιθος κοῦφον ἔχοντα νόον·
 ἐχθαίρω δὲ γυναῖκα περιδρομον, ἄνδρά τε μάργον,
 ὃς τὴν ἀλλοτρίην βούλετ' ἄρουραν ἀροῦν.

The speaker, a virtuous matron,¹¹ rejects men and women who have sexual preferences different from her own. In adapting this piece of gnomic writing to a homosexual situation, Callimachus had to substitute a promiscuous boy for the promiscuous female of his model.¹² The poet will have been encouraged by two other couplets in the same collection, which reject a fickle παῖς who went his own way (Theogn. 599–602 West):¹³

οὐ μ' ἔλαθες φοιτῶν κατ' ἀμαξιτόν, ἦν ἄρα καὶ πρὶν
 ἡλᾶστρεϊς, κλέπτων ἡμετέρην φιλίην.
 ἔρρε θεοῖσιν <τ'> ἐχθρὸ καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἄπιστε,
 ψυχρὸν ὃς ἐν κόλπῳ ποικίλον εἶχες ὄφιν.

Not only does the trodden path which Callimachus dislikes come straight from "Theognis," but so does the sullied well, which has often been compared to Theognis 959–962:

ἔστε μὲν αὐτὸς ἔπινον ἀπὸ κρήνης μελανύδρου,
 ἡδύ τί μοι ἐδόκει καὶ καλὸν ἦμεν ὕδωρ·
 νῦν δ' ἤδη τεθόλωται, ὕδωρ δ' ἀναμίσγεται ὕδει·
 ἄλλης δὲ κρήνης πίομαι ἢ ποταμοῦ.

Diction, theme, and even the metaphors of *Epigram* 28.1–4 are all traditional. But their combined effect is unique. In most priamels, the values which the poet rejects are unrelated to his own preference which they serve to emphasize: neither their nature nor the order in which

¹⁰ On Callimachus' use of Theognidea see R. Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolion* (1893) 69 f, who saw the connection of *Epigram* 28 with Theogn. 579 ff and 959 ff but not 599 ff.

¹¹ More specific identifications, such as a goddess or poetess, have been suggested; see M. L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus* (1974) 156.

¹² Compare Theocr. *Id.* 7.120–121. The same words with which Archilochus berates the faded beauty of Neoboule (S 478a 26 ff in Page, *Suppl. Lyr. Gr.*) are put by Theocritus into the mouth of women who taunt an ἐρώμενος for being past his prime.

¹³ Commentators on Callim. *Epigr.* 28 seem to be unaware of *Theogn.* 599 ff, or 1311–18. The anonymous couplet *A.P.* 12.104 (οὐμός ἔρως παρ' ἐμοὶ μενέτω μόνῳ· ἦν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλους / φοιτήση, μισῶ κοινὸν ἔρωτα, Κύπρι) appears to be inspired by Callim. *Epigr.* 28 and illustrates the meaning of περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος (see above, n.6); cf. O. Weinreich, *Die Distichen des Catull* (Tübingen 1926) 62.

they occur seem to matter much.¹⁴ Take the plain erotic priamel in Theocritus, *Idyll* 8.53–56:

μή μοι γὰν Πέλοπος, μή μοι Κροίσεια τάλαντα
εἴη ἔχειν, μηδὲ πρόσθε θέειν ἀνέμων·
ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῷ πέτρᾳ τᾷδ' ἄσομαι ἀγκὰς ἔχων τυ,
σύννομα μῆλ' ἐσορῶν Σικελικὰν τ' ἐς ἄλλα.

The land of Pelops, the wealth of Croesus, and the swiftness of the winds are all proverbial, but they are of a completely different nature than the cherished presence of fair Milon. Hellenistic poets in general show little concern for such thematic inconsistencies. Not so Sappho, or for that matter Callimachus in *Epigram* 28. Metrically and stylistically, the second couplet repeats the pattern of the first.¹⁵ The symmetry is apparent both to the eye and to the ear. If this is a valid index, it follows that Callimachus arranged the four pursuits from which he dissociates himself in a much more deliberate order than other poets. But it would be wrong to force a close thematic relationship upon the ποίημα κυκλικόν and the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος on the one hand or the trodden path and public well on the other hand. Scholars who complained that the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος should be mentioned “at the end of the list, not sandwiched between the highway and the common drinking place” would hardly have expected such rigorous logic from Callimachus if they had read the whole epigram as a full-fledged priamel.¹⁶ The poet proceeded by association. Thematically, all four items in his catalogue participate in the same defect, to wit lack of exclusiveness. Poetry in the tradition of the epic cycle touches on too many subjects, just as a busy road, a promiscuous lover, and the parish pump serve too many needs.¹⁷

¹⁴ Rightly emphasized by Schmid (above, n.1) 49, who compares Theocr. *Id.* 8.53 ff with Callim. fr. 75.44 ff (another erotic priamel of high sophistication).

¹⁵ Repetition and parallelism, which characterize *Epigr.* 28.1–4, are also the hallmark of the priamel.

¹⁶ The quotation is from Gow and Page *ad loc.*, who refer for their complaint to Fraenkel, *Agamemnon* II 407 n.3, a brief description of the serial style typical of the priamel (see above, n.3). But they obscure the connection with *Theogn.* 579 ff by quoting 581 γυναικα περιδρομον without ἐχθαίρω (579, 581). A similar complaint, and equally mistaken, is that of L. P. Wilkinson, *Class. Rev.* 81 (1967) 6: “We should logically expect Lysanias to be praised (prematurely) for not being περίφοιτος rather than for his beauty.”

¹⁷ The κυκλικοί (according to Aristotle, early but inferior imitators of Homer as the poet of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*) were held in utter disdain by Hellenistic literary theory as well as by Aristarchus and his school; their style and subject matter were considered repetitious, trite, and lacking in focus. See R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* I (1968) 73 f, 137, and 230; C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: The “Ars Poetica”* (1971) 210 ff on *A.P.* 132 and 136 (where Horace adopts the critical terminology and metaphors of Callimachus; cf. R. Thomas, this volume).

There is no doubt in my mind that in writing this epigram Callimachus wrote his personal credo, which is that of an extremely self-conscious man who cultivated his privacy and exclusive taste.

"We cannot fail to see that the final couplet is irrelevant to the previous statements made by Callimachus."¹⁸ So a recent critic. Several other scholars have gone so far as to excise the concluding couplet for similar reasons. But to remove lines 5-6 is to undo Callimachus' craftsmanship, and to turn a deaf ear to his wit. In his extremely sensitive analysis of this epigram, Wilamowitz pointed out that the unexpected turn of events in the last couplet is the quintessential property of a Callimachean epigram.¹⁹ But we can now go further than he could. If the first two couplets are a priamel which lists things liked by the mob but hated by Callimachus, the third couplet, separated by the antithetical δέ which introduces the poet's own preference, is the natural sequel. But Callimachus would not be Callimachus, and the epigram not an epigram, if the poem ended here. He never intended to write a conventional declaration of love along the lines of Sappho. As it turns out, and as the poet has known all along, Lysanias is already taken. This circumstance not only puts him definitely out of Callimachus' reach, but also takes him off the poet's mind for good. True to his own declaration, Callimachus will not share anything. Lysanias is rejected. Almost unnoticeably, the traditional priamel, together with its inherited function, has been turned on its head. In the end, the negative priamel does not culminate, as it should, in a statement of what Callimachus likes best but — and this is his triumph both over Lysanias and over his readers — of what he hates most. A perfect synthesis of expectations raised by the priamel and of the same hopes destroyed in the final epigrammatic blow.²⁰

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¹⁸ Giangrande (above, n.8) 34, who did not remove the last couplet but chose to rewrite it.

¹⁹ *Homerische Untersuchungen*. Philologische Untersuchungen 7 (Berlin 1884) 354 n.36. Cf. *Hellenistische Dichtung* I 178, II 129.

²⁰ In deference to earlier interpreters, it must be said that their combined wisdom adds up to a reading of the epigram which is not essentially different from mine. But if some of them understood the poem's literary form, they did so instinctively, not consciously. In particular Krafft (above, n.4) 20-22 gives an admirable analysis of the stylistic features which identify lines 1-4 as the introduction of a priamel, but he clearly did not realize that the epigram, including lines 5-6, is a priamel.

I am grateful to Professors Wendell Clausen and Richard Thomas for their advice.

ATHENS IN 100 B.C.

S. V. TRACY

For Sterling Dow

THIS study¹ draws primarily on the evidence of one inscription, *IG II*² 2336, which Dow republished in 1940.² Dow's edition remains today the standard text; my study in preparation of a complete new edition of this inscription has suggested the possibility of some new information on Athens as it was in the years just around 100 B.C.³

I

One of the most significant events for Athens in the second century B.C. was the acquisition of Delos in the political aftermath of the third Macedonian War in 167/6 B.C. The island became a cleruchy of Athens and was declared a free port. This of course happened as a consequence of actions taken by the Roman Senate. Delos grew rapidly in importance and, following the destruction of Corinth in 146 B.C. and the organization of the province of Asia after 133 B.C., it became the undisputed center of trade in the entire Aegean area. The Athenians who inhabited the island and governed it thus faced increasingly weighty responsibilities and opportunities. In particular, as Delos grew in commercial importance, a large, non-Athenian, transient, and commercially powerful community grew up on the island. The Italian part of that community was among the largest and the most influential.⁴ It does not

¹ This article was originally delivered at the annual meeting of the Association of Ancient Historians held in Ottawa on May 13-14, 1977. I am most grateful to Professor E. Badian, chairman of the Ottawa session, for his incisive comments. I also wish to express my thanks to Professors S. Dow, A. G. Woodhead, J. Allison, J. M. Balcer, and D. K. Clift, each of whom offered helpful comments during the preparation of this study.

² *HSCP* 51 (1940) 111-124; all line references in this article are to this text.

³ For an illuminating account of the political situation in Athens at the inception of the first Mithradatic War, see E. Badian, "Rome, Athens, and Mithridates," *AJAH* 1 (1976) 105-128.

⁴ Cf. W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (London 1911) 346-414; P. Roussel, *Délos colonie athénienne* (Paris 1916) 33-96; J. Hatzfeld, *Les trafiquants italiens dans l'orient hellénique* (Paris 1919) 30-37; W. A. Laidlaw, *A History of Delos*

require much imagination to contemplate the problems of jurisdiction and the need for firm, effective policies governing trade on the island.

In the first few years after the Athenian assumption of control, there occurred a dispute between a certain Demetrios of Rhenea, head of the Sarapeion on Delos, and the Athenian officials governing the island. The details are obscure but the outcome is clear thanks to the discovery of an inscription, *Inscriptions de Délos* 1510.⁵ Apparently the Athenians moved to close Demetrios' shrine; he appealed, going to Rome himself to present his case before the Senate which acted in his favor. He returned to Athens with a copy of the favorable *Senatus Consultum*, where there ensued protracted discussion in the Boule, followed by the issuance of a terse letter from the Athenian generals to Charmides, Epimeletes of Delos. I translate the first fourteen lines of this inscription: "The generals to Charmides, Epimeletes of Delos, greetings. There having been extensive discussion in the Boule concerning the *Senatus Consultum de Sarapeo* which Demetrios of Rhenea brought from Rome, it has seemed the wisest policy (1) not to prevent him from opening and serving his shrine as he has in the past; (2) to write you about our decision for your information. A copy of the *Senatus Consultum* which he brought with him is appended."

This is clearly not the language of a decree of the Athenian people. No such decree was ever passed, the reason being that it was not within the competence of the Athenian Boule and assembly to pass on *Senatus Consulta*. So, after much discussion in the Boule, the generals asserted reality with their laconic letter to the governor. If nothing else, this document makes it clear that the Athenian acquisition of Delos had come on one condition at least, namely the recognition of the ultimate authority of the acts of the Roman Senate with regard to Delos, though it is difficult to imagine that in practice it stopped there. In the two generations which followed, the Athenians clearly recognized the authority of Rome and worked successfully within it, achieving, through their effective administration of the island, a high degree of prosperity and a renewed prominence for themselves and their city.⁶ With this as background, let us turn our attention to Athens around 100 B.C. to discern, if possible, the effect which this prolonged dependence on Rome,

(Oxford 1933) 201-231 and M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1953) 786-799.

⁵ Number 5 in R. K. Sherck, *Roman Documents from the Greek East* (Baltimore 1969) 37-39.

⁶ For an assessment of the economic situation, see J. Day, *An Economic History of Athens under Roman Domination* (New York 1942) 50-119.

coupled with the administration of the growing commerce on the island, exercised on Athens and her institutions.

II

The most important document of Athens for the years around 100 B.C. is *IG II*² 2336, a list of contributors of ἀπαρχαί for the Pythais. This inscription preserves a record for seven consecutive years from 103/2 to 97/6 B.C. of the principal annual officials of Athens. In addition to the nine traditional Archons, it lists the Hoplite General, the Herald of the Areopagos, the General ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, the General ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευήν, the Epimeletes of the Harbor in Piraeus, the Athenians chosen to administer Delos, plus the Delian priests — thirty-one officials potentially for each year, if all had been inscribed. We have no such extensive list for any other comparable period in the entire history of Athens. *IG II*² 2336 is, thus, a uniquely valuable document.

Fifty-eight fragments of the stele survive, enough to enable it to be reconstructed. The text too is preserved in large measure and, where there are *lacunae*, their limits can now be determined with exactitude. The contributions of one hundred seventy-three officials were originally inscribed; of this total, the names of one hundred forty-two are preserved or can be restored. And in all, the names of one hundred twenty separate individuals are preserved well enough to permit study.

Study of the offices and the incumbents listed on *IG II*² 2336 provides an interesting picture of Athenian government around 100 B.C. There are several striking facts. The prominence of Delian offices is at once apparent. Of the thirty-one normally to be listed, there are eight priests (all Delian), nine officials who administer the island, and fourteen who administer the city and Piraeus. The language of the preamble designates these officials as archons, that is, annual officials of the Athenians who were either elected or chosen by lot. These are not all such officials (we know, for example, of other generals and priests in this period),⁷ but they do appear to be the most important ones. While the nature of the list, contributions to Pythian Apollo for the Pythais, may explain the listing of some of the Delian officials, the appearance of so many provides strong evidence of the importance which Delos had assumed in Athenian affairs by 100 B.C. The Athenian officials who administered Lemnos and Imbros did not enjoy the same status.⁸

⁷ Cf., for example, *IG II*² 2869, 2872, 4701.

⁸ See *Hesperia* 36 (1967) 89 for the existence around 100 B.C. of a στρατηγός ἐπὶ Ἰμβρον and *IG XII* 8 no. 26 for the στρατηγός ἐπὶ Λήμνον.

Another notable fact — the nine traditional archonships are regularly held in the years 103/2–97/6 by persons who are otherwise largely unattested and who, as a result, appear to be relatively insignificant political personalities. Indeed, the names of fifty incumbents are known from the inscription, but thirty-one are completely unattested elsewhere. And those who are attested (with the notable exception of Medeios of the Piraeus) held only relatively minor posts, such as the generalship in charge of Piraeus, a mint magistracy, or a priesthood.⁹ In a period as rich prosopographically as this one is,¹⁰ this is significant and suggests that the nine traditional Athenian archonships were not at this time offices of the first political importance — rungs on the way up, yes, but not the final goal of the politically powerful and ambitious.¹¹ By contrast, certain offices do emerge as the most important ones. This list of subscribers is organized on a principle of precedence.¹² In each of the first three years, the list is arranged roughly in three groups: officials who administer the city come first (for example, in year I, ll. 6–24), followed by those who administer Delos (ll. 25–34) and the priests appear last (ll. 35–45).¹³ The most important official in each group tends to be listed just at the head of the group. Thus, the Hoplite

⁹ For example, Argeios of Trikorinthos, archon in 98/7 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 194), served as General ἐνὶ τὸν Πειραιᾷ ca. 100 B.C. (*IG* II² 2872, 2952); Kallimakhos of Leukonoion, basileus in 100/99 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 155), was probably the mint magistrate of that name in 93/2 (for the date, cf. D. M. Lewis, *Num. Chron.* 7th Series 2, 1962, 277); Aristion of Melite, Polemarch in 98/7 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 196), is attested as Priest of Sarapis on Delos in 114/3 (*ID* 2208), and Aristonymos of Eleusis, Thesmothetes in 102/1 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 55), was General ἐνὶ τὸν Πειραιᾷ ca. 100 B.C. (*Hesperia* 36, 1967, 88, l. 39).

¹⁰ The complete records of the Pythaiads of 106/5 and 98/7 survive (cf. *FD* III 2 nos. 3–48; on the texts of 98/7, see also *Hesperia* suppl. 15 48–68 and, on those of 106/5, see *BCH* 99 [1975] 195–218); they memorialize respectively the names of about five hundred and three hundred participants. Also from Athens come well preserved lists of ephebes for 128/7 (*Hesperia* 24, 1955, 220–239), 123/2 (*IG* II² 1006), 119/8 (*IG* II² 1008), 117/6 (*IG* II² 1009), 107/6 (*IG* II² 1011), and 102/1 (*IG* II² 1028 = *Hesperia* suppl. 15 no. 6) supplying the names and patronymics of another five hundred twenty-four Athenians. Last, the long series of Delian inscriptions (*ID* 1400–2645) provides much valuable prosopography for the period.

¹¹ P. MacKendrick, *The Athenian Aristocracy* 399 to 31 B.C. (Cambridge, Mass. 1969) 56, seems substantially correct in portraying the archonships as important mainly for giving entry to the Areopagos.

¹² Though he never published an account of it, Dow brought this to my attention for the first time in a seminar on Greek epigraphy.

¹³ Year II: city officials (ll. 49–62), Delian officials (ll. 63–75), Delian priests (ll. 76–88); Year III: city officials (ll. 95–109), Delian officials (ll. 110–122), Delian priests (ll. 123–136).

General is listed first among the city officials (ll. 6-7), the Epimeletes of Delos at the head of the Delian officials (ll. 25-26), and the Priest of Apollo first among the priests (ll. 35-36). Moreover, the contribution expected from each official was set at fifty, one hundred, or two hundred drachmas¹⁴ and apparently was fixed. The preserved sums reveal no variation. Twenty-two of the thirty-one officials contributed one hundred drachmas and that was clearly the regular amount. A greater or lesser amount, therefore, marks more important and less important offices.¹⁵ Employing, then, the two criteria of precedence and amount contributed, the Hoplite General, the Epimeletes of Delos, the ἐπιμελητῆς ἐμπορίου,¹⁶ and ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ emerge as the most important officials in 100 B.C. It is significant that three of these four officials carry out their duties on the island. As another indication of the importance of these offices, the incumbents, in contrast to those holding the nine archonships, are well attested in the record available to us. Only four of nineteen are not attested elsewhere. Many, in fact, have Delian associations of long standing.¹⁷

¹⁴ The one exception to this is service as Agonothetes which is only listed in the case of the extraordinary contributions of Medeios in lines 184-189 and of Sarapion in lines 209-216. The expected contribution for that office was 250 drachmas.

¹⁵ The Hoplite General, the Epimeletes of Delos, the ἐπιμελητῆς ἐμπορίου, and ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ contributed two hundred drachmas; the General ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, the General ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευήν, and the priests of Anios, Sarapis, and Dionysos contributed fifty.

¹⁶ That this office is the Delian one and not the Athenian office of the same title seems beyond doubt. The Delian office began in the years after 166 B.C. as a board of three (*ID* 1507, ll. 16-18), but by 100 B.C. the powers of the board had been concentrated in one individual. For a discussion of the office on Delos and a list of the known incumbents, see Roussel (above, n.4) 179-182. The Athenian office, a board of ten, is well attested in the fourth century B.C. (*Hesperia* 43 [1974] 158, ll. 21-22; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 51.4; Demosthenes, 58.8-9; Deinarchos, 2.10). U. Kahrstedt's claim (*Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen* II [Stuttgart 1936] 50-51) that the ἐπιμελητῆς τοῦ ἐμ Πειραιεὶ λυμένος (cf. *IG* II² 1012, ll. 19-20; *IG* II² 1013, ll. 47-48; *IG* II² 2336, ll. 23, 88, 108, 146, 222, 239) had replaced it by 112 B.C. appears well founded (*pace* Stroud, *Hesperia* 43 [1974] 181 n.92).

¹⁷ The incumbents and their Delian associations are as follows (see also below, n.63). (*PA* = J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica* [Berlin 1901-1903]; *NPA* = J. Sundwall, *Nachträge zur Prosopographia Attica* [Helsingfors 1910]).

Hoplite General

103/2 Ἀμμώνιος [Δημητρίῳ]ν Ἀναφλύστιος l. 6 *NPA* 11

Ammonios was Epimeletes of Delos in 107/6 (*ID* 2232, ll. 4-5) and at least three other members of his family held that office (*ID* 2044, 2125, 2600). For a stemma, see Roussel (above, n.4) 104.

102/1 [Σ]αραπίων Μ[ε]λιτεύς l. 50 PA 12564

Sarapion served as Governor of the Island in 100/99 (ID 2364) and is also attested on ID 1870 and 2005. His son Diokles was Kleidoukhos of Apollo also in 100/99 (ID 2364, ll. 10-11).

101/0 Ἀπο[λλο]δωρος Μ[ε]λιτεύς l. 95 PA 1430

Not attested elsewhere, unless perhaps he is identical with Ἀπολλόδωρος Φιλωνύμου Δεκελειεύς who was Governor of the Island about 110 B.C. (ID 2615, l. 5).

100/99 Ἑσπιαῖος [Θε]οχάριδος ἐκ Κεραμείων l. 141 PA 5202

He probably served as Agoranomos on Delos in 101/0 (IG II² 2336, l. 115); his cousin, Theokharis, was ἐπὶ τὰ ἱερά on Delos in 99/8 (ID 1709, l. 10).

99/8 [Μήδειος Μηδείου] Πειραιεύς l. 167 PA 10098

Medeios is attested on the island as governor in 98/7 (ID 1757), as Agonothetes of the Delia (IG II² 2336, l. 189), as ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ (ibid., l. 187), as a trierarch (ID 1841), and as a Deliastes (ID 1869b). His son Medeios was a pompostolos on Delos around 100 B.C. (ID 2607).

98/7 [Σ]αραπίων Σαραπίωνος Μελιτεύς l. 208

Identical with the Hoplite General of 102/1.

97/6 Πύρρος Πύρρου Λαμπρεύς l. 261 PA 12520

Pyrrhus served as Epimeletes of Delos in 104/3 (ID 2599). His brother Buttakos held the post of Gymnasiarch on the island in 104/3 (ibid.) and that of ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ in 97/6 (IG II² 2336, l. 275). Their grandfather was Governor of the Island in 153/2 (ID 1432 Aa, col. I, l. 3) and an uncle was ἐπὶ τὰ ἱερά ca. 135 (ID 2041). For a stemma of the family, see Roussel (above, n.4) 102.

Epimeletes of Delos

103/2 [Διοσκουρίδης -----] l. 25 PA 4344

The name is restored from ID 1927.

102/1 [Θεόδο]τος Σουνεύς l. 63 PA 6803

He served as a priest on the island ca. 113 (ID 2261, 2285) and again in 110/09 (ID 2228 and 2626).

101/0 Καλλίστρα[ος ^{ca. 4} -----]εύς l. 111 PA 8141

This man is not attested elsewhere.

100/99 Σαρ[α]πίων Μελιτεύς l. 143

Identical with the Hoplite General of 102/1.

99/8 Πολύκλειτο[ς Ἀλεξάνδρου Φλυ]εύς l. 204 PA 11978

One of his sons became governor of Delos in 54/3 (ID 1662). For a stemma, see Roussel (above, n.4) 111.

98/7 Μήδειος Μηδ[είου Πειραιε]ύς l. 191

The importance of the island is unmistakable. The men who were politically most influential in Athens around 100 B.C. were men from families which had, in most cases it seems probable, extensive commercial interests on Delos. This appears to be a natural consequence of two factors. First, *IG* II² 2336 reflects a system of government in which people paid for the privilege of holding office instead of *being* paid. Doubtless it required considerable means to be able to stand for the highest offices and to meet the financial obligations which they entailed, if one was elected. This fact, namely wealth, may go a long way toward explaining the extensive Delian connections of the men holding the highest offices. The commerce on Delos was, after all, the primary

Identical with the Hoplite General of 99/8.

97/6 [*Ἀριστίων ἐξ Οὔλου*] l. 233 *PA* 1749

Aristion also served on the island as *ἐπιμελητῆς ἐμπορίου* in 101/0 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 1113); his father held the governorship of the island in 117/6 (*ID* 2055, ll. 19–20).

ἐπιμελητῆς ἐμπορίου

103/2 not preserved

102/1 [-----] l. 75

101/0 *Ἀριστίων [ἐ]ξ Οὔλου* l. 113

Identical with the Epimeletes of Delos in 97/6.

100/99 not recorded

99/8 *Ἀρχίας Διογένου Ἄνα[φλύστιος]* l. 179 *PA* 2461

Arkhias also served as General *ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν* probably in 101/0 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 263).

98/7 not recorded

97/6 not recorded

ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ

103/2 not recorded

102/1 *Καλλί[ας] Ἀθμον[εύς]* *Hesperia* suppl. 15 27, l. 78

This man is not attested elsewhere.

101/0 not recorded

100/99 *Μήδ[ε]ιο[ς] Μ[η]δείου Πειραιεύς* l. 187

Identical with the Hoplite General of 99/8. On the date, see below, n.59.

99/8 not recorded

98/7 not recorded

97/6 [*Βύττακ*]ος *Πύρρου Λαμπρεύς* l. 275 *PA* 2934

Brother of Pyrrhus, the Hoplite General of 97/6, *q.v.*

source of wealth in this period.¹⁸ Second, the island was an important international center, the administration of which required business acumen combined with the ability to deal effectively on a daily basis with traders from all over the Mediterranean world.¹⁹ Naturally, men who grew up on the island and whose families dealt with the international trading community were best qualified for many of the key political and administrative posts.

III

The text of *IG II*² 2336 also enables us, in a certain sense, to see the workings of the Athenian government for these seven years. Though there are irregularities in the list, especially in the fourth year and after, they relate to problems of collecting the contributions and inscribing the record and do not provide evidence for irregularities in government. Rather, the inscription reveals that the Athenian government was operating very smoothly throughout the seven-year period. To be specific — in the case of allotted officials, such as priesthoods and the nine traditional archonships, tribal rotation provides a good test, for the system of sortition lay at the heart of the Athenian political system. Four of the eight priesthoods listed on *IG II*² 2336 were chosen by lot in tribal rotation, namely the priests of Artemis on the Island, Anios, Sarapis, and Zeus Kynthios. All preserve the rotation with no breaks, as may be seen from Table I.²⁰ (In the tables below, Roman numerals signify that the indication of tribe is preserved and Arabic numerals are used to signify that it is not preserved but conjectured.)

¹⁸ See J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford 1971) xx-xxxi. Although Davies treats the period 600-300 B.C., the evidence which he adduces of wealth conferring political power is applicable to later periods as well.

¹⁹ For the breadth of the trade on the island, see especially Rostovtzeff (above, n.4) 794-798.

²⁰ The tribal affiliation of the other priests is as follows:

	Apollo	Roma	Dionysos	Holy Goddess
103/2	I	XII	—	X
102/1	—	—	—	III
101/0	VII	VIII	II or VIII	VI
100/99	XI	—	—	—
99/8	II	—	—	—
98/7	—	VII	—	VII
97/6	IV or XII	II or VIII	—	VII

Table 1. Tribal affiliation of priests

	Artemis	Anios	Sarapis	Zeus Kynthios
103/2	II	IV	V	I
102/1	III	V	VI	2
101/0	IV	VI	VII	3
100/99	5	7	8	4
99/8	6	8	9	5
98/7	7	9	10	6
97/6	VIII	10	XI	VII

The nine archonships also continued to be allotted by a system which ensured that no more than one archon in a given year came from a single tribe, as can be seen from Table 2.

Table 2. Tribal affiliation of the nine traditional archons

	103/2	102/1	101/0	100/99	99/8	98/7	97/6
Archon	—	VIII	IX	VII	—	X	VI
Basileus	—	XII	XII	IV	—	VI	II
Polemarch	—	X	III	IX	—	VIII	VII
Thesmothetes	—	IX	I	I	—	III	I
Thesmothetes	—	II	V	II	—	V	III
Thesmothetes	—	VII	VI	III	V	VII	IV
Thesmothetes	—	IV	VII	V	VI	IX	V
Thesmothetes	—	V	VIII	X	VII	XI	X
Thesmothetes	—	VI	—	XII	IX or XI	XII	XII

Furthermore, there is no known instance, either on this inscription or from any other source prior to 90 B.C.,²¹ of someone holding a traditional archonship more than once or for longer than a single year. In general, a man was permitted to hold only one of these offices after which he became a member of the Areopagos. This system of sortition and these limitations on holding the nine traditional archonships, which were described by Aristotle in the latter part of the fourth century B.C.,²² were still in regular use, as the text of *IG II*² 2336 reveals, at the end of the second century B.C.

IV

Alongside this evidence of regularity in the allotted offices, the text of *IG II*² 2336 does seem to provide some evidence for a single individual

²¹ Cf. *IG II*² 1713, ll. 9-11.

²² *Ath. Pol.* 55.

holding more than one elected office at the same time. If it were so, it would be a drastic change and perhaps be indicative of a lack of qualified men or of one man assuming highly irregular powers. In either case, the ramifications would be rather great. Since there are only two possible instances of simultaneous office holding on the entire inscription and since the matter is of some consequence, it is worth examining both cases in detail.

Kharias, son of Kharias, of Aithalidai appears in lines 226–227 as General ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν and in line 238 as ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων on Delos, entries which have usually been assigned to 97/6. The date of his charge over the sacred moneys on Delos is indeed fixed to 97/6 by a Delian inscription, *ID* 1878. Nothing, however, fixes the date of his incumbency as General ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, for the year-heading for 97/6, the final year, which Ferguson restored just above line 226,²³ never existed, as the relative position of the lines in the two columns has revealed.²⁴ By position on the stele, this office is listed below the archons of 98/7 (who appear in lines 192–202) and above those of 97/6 (lines 249–260), so that it could belong to either year. There are two other Generals ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν listed below this one (ll. 262–263 and 270–271), also belonging, or so it would appear, to the year 97/6. But the evidence which we have suggests that there was only one General ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν in any given year — only one is listed in the first, second, and fourth years on this inscription and only one is attested on *Fouilles de Delphes* III 2 no. 24, an ephebic inscription which lists the generals associated with the Ephebeia. Furthermore, seven Generals ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν in all appear on *IG* II² 2336. Since the list covers seven years, it seems clear that, of the three apparently listed in 97/6, only one actually served in that year and the others served in earlier years. That Kharias' service as General ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν should be placed in 98/7 and that one of the others held office in 101/0 but made his contribution late and so is entered near the bottom of the list seems the obvious and simplest conclusion.

The other apparent exception involves one of the most important men of the time, Medeios, son of Medeios, of the Piraeus²⁵ who is attested as Hoplite General, ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ, and Epimeletes of the Island; his contributions are listed in lines 167

²³ "Researches in Athenian and Delian Documents III," *Klio* 9 (1909) 310.

²⁴ See the summary of my paper, "A Non-Existent Year-Heading in *IG* II² 2336" in *AJA* 78 (1974) 180–181.

²⁵ For Medeios and his family, see the commentary accompanying *ID* 1711 and also the references above in note 17.

and 184-191 under the year 99/8 along with several in his capacity as Agonothetes of various games. And it has naturally been supposed that he held these offices all at one time.²⁶ Service as Agonothetes, however, is not usually listed on this inscription. Moreover, the Agonothesia in this period seems to have been a liturgy of limited duration and not an annual office.²⁷ All this evidence suggests that this record of Medeios' contributions is an unusual one,²⁸ one in fact which records his contribution of an extraordinarily large sum of money given for a number of offices held over several years. A Delian inscription, *ID* 1757, supports this view, for it reveals that Medeios was Epimeletes of Delos in the year 98/7 and not in 99/8. Since his Hoplite Generalship is listed in line 167 (the restoration by Dow is, I believe, beyond doubt) just under the year rubric for 99/8, it seems quite certain that he served as Hoplite General in 99/8. There is no independent evidence for the year in which he was ἐπὶ τῇ δημοσίᾳ τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ. We may suspect, however, that he did not hold that office concurrently with either of the others.²⁹

The entire character of the second half of *IG* II² 2336 supports this interpretation. The occurrence of the year-headings, οἷδε ἀπέδωκαν τὰς ἀπαρχὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ δεῖναι ἄρχοντος, provides the clearest evidence. In the first one hundred sixty-three lines of the text, covering the first four years, the year-heading for each year dates all the entries listed under it and marks off the entries of one year from those in the next. After line 163 this changed. Editors, however, have, by their restoration after

²⁶ See, for example, Ferguson (above, n.4) 436 and Badian (above, n.3) 106.

²⁷ Pauly-Wissowa, *RE* 1.1, col. 872.

²⁸ The record at lines 185-191 is unusual in another sense, for the name of Medeios has been erased and then reinscribed. Dow thought (see the marginal notation in his text) that the same man who inscribed the lines originally reinscribed Medeios' name. This does not appear to be the case. The workman who originally inscribed lines 184-191 employed small serifs; his lettering has a neat, rather square appearance. The man who reinscribed Medeios' name did not use serifs and tended to curve slightly the strokes of epsilon and sigma. I conclude that two different men were at work and, therefore, that the reinscribing was done at a time subsequent to the original inscribing of the lines.

A. Wilhelm, "Attische Urkunden III," *Sitzungsberichte Akad. Wiss. Wien* 202.5 (1925) 59-61, has given the most probable explanation of these erasures. He suggests that Medeios' leadership of the opposition to Mithradates, most clearly seen in his threefold archonship from 91-88, made him a particular target of the pro-Mithradatic elements in Athens and that the erasure of his name on *IG* II² 2336 occurred when these elements took control of Athens in 88/7. The reinscribing then was done after Sulla had taken over in 86 B.C.

²⁹ See below, n.59.

line 223 of a seventh year-heading which never existed, introduced more regularity into this inscription than there in fact was. Instead of a seven-year list divided neatly into seven sections by seven year-headings, we are faced with a more complicated state of affairs. From line 164 to the bottom of the inscription, that is most of the second column, the officials of three years 99/8, 98/7, and 97/6 are listed, but only two year-headings (for 99/8 and 98/7) were ever inscribed. Neither is a true heading, for under each appear officials who held office in another year. Under the year-heading of 99/8 (ll. 164–165), for example, appear listed the contributions of the traditional archons both of 99/8 (ll. 169–177) and of 98/7 (ll. 194–202) with the extraordinary contributions of Medeios entered in between. The list has changed character in an important way from a fairly tidy annual record of annual contributions to a rather untidy record of a last-minute fund-raising effort to support the Pythais scheduled to go to Delphi at the close of the year 98/7.

To show this one need only examine the extraordinary contributions of Medeios who gave a total of eleven hundred drachmas and of Sarapion who gave a total of eleven hundred fifty. Both made these contributions during 98/7, perhaps quite close together in time. Medeios' contributions in lines 167 and 184–191 were inscribed by a single workman,³⁰ and thus all at one time. Among the offices listed appears his governorship of Delos which he held in 98/7;³¹ therefore, these entries, for whatever reason, cannot have been made until sometime in 98/7. Sarapion's entries in lines 207–216 were also made in 98/7, for they are immediately preceded by the year-heading for that year (l. 206), which in fact is used to date them. Extraordinary contributions were needed because the fund-raising effort begun in 103/2 had gone well at first but then had experienced serious difficulties in the fourth year of the six projected³² and may even have come to a halt for a while. That there were serious problems can be most easily gauged from the number of contributors in the first four years: thirty in the first, thirty in the second, twenty-seven in the third, and sixteen in the fourth year, with a corresponding diminution in money collected. To make up for the shortfall, not only did Sarapion (the elected head of the Pythais for

³⁰ See the indications of Hand in the left margin of Dow's text.

³¹ *ID* 1757.

³² The spacing of the list strongly suggests that a six-year collection was planned. The first three year-panels (ll. 5–136), even though not quite fully subscribed, occupy nearly the entire vertical space of column one. The original plan, it appears, called for six annual panels of thirty to thirty-one contributors arranged in two columns, three panels to a column. The organized collection period then was to commence in 103/2 and to end in 98/7.

98/7)³³ and Medeios come forward, but the officials of 97/6 also came forward to make what was in essence a contribution supplemental to the regular collection period, which officially terminated with 98/7, the year of the Pythais. (This is the reason that the officials of 97/6 are not accorded a year-heading on the inscription.)

Thus, the only two apparent instances of simultaneous office holding occur in that part of the inscription where the strict year-by-year listing has broken down and was replaced by a fairly disorganized procedure with no clear separation of officials who held office in one year from those in the next. There is, in fact, no documented case of simultaneous office holding on *IG II*² 2336 or in this period in general.

In summary, this inscription gives no support to those who would see a constitutional disruption in Athens in the years 103/2–97/6 B.C. Ferguson wrongly, although brilliantly, argued for an oligarchic revolution in the period 103/2–101/0, in which a pro-Roman faction led by Medeios overthrew the democracy.³⁴ Badian has recently provided a forceful and needed reminder that Ferguson's oligarchic revolution had no basis in fact.³⁵ The text of *IG II*² 2336 provides no evidence for it. In fact, it constitutes positive and powerful evidence against it.

V

As for the theory, first proposed by Kirchner,³⁶ reinforced and reiterated by Ferguson³⁷ and Dow,³⁸ and still current,³⁹ that *IG II*² 2336 records contributions for a Pythais to Delos, I observe only that there is no independent evidence whatsoever for a Pythais to Delos. There was only one Pythais, the famous one to Delphi. That the appearance of Delian officials on *IG II*² 2336 provides evidence for a Delian Pythais was always an unwarranted inference. Rather their appearance suggests that the Delian officials had achieved sufficient wealth and prominence that they could naturally be tapped for contributions in a time of need and there appears to have been pressing need.

³³ Cf. *FD III* 2 no. 6, l. 5 = *Hesperia* suppl. 15 no. 7a.

³⁴ "The Oligarchic Revolution at Athens of the Year 103/2 B.C.," *Klio* 4 (1904) 1–17; *Hellenistic Athens* 425–437.

³⁵ *AJAH* 1 (1976) 105–106.

³⁶ *IG II/III*² p. 688.

³⁷ *Athenian Tribal Cycles in the Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge 1932) 148–149.

³⁸ *HSCP* 51 (1940) 111.

³⁹ Cf., for example, MacKendrick (above, n.11) 54 and P. Bruneau, *Recherches sur les cultes de Délos à l'époque hellénistique et à l'époque impériale*, Bibl. Ec. fr. Ath. et Rome fasc. 217 (Paris 1970) 128–137.

The permanent record which has come down to us as *IG II² 2336* was the result of a special piece of legislation referred to in the preamble of the inscription:

ὁ κεχειροτον[ημέν]ος ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξαποστο/λὴν τῆς
 Πυθαίδος καὶ τὰς ἀπαρχὰς τῆς πρώτης ἐννεετηρί[δος]
 Ἀμφικρ[α]τίας Ἐπιστράτου Περ/ιθοίδης ἀνέγραψ[εν]
 τοὺς δόντας τῶν ἀρχόντων τὰς ἀπαρχὰς [τ]ῶι
 Ἀπό[λλ]ω[νι] τῶι Πυθίῳ κα/τὰ τὸ ψήφισμα
 [δ] Ἐ[ν]ότιμος⁴⁰ ἐγ Μυρρι[νο]ύττης εἶπεν.

IG II² 2336, ll. 1-4

This decree proposed by Xenotimos apparently named the officials who were to contribute and, instead of fixing a penalty for failure to do so, authorized Amphikrates, the official charged with collecting the money, to publish an annual list, which specified the title, name, and gift of each contributor. This could be characterized as a not very subtle, even high-handed, method of fund raising. The stele and text seem, therefore, to have come into being as a result of rather strong measures and under strained circumstances. This was the first enneeteris (106/5-98/7) and it only became clear, we may suppose, after a year or so into the period that, if an organized collection effort were not undertaken, the Pythaïs of 98/7 would go to Delphi nearly empty-handed — hence the legislation of Xenotimos, the primary goal of which was to raise approximately three talents (eighteen thousand drachmas)⁴¹ as the official ἀπαρχαί offered by the city of Athens to the sanctuary at Delphi at the time of the Pythaïs. To this end Xenotimos named the officials who could most reasonably be expected to contribute as part of their annual obligations, among whom significantly were a large number of officials who served on Delos.

⁴⁰ Dow restored the *nomen* Phanotimos, but this was before the advent of the invaluable F. Dornseiff-B. Hansen, *Rückläufiges Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* (Berlin 1957). In addition to Φανότιμος, Ξενότιμος and Μενότιμος are also possible. Xenotimos alone is attested in Attica, though not in Myrrhinoutta, and should probably be restored here.

⁴¹ With the help of the supplementary contributions of officials of 97/6, the seventh year, the total actually collected came to nineteen thousand fifty drachmas. Note that if all the officials of each year had contributed as planned, the total amount collected over six years would have been nineteen thousand five hundred drachmas, i.e., six times three thousand two hundred fifty. Again these numbers point to a plan to raise approximately three thousand drachmas (one half talent) per year for six years.

VI

Badian has recently interpreted the extraordinary contributions of Medeios and Sarapion on *IG II*² 2336, lines 184-191 and 207-216, as evidence of an unfriendly political rivalry between the two men.⁴² The evidence, instead, points, as the above implies, to cooperation between them in raising the money for the Pythais which Sarapion himself headed. It also seems very likely that the two were related by marriage. Sometime about 100 B.C., we learn from Pseudo-Plutarch, *Decem Oratorum Vitae* 843 B, Medeios' sister Philippa married a certain Diokles of Melite. Unfortunately his patronymic is not supplied. The name Diokles, however, is well attested in Sarapion's family; one of his sons and several of his descendants bore it.⁴³ It seems probable that the Diokles in question was a close relative of Sarapion. Medeios' sister would scarcely have married just anybody. Another factor is that Medeios may have been significantly younger than Sarapion. Medeios participated in the Pythais of 128/7 as a child Pythaïst⁴⁴ and was thus about twelve years of age in 128/7 and about forty in 100 B.C. He did not hold an archonship until 101/0 when he served as Archon Eponymous.⁴⁵ By the year 102/1 Sarapion had not only served as archon, the record of which has not survived to us (unless he is to be identified with the Eponymous Archon of 116/5), but he had also been elected Hoplite General once⁴⁶ and was to be re-elected to that powerful office just four years later, when he also served as leader of the Pythais.⁴⁷ This suggests that Sarapion was a senior and powerful political figure in 100 B.C. It seems likely, therefore, that the two men were at least ten to fifteen years apart. Medeios' abrupt rise in Athenian politics beginning in 101 B.C., when he was a rather young man, will then most naturally be explained if he was the gifted protégé of the most powerful man in Athens at the time, namely Sarapion of Melite.

VII

The text of *IG II*² 2336 also reveals that the Herald of the Areopagos, whose ascendancy we tend to associate with the period

⁴² *AJAH* 1 (1976) 105 ff, esp. 106-107.

⁴³ For the son, see *ID* 2364 and *FD III* 2, nos. 31 and 17, l. 16 = *Hesperia* suppl. 15 54; for other descendants of the same name, see *IG II*² 1343, ll. 19-20 and *Trans. Am. Philosoph. Soc.* 64 (1974) 51, ll. 21-22.

⁴⁴ *FD III* 2 no. 12, col. II, l. 4.

⁴⁵ *IG II*² 2336, ll. 94 and 96.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, l. 50.

⁴⁷ *FD III* 2 no. 6, ll. 5-7 = *Hesperia* suppl. 15 48.

after Sulla,⁴⁸ was already in 100 B.C. one of the most powerful officials in Athens. On *IG II*² 2336 and in the Pythais records of 106/5 and 98/7, the herald is listed together with the nine archons, often at their head.⁴⁹ The individuals who hold the office are well known and distinguished. For example, Pyrrhos, son of Pyrrhos, of Lamptrai, herald in 98/7,⁵⁰ served as Epimeletes of the Island in 104/3⁵¹ and as Hoplite General in 97/6⁵² and Andreas, son of Andreas, from Piraeus, herald in 97/6,⁵³ became Epimeletes of Delos about 90 B.C.⁵⁴ In short, the herald seems to have been a senior official who acted as the head of the board of archons. In fact, of the officials who administered Athens he has grown to a position second only to the Hoplite General.⁵⁵

How and when did this happen? A guess may be hazarded. Membership in the Areopagos could be gained only by holding one of the nine archonships. It is probable (we have no proof) that by 100 B.C. many of the elected offices, such as the Hoplite General and the Epimeletes of Delos, were open in practice only to members of the Areopagos.⁵⁶ Membership in that council will then have been highly desirable for politically ambitious men, and they will have stood for one of the traditional archonships early in their careers. Thus the incumbents of the archonships in this period were often relatively junior men.⁵⁷ The herald in contrast was elected each year from among those who were already members to head the new group of nine members and will naturally have assumed a leading position. The career of Medeios may provide some supporting evidence. On *IG II*² 2336 he is attested as

⁴⁸ D. J. Geagan, *The Athenian Constitution after Sulla*, *Hesperia* suppl. 12 (Princeton 1967) 57-61.

⁴⁹ Cf. ll. 8, 105, 152, 192, and 249 of *IG II*² 2336, ll. 25 and 26 of *FD III* 2 nos. 10 and 2 = *Hesperia* suppl. 15 50, and ll. 13-14 of *FD III* 2 no. 4 as re-edited in *BCH* 99 (1975) 196-197.

⁵⁰ *IG II*² 2336, ll. 192-193.

⁵¹ *ID* 2599.

⁵² *IG II*² 2336, l. 261.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, ll. 249-250.

⁵⁴ *ID* 2266, l. 7.

⁵⁵ Ferguson (above, n.4), 429 n.2, perceived this though his interpretation and some of his facts are wrong. For example, the herald contributes one hundred drachmas on *IG II*² 2336, not two hundred, as Ferguson claims.

⁵⁶ There are no certain examples violating this principle. J. Sundwall long ago suggested that it applied to the governorship of Delos; cf. *Untersuchungen über die attischen Münzen des Neueren Stiles* (Oefversigt of Finska Vetenskaps-Societens Förhandlingar 49-50, 1906-08) [Helsingfors 1908], 71. Badian (above, n.42) 107, 114, 121 n.10, 125 n.40, has reaffirmed it for that office in the nineties.

⁵⁷ See above, n.9.

holding in rapid succession a series of high offices, but these are, it seems notable, preceded by his Eponymous Archonship, as though it were a requirement to the others. He served as Eponymous Archon in 101/0,⁵⁸ ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ most probably in 100/99,⁵⁹ Hoplite General in 99/8,⁶⁰ and Governor of the Island in 98/7.⁶¹ Apparently membership in the Areopagos had become a pre-requisite to holding the highest elective offices. This no doubt happened gradually in the years after 166 B.C. We can only observe that by 128/7 the Herald of the Areopagos had attained a position of prominence, for in the record of the Pythais for that year he is listed for the first time in our evidence with the nine traditional archons.⁶²

VIII

I began by emphasizing that the development of commerce on Delos naturally led to a prominent role for persons of Delian background in Athenian politics of 100 B.C. It is now time to redress the picture lest I appear to be implying the existence of a small circle of Delian business tycoons ruling Athens for their own gain. While the text of *IG* II² 2336 does reveal a group of powerful families, headed by men such as Medeios of Piraeus and Sarapion of Melite,⁶³ it also reveals that a great

⁵⁸ *IG* II² 2336, ll. 94 and 96.

⁵⁹ The date is not precisely known, but may be inferred. Since the service is listed on *IG* II² 2336 (l. 186), Medeios must have held the office within the years 103/2 to 97/6. The years 101/0, 99/8, and 98/7 may be eliminated as possibilities on the grounds that it is highly unlikely that Medeios held this annual office simultaneously with another annual office. Furthermore, we know that other incumbents held the office in the years 102/1 and 97/6 (cf. *Hesperia* suppl. 15 27, ll. 76–78 and *IG* II² 2336, lines 274–275); thus, the only possible years for Medeios' incumbency are 103/2 and 100/99. Given the importance of the office, Medeios' relative youth, and the fact that he had not yet (in 103/2) held one of the nine traditional archonships and thus gained membership to the Areopagos, the choice of 100/99 seems most probable. If this is correct, then Medeios held this, his first office of major importance, under the guidance of his mentor Sarapion who was Governor of the Island in 100/99 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 143 and *ID* 2364).

⁶⁰ *IG* II² 2336, l. 167.

⁶¹ *ID* 1757.

⁶² *FD* III 2 no. 3, col. II, ll. 3–7. See my discussion of these lines in *BCH* 99 (1975) 189 n.14.

⁶³ Other influential men of the time include (also see above, n.17):

1. Pyrrhos of Lamptrai (*PA* 12520) and his brother, Buttakos (*PA* 2934). In addition to being Hoplite General in 97/6 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 261) and Herald

number of persons of differing backgrounds could afford to hold office in this period. One hundred twenty separate individuals are known to have done so from this inscription alone. In other words, the prosperity accruing from the commerce on Delos seems to have been fairly widespread and not limited to only a few very wealthy families. Intense building activity usually provides a sure sign of prosperity. Though there was no large-scale building program in Athens during this period, there was a massive one on the island;⁶⁴ there was also a revival of religious festivals in this period (we may mention the Pythaïs to Delphi⁶⁵ and the festivals of the Apollonia and the Delia on the island).⁶⁶ More-

of the Areopagos in 98/7 (ibid., l. 193), Pyrrhos served as Epimeletes of Delos in 104/3 (*ID* 2599). Buttakos is attested as Gymnasiarch on Delos in 104/3 (ibid.), as Epimeletes of Piraeus in 102/1 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 89), and as *ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Ἀθήλῳ* in 97/6 (ibid., l. 274).

2. Hestiaios of Kerameis (*PA* 5202) and his cousin, Theokharis (*PA* 7188). Hestiaios served as Hoplite General in 100/99 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 141) and perhaps as Agoranomos on Delos in 101/0 (ibid., l. 115); Theokharis as Kosmetes of ephebes in 119/8 (*IG* II² 1008, l. 46), Herald of the Areopagos in 101/0 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 105), and *ἐπὶ τὰ ἱερά* on Delos in 99/8 (ibid., l. 205).

3. Aristion of Oion (*PA* 1749) who served as *ἐπιμελητὴς ἐμπορίου* in 101/0 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 113) and Epimeletes of Delos in 97/6 (ibid., l. 233).

4. Ammonios of Anaphlystos (*NPA* p. 11) who was Epimeletes of Delos in 107/6 (*ID* 2232) and Hoplite General in 103/2 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 6) and his brother Dionysios (*PA* 4152) who was Epimeletes of Delos in 111/0 (*ID* 2125) and Hoplite General in 106/5 (*FD* III 2 no. 5, l. 12).

5. Theodotos of Sounion (*PA* 6803), who is attested as Priest of the Syrian Divinities on Delos in ca. 113/2 (*ID* 2261, 2285), Priest of Holy Aphrodite on Delos in 110/09 (*ID* 2228 and 2626), and as Epimeletes of the Island in 102/1 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 63).

6. Polykleitos of Phlya (*PA* 11978), who was active in the Pythaïds of 128/7 (*FD* III 2 no. 12, col. III, l. 4) and 106/5 (ibid. no. 28, col. I, l. 40) and became Epimeletes of Delos in 99/8 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 204).

7. Andreas of Piraeus (*PA* 838) who served as Herald of the Areopagos in 97/6 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 250) and Epimeletes of Delos ca. 90 (*ID* 2266, l. 7).

8. Arkhias of Anaphlystos (*PA* 2461 and *PA* 2453), who was *ἐπιμελητὴς ἐμπορίου* in 99/8 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 179) and General *ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν* probably in 101/0 (ibid., l. 263).

9. Kharias of Aithalidai (*PA* 15335) who served as Agoranomos on Delos (*ID* 2381), paymaster of his prytany (*Hesperia* 36, 1967, 90, l. 60), General *ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν* in 98/7 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 227), and *ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων* in 97/6 (*IG* II² 2336, l. 238 and *ID* 1878).

⁶⁴ Cf., e.g., Ferguson (above, n.4) 361–366.

⁶⁵ Cf. A. Boëthius, *Die Pythaïs* (Uppsala 1918) 52 ff and Day (above, n.6) 174–175.

⁶⁶ Bruneau (above, n.39) 76–86.

over, the primary institution of education in Athens, the Ephebeia, increased markedly in size and activity in the last thirty years of the second century B.C. (as measured by the relatively large number of inscriptions which survive).⁶⁷ The building activity and the growth of rather costly religious and educational institutions in the years 138 B.C. and following attest to a general prosperity in Athens during the period.⁶⁸

To summarize, in the years after the acquisition of Delos in 167/6 B.C. the Athenians pursued vigorously and successfully a course of commercial leadership, based ultimately, however, on Rome's good will. The period was one of general prosperity with rapid but natural change. Offices newly created in 166 B.C. to administer Delos had become by 100 B.C. among the most important in Athens. The Areopagos and its herald rose in influence commensurately with the increase in wealth, power, and prestige of the city and its officials. No doubt to the average Athenian in 100 B.C. things seemed rather good.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ch. Pelekidis, *Histoire de l'Éphébie attique* (Paris 1962) 183-209 and the references above, n.10.

⁶⁸ The evidence of the new style silver coinage of Athens (see M. Thompson, *The New Style Silver Coinage of Athens* [New York 1961]) offers some intriguing puzzles which admit of no easy solution. I am, however, persuaded by the preponderance of historical-prosopographical evidence that Thompson dated the coinage about a generation early and that the lower dating advocated by D. M. Lewis (*Num. Chron.* 7th ser. 2 [1962] 275-300), H. B. Mattingly (*JHS* 91 [1971] 85-93), E. Badian (above, n.3, 117-119) and now accepted by B. D. Meritt (*AJA* 79 [1975] 305) is substantially correct. This lower dating, however, gives the following rough chronological sequence for Thompson's periods: *Early Period* (ca. 165-137/6), *Middle Period* (136/5-100/99), *Late Period* (99/8-ca. 70). In the Early Period the evidence suggests an extensive coinage, a moderate, but steady, output in the Middle Period, and "a tremendous emission" in the first eight years of the Late Period (Thompson, 709-714). On the surface at least, this is puzzling and is the opposite of what we would expect. In very simplistic terms, one would think that the highest volume of coinage would coincide with the Middle Period, the years when Athens on all other evidence seems to have been most prosperous. If the dating of the coinage is approximately correct, as it seems to be, and if our sample of evidence is statistically reliable, as it seems to be, and if the interpretation of it by Thompson is generally sound, as it seems to be, then the high emissions of the Early and Late Periods may reflect an uncertain and inflationary economy in the Aegean, caused in the Early Period by Rome's actions declaring Delos a free port and upsetting the position of Rhodes as the chief trading center and in the Late Period by the growing split between Rome and Mithradates and by the shift of trade from the Aegean area to Puteoli and the Italian peninsula. Although working with the earlier dates, Thompson too found the evidence puzzling; see 714 with n.1 for her attempt at a solution.

IX

The Athenians of 100 B.C. had a few problems, to be sure. Puteoli may already have begun to drain trade away from Delos⁶⁹ and thus Athenian prosperity may have peaked. The most pressing problem, however, was posed by a slave revolt which we hear of directly only in Poseidonios as recorded in Athenaeus VI.272 E–F:⁷⁰ . . . καὶ ἀποστάντας φησὶν αὐτοὺς καταφονεῦσαι μὲν τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν μετάλλων φύλακας, καταλαβέσθαι δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ Σουνίῳ ἀκρόπολιν καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον πορθηῆσαι τὴν Ἀττικὴν. Athenaeus then adds: οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ καιρὸς ὅτε καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἡ δευτέρα τῶν δούλων ἐπανάστασις ἐγένετο.

Modern scholars agree in placing this event a little before 100 B.C. Presumably, if the slaves were organized enough to seize Sounion and to ravage Attica for a long time, the revolt was a major one which must have had a significant effect on the Laureion-Thorikos area and indirectly on the coinage, which still may have depended to some degree on silver from that area (see below, n.83).⁷¹ Moreover, since the headland at Sounion and the docks there command the sea route between Athens and Delos, the revolt must have seriously impaired, if not actually cut off, communications between the island and the mother city. Furthermore, the threat to lives and property posed by a revolt of this magnitude must have created an emergency situation which required the mobilization of all available forces in Athens and Attica. Given these considerations, there is surprisingly little evidence outside Athenaeus for this revolt.

The most influential modern student of the problem, Siegfried Lauffer, dates the beginning of the revolt to 104 and believes that it continued into 103 or even into the year 102.⁷² But much of his argument for the specific date rests on his acceptance of Ferguson's oligarchic revolution in 103/2. Lauffer reasons that the slaves and pirates in the eastern Mediterranean found in each other allies as they opposed the

⁶⁹ Day (above, n.6) 118 and Rostovtzeff (above, n.4) 864 and 959.

⁷⁰ L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius* I (Cambridge 1972) 232–233 no. 262 = F. Jacoby, *FGr Hist* 87 F 35.

⁷¹ The dependence on silver from the Laureion mines may not have been very great, since, by the end of the first century B.C., not only the mines but even the slag heaps had been completely exhausted (Strabo, 9.1.23). The last known mining lease for the area dates to 307/6 (*Hesperia* 19 [1950] 282; cf. R. J. Hopper, "The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C.," *BSA* 48 [1953] 200–254). It could well be that the scale of operations in the latter half of the second century B.C. was a rather small one.

⁷² *Die Bergwerkssklaven von Laureion*, *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz* nos. 11–12 (1955–56) 236–240.

established powers.⁷³ He argues therefore that the slave revolts in Sicily and Attica must have preceded and in fact caused in part the dispatch in 102 B.C. by the Roman Senate of the praetor Marcus Antonius to Cilicia to suppress the pirates. Even supposing Lauffer's reconstruction is correct, which seems doubtful, it must be pointed out that only the Sicilian revolt had to precede Antonius' mission in 102 B.C. A serious revolt in Sicily was sufficient to create concern that there would be other outbreaks as there had been in the 130s when a rising in Sicily had been followed fairly closely by uprisings in Greece.⁷⁴

There exists, however, some evidence, I believe, which has heretofore escaped notice. The composition of the Pythaïs of 98/7, in particular, reveals some interesting peculiarities. This Pythaïs was a large one; nearly three hundred persons participated. However, compared with the Pythaïs of 106/5, which had slightly more than five hundred participants, it appears relatively modest. This cutback, if that is what it was, no doubt reflects the economic effect of the slave revolt;⁷⁵ fewer persons could afford to make the trip. Examining the figures more closely,⁷⁶ however, reveals that only eighteen child Pythaïsts participated in 98/7 as compared to about one hundred in 106/5 and, most striking of all, only a token contingent of five Hippeis participated, whereas one hundred twenty-two took part in 106/5. Note that these figures account for the total difference. The rest of the Pythaïs of 98/7 was, numerically speaking, comparable to that of 106/5. In short, a general cutback and decline in the Pythaïs is hardly an accurate way to interpret the evidence. Perhaps the reasons for the particular cutbacks were purely economic, that is, the Hippeis as a class were hardest hit by the slave revolt. Another interpretation seems more probable, however, namely that the Hippeis remained behind in Attica to help ensure the safety of the countryside. No doubt they still retained certain military duties, as the title *συστρατιῶται*, which was applied to thirty of their number in 106/5, suggests.⁷⁷ If this interpretation is correct, the aftermath of the revolt was still quite real in 98/7. The contingent to Delphi may, then, have been deliberately streamlined by limiting the number of very

⁷³ Relevant here is the *Lex de Piratis* of 100 B.C. known from Delphi (*FD* III 4 no. 37) and now also from a copy uncovered at Cnidos (*JRS* 64 [1974] 195–220). This text makes no mention of slave revolts and seems to cast at least some doubt on Lauffer's theory of an alliance between slaves and pirates.

⁷⁴ Lauffer (above, n.72) 233 ff and Ferguson (above, n.4) 379.

⁷⁵ G. Daux, *Delphes au II^e et au I^{er} siècle* (Paris 1936) 561, following Ferguson, attributes the decline to political crises in Athens.

⁷⁶ For these numbers, cf. *BCH* 99 (1975) 218.

⁷⁷ *FD* III 2 no. 28, col. III, l. 41.

young participants so that it could proceed to Delphi more rapidly and safely. This suggests a date for the revolt in Attica nearer 100 than 104 B.C.

The text of *IG II*² 2336 reveals a drastic curtailment of contributions beginning in 100/99, the fourth year, and lasting well into the year 99/8. Whatever happened, it affected all thirty-one officials expected to contribute⁷⁸ and so interrupted the collection that the annual nature of the list had to give way, for, when contributions came to be made and recorded again, the departure of the Pythais was so near that an extraordinary effort was required to raise the money.⁷⁹ Perhaps the disruption in *IG II*² 2336 reflects the upheaval caused by the slave revolt. This, of course, is impossible to prove, but it seems the most natural explanation. Moreover, the accounts and records of the first two years on the inscription, that is, the years 103/2 and 102/1, were kept in such a way that they could all be inscribed by one mason at the end of the year;⁸⁰ this suggests a period of normalcy in those years. We also have from this same period a complete inscription praising the Epheboi of 102/1.⁸¹ The language of that document betrays no unusual military activities for the Epheboi. Yet they certainly would have been involved in some way in any emergency created by a serious slave revolt. In addition, I note that for the year 104/3 a prytany decree survives which was passed in the middle of that year.⁸² Not only its language, but the very fact of its passage suggests a period of business as usual, rather than the kind of upheaval which Poseidonios' description implies. Thus our evidence, such as it is, suggests a period of normalcy from 104/3 to 102/1, and the little new evidence we are able to adduce, and it is very little, points to a serious disruption of some sort in Athens in 100 B.C. and the year following. I would suggest that the slave revolt fits more naturally in that context than in 104 and the years immediately following.⁸³

⁷⁸ Complete documentation must await a new edition of this inscription (now in readiness). As some indication — of the major officials of 100/99, the Hoplite General (l. 140) and the Epimeletes of Delos (l. 142) made late contributions which were entered on the stele in the blank space left at the bottom of column I (cf. Dow's text *ad loc.*). The ἐπιμελητῆς ἐμπορίου never contributed and Medeios, ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν δημοσίαν τράπεζαν τὴν ἐν Δήλῳ for this year (above, n.59), made a late contribution (l. 186).

⁷⁹ Above, section IV.

⁸⁰ See the indications of Hand in the left margin of Dow's text.

⁸¹ *IG II*² 1028 = *Hesperia* suppl. 15 no. 6.

⁸² *IG II*² 989 = *Hesperia* suppl. 15 no. 4.

⁸³ The coinage provides no clear-cut evidence. If one looks at the production of coinage in the 130s to see what effect the slave revolt had then, one can discern little. The production of tetradrachms remained at a relatively low level

Except for the slave revolt, which may well, after all, be exaggerated in our one source, the Athenians of 100 B.C. enjoyed peace, prosperity, and relative political stability. Some Athenians may have worried about the growth of Puteoli and consequent loss of trade, but most were probably lulled by their prosperity into forgetting their dependence on Rome. They did not yet hear the rumblings on the horizon and perhaps had forgotten Rome's treatment of Rhodes, or were persuaded by Rome's apologists that Rhodes had deserved her treatment.⁸⁴ In any case, they administered Delos well, deserved Rome's good will, and so far had received preferential treatment. What the future held, they had no way of knowing.

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for the entire period from 135 to 128 B.C. The revolt apparently produced no sharp fluctuations and had little direct effect on the coinage. In the several years preceding 100 B.C. the production of coinage (calculated by using Thompson's formula on pp. 710-712 of multiplying the surviving obverse dies by six thousand) fluctuated between sixty-six thousand and ninety thousand tetradrachms per year. Beginning either in 100/99 (Mattingly, above, n.68, 91) or 99/8 (Lewis, above, n.68, 276 ff), the production doubled and then trebled in successive years, going to one hundred seventy-four thousand and then to two hundred eighty-two thousand per year; the level remained at over one hundred thousand per year down to ca. 91 B.C. It is, I think, as difficult to see the later slave revolt having any direct bearing upon these production rates as it is in the case of the earlier revolt. There may be no direct causal linkage (see above, n.71).

If, however, the dates were more firm, one might, for example, postulate, as Mattingly does for the year 99/8 (*Historia* 20 [1971] 42-43), a year without coinage in 100/99 and move Dositheos/Kharias from 100/99 to 99/8 and then suppose that the tremendous increase in production in 99/8 and 98/7 was designed to compensate for a year without coinage. A further advantage of this would be that the quite extraordinary interruption in the orderly rotation of third magistrates in precisely these years (Thompson [above, n.68] 328) would then be part of the pattern of disruption and extraordinary measures caused by the crisis. But lacking further evidence, this must all remain conjecture.

⁸⁴ Concerning Rome's arbitrary treatment of Rhodes, cf. E. Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes in the Second Century B.C.," *CQ* 69 (1975) 79 ff.

ON CICERO'S SPEECHES

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PRO QUINCTIO

69 an omnis tu istos vincere volebas qui nunc tu ut vincas tanto opere laborant?

Kinsey explains that *omnis* "is emphatic and seems to imply that Naevius had hoped that some of his present supporters would perish in the civil strife." But an out-and-out Marian like Naevius as Cicero represents him could only have wanted Sulla, and so *all* Sullans, to lose. Kinsey ignores Hotomanus' proposal to expel *omnis*, which could be a reflection of *omnium* in the previous sentence. I do not see what A. Klotz found displeasing in the resulting collocation of words. However, this measure is not required. *omnis* is *not* emphatic, it merely indicates that these Sullan friends of Naevius were out in force: "All these friends of yours who are so anxious for you to win your case — did *you* want *them* to win the war?"

PRO ROSCIO AMERINO

33 quo populus Romanus nihil vidit indignius nisi eiusdem viri mortem, quae tantum potuit ut omnis occisus perdiderit et affligerit; quos *quia* servare per compositionem volebat, ipse ab eis interemptus est.

This concerns the murder of Scaevola Pontifex in 82 by the Marian Praetor Damasippus. *quos* has to refer to *omnis*, the whole community, but *eis* to the Marians only, defying correct expression. Commentators have adduced Tac. *Ann.* IV.14.3 *nam cives Romanos templo Aesculapii induxerant, cum iussu regis Mithridatis apud cunctas Asiae insulas et urbes trucidarentur* and Xen. *Hell.* II.1.16 οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ὀρμώμενοι τὴν βασιλέως κακῶς ἐποιοῦν . . . καὶ στρατηγούς πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι προσείλοντο Μένανδρον κ. τ. λ. Tacitus is not Cicero, and the passages are not really commensurate; for there is no such gap between those particular Roman citizens at Cos and the generality of their fellows in the area as between the whole Roman people and the Marians responsible for Scaevola's death. In Xenophon all the Athenian

operations, whether conducted from Samos or in Athens, are naturally enough attributed to "the Athenians," as opposed to Lysander.

Let the grammarian eliminate *quia*; the historian should not object. It is nowhere else recorded that Scaevola was killed *because* he advocated peace. On the contrary, Appian (*B.C.* I.88) says he perished along with a number of others by order of the younger Marius, who in despair of the future wished to destroy his private enemies; cf. Liv. *Epit.* LXXXVI *omnem quae in urbe erat nobilitatem trucidavit*, Vell. II.26.2. Scaevola's peacemaking efforts added pathos (or irony) to his death, but they are not very likely to have been the reason for it.

I find in Graevius: "'Vide num melius sit, *qui quos servare, etc.*' F. Ursinus."

- 93 erat tum multitudo sicariorum . . . quid? ea multitudo quae erat? opinor, aut eorum qui in bonis erant *occupati*, aut eorum qui ab eis conducebantur ut aliquem occiderent.

Landgraf explains: "Die in Güterkäufen (ihr Geschäft) machten," comparing s. 80 *sectores collorum et bonorum* and the scholiast's note (Stangl 312) *id est qui volebant alienas res sibi vindicare*. That would require *bonis alienis* (Lambinus). But why talk of these assassins, people like T. Roscius who wanted to remove the rightful owners of property they had seized, as *busy* with other men's goods, when the only relevant fact is that they had got possession of them? Read *occupatis. in bonis esse* = *bona possidere* is a regular phrase; cf. s. 107 *qui sunt igitur in istis bonis quibus partem Chrysogonus dederit? duo Roscii*. For *occupare bona* see *Thes.* IX.2.385.26.

- 96 quid attinuit eum potissimum nuntiare quod, si nullum iam ante consilium de morte ac de bonis eius inieras . . . ad te minime omnium pertinebat?

eum is T. Roscius' client Mallius Glaucia, who brought the news of Sex. Roscius' murder to Ameria. Lambinus' second edition (1584) has *eum id potissimum*. If *id* is added, as I think it should be, let it rather come after *attinuit*.

- 107 ipsos [*sc.* Roscios] certo scio non negare ad haec bona Chrysogonum accessisse impulsu suo. si eum qui *indici causa* partem acceperit oculis cernetis, poteritisne dubitare, iudices, qui indicarit?

indici causa is Clark's conjecture for *iudiciuae* in the best manuscript (should *cā* for *causa* be postulated in a mediaeval manuscript?); other manuscripts have *indiciue*, *iudicine*, *iudici ut*, *indicii*. Landgraf reads *indicii pretium*, others other things. But I have little doubt that Cicero

wrote *indicivam*. *indiciva* = *indicii praemium* is used twice by the elder Seneca and twice by Apuleius; their manuscripts mostly corrupt it slightly, as Cicero's do here. The understood substantive might be *merces*, as the Thesaurus suggests, but why not *pars*? As is well known, such feminine forms are used both with and without a substantive, e.g., (*aqua*) *calida*, (*cena*) *viatica*.

PRO ROSCIO COMOEDO

- 11 quid est in arbitrio? mite, moderatum: QUANTUM AEQUIUS ET MELIUS SIT DARI. ille *tamen* confitetur plus se petere quam debeat, *sed* satis superque habere dicit quod sibi ab arbitro tribuatur.

For the sense cf. s. 13 *qui cum de hac pecunia . . . arbitrum sumpsit, iudicavit sibi pecuniam non deberi. tamen* and *sed*, both inappropriate, may be replaced by *autem* (Rinkes) or *iam* and *et* or *se* (cf. *Verr.* II.4.65 *iste ait se velle illud etiam considerare; nequaquam se esse satiatum*).

- 44 Manilio et Luscio negas esse credendum? . . . quid exspectas quam mox ego Luscium et Manilium dicam ordine esse senatores, aetate grandis natu, natura sanctos et religiosos, copiis rei familiaris locupletis et pecuniosos? non faciam; *nihil mihi detraham, cum illis exactae aetatis severissime fructum quem meruerunt retribuam*. magis mea adolescentia indiget illorum bona existimatione quam illorum severissima senectus desiderat meam laudem.

Mommsen substituted *ne* for *nihil*. But Cicero cannot be saying that due praise of these pillars of Roman respectability would or might detract from himself. Mommsen also expelled *severissime*, hardly to be tolerated with *severissima* below. Note too the rare clausula *retribuam*. Tinkering does not help. *nihil . . . retribuam* disrupts the sequence *non faciam*: *magis . . . laudem* and must be regarded as an idle adscript by someone who misunderstood what he read.

PRO CAECINA

- 57 is qui legitime procurator dicitur, omnium rerum eius qui in Italia non sit absitve rei publicae causa quasi quidam paene dominus

non sit = *non habitet*; cf. *Verr.* II.2.87 *qui fuit Himerae*, II.2.100 *cum eorum omnium edicto non liceret Romae quemquam esse qui rei capitalis condemnatus esset*. The next words conspicuously omit persons temporarily abroad on business of their own, like Cicero's client P. Quinctius,

whose procurator was called Alfenus. This cannot be intentional or accidental. Read *absitve* <vel sua vel> *rei publicae causa*; cf. *Off.* III.90 *ei cuius magis intersit vel sua vel rei publicae causa vivere*.

- 79 qua re permagnam initis a nobis gratiam, cum eum auctorem defensionis nostrae esse dicitis. illud autem miror, quem vos aliquid contra me sentire dicatis, cur eum auctorem vos pro me appelletis, nostrum nominetis.

quem Clark, *cum* T, *cur* cett. codd. *cur* Clark, *cum* codd. The following, or something to the following effect, is what I think Cicero wrote: *illud autem miror, cur meum* (Orelli) *auctorem vos pro me appelletis, vestrum* (codd. ck), *quem vos aliquid contra me sentire dicatis (dicitis?)*, <non> (Orelli) *nominetis*.

The opposition had urged the court not to pay overmuch attention to the authority of the jurist C. Aquillius Gallus, who, as they alleged, was advising Cicero in the case (ss. 77 ff). Cicero answers with an encomium of Aquillius and a welcome to the allegation. But, he adds, it was remarkable that they should name Aquillius instead of letting Cicero do it (*vos pro me appelletis*), while leaving their own legal adviser, whose opinion they quoted against Cicero, in anonymity.

The transposition in the manuscripts might be accounted for by supposing that the copyist's eye wandered from *urum* (or *nrum* if that corruption had already taken place) to *n* *n*- so that he omitted *quem* (*cum*) . . . *dicatis n*. *quem* (*cum*) . . . *dicatis* (without *n*) was added in the margin and then put back in the text before instead of after *cur* (*cum*) . . . *appelletis*.

- 95 postea cur tu, Aebutius, de isto potius fundo quam de alio, si quem habes, Caecinae denuntiabas, si Caecina non possidebat?

The property in question was claimed by Aebutius from Caecina, who had inherited it from his wife; cf. s. 19 *homini* (sc. *Caecinae*) *Romae in foro denuntiat fundum illum de quo ante dixi . . . suum esse*. In order to prove that Caecina had previously been in legal occupation Cicero argues that had this not been the case Aebutius would not have claimed the property; he would have claimed some other property owned by — whom? According to the vulgate (*si quem habes*), by Aebutius himself. Why should Aebutius claim his own property? Read *habet*. If the property had not been in Caecina's occupation, Aebutius would have fixed on some other place of Caecina's which *was* in Caecina's occupation. It is implied that, since Aebutius' claim was fraudulent anyway, he had a free choice.

- 104 cum haec ita sint, statuite quid vos tempora rei publicae de armatis hominibus, quid illius confessio de vi, quid nostra *decisio* de aequitate, quid ratio interdicti de iure admoneat ut iudicetis.

decisio cannot mean "explicatio verborum" (Manutius) or "les principes que nous avons établis" (Boulanger) or "conclusion" (Grose Hodge) or anything else in Ciceronian Latin except *pactio*, which makes no sense. Neither does *defensio* (Bruxellensis 14492; see A. Klotz' apparatus) give satisfaction. *disputatio* (becoming *dispucio*?) would be in place; cf. *Scaur.* 19 *quae potest eloquentia disputando ignoti hominis impudentiam confutare?*, *Dom.* 142 *revocate iam animos vestros ab hac subtili nostra disputatione*. The fact of the violence was established by Aebutius' admission, the equity by Cicero's argument, the law by the terms of the Praetor's interdict.

DIVINATIO IN CAECILIUM

- 8 populus Romanus interea, tametsi multis incommodis difficultatibusque adfectus est, tamen nihil aequae in re publica atque illam veterem iudiciorum *vim gravitatemque requirit*. *iudiciorum* desiderio tribunicia potestas efflagitata est

The words *vim . . . iudiciorum*, missing in the better manuscripts, are best regarded as conjectural and as such not commended by the heroic clausula *-temque requirit*. But the original was probably similar, perhaps *auctoritatem requirit*. *iudiciorum* or (better) *veterum iud. auct. requirit*. *quorum (iudiciorum)*; cf. s. 70 *ad legum defensionem iudiciorumque auctoritatem*, *Verr.* I.5 *cum . . . aliqua ex parte mea diligentia constituta auctoritas iudiciorum videretur*.

- 37 cum causam sociorum fortunasque provinciae, ius populi Romani, gravitatem *iudici* legumque susceperis

Verres' prosecutor would be upholding the judicial system, not this particular tribunal. All analogy calls for *iudiciorum legumque*; cf. s. 27 *vim legum, gravitatem iudiciorum*, 35 *in foro, iudiciis, legibus*, 68 *leges iudiciaque*, 70 (see previous note), *Verr.* II.1.82 *nostris . . . legibus ac iudiciis*, II.5.186 *legum iudiciorumque arbitri*, *Mil.* 18 *iure legum iudiciorumque*, *Phil.* VIII.10 *leges, iura, iudicia*, 11 *sine legibus, sine iudiciis*. Similarly *iudiciorum dignitas, auctoritas, existimatio* as in *Rab. Perd. R.* 20 et al.

IN VERREM

- I.48 ita res a me agetur ut in eorum consiliis omnibus non modo aures omnium, sed etiam oculi populi Romani interesse videantur.

omnium, Peterson's conjecture for *hominum*, was rightly dismissed by L. H. G. Greenwood, but *hominum* with *populi Romani* (\bar{p} . \bar{r} .) remains impossible. Elimination of the latter and emendation (*oculi et manus, oculi animique*) have been proposed, but perhaps it is better to eliminate the former, which may actually have arisen from *omnium* reflecting *omnibus*.

- I.55 illud a me novum, iudices, cognoscetis, quod ita testis constituam ut crimen totum explicem, ubi id *interrogando* argumentis atque oratione firmavero, tum testis ad crimen adcommodem, ut nihil inter illam usitatam accusationem atque hanc novam intersit, nisi quod in illa tum cum omnia dicta sunt testes dantur, hic in singulas res dabuntur, ut illis quoque eadem interrogandi facultas argumentandi dicendique sit.

The variant *ut ubi* for *ubi id* in Pseudo-Asconius seems without significance. Cicero's novel procedure is more perspicuously described in II.1.29 *sic a me sunt acta omnia priore actione ut in criminibus omnibus nullum esset in quo quisquam vestrum perpetuam accusationem requireret . . . etenim sic me ipsum egisse memoria tenetis ut in testibus interrogandis omnia crimina proponerem et explicarem, ut, cum rem totam in medio posuissem, tum denique testem interrogarem*. Instead of a preliminary speech covering the whole ground, he took each charge separately, first explaining and establishing it to the jury, then calling the relevant witnesses (*in testibus interrogandis* covers both parts of the process, as distinct from the *perpetua oratio* to come). The defence could follow suit.

interrogando, manifest nonsense where it stands, may be removed with Madvig (followed by Müller and A. Klotz), or better, transposed, not to precede *crimen totum* (Hotomanus) but to follow *tum*. Cicero is now consistent and clear enough, but he would be even clearer if he had written *ut primum unumquodque crimen totum explicem*.

- II.1.4 neque enim salus ulla rei publicae maior hoc tempore reperiri potest quam populum Romanum intellegere . . . socios, leges, rem publicam senatorio consilio *maxime* posse defendi.

In the vulgate *maxime* has to be taken with *senatorio consilio* (= *potissimum*), not with *defendi*, as by translators who allow themselves to render "safely" or "puissamment." But it is hard to see how this jury of Senators could be expected to prove that it was *better* for the job than any jury otherwise composed. *posse defendi* by itself says as much as is reasonable. Read <*cum*> *maxime* (cf. *hoc tempore* above). The demonstration had to be given then and there, before it was too late.

II.1.18 et cum eius patronus ex eo quaereret cur suos familiarissimos, Sex. Peducaeu, Q. Considium, Q. Iunium *reici* passus esset, respondit "quod eos in iudicando nimium sui iuris sententiaeque cognosset."

Pseudo-Asconius' note "*reici passus esset* Ac per hoc reiecisset ipse" supports the reading but does not explain it. The only possible explanation seems to be Mommsen's (*Strafrecht* 215 n.1): "Eine Anzahl von Geschworenen also konnte der Angeklagte bezeichnen, ohne dass der Ankläger dies zu hindern vermochte." This prerogative of the defense (or did it apply to the prosecution equally?) is nowhere else attested and seems to make a mockery of the challenging process. Despite the antiquity of the vulgate I suspect that Cicero wrote *reici* <*facile*> *passus esset*. Verres had been rather glad that these friends of his were challenged, though he obviously could not challenge them himself.

II.1.31 etenim qua stultitia fuissem, si, quam diem qui istum eripiendum redemerunt in cautione *viderunt*, — cum ita caverent, "si post Kalendas Ianuarias in consilium iretur," — in eam diem ego, cum potuissem vitare, incidissem!

(I have put a note of exclamation instead of Peterson's question mark.) For *viderunt*, which hardly seems admissible in any relevant sense, H. E. P. Platt conjectured *scripserunt*, Peterson *indixerunt*. Pseudo-Asconius, whose lemma stops at *redemerunt*, paraphrases *quam diem illi in promittendo elegerant*. Perhaps *vindicaverunt*, "claimed for themselves," "appropriated."

II.1.35 video quid egerim: erigit se, sperat sibi auram posse aliquam adflari in hoc crimine voluntatis *defensionisque* eorum quibus Cn. Carbonis mortui nomen odio sit, quibus illam relictionem prodicionemque consulis sui gratam sperat fore.

defensionisque is the vulgate, *dissensionisque* the paradosis, Peterson conjectured *consensionisque*, *adsensionisque* lurks in the shadows. I would read *offensionisque*, clarifying the nature of *voluntatis*; cf. II.3.220 *non est iam in lege neque in officio, sed in voluntate hominum atque avaritia positus modus aestimandi*. As Carbo's Quaestor Verres had betrayed his Consul. He now hoped that Sullan prejudice and hostility to Carbo would make his conduct acceptable.

II.1.62 sed ego omnia quae negari poterunt praetermittam; etiam *haec* quae certissima sunt et clarissima relinquam; unum aliquod de nefariis istius factis eligam

The offenses to be omitted are not specified either before or after. Read *ea*?

II.1.67 clamor interea fit tota domo; inter servos *Rubri* atque hospitis iactatur domi suae vir primarius et homo honestissimus; pro se quisque manus adfert; aqua denique ferventi a Rubrio ipso Philodamus perfunditur.

A. Klotz marks a lacuna before *inter servos*: "ac sane desideratur aliquid. nec enim recte dicitur: hospitem 'inter servos Rubri atque hospitis' iactari." A citation in the fourth(?) -century treatise *de Figuris* by Julius Rufinianus has *pugna inter servos*, whence *pugnatur* (Rau). This could be right, but one is reluctant to dissociate *inter servos* from *iactatur* (cf. *Thes.* VII.2.52.77, 55.21). Perhaps *suos*, easily lost after *servos* (cf. *servos suos ad se vocat* above), is to be substituted for *Rubri*, that being regarded as a gloss on *hospitis*.

II.1.90 sunt Romae legati Milesii, homines nobilissimi ac principes civitatis, qui tametsi mensem Februarium et consulum designatorum nomen *exspectant*, tamen hoc tantum facinus non modo negare interrogati, sed ne producti quidem reticere poterunt.

The Milesians knew their business would come before the Senate in February, the month prescribed for hearing foreign delegations, and they also knew that both Consuls would be friends of Verres, the elections having already taken place (cf. I.18); even so, they could not refuse their testimony to Verres' guilt. But *nomen exspectant* is not to be understood with Long "are yet uncertain what treatment to expect from the 'consules designati,' whose names they know." That is impossible for obvious reasons and for a reason less obvious: if Cicero had meant "the names of the Consuls-Designate" he would have used the plural *nomina*. The singular has to be collective, "the name 'Consuls-Designate'"; cf. *Phil.* V.25 *nomen ipsum legatorum hunc . . . restinguet ardorem*, *Rosc. Am.* 79 *restare tibi videbatur servorum nomen*, *Sest.* 105 *horum* (i.e., *popularium*) *homines nomen . . . amabant*, *Arch.* 27 *in qua urbe . . . poetarum nomen . . . coluerunt* et al.

exspectant then is doubly wrong. It cannot, of course, mean, as Pseudo-Asconius thought, *extimescunt*, and his mention of that word as a variant reading can be disregarded; so can Hotomanus' conjecture *Februarium exspectant et nomen extimescunt*. This is only another example of *exspectare* and *spectare* confused ("solemnis librariorum error," Garatoni on *Rosc. Com.* 42). Read *spectant*: "although they have an eye to next February and the word 'Consuls-Designate'"; cf., e.g., II.2.33 *cum iudex . . . voluntatem spectaret eius quem statim de capite suo putaret iudicaturum*.

II.1.98 forsitan meliores illi accusatores habendi sint, qui haec omnia fecerunt. *ita est*; sed ego defensorem in mea persona, non accusatorem, maxime laudari volo.

Omission of *ita est* (absent in one manuscript of little importance), was proposed by Orelli before Müller. But why were the words intruded? Cicero does not say *ita esto*, as in Long's text, nor yet, in his speeches, *ita sit*, though *sane ita sit* occurs in the *philosophica*. Perhaps he wrote here *qui haec omnia ita fecerunt. esto*.

II.1.100 quod minus Dolabella Verri acceptum rettulit quam Verres illi expensum *tulerit*, HS quingenta triginta quinque milia, et quod plus fecit Dolabella Verrem accepisse quam iste in suis tabulis habuit *sqq.*

tulerit, I suppose, should read *tulit*, in line with *habuit* below.

II.1.108 atque in his ipsis rebus multa videmus ita sancta esse legibus ut ante facta in iudicium non vocentur; Cornelia testamentaria, nummaria, ceterae complures, in quibus *sqq.*

"Cum Hotomano intellige *sunt*" (Zumpt). Easier, perhaps, to supply *ut est (sunt)* in the text; cf. *Div. I.34 ipsa sors contemnenda non est, si auctoritatem habet vetustatis, ut eae sunt sortes quas e terra editas accepimus*.

II.1.118 *ac*, per deos immortales! quid est quod de hoc dici possit?

The manuscripts, at this point much reduced in number and weight, are divided between *ac* and *at*, neither of which has any business. When thus introducing an indignant question or exclamation by way of comment on something just said, *per deos immortales* is not so preceded (cf. II.3.25, 84, 106; II.5.136).

II.1.142 praedibus et praediis populo cautum est; et, si non putas cautum, *scilicet* tu, praetor, in mea bona quos voles immittes, me ad meas fortunas defendendas accedere non sines.

Halm's attempt, one of a number, seems to point the right way: *et si non putas* [sc. *cautum esse*], *caveas licet*. But *amplius* is needed, as in Madvig's supplement *cautum*, <*amplius cavebitur*>; cf. s. 143 *ne parum locuples esset? at erat et esset amplius, si velles, populo cautum praedibus et praediis*. Perhaps then: *et si non putas cautum sa<ti>s, amplius caveas licet. tu, praetor, . . .*"

II.2.8 tametsi et illum annum pertulerant qui sic eos adfixerat ut salvi esse non possent, nisi C. Marcellus quasi aliquo fato venisset . . . et post M. Antoni infinitum illud imperium senserant.

"That awful year" (Greenwood) is the year 80, when M. Aemilius Lepidus was governor. Why does Cicero not name him? As Zumpt suggests, for fear of annoying Lepidus' surviving supporters. But since Cicero cannot have intended an unintelligible allusion, that explanation does not take us far. Were people so familiar with what had happened in Sicily ten years previously that they could be relied upon to make the identification straight away? Or did he write *illum annum Lepidianum*?

II.2.22 *petit Naeuius Turpio quidam . . . ; etenim erat eius modi causa ut ipse praetor, cum quaereret calumniatorem paulo tamen considerationem, reperire non posset. hunc hominem Veneri absolvit, sibi condemnat.*

hominem (corrected to *Dionem* in one manuscript) must be the victim Dio, not the plaintiff Turpio, so *hunc* cannot be right. *hic* (Hotomanus ex cod.), i.e., Verres, is no better. *tunc* comes to mind. It is to be met with in Zumpt's commentary (1831) and again in Creuzer and Moser's (1847).

II.2.32 *ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conventu civium Romanorum proponi solent.*

This concludes an exposé of standard trial procedures in Sicily in cases involving natives, under the following heads: cases between Sicilians of the same city; cases between Sicilians of different cities; community sued by individual or vice versa; Sicilian sued by Roman; Roman sued by Sicilian. What is meant by "all other cases"? Litigation between Romans or other non-Sicilians (Gronovius) is irrelevant because Cicero is explicitly concerned only with Sicilians (*Siculi hoc iure sunt*). Read *certarum*. In certain types of case, which Cicero does not think it necessary to specify, the judge in the last two categories was replaced by a jury of Roman citizens. He goes on to mention cases between farmers and tithe collectors, which were handled under the *lex Hieronica*, as another exception to general rule.

II.2.33 *aut si legibus erat iudicium constitutum et ad civem suum iudicem venerant, libere civi iudicare non licebat.*

civi ("the fellow-citizen in question") is unusual Latin. I suspect it to be a reflexion of *civis cum cive* and *civem*, to be removed or replaced by *ei*.

II.2.34 *selecti ex conventu aut propositi ex negotiatoribus iudices nulli: haec copia, quam dico, iudicum cohors non Q. Scaevolae, qui tamen de cohorte sua dare non solebat, sed C. Verris.*

"Dabantur, inquit, ex cohorte iudices; et ex qua cohorte? non Q. Scaevolae, sed C. Verris." But Cicero could never have written the vulgate. Perhaps he wrote <suppeditabat> *hanc copiam*.

II.2.100 nuntiabatur illi *primis* illis temporibus

No doubt the meaning is "soon afterwards, i.e., soon after Sthenius' trial" ("dictum videtur ut *paucis illis diebus*" Zumpt). *proximis* is suggested in my note on *Att.* VIII.14.1. See below on *Phil.* VIII.33.

II.2.143 is haec tamen constituat necesse est, primum averti pecuniam domum non placere, deinde ipsarum statuarum modum quendam esse oportere, deinde illud, certe ab invitis exigi non oportere.

The comma after *deinde illud* should follow *certe*; cf. *Quinct.* 65 *illud certe probari omnibus necesse est*, *Agr.* II.64 *unum hoc certe*, *Pis.* 36 *hoc certe video*, *Lig.* 27 *hoc certe* et sim.

II.2.180 multa enim quae scio a te esse commissae . . . praetermittam. tantum agam de hoc toto nomine societatis. ut iam scire possis, quaeram decretumne sit. cum id invenero, quaeram remotaene sint litterae. cum id quoque constabit, vos *sqq.*

To be repunctuated: *tantum agam de hoc toto nomine societatis, ut iam scire possis: quaeram sqq.* *tantum* is anticipatory, "just this much," as in s. 192 *tantum, opinor, Hortensi*. In fact Cicero goes into considerable detail (ss. 181 ff).

II.3.95 tu sic ordinem senatorium despexisti, . . . sic habuisti statutum cum animo ac deliberatum, omnis qui *habitarent* in Sicilia, aut qui Siciliam te praetore attigissent, iudices reicere, ut illud non cogitares tamen, ad eiusdem ordinis homines te iudices esse venturum?

Editors read *habitarent* rather than *haberent*, which has better manuscript authority, and so commit their text to the establishment of Roman Senators permanently residing outside Italy, because, presumably, "*haberent in Sicilia* is an odd phrase to express ownership of land in Sicily" (Long, echoing Zumpt). Not so; cf. *Rosc. Am.* 132 *qui in Sallentinis aut in Bruttis habent*, *Fam.* XVI.21.7 *habes* ("you are a landed proprietor"), also my explanation of *Mart.* III.48 (*Cl. Phil.* 73 [1978] 276). Peterson idly conjectures *agerent*.

II.3.100 Imacharensis iam omni frumento ablato, iam *omnibus* iniuriis tuis exinanitos, tributum facere miseros ac perditos coegisti

omnibus (= *tot*) is unusual Latin and corresponds ill with *omni frumento*. Perhaps a mechanical interpolation due to *omni*. Alternatively *tuis* might be omitted and *omnibus* understood as *παντοίοις*.

II.3.121 illi ipsi qui remanserant, vix *decuma* pars aratorum, relicturi agros omnes erant, nisi *sqq.*

Cicero has just produced a series of figures showing how Verres' acts of oppression had depleted the farming population of the province. Out of 83 farmers in the district of Leontini 32 remained in his third year. Corresponding figures for three other areas are given as 86 out of 187, 120 out of 252, 80 out of 250. Total: 318 out of 772. These numbers, Cicero adds, fairly represented the situation throughout the island. Assuming that the orator and the jury were capable of that much arithmetic, I hope he may be acquitted out of hand of a shameless falsehood. He wrote *vix dimidia*. The scribe's inadvertence can easily be pardoned. He had just written *decumano* and had *decumas* coming in a moment, his head was full of the number ten.

II.3.131 hoc cum palam decumani tota provincia loquerentur . . . nihilne tibi venit in mentem . . . fortunis tuis providere? cum . . . decumani aratoribus ad pactiones faciendas non suam vim, sed tuum scelus ac nomen opponerent. ecquod iudicium Romae tam dissolutum . . . fore putasti, quo ex iudicio te ulla Salus servare posset?

The occlusive full stop after *opponerent* (a colon can be found in old editions) should be a comma, or else a question-mark.

II.3.165 ac primum hoc ex te quaero: *tu*, cui publicani ex Carpinati litteris gratias egerunt, pecunia publica . . . fueritne tibi quaestui, pensitaritne tibi binas centesimas?

Ernesti bracketed *tu* and Benedict changed to *tibi*, but editors still prefer the "egregium ἀνακόλουθον" (Orelli). Would it not be better to read *ex te quaero, te, cui . . . egerunt: pecunia sqq.*? Cf. II.4.79 *te nunc, P. Scipio, te, lectissimum ornatissimumque adulescentem appello*. The irony of *cui . . . egerunt* is underlined by the repeated pronoun. Verres had lent public money to *publicani* and pocketed the interest. They had intended to demand its return (s. 167), but instead their local agent Carpinatius persuaded his principals to destroy the records and thank the governor for sundry good offices.

II.3.176 mala est haec quidem, ut dixi, ac potius perdita maximorum peccatorum, *huius autem* iniquitatis et inertiae confessio, non defensio criminis.

The words *huius autem* (followed by *et* in an inferior tradition) are an unmanageable encumbrance. Graevius deleted *autem*, but *huius* must go too. With reference to Verres Cicero would here have written *tuae* (rather than *istius*), but there is no room for such a reference anyway. To account for the presence of the words is another matter. Could they have been added by somebody who took *peccatorum* as masculine, referring to the *mancipes* of the previous sentence, and wished it to be clear that *iniquitatis* and *inertiae* belong to Verres? Relieved of the intrusion these two genitives define *peccatorum*. Or read *hoc est*?

II.4.6 qui forum et basilicas non spoliis provinciarum sed ornamentis amicorum, *commodis* hospitum non furtis nocentium ornarent

The only real support for *commodum* = "loan (of an object)" seems to be Isid. *Etym.* V.25.16, where Lindsay reads *commodatum*. So far as I can discover, nobody has actually proposed to read *commodatis* here. This too is hardly found except in the jurists, who use it regularly. But there is no other single Latin word for a loaned article (*res commodata*) and Cicero needed one to balance *furtis*.

II.4.123 ac videte quanto taetrior hic tyrannus Syracusanis fuerit quam quisquam superiorum, *quia*, *cum* illi tamen ornarint templa deorum immortalium, hic etiam illorum monumenta atque ornamenta sustulit.

quia, *cum* is Peterson's conjecture. The manuscripts have *quia* or *quā* (whence Orelli *umquam*) or *cum* (*quum* R. Klotz, *quom* A. Klotz). Perhaps the answer is *qui*, *cum* (*quīc*). For the sequence *hic . . . qui . . . hic* see *Thes.* VI.2710.66, VII.2.464.56 (add *Cluent.* 7 *hunc locum . . . quem illi horribilem A. Cluentio ac formidolosum fore putaverunt, eum tandem* sqq.)

II.5.5 nos enim nihil umquam prorsus audivimus, sed illud audivimus, M. Crassi . . . virtute consilioque factum ne sqq.

"Nihil, sc. tale" (E. Thomas), and so translators. *nihil tale umquam* or *nihil umquam prorsus tale* is what Cicero will have written; cf. *Phil.* IV.3 *nihil ex omni saeculorum memoria tale cognovi*, *Rep.* II.42 *nihil ut tale ulla in re publica reperiatur*, et sim.

II.5.6 at cum esset in Italia bellum tam prope a Sicilia, tamen in Sicilia non fuit. quid mirum? ne cum in Sicilia quidem fuit eodem intervallo, pars eius belli in Italiam ulla pervasit.

at . . . fuit, an argument on Verres' side, has to be a question: "Did the Slave War on the Italian side of the straits then leave Sicily unaffected?" Nothing surprising about that . . ."

- II.5.55 numquam in Sicilia frumentum publice est emptum quin Mamertinis pro portione imperaretur, antequam hoc delectum praeclarumque consilium *iste* dedit, ut ab his nummos acciperet ac sui similis esset.

Verres' *consilium*, consisting of his creatures, advised him to exempt Messana from the general obligation to furnish grain and Verres accepted their recommendation with pleasure: s. 54 *de consili sententia libenter ait se facere, itaque perscribit*. I do not believe that *consilium dedit ut acciperet* can mean "set the council to work so as to get . . ." or anything else which would make sense here. *isti* (Orelli) is a perfect and painless remedy, but modern editors do not seem to have noticed it. For *dare alicui ut* see *Thes.* V.1.1690.57.

- II.5.125 quid vero? illa Segestanorum non solum litteris tradita neque commemorata verbis, sed multis officiis illorum usurpata et comprobata cognatio quos tandem fructus huiusce necessitudinis in istius imperio tulit?

"*Huiusce necessitudinis* est ajouté par anacolouthé; sous-entendez *Segestana civitas* comme sujet de *tulit*" (Thomas). Is not that asking rather much? It might be better to read: *quid vero illa . . . cognatio? quos tandem fructus* <*hic populus*> *huiusce* sqq. Cf. *Div.* I.18 (from the poem *de Consulatu*) *quid vero Phoebi fax . . .?*, *Flacc.* 5 (fr. iii) *quid vero Decianus?* (and my note on *Att.* II.12.2 *quid Caesar?*).

PRO CLUENTIO

- 30 vos quaeso memoria teneatis non mihi hoc esse propositum ut accusem Oppianicum mortuum sed, cum hoc persuadere vobis velim, iudicium ab hoc non esse corruptum, hoc uti initio ac fundamento defensionis, *Oppianicum*, hominem sceleratissimum et nocentissimum, esse damnatum.

For *oppianicum hominem* the (superior) Cluniac tradition has *oppianicum mortuum hominem*. *mortuum* is easily dismissed as a mechanical repetition, but the result is unsatisfactory. Cicero asks the jury to bear in mind that he is not prosecuting the deceased Oppianicus; but he has to show that the man condemned at the previous trial was guilty, for that means that it was he and not Cluentius who needed to bribe the court. The repetition of the name is worse than uncalled for, it damages the point. The Cluniac reading betrays what really happened. *oppianicum mortuum* got into the text either by repetition from above or from the margin, where it may have been a gloss on *hominem*. The Laurentian

tradition (our vulgate) represents a further stage of corruption. The unassimilable *mortuum* is dropped, but *oppianicum*, being superficially free of objection, remains.

69 HS DCXL deferri ad se domum iussit.

In Clark's text the same numeral appears in ss. 74, 82, and 87. The numeral here is his conjecture, and only in 74 and 82 does it have anything like respectable manuscript authority. But the Cluniac tradition has *XXXX* (*milia*) in the first three places and *sexcenta* (*et*) *quadraginta milia* in the fourth.

It does not yet seem to have been generally recognized that the "subtractive" notation of numbers (IV instead of IIII and so on) has very little support in Cicero's better manuscripts, at any rate in the Letters and Speeches (I have not looked further). The only examples in the Letters, I believe, are *XIX* in the Mediceus at *Fam.* V.20.3, where I read *XX* for this reason, and *IV Kal.* in *Att.* XIII.19.1, where there are vv. 1.1. *VI* and *VIII* (read *IIII*). *XIV* in *Att.* XV.3.2 is read in most editions, including my Oxford Text of 1961, but Sjögren-Önnerfors and my edition of 1967 have *XIIII* without notice of variant, so I suppose this is what we found in our photographs. In *Att.* XV.4.1 *IX Kal.* is the vulgate, but it is a conjecture (by Schiche) for *X* (v.l. *XI*). Certainly this is the right date, unless there was a *lapsus calami* on Cicero's part. I should now have to write it *VIIII*. In *Quinct.* 24 most editors emend *IV* to *II* (Hotomanus) for a different reason. Kinsey, who does not, remarks that Orelli seems to have been correct in thinking that *a.d. II = pridie* is not in accordance with Latin usage; but see my note on *Fam.* XIV.4.3. *XL* is found in texts of *Verr.* I.31, *Agr.* III.4 (where Früchtel and others have *quadragesimum*), and *Pis.* 4 (but A. Klotz has *XXXX*), *IX* at *Verr.* II.1.156. These can hardly stand (even if they are really the paradosis) against the overwhelming preponderance of "additive" forms (eleven in *Verr.* II.2 and 3 alone) and should be replaced by words.

76 non nulli autem severi homines qui hoc statuerunt, quo quisque animo quid faceret spectari oportere, etsi alii pecunia accepta verum iudicabant, tamen nihilo minus se superioribus suis iudiciis constare putabant oportere; itaque damnarunt.

As argued in *Cl. Rev.* 3 (1959) 200 f, *non* must have dropped out after *spectari*. On the conjectural addition of negatives see my note on *Fam.* VII.18.2.

- 123 ac primum illud statuamus utrum, quia censores subscripserint, ita sit, an quia ita fuerit, illi subscripserint. si quia subscripserint, videte quid agatis ne in unum quemque nostrum censoribus in posterum potestatem regiam permittatis

Commas are needed after *statuamus* and *agatis*. Something corresponding to *ita sit* must have dropped out before *videte*, e.g., *si, quia subscripserint*, <*ita esse existimandum est*>. The alternative *an quia ita fuerit, illi subscripserint* is duly taken up below: *sin autem quod subscripserint, quia verum est, idcirco grave debet esse*.

- 184 *hem* hoc illud est quod ante dixi: mulier abundat audacia, consilio et ratione deficitur.

hem is Clark's conjecture. That exclamation is found only twice in Cicero's writings, in ultra-pathetic contexts (*Rab. Post.* 45, *Fam.* xiv.7.2). A. Klotz reads *em*, Früchtel, with the Laurentian tradition, *en*. However, the superior Cluniac tradition offers *item*, which suggests *idem hoc illud est* (i.e., *hoc est idem illud*).

- 186 quid ais, T. Atti? tu periculum capitis, tu indicium sceleris, tu fortunas alterius litteris *conscriptas* in iudicium adferes neque earum auctorem litterarum neque obsignatorem neque testem ullum nominabis?

fortunas litteris conscriptas is a monstrosity. Read *conscriptis*, "by means of a written document"; cf *N.D.* III.42 *quem aiunt Phrygiās litteras conscripsisse*. Here *conscriptis* carries on the innuendo of falsification from *orationem Stratonis conscribere* (s. 184) and *videtis . . . mulierem . . . hanc fictam quaestionem conscripsisse* (s. 185).

On the prosecutor's name (Attius, not Accius) see my *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature* (1976) 4.

- 201 nunc vero quid erit profectum nisi ut huius ex mediis mortis insidiis vita ad luctum conservata, mors sepulcro *patris* privata esse videatur?

"The sepulchre of his fathers," "le tombeau de ses pères"; and so Long: "If he was condemned and left his country, he would not be buried with his fathers." And so (*patrio*) doubtless Cicero; cf. *Rosc. Am.* 24 *cui . . . ne iter quidem ad sepulchrum patrum reliquisset*, *Rab. Perd. R.* 37 *ne patrio sepulchro privetur laborat*.

PRO FONTEIO

- 34 si turpi adulescentia, vita infami, magistratibus quos ante oculos vestros gessit <male gestis>, convictus virorum bonorum testimoniis, legationibus flagitiose obitis, invisus suis omnibus in iudicium vocaretur

male gestis is Madvig's supplement. The same scholar's proposal to delete *virorum bonorum testimoniis* is less plausible. *virorum bonorum* is needed to balance *suis omnibus*; and cf. s. 35 *nunc vero, cum laedat nemo bonus*. But, following a neglected proposal of Hotomanus, *convictus* (*convictis* codd.) . . . *testimoniis* must change places with *legationibus* . . . *obitis* to yield three rhetorically balanced pairs. *male gestis legationibus flagitiose obitis* will have been omitted and added in the margin, then restored to the text in the wrong place and without *male gestis*.

- 39 is igitur vir quem ne inimicus quidem satis in appellando significare poterat, nisi *ante* laudasset

Either Cicero or a copyist has been careless here. I am going to assume it is the copyist. The words follow the story of how C. Gracchus once complained of having to call his enemy "Frugi" in order to distinguish him from other Pisones. In naming him (*in appellando*) he could not have "praised" him (i.e., called him "Frugi") *beforehand* (*ante*). It will not do to suggest that *appellare* is used generally, "accost" rather than "name"; Gracchus had been obliged to use the name to his orderly, who was to summon Piso to a meeting. *ante* (*āte*) should be *eadem* (*eadē*; sc. *opera*). This adverb is found mainly before and after the classical period, but Cicero uses it in letters for *eadem via*. Here he may have found it in his source for the anecdote. Cf. Boulanger: "en même temps."

PRO LEGE MANILIA

- 14 qua re si propter socios nulla ipsi iniuria lacesciti maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt, quanto vos studiosius convenit iniuriis provocatos sociorum salutem una cum imperi vestri dignitate defendere . . . ?

Again to be punctuated as an exclamation rather than a question; cf. Housman, *Classical Papers* 1083, 1211 ff. *vestris* (*ur̄is*) would easily fall out after *iniuriis* and is rhetorically desirable, indeed, as it seems to me, almost necessary.

- 62 quid tam singulare quam ut ex senatus consulto legibus solutus consul ante fieret quam ullum alium magistratum per leges capere licuisset?

Since Pompey in 70 was of legal age to hold the Quaestorship or Tribune, *magistratum* has to be understood as "curule magistracy." But is that legitimate? Rather, *curulem* has fallen out here, as in the manuscripts of Val. Max. VIII.15.8 *nondum ullum honorem auspicatus bis triumphavit*, where however *curulem* is supplied by editors after *honorem* from Paris' epitome. Cf. Att. XIII.32.2 *video enim curulis magistratus eum legitimis annis perfacile cepisse. alium*, absent in the Harleiensis, would certainly be no loss.

DE LEGE AGRARIA

- I.20 quid enim cavendum est in coloniis deducendis? si luxuries, Hannibalem ipsum Capua corrumpit, si superbia, nata inibi esse haec ex Campanorum fastidio videtur, si praesidium, non praepositur huic urbi ista colonia, sed opponitur.

praesidium was the usual reason for founding a Roman colony, not something to beware of; cf. Phil. V.27 *coloniam populi Romani praesidi causa collocatam*, Leg. Agr. II.73, Font. 13, Liv. I.56.3, Hor. Sat. II.1.37, App. B.C. I.96 *φρούρια κατὰ τῆς Ἰταλίας*, II.140 *φύλακας εἶναι τῶν πεπολεμηκότων*.¹ *quid sequendum?* vel sim. must have dropped out before *si praesidium*. J. H. Freese renders "if protection is our object."

- II.10 neque vero illa popularia sunt existimanda, iudiciorum perturbationes, rerum iudicatarum infirmationes, restitutio damnatorum, qui civitatum adflictarum perditis iam rebus extremi *exitiorum* solent esse exitus.

"Videtur esse delenda vox, *exitiorum*" Lambinus. Kayser held *qui . . . exitus* for an interpolation suggested by Verr. II.5.12 *perditae civitates desperatis iam omnibus rebus hos solent exitus exitialis habere, ut damnati in integrum restituantur* sqq. But all would be well if *exitiorum* were away. *exitus* may have suggested it to the copyist's mind, especially if he recalled the Verrine parallel. Alternatively, *extremi* might be a gloss on an original reading *exitiales*.

- II.13 aliquando tandem me designato lex in publicum proponitur.

¹ Most of these references are due to Professor P. B. Harvey.

One branch of the tradition has *tandem*, the other *tamen*, between which there seems nothing to choose. Translators are forced to render a word which is not in the text, but ought to be: *etiamnunc* (cf. *Thes.* V.2.960.19). The Tribunes published their law almost at the end of the year, when Cicero was about to exchange his status of Designate for that of Consul. Zumpt did not mend matters by punctuating *aliquando, tamen me designato, lex* ("sed tamen cum etiam tunc essem designatus, cum nondum consulatum inissem").

II.34 interea dissolvant iudicia publica, e consiliis abducant quos velint, singuli de maximis rebus iudicent, *quaestori* permittant, finitorem mittant, ratum sit quod finitor uni illi a quo missus erit renuntiaverit.

The emendation *quaestori* in a note by Torrentius Levinus printed in the margin of the Aldine edition (1554), almost painfully obvious and obviously right, is ignored by the generality of editors. Früchtel, however, mentions it in his apparatus with a reference to Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* II.1. 634 n.5, who had naturally endorsed it.²

II.43-44 iudicabit Alexandream regis esse, a populo Romano abiudicabit. primum cur <de> populi Romani *hereditate* xviri iudicent, cum vos volueritis de privatis hereditatibus civiros iudicare?

cur (Pluygers) for *cum* (codd.) is evidently right; not so *de populi Romani hereditate* (Müller) for *populi Romani hereditatem*. Better to retain this and read *abiudicent*.

II.47-48 sequitur enim caput, quo capite . . . cogit atque imperat ut xviri vestra vectigalia vendant nominatim, Quirites. *eam* tu mihi ex ordine recita de legis scripto populi Romani auctionem; quam me hercule ego praeconi huic ipsi luctuosam et acerbam praedicationem futuram puto.

Quirites. eam is Clark's substitute for *quam* (del. Ussing). Better perhaps to substitute *Quirites* (without *eam*); cf. *Red. ad Quir.* 22, *Phil.*

² Professor Harvey kindly comments: "Editors who prefer *quaestori* are, one thinks, not only deceived by an obvious *lectio facilior*, but also not well versed in Roman legal terminology and process. The terminology throughout this section (and at 2.56 fin.-57), when purged of Cicero's clever rhetorical irrelevancies . . . is most appropriate to what we know of *cognitiones*, esp. agrarian *cognitiones*. One might add to Mommsen's comments by pointing to the phrasing and terms in *Edict. Claud.* de controvers. agror. Anaun. Ins. 18-19 (*ILS* 206 = *CIL*. 5.5050): 'summa cura inquisierit et cognoverit.'"

IV.1, where Peterson notes that *Quirites*, abbreviated *Q.* or *q̃.* or *qr.* or *quī*, is often corrupted to "e.g., *quam*, *que*, *quia*."

II.57 *sed quae* <*est*> *haec impudentia*

So modern editors for *sed quid haec* with ascription to Madvig, who says (*Adv.* III p. 129) "sic editur e Gruteri coniectura." I prefer another neglected adscript of Torrentius, *sed quid hoc impudentius?*, a favorite kind of expression with Cicero; cf. *Pis.* 49 *quid hoc turpius?*, *Att.* VII.9.4 *nam quid impudentius?* et sim.

II.98 *haec tu cum istis tuis auctoribus excogitasti, ut vetera vectigalia nostra* <*expilaretis*>, *exploraretis nova*

nostra expleretis noua codd. *expilaretis* (Lauredanus) is very likely right, and Clark was very likely right to add another verb; but *exploraretis* (cod. Turnebi) is plainly inapposite. Perhaps *extorqueretis*.

II.99 *ut nihil auro et argento violari, nihil numero et servitiis declarari, nihil vi et manu perfringi posset quod non vos oppressum atque ereptum teneretis.*

servitiis is one of Clark's less fortunate inspirations. There is nothing suspicious in *suffragiis* (codd.); the trouble evidently lies with the senseless *declarari*. *depravari* (Madvig) is idle, *dilacerari* is a word not used by Cicero, *delacerari* (Bücheler, according to Früchtel's apparatus) is not a Latin word at all. I think the reference has to be to confiscations by popular vote (cf. *Dom.* 20 *cum lege nefaria Ptolomaeum . . . publicasses*); not "ad ea comitia quibus honores mandantur" (Zumpt). The verb needed is *publicari*, corrupted perhaps by way of *duplicari*. As Cicero goes on to say, the Commissioners would rove over the world *cum imperio summo, cum iudicio infinito, cum omni pecunia*; any property that was liable to be bought (the pejorative *violari* is rhetorical), confiscated, or taken by force would be at their mercy.

PRO MURENA

16 *nec mihi umquam minus in Q. Pompeio, novo homine et fortissimo viro, virtutis esse visum est quam in homine nobilissimo. M. Aemilio. etenim eiusdem animi atque ingeni est posteris suis, quod Pompeius fecit, amplitudinem nominis quam non acceperit tradere et, ut Scaurus, memoriam prope intermortuam generis sua virtute renovare.*

minus (omitted in ed. Veneta and placed before *virtutis* in cod. Monac. 15734) stultifies the passage. Cicero has just observed that he

has always looked upon the patrician Ser. Sulpicius Rufus as a man of his own (equestrian) class (*in nostrum numerum adgregare soleo*) because, as the son of a Knight and grandson of an undistinguished Senator, Sulpicius had risen in the world *virtute industriaque*. Then he compares Sulpicius with the great self-made *nobilis* of a previous generation, M. Aemilius Scaurus, and (by implication) himself with the *novus homo* Q. Pompeius. The *nobilis* who makes his own way must be credited with as much *virtus* as the *novus homo* who does the same. All this is a compliment to sugar the pill; Cicero's real point is that for electoral purposes Sulpicius did not count as a *nobilis* at all.

The vulgate stands this compliment on its head: Pompeius had as much *virtus* as Scaurus (so Cicero had as much as Sulpicius). That claim is irrelevant in a context which basically is not concerned with Sulpicius vis-à-vis Cicero but with Sulpicius vis-à-vis Murena — not a *nobilis*, but by no means *novus* either. And nobody but an imbecile would solemnly parade a long-cherished opinion that it took no less *virtus* for a *novus homo* to get to the top than for a *nobilis*. But everybody might not realize, as Cicero did, that if the *nobilis* started as far down as Scaurus and Sulpicius, it did not take any more. *minus* must have been substituted for *plus* by somebody who, like Cicero's editors, had no idea what he is driving at.

23 non patiar te in tanto errore versari ut istud nescio quid quod *tanto opere* didicisti praeclarum aliquid esse arbitrere.

didicisti (not *dilexisti* or *diligis* or (*quo*) *delectaris*) is the right verb, but *tanta opera* must replace *tanto opere*, with which it is not synonymous; cf. *Tusc.* 1.103 *multam . . . operam . . . frustra consumpsi* et sim. In the next sentence Cicero says: *quod quidem ius civile didicisti, non dicam operam perdidisti*.

56 accusat Ser. Sulpicius, sodalis *filius*, cuius ingenio paterni omnes necessarii munitiores esse debebant.

filius is a correction of Zumpt's, but *filii* has little real authority. One manuscript has *fil.*, and *Σ*, which Clark reckons as "instar omnium" in his preface, leaves the word out. It is also impossible. *paternei necessarii* shows that the younger Sulpicius' father was a friend of Murena's and from the absence of any mention of Murena's son in the peroration it is a safe inference that at this time he did not have one.

The passage clears away one doubt which has persisted through the centuries. It proves that this young man was *not* the son of the prosecutor-in-chief, Ser. Sulpicius Rufus. The prosecution was, to be sure,

largely a family effort. Another of the three *subscriptores* is called "Postumus" in the manuscripts but was probably a Postumius, in some way connected with Sulpicius senior's wife (cf. my *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature* [1976] 59 f). Commentators have tended to keep an open mind on the question whether the two Sulpicii were father and son, though Zumpt and Heitland denied it, mainly on the ground that the relationship is nowhere mentioned in Cicero's speech. That is certainly a telling point, all the more so in view of the personal friendship between Cicero and the elder Sulpicius. It is also argued that references to Ser. Sulpicius Rufus *filius* in Cicero's correspondence of 51-43 and in *Phil.* IX.9 give the impression of a man hardly old enough to have acted as *subscriptor* in 63.

In his article in *RE* (Sulpicius, 96) Münzer adduces these two arguments but concludes none the less that the identity of the two younger Servii remains very probable. In this passage it is decisively refuted. If the elder Sulpicius had been Murena's *sodalis*, Cicero would have been sure to make something of it; here, where he is concerned to show that none of the four prosecutors harbored any enmity toward his client, mention of the fact in connection with the younger instead of the elder Sulpicius (of whom he merely says that he had been actuated, not by any injury on Murena's part, but by their electoral rivalry) would defy explanation. Nor could anything be more incongruous than to tell the young man that he should be protecting all his father's connections if that same father was the principal prosecutor.

The contrary opinion presents no difficulties. The *subscriptor* will not have been Caesar's Legate and assassin Ser. Sulpicius Galba, as Zumpt supposed. For Sulpicii Galbae, like most *nobiles* (the Sulpicii Rufi are among the exceptions), are usually referred to by cognomen rather than gentilicium. The Sulpicii Rufi at this period existed in at least one other branch, which included another Caesarian Legate, P. Sulpicius Rufus, who may have been a son of the Tribune of 88. In view of the political associations involved our Servius is more likely to have been the Tribune's nephew or second cousin, perhaps son of Pomponius Atticus' connection Ser. Sulpicius (*RE* 19). Note also the Pompeian Senator Ser. Sulpicius (*RE* 21) and a contemporary moneyer (*RE* 20), who seems however to have been a Galba.

- 71 noli igitur eripere *hunc* inferiori generi hominum fructum officii, Cato; sine eos qui omnia a nobis sperant habere ipsos quoque aliquid quod nobis tribuere possint. si nihil erit praeter ipsorum suffragium, *tenues*, *etsi* suffragantur, nil valent gratia.

Perhaps *hunc* should be *huic. tenues, etsi* (Clark) is the sort of conjecture an editor would hardly put into his text if it were not his own; the manuscripts have *tenue* (*tenue*) *est si (sed)*. Cicero's point is that humble folk (*homines tenues*) do not have anything to offer their patrons except their votes and personal services — no *gratia*. There have been other proposals, less plausible, as it seems to me, than the following: *si . . . suffragium, leve est: ipsi suffragantur, nil valent gratia. tenue* would be apt to replace *leue* from the pen of a copyist who had just written *homines tenues* and *tenuiorum amicorum*.

71 itaque et legi Fabiae, quae est de numero sectatorum, et senatus consulto quod est L. Caesare consule factum restiterunt.

"The reading *L. Caesare consule* has not received the suspicion it deserves. When purely concerned with dating a year Cicero almost always gives the name of both consuls, e.g., in *Sull.* 56 our year 64 is referred to by *L. Iulio C. Figulo consulibus*." So T. E. Kinsey (*Rev. Belge de Phil. et Hist.* 43 [1965] 57). For further elaboration see his article. In fact the point had been made previously, most forcefully by Zumpt, who printed *a L. Caesare*, found according to his note in one manuscript. This could be right, though *factum est s.c. a consule* = *factum est s.c. consule referente* is not so everyday as he says; but cf. *Phil.* XIV.5 *quid C. Pansa egit aliud . . . senatus consultis faciendis gravissimis in Antonium . . . ?* Or *referente* may have dropped out after *consule*, as Kinsey suggests, or *hoc* before *L.* (assuming that L. Caesar was in court). But after all, an ordinary date may be the most likely answer: *L. Caesare* <*C. Figulo*> *cos(s)*.

IN CATILINAM

II.3 sed quam multos fuisse putatis qui quae ego deferrem non crederent, quam multos qui propter stultitiam non putarent, quam multos qui etiam defenderent, quam multos qui propter improbitatem faverent?

I am not in favor of deleting *quam . . . putarent* (Halm, cod. Laurent. XLV.2) or *quam . . . faverent* (Bloch), but the former belongs where the best manuscripts and the latest Teubner editor, P. Reis, put it, after *defenderent*. A supplement is necessary: *quam multos qui propter stultitiam* <*coniurationem factam*> *non putarent*; cf. I.30 *neminem tam stultum fore qui non videat coniurationem esse factam*. There are now two pairs: first, applying particularly to Cicero's revelations, those who would have disbelieved and those who would have spoken up on behalf of the offenders;

second, more generally, those stupid enough to think there was no plot and those wicked enough to wish it well.

PRO SULLA

66 eius aspectus . . . greges hominum perditorum metum nobis
seditionesque adferebant.

Madvig's *metum nobis* <*caedis*> *seditionisque* should be adopted in the form *seditionis* <*caedis*>*que*.

68 de quo etiam si quis dubitasset antea *an* id quod tu arguis cogitasset
 . . . sustulisti hanc suspicionem, cum dixisti *sqq.*

an (Eberhard) is a conjectural substitute for *num*, which some editors rightly retain. It suits the suggestion in my note on *Fam.* VII.32.1 that there is a semantic difference between *num* and *an* in such passages, the former implying that the possibility in mind is unlikely or unwelcome.

71 semper audax, petulans, libidinosus; quem in stuprorum *defen-*
sionibus non solum verbis uti improbissimis solitum esse scimus
 verum etiam pugnis et calcibus.

Commentators on *stuprorum defensionibus* explain that "Autronius was wont to appear as the advocate of culprits tried for licentious conduct" (Reid) or understand the words as referring to self-defense against accusations of such conduct. Whom, it may be wondered, did he punch and kick, the prosecutor, or the witnesses, or the jury? And why only in cases involving "licentious conduct"? He would be more likely to resort to foul language and physical violence when caught *in flagranti delictu*. I had thought of *offensionibus*, "mishaps" (cf. *Man.* 28 *non offensionibus belli sed victoriis*), but gave it up in favor of a suggestion made privately by Dr. L. Håkanson, *depre(he)nsionibus*, "when caught in the act." The noun is rare, but Cicero has it in *Cluent.* 50 *veneni deprehensione*.

76 beluae quaedam illae *ex portentis* immanes ac ferae forma hominum
 indutae exstiterunt.

belua, as Reid remarks, is a favorite word in Ciceronian invective, and so is *portentum* (of persons), but *beluae ex portentis*, "monsters born of prodigies," is surely too much. For *ex portentis* read *et portenta*. The copyist may have been offended by *immanes* in agreement with the remoter substantive (cf. Kühner-Stegmann, I.53).

PRO FLACCO

- 78 "decrevit Flaccus." num aliud atque oportuit? "in liberos." num aliud censuit senatus? "in absentem." decrevit, cum ibidem esses, cum prodire nolles; non est hoc in absentem, sed in latentem *reum*.
SENATUS CONSULTUM ET DECRETUM FLACCI.

reum is not in the Bobbio Scholiast's lemma (at least, so editors say, though see Stangl's note). It is at any rate an objectionable superfluity, whereas *recita* (Halm) is imperatively required. But the documents here need specification for the *praeco*'s benefit, so read: *recita* <*senatus consultum et decretum Flacci*>. *SENATUS CONSULTUM ET DECRETUM FLACCI*. Cf. Lambinus' supplement in *Dom.* 136 *recita senatus consultum*. *SENATUS CONSULTUM* ("et potest quidem excidis littera .R. (= Recita)" [Peterson]) and *Verr.* II.3.74 *cognoscite Agyrinensium publicas litteras, deinde testimonium publicum civitatis. recita*, where editors supply *LITTERAE PUBLICAE. TESTIMONIUM PUBLICUM*.

Thus the clausula — ∪ — ∪ — ∪ comes twice in this passage. Cicero's normal rhythmic habits do not govern such short, staccato sentences, a fact not sufficiently taken into account by E. Fraenkel in his *Leseproben aus Reden Ciceros und Catos* (pp. 198 f.).

- 79 quid? haec Apollonidenses occasionem nacti ad Flaccum <*non*> detulerunt, apud Orbium acta non sunt, ad Globulum delata non sunt?

non (Lambinus) is added by many editors. Du Mesnil, who considered an added negative unquestionably necessary, preferred *nonne* after *occasionem*. But Cicero has been misunderstood. He means that the complaint was not just made to Flaccus on the spur of the moment; it had already been brought before his two predecessors. "Did they complain to Flaccus without having previously complained to Orbius and Globulus?" Greek would employ μέν and δέ.

- 85 tu, T. Vetti, si quae tibi in Africa venerit hereditas, *usu* amittes, an tuum nulla avaritia salva dignitate retinebis?

"Either 'lose by someone else taking possession of it' or 'lose from use' (i.e., a parallel to *usu capio*)." So Webster, repeating traditional doctrine and adding that the former seems more likely. Neither seems at all likely to me, and I rather suspect that *usu* comes from *utrū*.

- 87 sed tamen Lurconem, quamquam pro sua dignitate moderatus est in testimonio dicendo orationi suae, tamen iratum Flacco esse vidistis.

orationi (Bremius) replaces the *paradosis religioni*. Teubner editors prefer *dicendo religiose orationi* (Schoell), which makes a muddle. I rather imagine that the original ran: *pro sua dignitate et religione moderatus est . . . orationi suae. religioni* in the manuscripts will then represent (*et*) *religione*, omitted from the text and put back in the wrong place.

POST REDITUM IN SENATU

- 9 audieram ex sapientissimo homine atque optimo civi et viro, Q. Catulo, non saepe unum consulem improbum, duo vero numquam excepto illo Cinnano tempore fuisse; qua re meam causam semper fore firmissimam dicere solebat, dum vel unus *in* re publica consul esset.

Not *in* (*i*) *re publica* but *e re publica*. *e re publica* is the opposite of *improbus*; cf. *Phil.* VIII.13 *bonos et utilis et e re publica civis*. I do not find it possible to translate *unus consul* with Kasten "ein rechter Konsul" (contrast *Q.Fr.* 5.3 *Racilius, qui unus est hoc tempore tribunus pl.*).

- 23 non est mei temporis iniurias meminisse, quas ego etiam si ulcisci possem, tamen oblivisci mallet: alio transferenda mea tota vita est, ut bene de me meritis referam gratiam, amicitias igni perspectas tuear, cum apertis hostibus bellum geram, timidis amicis ignoscam, proditores *indicem*, dolorem profectionis meae reditus dignitate consoler.

In the manuscripts *non* stands before *indicem*. Madvig omitted it, and changed the verb to *vindicem* (*non vindicem* Hotomanus, also found in manuscripts). A. Klotz, Wuilleumier, Kasten, and Guillen follow him. Palaeography has nothing to say against *uindicem* for *nindicem* or *niudicem*, but in several other respects it does discredit to its illustrious author. The worse than dubious Latinity of *vindicare aliquem* in the required sense is exposed by E. Courtney (*C.R.* 10 [1960] 95 f), who cites Housman. That sense also affronts the context: Cicero declares he will forget injuries, not avenge them. Only two "traitors" can be identified from the Correspondence, Hortensius and Q. Arrius; see my note on *Att.* III.8.4. Doubtless, as Courtney thinks, Hortensius is principally in mind, and who can imagine that Cicero thought he had the power to punish Hortensius, even if he wanted to? *non indicem* is not merely acceptable ("the Manuscript reading will probably stand" Courtney) but exactly and uniquely right. Cicero will not point an accusing finger at these people but leave them to their own consciences.

POST REDITUM AD QUIRITES

- 20 quem egomet dicere audiui tum se fuisse miserum cum careret patria quam obsidione liberavisset, . . . cum parva navicula pervectus in Africam . . . inops supplexque venisset: reciperata vero sua dignitate se non commissurum ut, cum ea quae amiserat sibi restituta essent, virtutem animi non haberet quam numquam perdidisset.

Here the addition of a negative is unavoidable. "*Se non fuisse perperam coni. Hotomanus et Marklandus*" (Orelli — Baiter — Halm): there the matter has rested. Except that it had better take the form in which it first occurred to me, *non tum se fuisse*, nothing could be more certain than this conjecture. The sequence "I was miserable in my time of misfortune, and now that my troubles are over I shall not be lacking in the courage I never lost" is enough by itself to upset any attentive reader. But furthermore, a man who retains *virtus animi* is not *miser* by Cicero's standard; cf. *Planc.* 78 *quo quidem etiam magis sum non dicam miser — nam hoc quidem abhorret a virtute verbum — sed certe exercitus, Tusc.* IV.82 *eos qui se aegritudini dediderunt miseros adflictos aerumnosos calamitosos* (sc. *dicere solemus*), *Phil.* XI.8 f, *Fam.* VI.1.3. In similar strain *Pis.* 43: *nec mihi ille M. Regulus . . . supplicio videtur adfectus nec C. Marius, quem . . . Africa devicta ab eodem . . . expulsum et naufragum vidit. miser non fui and virtutem animi non perdidi* come to the same thing.

- 23 bene meritos <ne> colas, nec exorari fas est, neque id rei publicae remittere *utique* necesse est.

utique is Lambinus' correction of *utrumque* (*utcunque*, read by A. Klotz, is not used adverbially by Cicero). Cicero would never have gone on record with the statement: "nor can any circumstances compel us to postpone our gratitude to political exigencies" (N. H. Watts). In his philosophy *res publica* in the last resort came first. And neither Cicero nor anybody else in his senses could say what this Latin means: "nor is it absolutely necessary to sacrifice gratitude to the public welfare." Read <*nisi*> *utique* necesse est.

- 23 postremo qui in ulciscendo remissior fuit, *in eo* <*consilium*> *aperte laudatur*.

The paradox is *in eorum aperte* [sic] *utitur. laudatur* (cod. Harl. 2681) seems highly probable, but I do not think Cicero wrote *in eo consilium* (Peterson; he would have written *eius consilium*) and *aperte* is pointless. Perhaps *is fere semper laudatur* (*non fere reprehenditur* Madvig). But A. Klotz was wise to obelize.

DE DOMO

- 7 hic tu me etiam, custodem defensoremque Capitoli templorumque omnium, "hostem Capitolinum" appellare ausus es, quod, cum in Capitolio senatum duo consules haberent, eo venerim?

Scholars have racked their brains to extract an intelligible insult from *hostem Capitolinum*, e.g., Wuilleumier: "Clodius devait lui reprocher d'avoir medité un coup d'état au Capitole en faveur de Pompée." The effort is wasted, for Cicero wrote *hospitem*, "our stranger in the Capitol." Clodius was alluding, of course, to his loss of civil rights in 58 and recent return from exile. Cicero had to hear taunts of this sort more than once; cf. s. 72, *Har. Resp.* 17 (see below), *Q. Fr.* III.2.2, Dio XXXIX.60.1. *hostem* has replaced *hospitem* also in s. 66 (see below).

- 20 qui cum lege nefaria Ptolomaeum, regem Cypri . . . causa incognita publicasses, populumque Romanum scelere obligasses, cum in eius regnum bona fortunas *patrocinium* huius imperi immisisses, cuius cum patre avo maioribus societas nobis et amicitia fuisset, *sqq.*

patrocinium is an insult to the reader's understanding. *latrocinium* (Naugerius, edd.) *huius imperi* could never have been said by Cicero ("non bene dici videtur" A. Klotz). Any credit for *patrimonium* <*vim*> belongs to Nägelsbach, not Clark; but *patrimonium* is already covered by *regnum bona fortunas*. Cicero wrote *praeconium*, "auctioneer's advertisement" (or "cry"; see my note on *Fam.* VII.24.1 *Hipponacteo praeconio*). Cf. s. 52 *ut Cyprius rex . . . cum bonis omnibus sub praeconem subiceretur*, *Sest.* 57 *ut sedens cum purpura et sceptro . . . praeconi publico subiceretur et imperante populo Romano . . . rex amicus . . . cum bonis omnibus publicaretur*.

- 34 videsne me non radicitus evellere omnis actiones tuas neque illud agere, quod apertum est, te omnino nihil gessisse iure, non fuisse tribunum plebis, hodie esse patricium? dico apud pontifices, augures adsunt: versor in medio iure publico.

Quod est, pontifices, ius adoptionis?

Nothing sensible will be made of this until the words *dico apud pontifices, augures adsunt* have been transferred to the beginning of the new paragraph.

Cicero has argued that the confiscation of his property was contrary to Roman law. It was also in his contention invalid for a different reason: Clodius' adoption having taken place in violation of both pontifical and augural law, he had never been legally Tribune and his acts in that capacity were null and void. *videsne sqq.* is not to say that Cicero

will not take up this second line of argument; it calls on Clodius to note that he has not yet reached it. So far he has shown that the particular legislation against himself was against *ius publicum*. Now with *dico . . . adsunt* he introduces a detailed exposition of the invalidity of the adoption and consequently the entire Tribunate. First he marshals arguments addressed to the Pontiffs (*quod est, pontifices, ius adoptionis?*), then those addressed to the Augurs (s.39 *venio ad augures*).

64-65 itaque infractus furor tuus inanis faciebat impetus; omnem enim vim omnium sceleratorum acerbitas mei casus exceperat; non erat in tam immani iniuria tantisque ruinis novae crudelitati locus. Cato fuerat proximus. *quid ageres?* non erat ut, qui modus <a>moribus fuerat, idem esset iniuriae.

"Locus varie emendatus," as Peterson says. His *amoribus* for *moribus* was not the last attempt. The passage should probably be obelized, but I think its purport was that Clodius' only means of injuring Cato (and getting rid of him) was to do him honor: *quod ageres non erat* (Lambinus) <nisi> ut, qui modus honoribus fuerat, idem esset iniuriae. The honors and the injury (i.e., the mission to Cyprus) being one and the same, Clodius could go only just so far in the latter direction as he went in the former.

66 qui ex eius custodia per insidias regis amici filium *hostem* captivum surripuisset

regis amici filius (so codd.) is bracketed by A. Klotz, but neither this nor *Armeni(i)* (Lehmeyer) is called for. King Tigranes was again a friend and ally of Rome; cf. *Sest. 59 regnat hodie et amicitiae nomen ac societatis, quod armis violarat, id precibus est consecutus*. His son was no enemy but a guest (*hospitem*; cf. on s. 7 above). He could also be regarded as a prisoner of war. Both as host and captor Pompey was outraged by the abduction.

79 conductis operis non solum egentium, sed etiam servorum, *Fidulio* principe

The name of this Clodian lieutenant was probably C. Fidulus; see *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature* 39. The further thought occurs that "C. Fidius," one of the prosecutors of Milo's lieutenant Saufeius in 52 (Ascon. 55 Clark), may be the same person.

93 et quoniam hoc reprehendis, quod solere me dicas de me ipso gloriosius praedicare, quis umquam audivit cum ego de me nisi coactus ac necessario dicerem? nam si, cum mihi furta largitiones libidines obiciuntur, ego respondere soleo meis consiliis periculis

laboribus patriam esse servatam, non tam sum existimandus de gestis rebus gloriari quam de obiectis confiteri. sed si mihi ante haec durissima rei publicae tempora nihil umquam aliud obiectum est nisi crudelitas eius unius temporis, cum a patria perniciem depuli, quid? me huic maledicto utrum non respondere an demisse respondere decuit?

eius unius is Müller's conjecture for *ea unius* or *ea: alii aliter*. This key passage has been found troublesome ("difficile à comprendre" Wuilleumier). It means: "I only boast when obliged to do so in answer to my enemies' charges. Now if these charges concerned some sort of personal misconduct, it would be irrelevant for me to answer them by talking about my public services — it would be tantamount to an admission of guilt. But the only charge made against me before my exile was that of cruelty in connection with the executions in 63. To that charge I had to reply proudly, justifying my action." The charge of cruelty, Cicero goes on to say, has now been replaced by one of cowardice in connection with his flight in 58 (s. 94); and that again forces him into self-glorification.

118 hanc tu igitur dedicationem appellas, ad quam non conlegium, non honoribus populi Romani ornatum pontificem, non denique *adulescentem* quemquam, cum haberes in collegio familiarissimos, adhibere potuisti?

Some would add a word after *quemquam* — *alium, scientem, nobilem*(!). The meaning surely is that Clodius might at least have chosen an older man (cf. Mommsen *non denique alium praeter illum adulescentem*; Madvig *non denique <non> adulescentem*). Note above *si auctoritatem quaerimus, etsi id est aetatis ut nondum consecutus sit* sqq., s. 139 *imperitus adulescens, novus sacerdos*. For *adulescentem* (-tē) read *adulta aetate*; cf. *Verr.* II.3.3. *qui ad hanc rem adulescentuli quam qui iam firmata aetate descendunt*.

144 vosque qui maxime <me> repetistis atque revocastis, quorum de sedibus haec mihi est proposita contentio, patrii penates familiaresque, qui huic urbi et rei publicae praesidetis, vos obtestor, quorum ego a templis atque delubris pestiferam illam et nefariam flammam depuli

"Les *di patrii* sont ceux de la cité, les *familiares* ceux du foyer, les *penates* les uns et les autres" (Wuilleumier); cf. *Har. Resp.* 37 *haruspices haec loquuntur an patrii penatesque di?*, *Sest.* 45 *penates patriique dei*. But *vosque qui . . . contentio* refers to Cicero's private *penates* (*di penates ac familiares mei* in s. 143), whereas *qui . . . praesidetis* refers to those of

Rome. The former are meant by the whole expression *patrii penates familiaresque* (cf. *Verr.* II.4.17 *deos penatis te patrios reposcit* and *patrii foci* et sim.), while the latter are addressed in *vos obtestor*. So after *familiaresque* read *vosque*, anaphorically taken up by *vos* below, or just *et*.

145 *ut, si in illo sqq.*

The elaborate invocation in the finale of this speech, reminiscent of the even lengthier one which concludes the *Verrines*, is unlikely to have taken the form of "une véritable anacoluthie." As Wuilleumier says, *ut* "reste dans l'air." Why not let it stay there, and out of the text? Its deletion was proposed by Pantagathus, but nobody heeds.

DE HARUSPICUM RESPONSO

3 *ego enim me, patres conscripti, inimicum semper esse professus sum duobus, qui me sqq.*

From my *Towards a Text of Cicero "ad Atticum"* (1960) 93: "A textual point arises in 13.3.1 *de Crispo et Mustela videbis, et velim scire quae sit pars duorum (istorum ds)*, on which Reid (*Hermath.* 10 [1899] 331) has 'Some of the earlier editors noted a difficulty about *duorum*, viz. that it is not used to signify "the two" or "these two" of persons already mentioned. I have never seen a precise parallel.' Comparing *Ov. Fast.* 2.629 *et soror et Procne Tereusque duabus iniquus*, *ibid.* 3.868 *ille vehit per freta longa duos*, *Mart.* 7.38.3 *fera monstra duorum (Cyclopis et Scyllae)*, *Cato ap. Gell.* 14.2.26 *si quis quid alter ab altero peterent . . . quod duo res gessissent, uti testes non interessent* et *sqq.* I do not think it necessary (despite the absence of Ciceronian parallels) to substitute *eorum* (Ernesti) or *duorum horum* (Orelli)."

In a postcard dated 6.9.1961 Professor C. J. Fordyce referred to *Lucr.* III. 579, *Petr.* 21.3 ("the two of us"), *Sen. Ben.* VII.4.5 *inter duos convenit* ("the two of us"), *Dial.* II.16.2 *quaeris quid inter duos intersit*, *N.Q.* VII.12.1 *intervallamus quod inter duos est*.

duobus here refers to Piso and Gabinius mentioned above — a Ciceronian example of this usage, and in a speech at that, which nobody seems to have thought of questioning.

17 *quid igitur responderem? quaero ex eo ipso qui ferre me non potest. me civem esse Romanum? litterate respondissem.*

To Clodius' taunt "What state do you belong to?" (see above on *Dom.* 7) Cicero answered "One which was unable to do without me."

litterate is sometimes believed to mean "literally," which is unexampled Latin and poor sense — a reply is not necessarily the worse for being literal. The alternative explanation that it is ironical ("subtilement" Wuilleumier) is at least on the right track. *litterate* = *docte*; cf. *de Orat.* II.253 *magis ut belle, ut litterate dicta laudantur*. The bald, simplistic answer "I am a Roman" clearly would not do for such an acknowledged master of repartee as Cicero. But the irony seems strained, and I suspect he wrote *vix litterate*: "That would not have been a very clever answer."

- 33 quid habet mea domus religiosi nisi quod impuri et sacrilegi parietem tangit? itaque ne quis meorum imprudens introspicere tuam domum possit ac te sacra illa tua facientem videre, tollam altius tectum, non ut ego te despiciam, sed ne tu aspicias urbem eam quam delere voluisti.

Cicero and Clodius had adjoining houses on the Palatine with a party wall. It appears that from Cicero's house it was possible to see something of what went on in his neighbor's (*sacra* refers to the Bona Dea affair; cf. also *Att.* I.18.3), and he announces his intention of putting a stop to this by raising the height of his own roof. It seems to follow that Clodius' house was the higher of the two, so that a person standing on Cicero's roof might find himself looking through Clodius' top-storey windows. To obviate this Cicero would only need to raise his roof to nearly the same height as Clodius'. But he is going to raise it higher, in order to achieve the further object of blocking Clodius' view of Rome. This seems to call for *tollam* <*etiam*> *altius* (sc. *tuo tecto*).

To a great extent the above interpretation was anticipated in a note by "Anonymus" in Olivetti's edition of 1758, beginning "Nullamne hic difficultatem viderunt interpretes? nullam quidem monstrant."

PRO SESTIO

- 18 alter unguentis adfluens, calamistrata coma, *despiciens* conscios stuprorum ac veteres vexatores aetatulae suae.

Not *despiciens* but *respiciens*. Even as Consul Gabinius still looked back to his old companions in vice and got himself up like a debauchee. Had he looked down on them, he might rather have been expected to make a show of respectability.

It is not very often that a correction is corroborated by a datum originally overlooked (the opposite event is less unusual). Long's note put me in mind that *conscios* . . . *suae* alludes in particular to Catiline;

cf. *Red. in Sen.* 10 *alter* (sc. *Gabinus*) *a me Catilinam, amatorem suum, . . . reposcebat*, *ibid.* 12 *si eius vir Catilina revixisset, Dom.* 62 *cum alter se Catilinae delicias . . . fuisse diceret*. *Gabinus* did not despise *Catiline*; he remembered him with affectionate regret. *Cicero* no doubt meant to imply that *Gabinus'* career as *Consul* was not unworthy of their old association.

- 39 *C. Caesar, qui a me nullo meo merito alienus esse debebat, inimicissimus esse meae salutis ab eodem cotidianis contionibus dicebatur.*

The paradox *qui . . . debebat* is supported by the *Bobbio* scholiast. I see nothing wrong with it which *credebatur* (*Halm*) or *videbatur* (*Urlichs*) will put right; the difficulty lies with *nullo meo merito*. The statement that *Cicero* had given *Caesar* no cause for estrangement (note the mild word *alienus*) was neither calculated to please *Caesar* nor in accord with *Cicero's* own private knowledge and public admissions. In s. 52 he implies the opposite: *neque erit iusta causa ad portas sedenti imperatori qua re suum terrorem falso iactari opponique patiatur*. The nature of *Caesar's* "good grounds" — *Cicero's* repeated rejection of his overtures in 59–58 — is indicated elsewhere: *Prov. Cons.* 42 *traduxit ad plebem inimicum meum, sive iratus mihi, quod me secum ne [in] beneficiis quidem videbat posse coniungi, sive exoratus . . . ergo adhuc magis est mihi verendum ne mea superbia in illius liberalitate quam ne illius iniuria in nostra inimicitia reprehendatur, Pis.* 79 *non postulabam ut ei carissimus essem cuius ego ne beneficiis quidem sententiam meam tradidissem*. In a letter to *Atticus* seven years later (*IX.2a.1*) he recalls *Caesar's* bitterness at his refusal of a seat on the agrarian Board of Twenty: *repudiari se totum, magis etiam quam olim in xxviratu, putabit*. *Cicero* must have written *non nullo*.

- 41 *atque hanc eius suspicionem alii litteris mittendis, alii nuntiis, alii coram ipsi excitaverunt, ut ille, cum a me certe nihil timeret, ab illis, ne quid meo nomine molirentur, sibi cavendum putaret.*

That *Pompey* should fear plots against his life from the very people who were warning him against *Cicero* is unexpected. Surely more would have been made of this seeming paradox. *Cicero* might at least have said *ab illis ipsis*. Also it makes no historical sense. These vipers in *Cicero's* bosom (*domi meae certi homines ad eam rem positi*) were presumably planted by *Clodius*. At this time (shortly before *Cicero's* exile) *Pompey* had no reason to apprehend danger from that quarter. In the *Vettius* affair a few months previously it was the opponents of the "Triumvirate," the *Consul* *Bibulus*, the younger *Curio*, *Lucullus*, *Domitius*,

even (if remotely) Cicero himself, who were implicated in an alleged conspiracy to assassinate him. These are the people whom Pompey would naturally suspect. For *illis* read *aliis*.

- 60 non illi ornandum M. Catonem sed relegandum . . . putaverunt, qui in contione palam dixerint linguam se evellisse M. Catoni, quae semper contra extraordinarias potestates libera fuisset. sentient, ut spero, brevi tempore manere libertatem illam, atque *hoc* etiam, si fieri potuerit, esse maiorem, *quod* cum consulibus illis M. Cato . . . voce ipsa ac dolore pugnavit, et post meum discessum iis Pisonem verbis . . . vexavit ut illum . . . provinciae paeniteret.

The logic of the statement that Cato's independence (*libertas*) would be the greater *because* he had spoken his mind to the Consuls of 58 about Cicero's exile is not apparent, particularly as these protests antedated the mission to Cyprus which, as the Clodians hoped, had "plucked his tongue out." For *hoc* . . . *quod* we need *ea* (sc. *libertate*) . . . *qua*.

- 71 hoc interim tempore P. Sestius, iudices, designatus iter ad C. Caesarem pro mea salute suscepit; . . . quid egerit, quantum profecerit, nihil ad causam. equidem existimo, si ille, ut arbitror, aequus nobis fuerit, nihil *ab* hoc profectum, sin iratior, non multum; sed tamen sedulitatem atque integritatem hominis videtis.

ab hoc (sc. *Sestio*) is superfluous and, at least so it reads to me, a little discourteous. The Bruxellensis has *ad hoc*, which I suspect was the earlier reading, *ad* being a reflexion of *ad causam*. *ab* removed leaves *hoc* (sc. *itinere*). Note Cousin's translation "le bénéfice de cette démarche."

- 78 nam si obnuntiasset Fabricio is praetor qui se servasse de caelo dixerat, accepisset res publica plagam, sed eam quam acceptam *gemere* posset.

For *gemere* ("put up with' (lit. lament)" Holden!) the choice of substitutes proposed is wide: *gemere* <non>, *reddere*, *sanare*, *contemnere*, <minus> *gemere*, (*qua accepta*) *emergere* were thought worthy of mention by Peterson, but not *gaudere*, *regere*, <palam> *gemere*, <saltem> *gemere*. Nobody seems to have suggested *concoquere*; cf. Petron. 105.5 *tres plagas Spartana nobilitate concoxi*. But the answer is not so far away: *gerere*. For the admittedly rare use of *gero* = *tolero* the Thesaurus (VI.1933.55) cites Enn. Ann. 45 (*aerumnas*), Cic. Phil. VI.17 (*labores*), Liv. VIII.11.6 (*fortunam*). Cf. also *vulnera gerere* in Ovid (*Met.* V.426, *Ibis* 254).

79 quem cum iacentem et concisum pluribus vulneribus extremo spiritu exsanguem et confectum viderent

extremo spiritu, "at the point of death" seems dubious Latin. Is not *in* required? Cf. *Fin.* II.99 *summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio*.

82 cum quaerere alii Numerium, alii Quintium, gemini nominis errore servatus est.

The name of this Clodian Tribune was Q. Numerius Rufus. The double error (*gemino* would be easier) must have lain in taking the nomen "Numerius" for a praenomen and, by consequence, the praenomen "Quintus" for a nomen "Quintius." But whether *Quintium* or *Quintum* is read (see Münzer in *RE* sub. nom.), the text fails to make this clear. "Numerius" by itself, even though wrongly believed to be a praenomen, would not have been a misnomer and could not have helped the man's escape. Perhaps Cicero himself was a little muddled here. But he could have written *cum alii Numerium <Quintium>, alii Quintium*.

114 tribum suam non tulit, Palatinam denique, per quam omnes illae pestes vexare rem publicam *dicebantur*, perdidit, nec quicquam illis comitiis quod boni viri vellent *nisi repulsam* tulit.

To the proposed replacements for *dicebantur* (*ordiebantur, moliebantur, solebant, p. r. praedicabantur, nitebantur*) add *conabantur*. But what else besides defeat would the *boni* have wished Vatinius at the praetorian elections? "The good men would have been glad if Vatinius had been roughly handled by the crowd" (Reid ap. Holden). Why then does Cicero say this did not happen with apparent satisfaction? Again Cousin arrives at the right result without assistance from his text: "les comices ne lui ont apporté que ce que voulaient les honnêtes gens: un échec," i.e., *nec quicquam illis comitiis nisi quod boni viri vellent, repulsam*. But I strongly suspect that *repulsam* came from the margin. Note that the second *tulit* ("took") bears a double meaning, "carried off" and "suffered."

126 qui tamen quoquo tempore conspectus erat, non modo gladiatores sed equi ipsi *gladiatorum* repentinis sibilis extimescebant.

gladiatorum looks rather like another adscript, to make it plain that the reference is to mounted gladiators.

127 tu mihi etiam M. Atilium Regulum commemoras, qui redire ipse Carthaginem sua voluntate ad supplicium *quam* sine iis captivis a quibus ad senatum missus erat Romae manere maluerit

Regulus was sent to Rome not by his fellow captives but by his Carthaginian captors, in order to bring about an exchange. So Cic. *Off.* I.39 *ut . . . Regulus captus a Poenis, cum de captivis commutandis Romam missus esset iurassetque se rediturum, primum, ut venit, captivos reddendos in senatu non censuit.* Similarly Liv. *Epit.* 18, Sil. VI.346, Flor. I.18.24, Auct. Vir. Ill.40.4. Horace's Ode (III.5) has a slant of its own, but in no way contradicts the rest of the testimony. Misunderstanding on these points has been responsible for a number of erroneous notes and conjectures, though not, I suppose, for A. Klotz' *invitis Carthaginiensibus.* Read *ad supplicium sine iis captivis de* (cod. [?] Ursini) *quibus ad senatum missus erat quam Romae manere.* Note once more Cousin's translation: "sans échange des prisonniers, pour qui on l'avait envoyé au Sénat."

PRO CAELIO

- 23 vellem dictum esset ab eodem etiam de Dione. de quo ipso tamen quid est quod exspectetis? quod is qui fecit aut non timet aut etiam fatetur, est enim rex; qui autem dictus est adiutor fuisse et conscius, P. Asicius, iudicio est liberatus. quod igitur est eius modi crimen ut qui commisit non neget, qui negavit absolutus sit, id hic pertimescat qui non modo a *facti* verum etiam a conscientiae suspitione afuit? et, si Asicio causa plus profuit quam nocuit invidia, huic oberit maledictum tuum qui istius facti non modo suspitione sed ne infamia quidem est aspersus?

Asicius had been tried for complicity in the murder of the Alexandrian envoy Dio at the instigation of the exiled Ptolemy Auletes. Cicero defended and Asicius was acquitted. He now professes belief in Asicius' innocence.

The vulgate *a facti* is a conjecture (by Naugerus) which, if it were in the manuscripts, would be diagnosed as a corruption (*experto credite*). Caelius is contrasted first with the king, whose guilt was not *suspected* but self-admitted; second with Asicius, who had been suspected (accused in fact) of complicity, though actually innocent. The paradoxical *facto* corresponds to *is qui fecit* above, as *conscientiae suspitione* corresponds to *qui dictus est adiutor fuisse et conscius*.

In the next sentence *causa* has caused trouble (*causae* Baehrens, in *causa* Mueller, *ea* coni. Clark, del. Schoell) because modern interpreters have not seen its meaning. R. G. Austin (1959) renders: "if Asicius gained more advantage from his trial than damage from the odium attaching to it." Similarly R. Gardner (Loeb 1965), though he manages

to avoid Austin's zeugma. J. Cousin (Budé 1962) translates *in causa* though *in* is not in his text: "si Asicius, dans cette cause, a été plus servi que desservi par la malveillance." Again there is nothing amiss. Asicius' case, says Cicero, was good enough to outweigh with the jury the odium aroused by the crime with which he was charged; whereas Caelius had never been suspected or so much as touched by the scandal. Ernesti's note seems close, though he might have phrased it more clearly: "si causa a iudicibus cognita plus profuit, quam iactatio criminis nocuit."

Clark should have known, but I question whether Austin's statement à propos of his conjecture that the confusion of *ea* and *ēa* is common applies to mediaeval manuscripts (see on *Rosc. Am.* above).

- 42 postremo cum paruerit voluptatibus . . . revocet se aliquando ad curam rei domesticae, rei forensis, reique publicae, ut ea quae ratione antea non *perspexerat* satietate abiecisse et experiendo contempsisse videatur.

"Voluptates, quas in iuventute perceperat non intellegens, quam essent inanes" (J. van Wageningen). So translators, e.g., Gardner: "the vanity of which reason had previously failed to reveal." The apparent implication in *antea* that reason did reveal the vanity later is out of place. Not reason but satiety caused the conversions. I suspect that Cicero wrote *despexerat*. *ratione despiciere* runs parallel with *satietate abicere* and *experiendo contemnere*. For confusion of prefixes see my *Towards a Text of Cicero "ad Atticum"* (1960) 71 and my note on *Att.* 21 (II.1).2 (*deteritum*). The psychological reason for it here is plain enough.

- 55 ut res minime dubitanda in contentione ponatur, utrum temeraria, procax, irata mulier finxisse crimen, an gravis, sapiens moderatusque vir religiose testimonium dixisse videatur.

The illogicality of this text was so conclusively demonstrated by J. L. Heller (*C.P.* 29 [1934] 141 ff) that it would be a waste of time to make the case afresh. Let it only be added that R. G. Austin, who still "could not see that any change is needed," observes that "the disjunctive question is one in form only, and the answer to both parts is affirmative (cf. *Verr.* iii.83, *Caec.* 29, *de domo* 7)." The first reference is irrelevant. In the other two the answer demanded in one part does not necessarily entail the answer demanded in the other. Here it does.

irreligiose (Francken before Schwarz and van Wageningen) is a simple remedy. I do not attach much weight to the objections that *vir ir-* is cacophonous (Heller, proposing <non> *finxisse*) or that it spoils the rhythm (Austin), but since Cicero does not use *irreligiosus* (-se)

elsewhere, <non> *religiose* is a better answer, palaeographically hardly less easy.

IN VATINIUM

- 28 nam Maximi quidem *summa laus* est sumptis inimicitii, suscepta causa, quaesitore consilioque delecto, commodiorem inimico suo condicionem reiectionis dare noluisse. nihil Maximus fecit alienum aut sua virtute aut illis viris clarissimis *sqq.*

Maximus' conduct as prosecutor in taking full advantage of the existing law, which Cicero maintains to have been unfair to the accused and which was about to be changed, was, he says, perfectly proper; but to describe it as creditable in the highest degree is little short of ridiculous. Perhaps *summum ius*: "is entirely within his rights in having refused . . ." Cf. Rutil. Lup. II.17 *summum ac legitimum . . . meae causae ius*.

- 39 si es odium publicum populi, senatus, universorum hominum *rusticanorum*

If Vatinius was hated by everybody (cf. above *si te vicini, si adfines, si tribules ita oderunt ut repulsam tuam triumphum suum duxerint, si nemo aspicit quin ingemescat, nemo mentionem facit quin exsecretur* *sqq.*) the inhabitants of Rome cannot be conspicuously omitted. Madvig's *rusticanorum* <*urbanorum*> is therefore substantially right, though the normal order, as A. Klotz points out, puts the city folk first. Also *urbani* normally combine with *rustici*, not *rusticani*; see my note on *Fam.* XVI.21.7 (add *Orat.* 81 *non modo urbanorum sed etiam rusticorum*). So probably Cicero wrote *urbanorum rusticorum*, though the reverse order makes a palaeographically neater solution.

PRO BALBO

- 10 quid dicam de auctoritate? *quae* tanta est quanta in his tantis virtutibus ac laudibus esse debet. cui senatus populusque Romanus amplissimae dignitatis praemia dedit non postulanti, imperia vero etiam recusanti, huius de facto, iudices, ita quaeri ut id agatur, licueritne ei facere quod fecit, an vero non dicam non licuerit, sed nefas fuerit . . . non turpe rei publicae, nonne vobis?

cui . . . *recusanti* is connected logically with what precedes, not with what follows; whereas *huius* looks back to the whole foregoing catalogue of Pompey's excellencies, beginning in s. 9 *quid enim abest huic homini*

quod, si adesset, iure haec ei tribui et concedi putaremus? Therefore: *quid dicam de auctoritate? qua* (abl.) *tanta est quanta . . . debet; cui senatus . . . recusanti. huius de facto sqq.*

- 54 dubitandum fuit quin, quo in genere *iudicum* praemia rata essent, in eodem iudicia imperatorum valerent? num fundos igitur factos populos Latinos arbitramur aut Serviliae legi aut ceteris quibus Latinis hominibus erat propositum aliqua ex re praemium civitatis?

Like Reid I find *iudicum* hard to swallow. The grant of full citizenship awarded under the lex Servilia to a "Latin" who successfully prosecuted a Senator can hardly be said to have been given by the jury in the case, even though its verdict of guilty made the grant possible. It came from the law; cf. the next sentence and s. 57 *legis de ambitu praemio . . . legum praemiis*. I cannot believe that Cicero was indulging in pointless word play. Rather *iudicum* ousted *legum* because the scribe's eye wandered up to *iucundum* in the previous line. But I am not quite certain that the text is wrong. *iudicum* does go nicely with *imperatorum*, and this may have led Cicero into a phrase which he would not have used otherwise.

DE PROVINCIIS CONSULARIBUS

18 *an* Ti. Gracchus . . . tantam laudem est adeptus . . . ?

20 *an* vero M. ille Lepidus . . . summi poetae voce laudatus est . . . ?

an cannot do duty for *nonne* (proposed by Peterson in s. 18). *an non* (Lambinus, Aldus), *non* before *tantam* (Müller), and *esset adeptus* (Halm) recognize the problem. The answer is *at* (Gryphius in s. 18) in both places, introducing adversative statements. These illustrations confute the idea implicit in both the preceding sentences that there was anything wrong in setting aside a private feud for the sake of the common good.

IN PISONEM

- 27 cum experrecta tandem virtus clarissimi viri celeriter et *verum* amicum et optime meritum civem et suum pristinum morem requisivit.

The "illustrious personage" is of course Pompey and the "true friend" Cicero. But the pointlessly "pathetic" *verum* rings false and the combination *verus amicus* occurs nowhere else in Cicero's speeches. I think he wrote *virum*, preferring that to *hominem* for the sake of his

favorite sequence *vir . . . civis*; cf. *Cluent.* 128 *et vir bonus et civis utilis*, *Phil.* II.116 *viros fortis egregiosque civis*, *Att.* IV.15.7 *o virum! o civem!* et al.

- 87 quid? vectigalem <populi Romani> provinciam, singulis rebus quaecumque venirent certo portorio imposito, servam tuis publicanis a te factam esse meministi?

populi Romani (i.e., *p.r.*) add. Clark. *servam* Clark, *servis* codd. *publicanis* del. Bake. *factam* codd. aliquot, *facta* E, *factum* cett.

The parallel with Verres has been noticed: *Verr.* II.3.50 *Veneriosque servos, quod isto praetore fuit novum genus publicanorum*. Nisbet justly objects to Clark's text that "in our passage Piso's agents could not be called his *publicani* without explanation" and leaves the problem unsolved. <*servam*> *servis*, *tuis publicanis*, *a te factam* or *servis*, *tuis publicanis*, *a te* <*servam*> *factam* would be sufficient to show what had (allegedly) been going on without entering into details, which Cicero obviously did not wish to do.

- 94 quod cum ita sit, mihi crede, neminem *invitum invitabis*; res ipsa et rei publicae tempus aut me ipsum, quod nolim, aut alium quempiam aut invitabit aut dehortabitur.

invitum is Hotomanus' correction of *invitus*. But the prophecy "you will invite nobody (to prosecute you) who does not want the job" is foolish (Piso was not challenging anybody but Cicero) and irrelevant. Read *invitaris*: "don't go issuing challenges, it will happen or it won't as circumstances and the public good determine"; cf. above *nihil est quod me horteris*, *nihil est quod invites*, and for *mihi crede* to reinforce advice see my note on *Att.* II.2.2 (*sed . . . doceo?*).

invitus now makes fair sense. For the combination with *invitaris*; cf. Plaut. *Trin.* 25 *nam ego amicum hodie meum / concastigabo pro commerita noxia, / invitus, ni id me invitet ut faciam fides*.

PRO PLANCIO

- 13 "desiderarunt te," inquit, "oculi mei, cum tu esses Cyrenis; me enim quam socios tua frui virtute malebam, et quo plus intererat, eo plus aberat a me, cum te non videbam."

This is part of what the Roman people would say to the *nobilis* M. Juventius Laterensis, who had been beaten by his competitor for the Aedileship, the *novus homo* Cn. Plancius, and was prosecuting him *de ambitu*. Holden, who also mentions some idle conjectures, paraphrases:

"et quo plus intererat me tua frui virtute, eo minus me virtute adiuvasti." Similarly Grimal. No. Read *quo plus* <eorum> *intererat*: "the greater the value of your presence to the provincials, the more I was losing by not having you in my sight." Cf. *Mil.* 99 *sed quo est ista magis divina virtus, eo maiore a te dolore divellor*.

27 vitia me hercule Cn. Planci res eae de quibus dixi tegere potuerunt, ne tu in ea vita de qua iam dicam tot et tanta adiumenta huic honori fuisse mirere.

huic = *Plancio*, as Holden says. Read *ne tu in ea vita de qua iam dicam tot et tanta*<*s*> (sc. *res*) *adiumenta huic honori*<*s*> (i.e., *aedilitatis*) *fuisse mirere*. Cf. *Mur.* 38 *num tibi haec parva videntur adiumenta et subsidia consulatus?* The various advantages enumerated in ss. 17 ff would have stood Plancius in good stead electorally even if his moral reputation had been open to criticism; all the less surprising that they helped him when combined with the fine record which Cicero is about to rehearse.

52 tribunus militum L. Philippus, summa nobilitate et eloquentia, quaestor C. Caelius, clarissimus ac fortissimus adulescens, tribuni pl. P. Rutilius Rufus, C. Fimbria, C. Cassius, Cn. Orestes facti non sunt, quos tamen omnis consules factos scimus esse.

Despite the fact that the manuscripts, with one insignificant exception, give his praenomen as Q., not C., the man who was not elected Quaestor has generally been assumed by editors to be C. Coelius Caldus, the *novus homo* who became Consul in 94. E. Badian has pointed out in *Studies in Greek and Roman History* 150 f that this identification is belied by Cicero's description. The combination of superlative adjectives is applied by Cicero to a number of eminent persons, such as Sulla, Pompey, L. Lucullus — even Milo (*Har. Resp.* 6), but he uses *clarissimus adulescens* only of *nobiles*: Cn. Lentulus (*Verr.* II.2.103), L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (*Verr.* II.1.139), Caesar Octavianus (*Phil.* III.7, IV.3), L. Lucullus' son (*Phil.* X.8), Sex. Pompeius Magnus (*Phil.* XIII.8). The mysterious "Extitius" of *Phil.* XIII.28 (see my *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature*, 36 f) is no real exception, the description being there ironic, like *adulescens nobilis* of the same person in *Phil.* VI.10. It sits strangely indeed on a *novus* whose first recorded activities belong to his Tribunate. Apart from his success, Coelius does not seem to have been a specially remarkable person: an industrious but not brilliant speaker (*Brut.* 165; cf. *de Orat.* I.117), stated in the *Commen-tariolum Petitionis* (11) to have won his election to the Consulship against two distinguished nobles *cum multo inferior esset genere, superior nulla re paene*.

The manuscripts will be right about the praenomen and wrong about the nomen. The latter can hardly represent any other than Badian's proposal: *Catulus*. The elder Q. Catulus' career prior to his Consulship in 102 is for us almost a blank, but the Lucilian fragment *nec parvo Catulo* (*Catullo* codd.) *pretio* apparently refers to him as a young man; see Cichorius, *Untersuchungen zu Lucilius* 150 ff. His subsequent military achievements might suggest *fortissimus*.

55 sed neque tu haec exhibes neque eis confidis

Clark's text has the merit of discarding the paradosis *haec habes* (or *habes haec*). *habes* = *habes parata* according to A. Klotz, which makes little sense. And the notion that expressions like *habes reditum meum* ("now you know about my return") have any relevance need not detain us. Perhaps *gravia* has fallen out; cf. s. 57 *ita levem habebit auctorem*, *Div. in Caec.* 69 *auctoritas . . . gravis habebatur*, *Balb.* 51 *cuius civitatis sit, id habent hodie leve*. The prosecution did not think these charges important and did not believe they were true.

58 sed venio iam ad L. Cassium, familiarem meum, cuius ex oratione ne illum quidem *Iuventium* tecum *expostulavi*, quem ille omni et humanitate et virtute ornatus adulescens primum de plebe aedilem curulem factum esse dixit.

The assistant prosecutor L. Cassius had revealed the fact, which Cicero says was news even to an antiquary like himself, that an ancestor of the prosecutor-in-chief had been the first plebeian to become Curule Aedile. Even if *aliquem cum aliquo expostulare* can be regarded as Ciceronian Latin, which I much doubt, how should Cicero have complained about this man to Laterensis? Neither the past tense (*expostulabo* Pantagathus) nor the idea has any business in the context. That demands *ne ille quidem Iuventius tecum expostulabit*. Cicero had not forgotten ss. 51 f, where Juventius is represented as asking how he is to explain his defeat by the *novus homo* Plancius to his noble ancestors. Cicero there tells him that he need not worry on that score, his ancestors were more likely to scold him for making such a fuss about the loss of an election. Now he says that this previously unknown Juventius who has emerged from Cassius' speech is not going to blame him either.

82 quae cum ita sint, iam succumbam, Laterensis, isti tuo crimini meque in eo ipso in quo nihil potest esse nimium, quoniam ita tu vis, nimium *gratum* esse concedam

in eo ipso is rightly explained by Holden "in gratia referenda." To take *eo ipso* as masculine (sc. *Plancio*. I do not know that it has been so

taken) goes against the run of the passage, and "nothing is too much in his case" is an inaccurate expression. But *in gratia referenda nimium gratus fui* is not Cicero's way of talking. *gratum* should be deleted as the misguided supplement of someone who took *nimium* for an adverb. For *nimius* = *immoderatus* cf. *ad Brut.* 23.3 *quod in honoribus decernendis nimius fuissem et tamquam prodigus*.

90 an, si umquam vitae cupiditas in me fuisset, ego mense Decembri mei consulatus omnium parricidarum tela commossem? quae, si *xx* quiessem dies, in aliorum vigiliam consulum recidissent.

Twenty days after the immortal Nones of December Cicero was still in office. He wrote *xxx*, "a month" (see my note on *Att.* VI.1.3 *tricesimo quoque die*).

91 nam si quis idcirco aliquid de libertate mea deminutum putat quod non ab omnibus isdem a quibus antea solitus sum dissentire dissentiam, primum, si bene de me meritis gratum me praebeo, *nonne* desino incurrere in crimen hominis nimium memoris nimiumque grati?

nonne (Clark for *non*) is a depravation, like *debeo* or *recuso* proposed for *desino*. And *non* does not = *nonne*, as A. Klotz supposed. The paradosis, unlike the conjectures, makes excellent sense. *non desino* is a statement, not a question. Juventius had said that Cicero's gratitude to Plancius was excessive, a charge which Cicero affected to admit; see above on s. 82. Now he turns aside Juventius' taunt that he has lost his political independence with a gesture of mock resignation (we can imagine the *actio*): "Why, here we go again; I stand accused of excessive gratitude!"

PRO RABIRIO POSTUMO

25 quam ob rem illud maneat et fixum sit quod neque moveri neque mutari potest; in quo aequi sperasse Postumum dicunt, peccasse iniqui, ipse etiam insanisse se confitetur, quod suam, quod amicorum pecuniam regi crediderit cum tanto fortunarum suarum periculo, hoc quidem semel suscepto atque contracto perpetienda <illa> fuerunt ut se aliquando ac suos vindicaret.

There should be a comma after *mutari potest* and a colon after *periculo*.

PRO SCAURO

- 13 en quibus familiis quam foedis, quam contaminatis, quam turpibus *datīs* hanc familiam, iudices. en quibus testibus commoti, de quo homine, de quo genere, de quo nomine sententias feratis, obliviscendum vobis *putatis*?

Both sentences should be followed with exclamation marks and *familiis* by a comma. *dedatis* (Heinrich) for *datīs* is rightly read by Schoell. In both sentences the mood of the main verb should be subjunctive, because Cicero does not say what the jury is doing but what it is being asked to do. So read *putetis*. Grimal renders: "Voici des témoins qui vous détermineraient à vous croire obligés d'oublier," etc.

PRO MILONE

- 49 age, sit ita factum: quae causa fuit cur Romam properaret, cur in noctem se coniceret? *quid* adferebat festinationis quod heres erat? primum nihil erat cur properato opus erat; deinde si quid esset, quid tandem erat quod ea nocte consequi posset, amitteret autem, si postridie mane venisset?

quid is "perfectly good Latin" (Clark), but the form of the question is improper. The suggestion that Clodius' position as heir under Cyrus' will might account for his hurrying back to Rome is a ninepin set up by Cicero to be knocked down. Nobody employs a rhetorical question equivalent to a denial (*quid adferebat?* = *nihil adferebat*) in such a case. *ecquid* (Wex), which Reid and others accept, is better, but still not usual. One would expect *num quid* or *an aliquid*.

PHILIPPICS

- I.14-15 non modo voce nemo L. Pisoni consulari sed ne vultu quidem adsensus est. quae, malum, est ista voluntaria servitus? fuerit quaedam necessaria; neque ego hoc ab omnibus eis desidero qui sententiam consulari loco dicunt. alia causa est eorum quorum silentio ignosco; alia eorum, quorum vocem requiro.

By the slavery which Cicero is prepared to concede was "necessary" he means, of course, Caesar's regime; so X.19 *omnis est misera servitus; sed fuerit quaedam necessaria; ecquodnam principium putatis libertatis capessendae?* What follows, *neque ego* sqq. is a different point and should begin a new sentence. But I find it hard to believe that *fuerit quaedam*

necessaria was not followed by something corresponding to *ecquodnam* . . . *capessendae* in X.19.

- I.34 *utinam, M. Antoni, avum tuum meminisses! . . . putasne illum immortalitatem mereri voluisse, ut propter armorum habendorum licentiam metueretur? illa erat vita, illa secunda fortuna, libertate esse parem ceteris, principem dignitate.*

vita, which Long renders "real living," seems odd. I would suggest *illa erant vota*, "that was his prayer." Cf. Liv. II.15.3 *ea esse vota omnium, ut, qui libertati erit in illa urbe finis, idem urbi sit* (on the text see R. M. Ogilvie, *C.Q.* 7 [1957] 76). This would be the first known example of *vota* thus used, but Livy will have written only fifteen to twenty years after Cicero spoke.

- I.35 *sed quid oratione te flectam?*

The question is, not "why should I . . .?," but "how shall I . . .?" Read *qui*; cf. *Verr.* II.2.177 *qui <id> defendet Hortensius?*, *Scaur.* 19 *qui refellemus?*

- I.38 *mihi fere satis est quod vixi vel ad aetatem vel ad gloriam: huc si quid accesserit, non tam mihi quam vobis reique publicae accesserit.*

These concluding words of the speech hold a problem which seems to have escaped notice. Wuilleumier does indeed remark: "même expression *Pro Marc.* 25, *Ad Fam.* X.1.1." But the words in the *pro Marcello* (the authenticity of which speech seems now to be universally accepted) are not Cicero's words but Caesar's: *itaque illam tuam praeclarissimam et sapientissimam vocem invitatus audiui: "satis diu vel naturae vixi vel gloriae."* Had Cicero forgotten? And did nobody remind him prior to the publication of the speech? That he deliberately echoed Caesar of all people in this solemn peroration is surely inconceivable. If that were all it might be easiest to dismiss the words *vel ad aetatem vel ad gloriam* as the marginal note of someone who remembered the *pro Marcello*. But their genuineness is strongly supported by the other passage which Wuilleumier mentions, from a letter to Plancus written within three or four weeks of the delivery of the First Philippic: *itaque mihi maximae curae est non de mea quidem vita, cui satis feci vel aetate vel factis vel, si quid etiam hoc ad rem pertinet, gloria, sed sqq. non liquet.*

- II.12 *non placet M. Antonio consulatus meus. at placuit P. Servilio, ut eum primum nomen ex illius temporis consularibus qui proxime est mortuus; placuit Q. Catulo, cuius semper in hac re publica vivet auctoritas; placuit duobus Lucullis, M. Crasso, Q.*

Hortensio, C. Curioni, C. Pisoni, M'. Glabrioni, M'. Lepido, L. Volcatio, C. Figulo, D. Silano, L. Murenæ, qui tum erant consules designati; placuit idem quod consularibus M. Catoni *sqq.*

The list of Consulars is in order of seniority, except that on that basis Curio should have preceded the Luculli. L. Cotta and L. Caesar are omitted as still alive (they are mentioned below). Also omitted are Q. Metellus Creticus and Q. Marcius Rex, who were outside Rome in 63 waiting for Triumphs. Pompey, absent from Italy in 63, is specially mentioned in the next sentence.

A similar list in *Att.* XII.21.1 (not in order of seniority) refers to the senatorial debate on 5 December 63. It differs from the above list by omitting Crassus, who was presumably absent on that occasion, and including (L.) Gellius (Poplicola; cos. 72) and (L. Manlius) Torquatus (cos. 65). The list in the Second Philippic evidently refers to a specific but different occasion, in all probability the meeting at which Cicero was voted a *supplicatio* (*Fam.* XV.4.11). Gellius and Torquatus may have been fortuitously absent. But it should be noted that the latter, who *cum esset aeger, tamen omnibus rebus illis interfuit* (*Sull.* 34) would have followed Volcatius and that *L. Torquato* could fall out of the text after *L. Volcatio* with particular ease.

II.27 quid duos Servilios — Cascas dicam an Ahalas? — et hos auctoritate mea censes excitatos potius quam caritate rei publicae?

This reading and punctuation leaves *quid* in the air and makes *et hos* resumptive, which is hardly tolerable after so short a parenthesis. Read *quid duo Servilii — Cascas dicam an Ahalas? et hos sqq.*

II.45 recordare tempus illud cum pater Curio maerens iacebat in lecto; filius se ad pedes meos prosternens, lacrimans, te mihi commendabat; orabat ut se contra suum patrem, si sestertium sexagiens *peteret*, defenderem; tantum enim se pro te intercessisse dicebat.

The Vaticanus has *se* (before *contra*), other manuscripts *te*. "The younger Curio had become security of Antony to the amount of six millions of sesterces which he was called upon to pay and then obliged to ask his father for them, and so he begs Cicero to stand between him and his father's anger" (Denniston). Certainly it is impossible to take *pater Curio* as subject of *peteret* — obviously he had not lent Antony the money. But *petere* in such a context means "demand"; it would not be used of a plea *ad misericordiam* from son to father. Read *peterentur*. The money would be demanded from Curio junior by Antony's creditor(s).

II.49 postea sum cultus a te, tu a me *observatus* in petitione quaesturae.

The Vaticanus, much our best authority, has *ouatus*. I know of no parallel for *observatus* of services or attentions rendered by a senior man like Cicero to a junior like Antony before his Quaestorship. Some older editions mention conjectures: *ornatus*, *adiutus*, *sublevatus*, *comitatus*. The second is likely; cf. *Mil.* 68 *se a te postea defensum in periculo capitis, adiutum in petitione praeturae*.

II.71 gustaras civilem sanguinem vel potius exsorbueras; fueras in acie Pharsalica antesignanus; L. Domitium, clarissimum et nobilissimum virum, occideras multosque praeterea qui e proelio effugerant, quos Caesar, ut non nullos, fortasse servasset, crudelissime persecutus trucidaras.

In a long note on *antesignanus* Denniston concludes, no doubt correctly, that here and in Caesar the term refers to "a flying body of picked troops . . . used for skirmishing or for special duties." He adds: "in describing Antony as an *antesignanus* Cicero is of course speaking figuratively" (Antony in fact commanded Caesar's left wing). But what is the purpose of this figure of speech? The term is hardly an insult in itself, and must have a special reference to Antony's role in the battle. That reference, obscured by renderings such as "in the front rank," is given by what follows. After the Pompeians had been put to flight, Antony pursued and butchered the fugitives like a light-armed skirmisher. The semicolon (or comma) might be better placed after *Pharsalica*, leaving *antesignanus* to characterize Antony's activity in the pursuit. For *fueras in acie* cf. *Fam.* IX.18.2 *in acie non fui*.

II.87 cum perditissimis latronibus non solum de die sed etiam in diem vivere.

Denniston considers *bibere* (for *vivere*) by no means certain. With *vivere* he finds everything simple: "not only (in act) live on what the day brings in, but also (in thought) disregard the morrow!" Housman had said all that needs saying on that score in *C.R.* 10 (1896) 193 (= *Classical Papers* 379). He also pointed out that Badham was the first to publish the correction, which editors continue to attribute to Müller or Hauschild.

II.90 etsi tum, cum optimum te putabant me quidem dissentiente, funeri tyranni, si illud funus fuit, sceleratissime praefuisti.

A subject for *putabant* would seem to have fallen out, perhaps *alii*; cf. s. 92 *constituta res publica videbatur aliis, mihi nullo modo*.

- V.35 neque enim ullam mercedem tanta virtus praeter hanc laudis gloriaeque desiderat; qua etiam si careat, tamen sit se ipsa contenta: quamquam in memoria gratorum civium tamquam in luce posita *laetetur*.

“The subjunctive is not dependent on ‘quamquam’ . . . it is due (like ‘sit’) to the conditional nature of the clause, *εὐφραίνουτ’ ἂν*, ‘if permitted it would rejoice’” (King). The nature of the clause is not conditional; virtue *would* do without glory were it to be lacking, but *does* rejoice in it. *laetetur* (*laetentur* V) is as inappropriate as *desideret* would be above. Read *laetatur*.

- V.45 sit pro praetore eo iure quo qui optimo. qui honos quamquam est magnus illi aetati, tamen ad necessitatem rerum gerendarum, non solum ad dignitatem valet. itaque illa quaeramus quae vix hodierno die consequemur. sed saepe spero fore huius adulescentis ornandi et nobis et populo Romano potestatem; hoc autem tempore ita censeo decernendum *sqq.*

A negative (*ne*) before *quaeramus* is necessary if *itaque . . . consequemur* is to make any sense. Cicero says that he only asks for Octavian what is necessary to enable him to function properly as an army commander. He will not ask for other honors, which at the moment might not be easily forthcoming. But there will be many other opportunities. Cf. *ad Brut.* 23.7 *quamquam ego illi tum verborum laudem tribui eamque modicam, decrevi etiam imperium; quod quamquam videbatur illi aetati honorificum, tamen erat exercitum habenti necessarium.*

- VIII.17 an hoc negare potes, qui omnis moras interponas quibus infirmetur Brutus, *melior* fiat Antonius?

“Id est, potentior” (Lemaire). Unfortunately goodness and strength are not quite the same thing. *melior* would mean “a better citizen,” “more of a *bonus*”; cf. *Att.* II.1.6, XV.6.1. Read *firmior*.

- VIII.30 nam illud quidem non adducor ut credam, esse quosdam qui inuideant *alicuius constantiae*, qui *labori*, qui perpetuam in re publica adiuvanda voluntatem et senatui et populo Romano probari moleste ferant.

labori, qui is Peterson’s conjecture for *labori eius* (V; other manuscripts have *laboribus qui eius* or *labori eius* (or *huius*) *qui eius*). But surely *constantia*, *labor*, and *voluntas* should run in tandem, as, e.g., if we read *qui inuideant alicui, qui eius constantiam, qui laborem, qui sqq.*

VIII.33 qui . . . ad C. Caesarem pro praetore ante Idus Martias *primas* adierint

primas can be supported from Cato (*R.R.* 147, 148) and Livy (XXIII.32.14, 42.21.5). But in *Catil.* I.14 Cicero has *proximis Idibus*; cf. *Amic.* 7 *proximis Nonis*, "on the last Nones." *primas* here has little manuscript authority. The Vaticanus omits it, and according to Orelli-Baiter-Halm the Tegernseensis (t) and another manuscript have *pr.imas*. On confusion between the two words see my note on *Att.* VIII.14.1 and on *Verr.* II.2. 100 (above); add yet another very probable example in *Q.Fr.* I.1.21.

X.11 alios ad negotium publicum ire cum cupimus, vix solemus extrudere: hunc retinentes *extrusimus*.

Cf. s. 10 *is tamquam extruderetur a senatu in Macedoniam et non contra prohiberetur proficisci, ita cucurrit*. Muretus' conjecture *extrusimus* for *extruimus* (V: *exclusimus* cett.) is more obvious than apt. Replace it with *elusi sumus*, "were given the slip."

XIII.6 tu vero ita vitam corpusque servato, ita fortunas, ita rem familiarem, ut haec libertate posteriora ducas itaque his uti velis, si libera re publica possis, nec pro his libertatem, sed pro libertate haec proicias tamquam pignora iniuriae.

The last three words are thus explained by King: "'Feeling that if retained they will but guarantee your wrong.' The possession of property [what about life and body?] under the government of a tyrant is so far from being a mixed blessing, that it is certain sooner or later to excite his covetousness, and then he will be deterred by no respect for law or honesty from appropriating it. Hence what in a free world would be the strongest security for a man's welfare under a tyrant is only a guarantee that he will be one of the tyrant's victims." Manutius on the other hand interprets that the possession of wealth under a tyrant is a pledge that its owner will behave amiss. Dismissing these futilities, add a word to the text: *pignora iniuriae* <*oblata*>, "as hostages to injury" (cf. "hostages to fortune"). Body, life, and goods are what make their owner vulnerable.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

UMMIDIUS QUADRATUS, *CAPAX IMPERII*

RONALD SYME

I THE Ummidii are an ancient family of long duration from Casinum, where their monuments stand to this day: mausoleum, theater, amphitheater. Their first consul was C. Ummidius Quadratus, consul suffect c. 40, who governed Syria for a decade; but sundry gaps and uncertainties intervene before the next on clear attestation, the homonym in the first year of Hadrian (*suff.* 118).

The treatment accorded the Ummidii by compilers and commentators in the recent age publishes many defects, one reason (but not the only reason) being the neglect of inscriptions.¹ Signal errors are on show. Rectification was called for — but problems subsist.²

The second consul emerges in the middle years of Trajan's reign, exhibited as a youthful orator with high praise and promise. About aspirants to eloquence Pliny the consular gave voice to grave concern. They were conceited and rebellious: "statim sapiunt, statim sciunt omnia, neminem verentur" (*Epp.* VIII.23.3). Yet there had been exceptions. An earlier letter, of the year 106, shows Pliny moved to ecstasy by the performance of two young aristocrats: Fuscus Salinator and Ummidius Quadratus. Why not? These were disciples, they conformed to a model and a master. That was apparent to the audience (VI.11).

Artfully introduced in this fashion and styled an "egregium par," they soon receive epistles from their senior friend and amiable monitor.³ Salinator, otherwise Cn. Pedanius Fuscus Salinator, had a consular father of the same name (*suff.* c. 84); and the first consul of the Pedanii, viz. L. Pedanius Secundus (*suff.* 43), was coeval with the great grandfather of Quadratus.

The two young men were perhaps already linked by ties of kinship.⁴ Further, they stand parallel in the near sequel. Pliny goes on to

¹ *RE* IXA (1961) 597 ff; Supp. IX (1962) 1827 ff.

² *Historia* 11 (1962) 153 f = *Roman Papers* (1979) 538; 17 (1968) 72 ff = *RP* (1979) 659 ff. The full exposition in the latter paper permits economy of annotation in this place. Likewise for some facts or dates easily accessible and nowhere in dispute.

³ *Epp.* VI.29; IX.13 (Quadratus); VII.9; IX.36 and 40 (Fuscus).

⁴ Cf. *Tacitus* (1958) 478; 670.

congratulate Julius Servianus (*suff.* 90, *cos.* II 102): as husband for his daughter he had selected Pedanius Fuscus (VI.26). Next, Ummidius Quadratus. A letter the year after indicates that he had recently taken a wife at the age of twenty-three (VII.24.2).

That letter, a show piece, was evoked and justified by the decease of Ummidia Quadratilla, close on eighty: the robust matron who kept to the habits of an earlier epoch (actors and the stage), but was careful to protect from contamination the tender years of her grandson. She was a daughter of the legate of Syria, now known by her full style as "Ummidia Quadratilla Asconia Secunda."⁵

II. The parents of young Quadratus had perished, perhaps long years since. Hence a problem: who was his father? A fragment of the *Fasti Ostienses* appeared to come in useful. At the end of a year, after the last *suffectus* (a Vibius), is registered the name "Umm[____]," with "[]consula[]" in the next line.⁶ A consul dying in office, that was an attractive conjecture. The year 93 offered, mortal in more respects than one: deadly prosecutions, and a whole sequence of unhealthy seasons.⁷ However, subsequent study assigns the fragment to the year 115, the name being taken to be that of a Vestal Virgin.⁸

The major problem awaits an answer. It concerns habits of nomenclature in the upper order. Now Quadratus bears the *gentilicium* of his grandmother. That cannot be his "real name," to be defined as the *nomen* of the male parent. Quadratus is therefore a masked *polyonymus*.

For parallel, observe the Augustan minister of state C. Sallustius Crispus, grandson of a Sallustia and adopted by her brother the historian. Here the original *gentilicium* baffles enquiry with a double aporia: the name was either that of Sallustia's husband or of her son-in-law.

Adoption is not the only explanation of polyonymy. A woman cannot adopt, in the full and proper sense, but she can transmit and impose her *nomen* by testament or by some other device. The notorious case is

⁵ *Not. Scav.* 1929, 29 (from the amphitheater). Duly noted by Groag under *PIR*² A 1207, but neglected by most in the sequel. Her father, it follows, had taken a wife from the Patavine clan which produced the scholar Asconius Pedianus, also the orator, politician, and poet Ti. Catius Asconius Silius Italicus (*cos.* 68).

⁶ *FO XXXI.*

⁷ *JRS* 43 (1953) 160 = *RP* (1979) 252 f. For deaths in the period, cf. *Tacitus* (1958) 69.

⁸ F. Zevi, *Dialoghi di Archeologia* 7 (1973) 67 f.

the stepmother of Ser. Sulpicius Galba (*cos.* 33). Ummidia Quadratilla might have proceeded in the same way with her grandson.

That is not all. Nomenclature from the maternal side of the family gets taken over. Thus the third Aurelius Fulvus (*cos.* 120), annexing the name of his grandfather Arrius Antoninus (*suff.* II, 97). In the year of his consulship he is styled "T. Aurelius Fulvus Arrius Antoninus."⁹

Finally, the maternal *nomen*, deemed more potent and attractive, can even extrude the "real name." C. Vitorius Hosidius Geta, admitted to the fraternity of the *Arvales* in 118, is patently the son of the *novus homo* M. Vitorius Marcellus (*suff.* 105). A poem of Statius, written in 95, assigns the boy Geta a "triumphalis avus" (*Silvae* IV.4.71 ff): that is, C. Hosidius Geta.¹⁰ Now a *senatus consultum* of the year 139 produces among the witnesses the senator M. Hosidius M. f. Geta.¹¹ Identity will be assumed with the *arvalis*. Furthermore, the full style "M. Vitorius M. f. C. Hosidius Geta." His consulship may be put c. 126, since on the protocol he precedes M. Annius Libo (*cos.* 128).

Guidance therefore accrues to the search for the missing *gentilicium* of C. Ummidius Quadratus (*suff.* 118). Like the grandson of Sallustia, Quadratus proceeds from either the son or the daughter of the old lady. In other words, he carried the name of her husband, or of her daughter's husband. No adoption needs to be postulated, merely a preference for the better *nomen*.

III. The exposition now demands brief mention of Quadratus' friend and coeval. Pedanius Fuscus took a wife when aged about twenty-two (that was normal); and, like other aristocrats, he might accede to the *fasces* at thirty-two, or not long after.

Fuscus became consul in 118, as the colleague of the new emperor. When recording the betrothal of Fuscus, Pliny eschewed what his readers knew: the daughter of Julius Servianus was the niece of P. Aelius Hadrianus (*suff.* 108).¹²

Fuscus was the destined heir, if anything should happen to Hadrian.

⁹ *CIL* VIII 8239. On tiles of the year 134 he is merely "Arrius Antoninus" (XV 92, etc.).

¹⁰ *PIR*² H 217: to be distinguished from Cn. Hosidius Geta (H 216), consul suffect in 44 with T. Flavius Sabinus.

¹¹ *ILS* 7190 (Cyzicus). For the date, H. G. Pflaum, *HAC* 1963 (1964) 110 ff. He proposes identification with the *arvalis*, C. Vitorius Hosidius Geta.

¹² This is the closest Pliny gets to a mention of Hadrianus, who in the year 100 had married the grand-niece of the emperor. Among others absent from the correspondence are M. Annius Verus (*suff.* 97) and T. Aurelius Fulvus (*cos.* 120), the coeval of Fuscus and Quadratus.

That plain fact has not always been allowed for. The names of Fuscus and Julia are absent from the historical record (Cassius Dio and the *Historia Augusta*), and also from many modern writings.¹³ Julia, indeed, being nowhere named, was denied an entry in *PIR*. The princely consorts had a short survival subsequent to 118, it may be concluded. Not perhaps victims of some political catastrophe, but rather perishing together in a pestilence such as might follow campaigns in the Orient. They left a son, very young.

In 118 Hadrian held the *fascēs* in absence for the first six months, so it appears, precisely as Trajan had done twenty years earlier. A normal pair of *suffecti* is attested in July, when Hadrian at last reached Rome. Fuscus remained in office until March 6 at least. Then came a certain Tebanianus, next Quadratus, who is attested in the last days of May.¹⁴

The season was critical for ruler and government. On the suspect death-bed adoption in Cilicia followed before long the suppression of four men of consular rank, condemned for an unverifiable conspiracy. By the same token, Quadratus will be discovered as a factor of moment in the closing years of the reign.

IV. Others besides Quadratus in this period earn scant mention in the written record. He is named once only: in the *Historia Augusta*, among the friends whom the capricious ruler came to dislike and discard (*Hadr.* 15.7). Supplement would be desirable, and it is furnished by epigraphy.

Charax in the Crimea yielded a dedication set up by a *beneficiarius* of the consular Ummidius Quadratus.¹⁵ This legate of Moesia Inferior is a son of Quadratus (*suff.* 118), such was the general assumption, his governorship being put in the vicinity of 150.¹⁶ The grounds were not adequate. Better, Quadratus himself, as legate c. 121-4. That is, as predecessor to C. Bruttius Praesens (*suff.* 118 or 119). Furthermore, but of less consequence, he was later proconsul of Africa, so it could be argued.¹⁷

¹³ Nowhere in *CAH* XI (1936).

¹⁴ See A. Degraffi, *I fasti consolari* (1952). Between Tebanianus and Quadratus Degraffi inserted a Libo. From *CIL* VI 207, but that inscription registers M. Annius Libo (*cos.* 128).

¹⁵ *Arch. Anz.* 26 (1911) 236.

¹⁶ Thus A. Stein, *Die Legaten von Moesien* (1940) 70; J. Fitz, *Epigraphica* 26 (1964) 45 ff.

¹⁷ *Historia* 17 (1968) 88 f = *RP* (1979) 675 f; *Dacia* 12 (1968) 335 = *Danubian Papers* (1971) 218. For the cursus of Bruttius Praesens, *IRT* 545 (Lepcis); *AE* 1950, 66 (Mactar).

For the conjecture about Africa, see the argument advanced in *Historia* 17 (1968) 91 f.

By good fortune, to narrow the date, the governor of Moesia Inferior in 120 happened to be known. Two fragments of a bilingual inscription at Tomis reveal the name, "[r]ius" in the Latin, "[r]torius" in the Greek.¹⁸ Hence an Artorius or a Sertorius, the former being accorded preference in *PIR*² A 1180. Good reasons spoke for "Se[r]torius," perhaps indeed for a Sertorius Brocchus. That is the name of a senator in the time of Claudius.¹⁹ Again, "Cn. Sertorius C. f. Brocchus" stands as the initial item in the nomenclature of an enigmatic *polyonymus* honored by a statue in a Dalmatian city.²⁰

A welcome surprise now intervenes, nothing less than the discovery of a decisive piece from the left side of the dedication at Tomis. The editors produce a clear and convincing restoration of the whole document.²¹ The fourth line runs

C. Ummidio Quadrato S[evero Serto]rio leg. Aug. pr. pr.

The eighth, in Greek, corresponds closely though the new fragment breaks after the name of C. Ummidius Quadratus, and before the second *cognomen* (which the spacing demands in both lines).

So far so good. But curiosity at once asks: why "S[evero]"? There are plenty of other *cognomina*. For example "Sabinus," not unbecoming a Sertorius. The editors have a ready answer. A verse inscription at Ephesus names a Quadratus and calls him son of the consular Severus.²² Without further ado they assign that document to a son of the Moesian legate, and the legate can thus be certified as C. Ummidius Quadratus Sertorius Severus.

Confidence was premature. The editors have fallen victim to obsolete information.²³ Short sentence can be administered. The persons on the Ephesian inscription belong much later: M. Ummidius Quadratus

¹⁸ *CIL* III 12493; 7539.

¹⁹ *PIR*¹ S 394 (known from coins as governor of an eastern province). Presumably the Brocchus who conducted as tribune of the plebs negotiations between the Senate and Claudius (Josephus, *Ag* XIX.234). The ancestor might be Brocchus, styled "non malus rhetor" (Seneca, *Controv.* I.1.43).

²⁰ *CIL* III 13826 (Doclea). Cf. *Historia* 17 (1968) 89 f.

²¹ A. Radulescu and M. Munteanu, in *Epigraphica: Travaux dédiés au VII Congrès d'épigraphie grecque et latine* (1977) 106 ff. The reconstruction is presented on p. 108.

²² *IBM* 539. The editors avow that they have not seen the publication.

²³ They quote the commentary of Sherwin-White on Pliny, *Epp.* VII.24.2, which adduces speculation about the family of Catilius Severus (*cos.* II 120), who is stated to be "politically connected" with Quadratus.

(*cos.* 167), had taken in adoption a son of Cn. Claudius Severus (*cos.* II 173). That was seen by Groag long ago.²⁴

V. What then is to be done? By paradox, nothing. The *cognomen* "S[everus]" turns out to be correct, and the supplement is not impaired through the defect of erudition. A Sertorius Severus was waiting on call in a letter of Pliny. A widow called Pomponia Galla, disinheriting her son, made bequests, in the first place to the orator, also to the "vir praetorius" Sertorius Severus and to other persons (V.I.1). As emerges from the letter, the transaction fell in the last years of Domitian, between the autumn of 93 and September of 96. Nothing can be surmised to explain Pliny's good fortune or link Pomponia Galla to Sertorius Severus.²⁵ The captation of widows was liable to be deprecated.²⁶

The problem of Quadratus' parentage now moves toward a partial solution. Pliny's Sertorius Severus may be either his father or his mother's brother. In other and alternative words, Quadratilla either married a Sertorius or gave her putative daughter to a Sertorius. Now Quadratilla was born c. 28, her grandson (*suff.* 118), in 83 or 84. In view of those ages, it seems more likely that the line ran through a son than through a daughter. If that is so, Sertorius Severus, of praetorian rank in 93-6, was her son, and either he or a brother was the father of Quadratus. The missing *gentilicium* of Quadratilla's husband is thus established (but not that of her son's wife). Finally, two legates of Moesia Inferior are reduced to one, viz. C. Ummidius Quadratus Sertorius Severus.

VI. The consular *Fasti* disclose some of Hadrian's kinsmen and allies in the first years of the reign. Pedanius Fuscus in 118 and P. Dasumius Rusticus the next year are his colleagues; and in 120 L. Catilius Severus (*suff.* 110) shares the *fascēs* with the third Aurelius Fulvus. More important, the choice of army commanders.²⁷ Catilius Severus took Hadrian's place in Syria, and in 118 Pompeius Falco (*suff.* 108) proceeded from Moesia Inferior to Britain. Some went out

²⁴ *Wiener Studien* 24 (1902) 261 ff, then *PIR*² C 1024. A revised text was produced by Keil, whence *SEG* XIII 505. See further *Historia* 17 (1968) 102 f.

²⁵ The lady is patently related to C. Pomponius Gallus Didius Rufus, pro-consul of Crete and Cyrene in 88/9 (*AE* 1954, 188) but hardly a daughter. The disinherited son was Asudius Curianus: a peculiar nomen, attested only by "Asudia C. l. Alethea" (*CIL* XI 5431: Asisium).

²⁶ As when another orator, M. Regulus, made approaches to Aurelia, "ornata femina" (*Epp.* I.20.10).

²⁷ For the detail, W. Eck, *Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian* (1970) 184 ff.

rapidly from their consulships. Thus A. Platorius Nepos, the first *suffectus* of 119, was despatched to Germania Inferior; and L. Coelius Rufus, *suffectus* in December, is attested the next year in Moesia Superior.²⁸

The dating of Quadratus now comes in. He might have held Moesia Inferior from 118 to 121, or from 120 to 124. Given Hadrian's emergency, it is likely enough that he was sent at once to succeed Pompeius Falco — and further, was perhaps kept there for longer than a triennium.²⁹

The choice of Quadratus is remarkable, and revealing in more ways than one. A consular legate of high cultivation or oratorical attainments, that is no surprise, no scandal. Appropriate names are not lacking.³⁰ Nor would much familiarity with provinces and armies be requisite. The appointments were political, sometimes with a premium on quite elderly men, as when Claudius Caesar sent to Syria the great grandfather of Quadratus.³¹

A young aristocrat is another matter. In fact, not one of the known legates under Hadrian avows extraction from a consular family, even on his maternal side.

VII. Nor can the emergence of Sertorii fail to excite a legitimate curiosity. To the origin of this family, there leads no clear path. One might be impelled to wonder about Spain. Of Sertorii on six inscriptions, three belong to a region of Tarraconensis famed in history for exploits of Q. Sertorius (Valentia and Liria), and each shows the *praenomen* "Quintus."³² However, Italy should not be left out of account. The name is frequent in *CIL* V and XI, over thirty specimens in each. Etruria stands out, with Etruscan documents as well as Latin.³³ As for *CIL* V, *Regio IX* (Liguria) can show two instances of "Sertorius Severus."³⁴ These are mere libertine folk — and "Severus" is one of

²⁸ There are unfortunate gaps. Thus the successors of Catilius Severus, first in Cappadocia (117/8), then in Syria (119), and of Minicius Natalis (*suff.* 106) in Pannonia Superior. Nor is a legate of Germania Superior attested in these years.

²⁹ Sex. Julius Severus (*suff.* 127) is attested as praetorian legate of Dacia Superior both in 120 and in 126 (*CIL* XVI 88; *AE* 1967, 395).

³⁰ Thus Licinius Sura and Sosius Senecio.

³¹ His inscription shows no previous military post (*ILS* 972: Casinum).

³² *CIL* II 3744; 3752 (Valentia); 3786 (Liria).

³³ Schulze, *LE* 230. Clusium and Perugia are high on show.

³⁴ Viz. Q. Sertorius Severus, named along with Q. Sertorius Synergus (XI.7469 f: Industria); Sertoria Severa, wife of a sevir (7545: territory of Aquae Statiellae).

the commonest *cognomina*, exceeded in *PIR* only by "Maximus" and "Proculus." There is a dearth of significant families of local notables — and the limits hampering a certain type of enquiry are brought into sharp relief. One does not even light upon an equestrian officer bearing the name.

Nor can anything be done with the uxorious husband in Juvenal — "cur desiderio Bibulae Sertorius ardet?" (VI. 142). Juvenal may have taken the name from Martial, who assigns it to three fictitious and disreputable characters.³⁵ There are other, and better, instances of this amiable practice.³⁶

What matters is the occurrence of a Sertorius on two inscriptions of *polyonymi*, the first at Doclea (already mentioned), the second a recent discovery at Ephesus.

VIII. Polyonymous senators carrying two family names have been discussed. They raise acute problems of parentage and ascendance. For some a plausible explanation avails.³⁷ Others baffle, for example L. Catilius Severus Julianus Claudius Reginus (*cos.* II 120).

Multiple vexations are imported by three or four *gentilicia* — there are several specimens in the time of Trajan.³⁸ The case of Pompeius Falco is variously instructive. When governor of Moesia Inferior he is registered as Q. Roscius Sex. f. Quir. Coelius Pompeius Falco.³⁹ On various grounds, among them the inscription of his granddaughter, "Q. Pompei Falconis nep(tis)" (*ILS* 1105), his "real name" can be divined; and by parentage he is presumably the son of a Sextus Pompeius.

A later document (of 123/4 at the earliest, the year of his pro-consulate in Asia) exhibits three additional items (*ILS* 1035). As follows:

1. Silius Decianus. Important in the negative sense, since no link

³⁵ Martial II.84.3; III.79.1; VII.10.5.

³⁶ Thus the extremely rare "Tongilius" (VII.130), from Martial II.40.1 (each is concerned with bathing). Not noted in *PIR*¹ or in *RE*. There had been a conspirator of that name (Cicero, *In Cat.* II.4).

³⁷ For example, no doubt about the real (i.e., paternal) nomen of C. Antius A. Julius Quadratus (*suff.* 94), C. Bruttius Praesens L. Fulvius Rusticus (*suff.* 118 or 119), T. Aurelius Fulvus Arrius Antoninus (*cos.* 120), L. Dasumius P. f. Tullius Tuscus (*suff.* 152).

³⁸ E.g., *ILS* 1016, 1038, 1044, 1052, 1054.

³⁹ *ILS* 1036: Hierapolis Castabala, in Cilicia. Add, from other inscriptions, the *cognomen* "Murena," which adheres (it can be argued) to Roscii, a Roscius in this instance being the man who adopted Pompeius Falco.

of kinship can be surmised with L. Silius Decianus (*suff.* 94), a son of Silius Italicus.

2. Vibullius Pius. Enigmatic, since it recurs as the second part of the name of P. Coelius Balbinus, who shared the *fascēs* with Aelius Caesar in 137 (*PIR*² C 1241). But it is also found in the dynastic house of Sparta.

3. Julius Eurycles Herclanus. Clear (but raising a problem). Observe the Hadrianic senator C. Julius Eurycles Herculanus L. Vibullius Pius (*PIR*² J 302).

Falco thus annexes two pieces of Euryclid nomenclature. How can the phenomenon be explained? First he had them all the time, being of Euryclid extraction: it is mere omission or abridgment that the names should be absent from the first inscription cited.⁴⁰ Against which, however, it must be observed that the names are likewise absent on several other documents anterior to 118.⁴¹

Second, Falco took over nomenclature from his wife's family. Parallels exist. Thus P. Calvisius Tullus Ruso (*cos.* 109), who married the heiress Domitia Cn. f. Lucilla. He clearly owes the "Tullus" to his wife's uncle and parent by adoption, namely Cn. Domitius Tullus (*suff.* II 98).

Falco's wife was Sosia Polla, daughter of Q. Sosius Senecio, who made a powerful entrance to the *Fasti* as *consul ordinarius* in 99. Sosius may come from a dynastic family in the Greek East, the *nomen* deriving from C. Sosius (*cos.* 32 B.C.), partisan of Marcus Antonius and governor of Syria. A similar origin might not be excluded for Q. Pompeius Sex. f. Falco.⁴²

Accreted names, it is clear, do not merely represent adoption, maternal ascendance, or even collateral relations. They are assumed from ostentation, parading not only pedigree but the memory of a friend and a friend's testamentary bequests. Hence evidence often valid for groups and clans, albeit sometimes tenuous. For example, the palmary monster, Falco's grandson (*cos.* 169). His inscription displays fourteen *gentilicia*.⁴³

⁴⁰ As argued by W. C. McDermott, *Ancient Society* 7 (1976) 244 f.

⁴¹ Namely on inscriptions in Moesia Inferior, e.g., *CIL* III 12470 (Tropaeum Traiani); 7537 (Tomis); *AE* 1936, 14 (Durostorum); 1957, 336 and 1963, 45 (Tomis). The three additional items are still absent from *AE* 1972, 577 (Ephesus), set up after the proconsulate of Asia.

⁴² The dedication by a friend at Castabala (*ILS* 1036) arouses curiosity.

⁴³ *ILS* 1104. The son of Bruttius Praesens (*cos.* 153) had ten or a dozen, to judge by his fragmentary inscription (*ILS* 1117).

IX. To proceed therefore with Sertorii in polyonymous nomenclature. First, the Doclea inscription, as follows:⁴⁴

CN. SERTO[*rio*
C. F. BROCC[*ho*
AQUILIO[
AGRICOLA[
PEDANIO. F[*usco*
IVLIO. SERVIANO

There is room, it will be noted, for two names, in lines 3 and 4. "Regulo" as the *cognomen* borne by the great orator M. Aquilius Regulus (*suff.*? c. 77): it recurs, so it happens, with M. Metilius Aquillius Regulus, the consul of 157 (*ILS* 1075). Next, "Iulio": "Iulius Agricola" occurs on the Ephesian inscription (see below). Cn. Sertorius Brocchus is thus equipped with five *gentilicia*.

Why this aristocrat should receive honors in Dalmatia is a mystery. That province supplies no other Sertorius on its inscriptions. Perhaps a governor — or an exile. Nor does conjecture about identity hold out any immediate prospect of success.

The nomenclature includes the names of Julius Servianus and Pedanius Fuscus. Groag was alert to the problem thus confronting. A daughter of Fuscus and Julia, he supposed, had married C. Sertorius Brocchus.⁴⁵ The son, Gnaeus, would therefore be a great-grandson of Julius Servianus — and also the nephew of the youthful Pedanius Fuscus, whose existence and whose fate is attested in 136/7.⁴⁶

That appears the easy solution. There are other possibilities. The connection of Servianus with the Pedanii or with the Sertorii (or with both) might antedate the marriage contracted between Fuscus and Julia in 106. Servianus (born c. 47), may well have had another wife, and other offspring, before he married the sister of Aelius Hadrianus (perhaps c. 90).

Or again, the wife of C. Sertorius Brocchus may be a sister, not a daughter, of Fuscus (*suff.* 118). In that case the son did not stand in the descendance of Servianus, so far as known. That would not prevent him from annexing the name of the potent kinsman. So far, therefore, Cn. Sertorius C. f. Brocchus.

⁴⁴ *CIL* III 13826, whence *PIR*¹ S 395, which does not allow for two gaps in the nomenclature.

⁴⁵ *RE* X 890; XIX 23.

⁴⁶ Dio LXIX.17.1 (stating his age as eighteen). Groag further asked whether that youth might not be a great-grandson of Servianus (not a grandson), hence identical with the person honored at Doclea (*RE* XIX 19).

X. More vexatious is the second document, from Ephesus. It is a mutilated statue basis with a bilingual text.⁴⁷ When both are combined, the result is roughly as follows:

[.] Velleius P.? f. Tro[...] L. Sertorius [...] Ped]anius Fuscus Sa[linat]or
Sallus[ti]us Bla[esus] Iulius Agricola [...] Caesonius.

Various problems are in cause. It is a surprise to discover, as on the Doclea inscription, the name of Julius Agricola. However, let that pass: there is no call to assume ancestry or close kinship.

The presence in the same nomenclature of a Velleius and a Sallustius Blaesus cannot evade comment, however brief. An intricate problem involves several senators in the late years of Domitian, and three deaths on record:

1. "Velleius Blaesus ille locuples consularis," who was subjected to "captatio" by M. Regulus shortly before his decease (Pliny, *Epp.* II.20.7).

2. Blaesus, the friend of Atedius Melior, who died in 90 or 91: commemorated by Statius (*Silvae* II.1.189 ff, cf. 3.77) and by Martial (VIII.38).

3. P. Sallustius Blaesus (*suff.* 89), with the *Arvales* as an assiduous member from 77 until May of 91 (when the Domitianic protocols break off).

4. Sallustius Lucullus, legate of Britain, put to death by Domitian on a trivial charge (Suetonius, *Dom.* 10.1).

A common identity for several of the four was suspected, hence the hypothesis of a *polyonymus*.⁴⁸ Velleius Blaesus and Blaesus can be amalgamated to advantage, that is clear. And the tribe "Tromentina" now attached to the *nomen* "Velleius" on the new document might appear promising at first sight. The name, though familiar, happens to be very rare. The towns of Italy enrolled in "Tromentina" (they are not numerous) fail to offer any useful Velleii.⁴⁹ The matter is of some importance, since it concerns the date and identity of a

⁴⁷ Published in *JÖAI* 49 (1968/71), Beiblatt 31, whence *AE* 1972, 578. On which see especially E. Champlin, *ZPE* 21 (1976) 84 ff.

⁴⁸ *Tacitus* (1958) 648 (in a compressed statement).

⁴⁹ The towns are Veii and Perusia; Fabrateria (Vetus and Nova); Aesernia. The addition of the tribe suggests a genuine and plenary adoption. That is to say, the young man honored at Ephesus (or rather his father) had been adopted by "Velleius Blaesus ille locuples consularis" (*Epp.* II.20.7). Pedanius Fuscus (*cos.* 118) was available as a small boy when that Velleius Blaesus died (in 90 or 91).

governor of Britain.⁵⁰ Full discussion is enjoined, but it must here be waived.⁵¹

To proceed to a more exciting theme. The Ephesian inscription discloses a young man, a *monetalis*, who had not yet held the quaestorship; and of the high aristocracy, since he is already a *pontifex*. Furthermore, he has a lictor for attendant. A scrupulous and searching enquiry comes to a firm conclusion: the youth, who has a "Pedanius Fuscus Salinator" in his nomenclature, is none other than the son of Fuscus and Julia, hence the grandnephew of Hadrian and the heir presumptive. Nor would his presence at Ephesus be anomalous: to meet the great-uncle returning in 134 after the war terminated in Palestine.⁵²

The age of the youth is sharply relevant. When the son of Fuscus came to grief, right at the end of 136, or early in the next year, he was eighteen years old. Such is the firm statement of Cassius Dio.⁵³ There seemed no reason to disallow. But a horoscope has been produced. It describes a man of birth and overt dynastic claims who was brought to ruin about the age of twenty-five; and he was destroyed along with an old man of his family.⁵⁴

The age fits a young man at Ephesus, who in 134 was not yet quaestor. The solution is elegant, nay convincing. Yet a slight hesitance may be allowed to subsist. That some other youth close to the dynasty as some of the names show (Pedanius Fuscus, though Julius Servianus appears to be absent) was accorded the honor of a lictor is not beyond credence.

XI. For many persons of birth and rank the testimony is sparse or solitary, sometimes only a name on the consular *Fasti* or a deduction from parents or descendants. Death was a frequent visitant, to carry off a youth in the prime of his promise or a young wife in childbirth. More marriages have to be assumed than those on record — and some divorces for reasons of dynastic policy (none of them intrude on the decorous pages of Pliny).

In the present context it will be expedient to register some missing persons and buried links.

⁵⁰ Champlin suggests an amalgamation of the three deceased consulars as "P. Velleius P. f. Tro. Lucullus Sallustius Blaesus, *cos. suff.* 89" (o.c. 86).

⁵¹ For further complications see *Some Arval Brethren*, Ch. XI (forthcoming).

⁵² E. Champlin (above, n.47) 88 f.

⁵³ Dio LXIX.17.1. For a different date for the death of Pedanius Fuscus, based on the horoscope, see now T. D. Barnes, *The Sources of the Historia Augusta* (1978) 45.

⁵⁴ E. Cumont, *Cat. cod. astr. graec.* VII.2.85, cf. E. Champlin (above, n.47).

1. The mother of Ummidius Quadratus (*suff.* 118), assuming his father a Sertorius.
2. The wife of Quadratus.
3. A husband for his sister, who is registered in Pliny (*Epp.* VII.24.2).
4. The mother of Pedanius Fuscus (*cos.* 118).
5. Perhaps brothers and sisters of Fuscus.
6. An earlier wife for Julius Servianus (*suff.* 90), before Hadrian's sister.
7. The mother of Cn. Sertorius Brocchus.
8. The husband of Domitia Cn. f. Lucilla, before she married P. Calvisius Tullus Ruso (*cos.* 109): she already had children and a granddaughter in 108 (*Epp.* VIII.18.2).
9. Brothers of T. Aurelius Fulvus (*cos.* 120), dead before 138 (*HA, Pius* 5.2).
10. The wife of M. Annius Libo (*cos.* 128).

Either directly or at several removes, a number of these ten items concern the life and career of C. Ummidius Quadratus Sertorius Severus. Before the recent discovery of the Tomitane fragment it was permissible to surmise some link or other with his coeval Pedanius Fuscus. They might have been cousins.

Furthermore, the pair of inscriptions carrying the name of Pedanius Fuscus. Each includes a Sertorius, viz. Cn. Sertorius C. f. Brocchus and L. Sertorius [. . . . The latter is either a Brocchus or a Severus.

The connection between Pedanii and Sertorii may go back some distance. There was a senatorial Sertorius Brocchus in the time of Claudius, when the first Pedanius crops up, namely L. Pedanius Secundus (*suff.* 43), *praefectus urbi* from 56 to 61. The social rank of the Pedanii was early embellished. Vespasian adlected into the patriciate a young *polyonymus* called L. Pedanius Secundus Pompeius Festus Munatianus.⁵⁵ He is close coeval to the father of Fuscus (*suff.* c. 84); and Fuscus is assigned a "domus patricia" by Pliny (VI.26.1).

The Pedanii come from Barcino in Tarraconensis, which city yields about twenty of their freedmen. Also, with no rank indicated, the enigmatic L. Pedanius L. f. Secundus Julius Persicus.⁵⁶

As became evident, the less illustrious Sertorii cannot be elucidated through a town of origin. Nor can the *patria* of Julius Servianus be ascertained. Spain seems to be the general notion, and Baetica in

⁵⁵ *AE* 1968, 482. When adlected he had been tribune in the legion IV Flavia Felix. The item "Pompeius Festus" might excite passing curiosity. The grammarian of that name quoted Lucan and Martial (ed. Lindsay, p. 31 and p. 506.)

⁵⁶ *CIL* II 4513. A Julius combined with a Pedanius might appear significant. The document carries no indication of rank.

particular. The city Italica has even been acclaimed, the home of Ulpia and Aelia.⁵⁷ Not plausible. The nearest one can get is friendship with L. Dasumius Hadrianus (*suff.* ? 93), the magnate of Corduba, who enjoined in the long and pompous testament that Julius Servianus should superintend his obsequies.⁵⁸

The two may also have been related. That does not suffice to indicate the same region. Further, it is not easy to discover a Julius among Spanish senators in the early Empire.⁵⁹ Narbonensis could be admitted (but not argued).⁶⁰

The notables of that province had already contracted alliances with Spanish groups, one result being the elevation of Trajan through a veiled coup d'état in October of the year 97. When Hadrian at the end discarded the Pedanii, the benefit went to the Anni from Uccubi in Baetica — but also to families of Nemausus, namely the Aurelii Fulvi and the descendants of Domitius Afer.

XII. Not long after the return from his last peregrination, Hadrian celebrated his sixtieth birthday, in January of the year 136. The ruler was in poor health and somber spirits, now at last under constraint to give thought to the problem of the succession.⁶¹

As son and heir he selected the consul L. Ceionius Commodus, who toward the end of the year became Aelius Caesar. The choice excited surmise and scandal, which continues to flourish, and to put out novel blossoms.

"Quod non sua seminat arbor." The root and trunk is the *Historia Augusta*, not always invoked with due caution and discrimination. The basic source of the *Vita Hadriani* is patently a sober biography that suffered double damage. It was ruthlessly abridged. It was also supplemented and enlivened with dubious matter, taken (so it can be argued) from Marius Maximus, a writer prone to gossip and detrac-

⁵⁷ Thus R. Etienne in *Les empereurs romains d'Espagne* (1965) 74. That scholar is disposed to claim an inordinate total of senators from Italica, among them Licinius Sura.

⁵⁸ *CIL* VI.10229, l. 110.

⁵⁹ The earliest for certain is a minor character, not earlier than the middle of the second century, namely Q. Julius Maximus (*CIL* II 112: Eborac).

⁶⁰ L. Julius Ursus (*suff.* II 98) who adopted Ser. Julius Servianus (*suff.* 90, *cos.* II 102) remains a problem. He is now disclosed as consul for the third time in 100; cf. a new piece of the *Fasti Ostienses*, to be published by F. Zevi.

⁶¹ On this question see H. G. Pflaum (above, n.11) 75 ff; A. R. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius* (1966) 44 ff; T. D. Barnes, *JRS* 57 (1967) 74 ff; R. Syme, *Historia* 17 (1968) 93 ff.

tion.⁶² There is also one of the "secondary biographies," comprising princes and pretenders, the *Vita* of Aelius Caesar: fiction almost total.

A passage in that *Vita* is the source of misconception and error. According to "scholarly biographers of Hadrian" the Emperor knew the "genitura" (that is, horoscope) of Ceionius Commodus, so the author alleges; and he supports the statement by citing the testimony of Marius Maximus who asserted Hadrian's expertise in astrology (*Ael.* 3.8f.).⁶³ That biography also carries a second reference to the horoscope, a little further down (4.5).

An ingenious theory has been promulgated.⁶⁴ It exhibits audacity (other terms could be used). The word "genitura," it is asserted, can mean "birth and parentage." Therefore Hadrian's heir, born in 100, was his own son: the fruit of adultery with the wife of L. Ceionius Commodus (*cos.* 106).

Another illicit argument is invoked, the name "Verus" attached to Hadrian's heir — in the *HA* but nowhere else. The prime and damaging specimen occurs in the "Letter of Hadrian," where Hadrian reminds Servianus that the Egyptians have defamed "filium meum Verum."⁶⁵ Hadrian's bastard, the notion is admissible — but not the "evidence."

As for the alleged horoscope, it did not indicate that Ceionius was doomed by the stars to perish before long. That is clear, as the second piece of fiction in the *Vita Aelii* shows. Consoling Hadrian for the loss of his heir, a "litteratus" was moved to exclaim: "who can hope to go on living if that horoscope was erroneous?" (4.5).

The item must be dismissed. It belongs to another rubric, namely the methods and the inventions of an impostor. It will further be expedient to put under sharp scrutiny any statements that document Hadrian's predilection for the science of the Chaldeans.⁶⁶

Not but that predictions, omens, and horoscopes came into intrigues and ambitions in the course of the year 136. That is an easy and natural surmise. The *HA* carries a solitary and isolated reference to the son of Pedanius Fuscus — which, by the way, betrays no awareness of his

⁶² For the structure of the *Vita Hadriani* see *Emperors and Biography* (1971) 113 ff. For the use of Marius Maximus elsewhere by the author of the *HA*, see *HAC* 1970 (1972) 287 ff. It should be added in passing that a number of scholars claim Maximus as the basic source of the earlier *Vitae*.

⁶³ The item had occurred, without the name of Maximus, in *Hadr.* 16.7.

⁶⁴ J. Carcopino, *Rev. ét. anc.* 51 (1949) 262 ff = *Passion et politique sous les Césars* (1958) 143 ff. The startling thesis diverted attention from errors of fact.

⁶⁵ *HA*, *Quadr. tyr.* 8.8. Servianus, being one of the family, knew the true parentage of Ceionius Commodus, so it is opined.

⁶⁶ On which, see remarks in *HAC* 1972/1974 (1976) 294 ff.

parentage and identity. Hadrian detested him for ambitions issuing from predictions: "quod imperium praesagiis et ostentis agitatus speraret" (*Hadr.* 23.3).

The survival of Hadrian's heir was in fact a question. His health was fragile. That is stated both by Cassius Dio and by the *HA*.⁶⁷

Hence another hypothesis. Hadrian made his decision for a deliberate reason. No long duration was indicated for Ceionius. Hadrian designed the succession to go to the grandson of M. Annius Verus (*cos.* III 126), who reached the age of fifteen in April of the year 136. Ceionius would serve as a stop-gap.⁶⁸

Speculation about the motives of Hadrian is unavoidable and may in fact be remunerative. It is not necessary to invoke calculation of an early demise for Aelius Caesar.

XIII. Hadrian's act had dire consequences. He abruptly disavowed the next in kin, old Servianus, his sister's husband (who had been elevated to a third consulship in 134), and his own grand-nephew, the son of Fuscus and Julia. Soon afterwards Servianus and this youth were executed — or received the command to die, the one aged ninety, the other eighteen, so Dio states.⁶⁹

If the youth was older by about seven years, as the other piece of evidence indicates (namely the horoscope), the enormity in the suppression of a prince would appear enhanced rather than palliated, at least to men of understanding. And they might further ask why Hadrian, while obdurate for Ceionius, if not infatuated, ought not to have promoted concord and strengthened the dynasty by enjoining on Ceionius the adoption of the young Pedanius Fuscus.

Hadrian's decision entailed other consequences. The choice of Ceionius Commodus provoked wide dissent. "Invitis omnibus," such is the comment in the *HA* (*Hadr.* 23.11), acceptable if toned down a little. Ceionius, himself son and grandson of *consules ordinarii*, belonged

⁶⁷ Dio LXIX.17.1; *HA*, *Hadr.* 23.15 (where the preceding statement, with quotation of Hadrian's words, "saepissime dictitavit," should probably be discounted).

The Ceionii were not perhaps a healthy stock. The grandfather (*cos.* 78) is not heard of after his governorship of Syria, or the father after his consulate (106): the father's widow went to C. Avidius Nigrinus (*suff.* 110).

⁶⁸ Thus, explicitly, H. G. Pflaum (above, n.11) 96; 100; 103: "il a dû compter que son fils adoptif ne lui survivrait pas longtemps, s'il lui survivait jamais."

⁶⁹ Dio LIX.17.1. The *HA* has the events in the reverse order (*Hadr.* 23.10). It has sometimes been accorded preference. Thus W. Weber in *CAH* XI (1936) 322; A. R. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius* (1966) 44.

to an influential faction of Italian families, of long established consular rank. At its heart may be detected a lady whom no source names. She was the wife in succession of L. Ceionius Commodus (*cos.* 106), C. Avidius Nigrinus (*suff.* 110), Sex. Vettulenus Civica Cerialis (*cos.* 106). She is a Plautia, sister to L. Fundanius Lamia Aelianus (*cos.* 116), with two Augustan consuls in the ancestry.⁷⁰

Hadrian's Aelius Caesar had a double link with Avidius Nigrinus, being not only a son of Plautia but having married a daughter of Avidius (by an earlier wife, whose name baffles ascertainment).⁷¹ In one aspect Hadrian's choice of Ceionius for the succession is remorse and reparation for an error committed two decades previously: Avidius was one of the four consulars then put to death on a charge of treason.⁷² Hadrian in his autobiography, composed in this late season, presented various items of apologia: one of them was his intention to make Avidius Nigrinus his successor (*Hadr.* 7.1). Not plausible — but evidence of a close friendship.

A ruler must try to hold the balance between competing factions or reinforce support for his destined successor. To buttress the position of Ceionius, Hadrian turned without reluctance (and indeed of necessity) to the most potent group of all, the Hispano-Narbonensian nexus. At its head, though unobtrusive through long years, stood M. Annius Verus (*cos.* III 126), a man whom Hadrian held in especial esteem — and there was a link somewhere between their families.⁷³

Alert to contriving alliances of birth and wealth, Verus in the last years of Trajan consigned his daughter Annia Faustina to Aurelius Fulvus (*cos.* 120). Verus had two sons. For the elder he secured as bride Domitia P. f. Lucilla (heiress to the fortune of the Domitii). The wife of the younger son, M. Annius Libo (*cos.* 128), is lost to history — and Libo himself is only a name, not a person. A wife, not perhaps his first,

⁷⁰ The name was deduced by Groag (in *PIR*² A 1408) from Avidia Plautia, daughter of Avidius Nigrinus (*ILS* 8217). For the whole group see *Athenaeum* 35 (1957) 306 ff (with a revised stemma) = *RP* (1979) 325 ff.

The Avidii come from Faventia on the Aemilia, the Ceionii probably from Bononia, while the *patria* of the Vettuleni is to be sought in the Sabine country. A Ceionius and a Vettulenus share the *fasces* both in 106 and in 136.

⁷¹ *HA*, *Hadr.* 23.10. Like Plautia, this Avidia cannot earn an entry in *PIR*.

⁷² For that personal motive, cf. *Tacitus* (1958) 601. The political and social importance of the group deserves and receives strong emphasis, cf. H. G. Pflaum (above, n.11) 100 ff; A. R. Birley (above, n.61) 40 ff.

⁷³ Perhaps through the Dasumii. A notice from Marius Maximus inserted in the *Vita Marci* (1.6) takes the ancestry back to Dasummus, whose son founded Lupiae (Lecce).

can however be extracted: a niece of Plautia, hence first cousin to Aelius Caesar.⁷⁴

The elder son of Annius Verus died before reaching the *fasces*, but he left a young boy (born in April of 121). In the course of the year 136, before his purpose was openly declared, Hadrian made a significant move. The young Marcus was betrothed to Ceionia Fabia, the daughter of Ceionius Commodus (*HA, Marcus* 4.5).

As it happened, the new Caesar had no long survival. He succumbed on the first day of 138. Hadrian had miscalculated, but he was not at a loss. He had recourse to another device, an adoption which enabled him to keep and to reinforce the Annian connection.

This time it was an older man, Aurelius Fulvus, the husband of Annia Faustina. The ruler announced the adoption in February; and it was enjoined on Fulvus that he take in adoption the son of Aelius Caesar (aged seven) — and also M. Annius Verus, his wife's nephew (aged sixteen).⁷⁵ Hence the dynasty styled "Antonine," for Hadrian's second choice carried the name of his maternal grandfather, Arrius Antoninus.

XIV. So far, on the shortest of statements, the transactions of 136–8. It cannot do justice to a complex situation. Intrigue and conflict brought in a variety of persons, not all on clear record — and some no doubt whose operations leave no trace. Groups are discerned in proximity to the power, not all easy to define and delimit.

And the groups interlocked, for such is the fashion of dynastic politics in any age. Annii and Aelii, it is surmised, were related through L. Dasumius Hadrianus (*suff.*? 93) But Dasumius may also have a connection with Julius Servianus. Again, Sertorii are now seen to attach Ummidius Quadratus to the Pedanii. But Quadratus, as will be shown, also comes into the ambit of the Annii.

Quadratus is named only once in the *Historia Augusta*, as one of three in a long list of friends whom the ruler came to dislike, incriminate, or destroy: "Ummidium Quadratum et Catilium Severum et Turbonem graviter insecutus est" (*Hadr.* 15.7).

The notice calls for delicate handling. It is not clear that the offense incurred by these three men was simultaneous or conjoined. The dere-

⁷⁴ See below, p. 306.

⁷⁵ *HA, Pius* 4.5. Many scholars have assumed that it was Hadrian's prime design to secure the succession for Marcus. For the priority of the son of Aelius Caesar see T. D. Barnes (above, n.61) 74 ff. That was reversed by Antoninus Pius, who consigned his daughter to Marcus.

liction of Marcius Turbo, for long years Guard Prefect, remains a mystery; and it is premature to suppose Quadratus a firm ally of Catilius Severus at any time.

That person, a *novus homo* of resplendent success, demands brief mention because of his intrusion on the Spanish and Narbonensian nexus. He is styled "proavus maternus" of the young Marcus Annius Verus.⁷⁶ How could that be? The problem is vexatious and elusive.

One solution that has been put out toys with the notion that "proavus" should be taken not literally but in the sense of a "substitute grandfather."⁷⁷ Catilius would acquire that status if he married Domitia Cn. f. Lucilla on the decease of her husband P. Calvisius Tullus Ruso (*cos.* 109), who did not survive to hold a second consulship.⁷⁸ She was the mother of Domitia P. f. Lucilla, and grandmother of Marcus.

That may well seem a forced expedient, a device of despair. Second thoughts suggest the better way, albeit peculiar: another wealthy heiress in the same family, namely the widow of old Domitius Tullus (*suff.* II 98). The man who married her would become in effect the step-great grandfather of the boy Marcus.⁷⁹

A letter of Pliny in 107 or 108 reports the death of Domitius Tullus, enlarging upon his opulence and noting his testamentary dispositions. The daughter inherited, but handsome provision was made for the widow. She was far from her first youth (*Epp.* VIII.18.8). About this time, after a slow career of minor praetorian posts, the prospects of Catilius improve, taking him to a consulship in 110.⁸⁰

Catilius Severus incurred the dislike of Hadrian. That was in the last days: personal ambitions and resentment at the adoption of Aurelius Fulvus, so the *HA* states, and he was demoted from the City Prefecture (24.6).

His ambitions do not pass belief. In those years competition was rife among consulars (some of them very old) who had boy candidates in their family ambit, including several not specified in the sources. "Dii avertant principes pueros!"⁸¹

⁷⁶ *HA*, *Marcus* 1.4 and 9; cf. the πρόπαππος in M. Aurelius, *Ad se ipsum* 1.4. Groag expressed no enthusiasm for his own solutions (*PIR*² C 357 f).

⁷⁷ *Tacitus* (1958) 793.

⁷⁸ In *Marcus* 1.3. his second consulate should be transferred to Cn. Domitius Tullus, his father-in-law (*suff.* II, 98): by emendation of the text, cf. *JRS* 43 (1953) 156.

⁷⁹ *Historia* 17 (1968) 95 f.

⁸⁰ By way of the prefecture of the *Aerarium Saturni*. For his cursus, *ILS* 1041, supplemented by *AE* 1913, 229 (five previous praetorian posts).

⁸¹ *HA*, *Tac.* 6.5 (in the oration of "Maecius Faltonius Nicomachus").

XV. Annii Verus was still with them — and Libo, the consul of 128, had a small son, who in 136 was about five years old.⁸² From the name of Libo's daughter, Annia Fundania Faustina, may be deduced his wife's name and identity: she can be presumed a daughter of L. Fundanius Lamia Aelianus (*cos.* 116), hence a niece of the enigmatic Plautia — who was the mother of Aelius Caesar. Further to the topic of these imbroglios, it will be noted that a son of Fundanius Lamia (*cos.* 116) had been married to Aurelia Fadilla, the elder daughter of Aurelius Fulvus: Fadilla was dead by 134, and her husband may no longer have been among the living in 136.⁸³

As for Ummidius Quadratus, he certainly had a son: already aged about twenty-two, as will be argued in the sequel. Linked to the Pedanii, as now emerges, Quadratus was perhaps on the edge of peril in the catastrophe of 136/7.

The *HA* registers the fate of Servianus, but not that of his grandson. One of the four passages that carry the identical phrase “mori coegit” concludes with the statement “multis aliis interfectis vel aperte vel per insidias” (23.8). The next item is suspect, since it adds, as though for confirmation, the story that Hadrian poisoned his wife.⁸⁴ The decease of Vibia Sabina falls at some time in the second half of 136, so it appears.⁸⁵ There is no means of telling whether it was a factor of any moment.⁸⁶ She had no kinsfolk that mattered.

Some doubt may attend upon “multis interfectis.” No other executions are on record. Not that anything is thereby proved, given the nature of the sources for Hadrian's reign. The *HA* in a “bad context,” namely speculation about the *cognomen* assumed by the successor, comes out with the notion that he rescued many senators whom Hadrian intended to kill.⁸⁷

⁸² Libo is registered on the *senatus consultum* of 139 (*ILS* 7190: Cyzicus) — not his son, as was affirmed “sine dubio” in *PIR*², A 668. That son was despatched to Syria c. 163 (*HA*, *Verus* 9.2). His consulship has recently emerged, suffect in February of 161 (*AE* 1972, 657).

⁸³ *PIR*², A 206 (Lamia); 1653 (Fadilla).

⁸⁴ *HA*, *Hadr.* 23.9: “quando quidem etiam Sabina uxor non sine fabula veneni dati ab Hadriano defuncta est.” Another story has her compelled to commit suicide (*Epit.* 14.8).

⁸⁵ For problems about the evidence, W. Eck, *RE Supp.* XV 913 f.

⁸⁶ Sabina has been regarded as the “principal obstacle” to Hadrian's plans for the succession: “l'empereur attendit donc la mort de sa femme” (H. G. Pflaum [above, n.11] 79).

⁸⁷ *Hadr.* 24.4; *Pius* 2.4. Perhaps from Aurelius Victor, who has a fuller version of the story (14.11; 13 f), continuing with the phrase “atque Aurelio Antonino cognomentum Pii” (15.1). Not in Eutropius or in the *Epitome*.

Banishment for some friends or kinsfolk of the Pedanii is not excluded. That might explain the *polyonymus* of Doclea, Cn. Sertorius Brocchus. If a grandson of Fuscus and Julia (by a daughter) he cannot have been more than an infant at the time of the catastrophe. Perhaps a nephew of the pair, hence first cousin to Hadrian's grand-nephew (cf. above).

Quadratus evaded harm, it is assumed. Indeed, he secured entrance to the rival constellation, precisely in the year 136. Two isolated items in the *HA* permit the noteworthy and often neglected deduction.

First, not long after his betrothal to the daughter of Ceionius Commodus, young Marcus surrendered his paternal estate to his sister (*Marcus* 4.7). That sister (Annia Cornificia) was on the verge of matrimony, as the context shows. Second, when she died Marcus transferred a part of his maternal fortune to her son Ummidius Quadratus (7.4). That son is patently M. Ummidius Quadratus, the consul of 167, who would reach the *fascēs* at an early age. Not heard of after his consulate, which fell in the plague years. The name of the Ummidii was transmitted through the adoption of a son of Claudius Severus, the youth who came to grief for conspiracy against Commodus.⁸⁸

The husband of Annia Cornificia was also named on tiles of the pair.⁸⁹ Otherwise this Ummidius Quadratus lacked direct attestation until the discovery of the inscription at Charax, revealing a legate of Moesia Inferior. It was therefore expedient to determine the date of his consulship. One estimate put it c. 140.⁹⁰ Or again, either 140 or 145 might appear plausible for the husband of Cornificia, succeeding Antoninus Pius and the prince Marcus Aurelius Caesar who opened both years.

The Moesian governorship now goes as an established fact to his father, C. Ummidius Quadratus Sertorius Severus. Therefore the son's consulate incurs a doubt. Cornificia died in 152.⁹¹ Her husband might have predeceased by a number of years. The notion would be attractive that he was about twenty-two when the marriage was contracted.

There is a way out, and it leads towards a further revelation. Among the *suffecti* of 146, the *Fasti Ostienses* present C. Annianus Verus. In this instance, the *cognomen* functions as a *gentilicium*. Parallels exist. For example, M. Vestinus Atticus (*cos.* 65), where the missing *nomen* is

⁸⁸ Cf. *PIR*² C 1024 (with the correct interpretation of *SEG* XIII 505: Ephe-sus). See further *Historia* 17 (1968) 102 f.

⁸⁹ *PIR*² A 708.

⁹⁰ *JRS* 43 (1953) 157; *Tacitus* (1958) 670.

⁹¹ *FO* XXIX.

"Julius." The *suffectus* of 146, it can be claimed, is C. (Ummidius Quadratus) Annianus Verus. That is, the husband of Cornificia. Only a *suffectus*, it is true. That objection can be got over. All for Marcus, the emperor would not wish to put this man in undue prominence.

What then may be deduced? There are two explanations. First, the husband of Annia Cornificia took over (and modified) nomenclature from her family. Second, he used nomenclature from the maternal side. Such is the more regular practice. Now his own son is M. Ummidius Quadratus (*cos.* 167). Found nowhere else among Ummidii, "Marcus" is the *praenomen* of the Annii. That is not all. An inscription discloses as legate to the proconsul of Africa in 161/2 a certain M. Ummidius Annianus Quadratianus, to be identified as the consul of 167.⁹² That is, again a piece of maternal nomenclature.

If the second hypothesis is accepted, momentous consequences ensue. The missing wife of Quadratus (*suff.* 118) turns out to be an Annia: to be presumed, like Faustina, a daughter of the *consul ter*. If so, Quadratus had been a member of the group long years before he secured Annia Cornificia as bride for his son (and they are thus in fact cousins).

On that showing, Quadratus and Fulvus stand parallel as brothers-in-law. Allies perhaps, but rather rivals. The year 139 opens with the second consulate of the new ruler — but not, like 118, a kinsman to share the *fascēs*. The colleague is Bruttius Praesens (*suff.* 118 or 119): perhaps Hadrian's choice, perhaps displacing him.⁹³

With the insertion of Quadratus, the dynastic imbroglio of 136–8 becomes denser, the pattern more intricate and closer to history. And by the same token, not easy to expound, still less furnish a narration.

Epilogue. The troubled close of the reign evoked its ominous dawn. It also opened a distant perspective. Old men whose habit it was to compare past and present when they congregated at funerals had rich material for subversive comment, recalling early vicissitudes in the first dynasty of the Caesars: matrimony and adoptions, the search for a successor, young princes dying untimely and an "ultimum facinus" to match the fate of Agrippa Postumus, but this time flagrant and not to be hushed up. Nothing is new in courts and dynasties, such was the declaration of one who survived and who benefited from these transactions.⁹⁴

⁹² *CIL* VIII 22691 (Gigthis), as interpreted in *Historia* 17 (1968) 100.

⁹³ It is here assumed that Quadratus was still among the living.

⁹⁴ M. Aurelius, *Ad se ipsum* X 27.

That epoch supplied another imperial theme of manifest appeal and value, namely a ruler's verdict: who might be deemed worthy to take the power after him? It sets out with the notorious anecdote that Cornelius Tacitus inserted into the ceremony of September 17, A.D. 14: Caesar Augustus on his death bed assessing the quality and ambitions of certain consulars.

The theme is perpetuated in the annals of the empire. Trajan at a banquet brought up the topic, challenging the guests to offer ten names, and he cut it short by pronouncing one name only — Julius Servianus.⁹⁵ When these stories are related they convey a normal implication: the man thus designated is not likely to die in his bed.

Failing with Ceionius Commodus, Hadrian fell back on Aurelius Fulvus. Was that the best of candidates? Sober judgment as well as thwarted ambitions might issue in doubt or denial. Yet Hadrian, it is clear, had valid reasons for his choice. Not only the potent nexus of families and his affection for the allied house of the Annii, notably the boy whom he styled "Verissimus." There is an attraction in opposites. Hadrian, conscious of instability in his own character, saw in Fulvus a necessary foil and counterpart: a tranquil steady man after the fashion of old Annius Verus, not many enemies, and the approbation of senators.

The season of life commended Fulvus (he was fifty-one), and a temperament averse from caprice or innovations. Yet far from dull. Fulvus was subtle, ironical, crafty.⁹⁶ As the *Historia Augusta* says of a later emperor, "magis blandus quam benignus, nec umquam creditus simplex."⁹⁷

But Fulvus lacked one kind of experience. To the great peregrinator over seas and lands succeeded a ruler who had never passed beyond the confines of Italy except for a residence of twelve months as proconsul in Asia. By contrast, advocates of Quadratus had a strong plea and argument. Their man was not merely enrolled in the dominant group and competent no less than Fulvus to maintain the dynasty as Hadrian prescribed, guardian to two princes (the son of Aelius Caesar and the grandson of Annius Verus). Having governed one of the armed provinces in the portion of Caesar, Quadratus stood out as "capax imperii."

⁹⁵ Dio in the version of Zonaras attributed the remark to Hadrian (LXIX.17.3 Boissevain). But Xiphilinus has Trajan: to be preferred, cf. Groag in *RE* X 885.

⁹⁶ As the language of his edicts and letters reveals, cf. W. Williams, *JRS* 66 (1976) 74 ff.

⁹⁷ *HA, Pert.* 12.1. Compare allegations against Marcus Aurelius in the suspect appendix to the *Vita*: "dederunt ei vitio quod et fictus fuisset nec tam simplex quam videretur" (*Marcus* 29.6). Probably from Marius Maximus.

Perhaps he did not want it, like the excellent Marcus Lepidus, "capax sed aspernans."⁹⁸

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⁹⁸ *Ann.* I.13.2.

However, there stood a clear impediment: Quadratus had an adult son. Nor is it certain that imperial history would have taken a very different course under some ruler other than Antoninus Pius.

THREE NEW HOMERICA ON PAPYRUS

TIMOTHY RENNER

OF all Greek authors whose works are represented among the papyri, none has survived in a greater profusion and variety of texts than the poet Homer. Pack's catalogue of literary papyri and the supplementary inventory by F. Uebel together list 516 published papyri of the *Iliad* and 158 of the *Odyssey*, which comprise fragments of books of all grades and dates from the early Ptolemaic through the Byzantine period.¹ Corresponding to, although lesser in bulk than, the enormous number of papyri of the two epics is an extensive and variegated body of HomERICA, or subliterary texts pertaining to Homer. These consist of the glossaries, paraphrases, lexica, commentaries, anthologies, and other aids that either were meant to assist the teacher, student, or reader of Homer as study and reference tools or, in the case of some paraphrases or summaries, were composed by the student as part of an exercise or assignment. Three varying specimens of such HomERICA from the papyrus collection of the University of Michigan are here published for the first time.²

A glossary may be conveniently defined as a list of words or lemmata arranged in the order of their occurrence in the original text and each bearing a gloss which contains one or more literal or nearly literal interpretations of the expression in question. A particular class of Homeric glossary is that known as *scholia minora*, in which the glosses sometimes contain more than one explanation of each lemma but do not as a rule attempt an elaborate or learned discussion after the manner of commentaries or scholia proper. Texts of this type, of which several dozen examples on papyrus are in existence, are also united as a group by detailed similarities in their methods of explanation and in the contents of their

¹ R. A. Pack, *The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Greco-Roman Egypt*, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor 1965) 49 ff, 157; F. Uebel, *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* 21 (1971) 174 ff; 24/25 (1976) 191 ff.

² The papyri were first studied as part of my dissertation, *Literary Papyri in the University of Michigan Collection* (Ann Arbor, Univ. Microfilms 1974). Thanks are thus due to O. M. Pearl, the chairman of my doctoral committee, and H. C. Youtie, as well as to the others who have since then made helpful suggestions.

glosses. These show that the *scholia minora* are the remains of an amorphous, fluctuating, and mainly anonymous body of straightforward lexicographical material that was popular rather than scholarly in nature. The first papyrus in our series is a glossary of the *scholia minora* type written in the first or second century A.D. The date makes it one of the earlier examples of texts from this body of scholia, the interpretations of which from at least as early as the first century A.D. began to find their way into a variety of other scholia and lexicographical works including Apollonius Sophista and, eventually, the Byzantine compilation known as the D-Scholia.³

The second papyrus, excavated at Karanis, is a fragment of a second-century A.D. lexicon to Homer arranged alphabetically by the first two or three letters of its lemmata. Homeric lexica of this type, which show many affinities with the interpretations of the *scholia minora* and of the D-Scholia, have been found only occasionally among the papyri. A comparison with other lexica preserved in manuscript suggests that the Michigan fragment, like five other lexica on papyrus, represents an early copy of the *Lexicon Homericum* of Apollonius Sophista. The work of Apollonius has been transmitted to us in a single manuscript and in shortened form, but much of the material in it was utilized by Hesychius and by other lexicographers in late antiquity.

The third papyrus, from an anthology or summary of *Iliad* Σ-T, also comes from Karanis and gives some more indication of the kind of literary study that took place in that town. The piece is interesting both because its writer quotes Homeric passages often and because it dates from the Ptolemaic period.⁴

³ For the nature and interrelationships of the *scholia minora* on papyrus, the D-Scholia, Apollonius Sophista, and other lexicographical compilations containing Homeric material, see A. Henrichs, "Scholia Minora zu Homer I," *ZPE* 7 (1971) 97-149, especially the introductory material, 99 ff. Earlier important studies are those of Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 23 (1888) 142-147 and A. Calderini, *Aegyptus* 2 (1921) 303-326.

⁴ In the line notes, lexicographical parallels have been cited where possible according to the abbreviations used by Henrichs, *ZPE* 7 (1971) 117 ff. For Eustathius the edition of Stallbaum (Leipzig 1825-29) has been followed except in the case of *Iliad* A-I, where M. van der Valk's first two volumes (Leiden 1971-76) may now be consulted. Of the scholia to Homer other than the D-Scholia, those to the *Iliad* are cited after H. Erbse, *Schol. gr. in Hom. Il.* (Berlin 1969-77) and those to the *Odyssey* after Dindorf. The references to Photius follow the edition of Porson (Leipzig 1823). "Orion" refers to the *Etymologicum* of Orion (ed. F. Sturz, Leipzig 1820). Square brackets around a reference indicate that the lemma in question appears there in a different inflected form from that in the papyrus.

1. *Scholia minora* TO *Iliad* A 1-9

P. Mich. inv. 1588; 17.7 × 15 cm; late first or second century A.D.;
provenance unknown

Purchased in 1924, this papyrus contains two columns of lemmata and explanations from a glossary of the *scholia minora* type on the opening verses of the *Iliad*. The text, written parallel to the fibers, has suffered from surface wear. Column I is essentially complete, but Column II has lost portions from the right side of all its glosses. On the back are two to three columns, badly marred by wear, of a grammatical text. The writing, in a well-formed hand of the type often seen in carefully executed documentary texts, may date from either the first or the second century, although the latter seems somewhat more likely.⁵

The arrangement of lemmata and glosses in parallel columns that are separated, except where the gloss is a lengthy one, by blank spaces of several letter-widths, follows the format of the majority of other similar texts. When a gloss requires more than one line, the writer begins the second line below the lemma but indents slightly. With the exception of some items the meanings of which should have been obvious to even the most inexperienced reader of Homer, the great majority of the words from the verses covered by the text have been glossed. Four published papyri containing *scholia minora* for all or part of these lines of the *Iliad* are available for comparison:

1. *P. Berol. inv.* 5014 = Pack² 1158 (fifth century A.D., Panopolis?), ed. U. Wilcken, *Sitzungsb. d. kön. pr. Ak. d. Wiss. zu Berlin, Phil.-hist. Kl.* (1887), 818 ff; cf. Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 23 (1888) 142 ff. Covers *A* 1-12.⁶

2. *P. Achmim* 2 = Pack² 1159 (third or fourth century, Panopolis), ed. U. Wilcken, *ibid.* 816 ff; also discussed by Wilamowitz (cf. above). Covers *A* 1-21 (summary of *A* precedes).

⁵ Many of the letters have cursive forms, although the writer is not always consistent with regard to a given letter. More often than not, each letter in a line is written separately, but there are a number of cursively linked pairs or groups of letters throughout the text. The writer's use of his space was reasonably generous (upper margin 1.7-2.3 cm, lower 1.7 cm — both perhaps originally deeper). Similar hands are Schubart, *P. Gr. Berol.* Papyrus 22 (A.D. 135?), Papyrus 24 (A.D. 148), Papyrus 28a (second century A.D.), *P. Lond.* I 128a (*Facs.* Vol. I, Pl. 52; A.D. 145), 140 (*Facs.* Vol. I, Pl. 21; A.D. 69-79). The grammatical text on the back is crudely written and difficult to date palaeographically but would be compatible with the period in general.

⁶ On this and the following papyrus cf. also A. Ludwich, "Über die Papyrus-Commentare zu den homerischen Gedichten," in *Index Lectionum* I (Königsberg 1902).

3. *P. Oslo* II 12 = Pack² 1160 (second century, Theadelphia?). Covers *A* 5-24.

4. *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 (third century, Oxyrhynchus), ed. pr. F. Carter Philips, *BASP* 8 (1971) 91 ff. Covers *A* 4-18.

With the exception of 2, the above glossaries display a fullness of coverage of the Homeric words that is comparable, or nearly so, to that of the Michigan papyrus. It is to be expected that a higher proportion of words should be glossed in *scholia minora* pertaining to the very beginning of the poem than in those covering a passage further along, where the reader would have built up a greater familiarity with the epic diction. This is in general confirmed by a survey of the fifty or so published papyri of *scholia minora* to both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.⁷

In the commentary, I have cited exhaustively the corresponding explanations offered by the four papyri listed above, all of which usually show a close affinity with the Michigan text. Also included are references to other lexicographical sources, among which the D-Scholia, Apollonius Sophista, and Hesychius generally contain the closest parallels to the glosses of the papyri. It has become clear that the *scholia minora* are essential to the textual, historical, and comparative study of

⁷ Of this total group of *scholia minora* texts for both Homeric epics, fully fifteen, or about 30 percent, pertain to *Iliad A* — a testimony to the frequency with which that book was read.

Twenty-seven papyri in Pack² which contain *scholia minora* are enumerated by Henrichs, *ZPE* 7 (1971) 104, n.24. Pack² 1176, which contains a glossary to *A* 364-371 as well as a prose paraphrase of part of the book, should probably be added to the group; likewise Pack² 1170, although unpublished, probably contains *scholia minora*. In the same note Henrichs also lists six Cologne and Michigan texts first edited by him in "Scholia Minora zu Homer" (*ZPE* 7 [1971] 97 ff, 229 ff, 8 [1971] 1 ff, 12 [1973] 17 ff) as well as nine more papyri which appeared after Pack². Of the latter group, *P. Oxy.* ined. with glossary to *A* 4-18 was published by F. C. Philips in *BASP* 8 (1971) 91 ff and is now *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207; and *P. Oxy.* ined. with glossary to *A* 302-323 was edited by S. Stephens as *P. Oxy.* XLV 3237. Further additions to the list of *scholia minora* papyri must now be made as follows: *P. Oxy.* XLV 3238 (to *A* 405?-538, *B* 385-393; early third century A.D.); *P. Hamb. inv.* 736 verso, ed. Th. Vlachodimitris, *ZPE* 11 (1973) 65 ff (to *B* 61-222; second century); *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3158 (to *E* 655-725, 782-822; second or third century); XLIV 3159 (to *H* 4-80?; preceded by hypothesis; third century); a wooden tablet in Alexandria, ed. H. Riad and J. Schwartz, *Chr. d'Eg.* 43 (1968) 114 ff (to *A* 31-48; preceded and followed by passages from the *Iliad*; date uncertain); *P. Vindob. gr. inv.* 39940, ed. P. J. Sijpesteijn and K. A. Worp, *ZPE* 15 (1974) 153 ff (to *O* 320-412, 520-633; late second century); *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3160 = *P. Strassb. inv.* 1401, ed. J. Schwartz, *ZPE* 4 (1969) 175 ff (cf. W. Luppe, *ZPE* 27 [1977] 101 ff; to α 441-444, β 2-300, 426-434; includes hypotheses; third century). Also, *P. Oxy.* XXX 2525 verso according to Lobel's brief description is a *scholia minora* text (to *B* 201-218; second century).

these and other lexa and scholia. This can be seen most clearly in the case of the D-Scholia, which are the end product of many centuries of anonymous and very simple explanatory efforts such as we find in the papyri. Finally, for comparative purposes four prose paraphrases of the *Iliad*, compiled by Byzantine scholars but heavily influenced by the *scholia minora* tradition, are cited after the partial edition by A. Ludwich, *Aristarchs homerische Textkritik* II (Leipzig 1885) 490 ff. Intended as translations the function of which was to assist in the comprehension of Homer by the reader, these are:

- Par. P The Psellos Paraphrase (also known as the Bekker Paraphrase), which of the four is closest to the D-Scholia
 Par. M The paraphrase of Manuel Moschopoulos
 Par. G The paraphrase written by Theodoros of Gaza, who essentially reworked the Moschopoulos paraphrase
 Par. A The interlinear paraphrase contained in Codex Venetus Graec. 822

The Michigan papyrus contains no breathings, accents, or other lectional aids. *Iota*-adscript is omitted. The writer makes use of a suspension once, in I.11. Discernible errors of spelling as such appear only in I.2 and 3 and are minor ones. In I.4 someone, perhaps a second hand or pen (M²) using a more watery ink than that of the main text, corrected an accusative pair to the genitive so as to bring the gloss more into line with his notion of clarity. It appears that M² may also have been responsible for at least the gloss of a short entry inserted between lines I.2 and 3 as well as for a supralinear addition to the gloss of line 3. The heading giving the book number above column I may have come from the same source.⁸

COLUMN I

]·[
 α βιβλ[ιου

	μηνιν	χολον ὀργὴν θυμον	(A 1)
2	αἰδε	αδε ο{ς} ἑστίν υμνει	(1)
2a	θεα Μουσα	πατρωνυμικω.	(1)
3	Πηληιαδε<ω>	Πηλεωσ υιου λεγει	(1)
	υ	ωσ	
	δε το[υ]	Αχιλλε[α]	

⁸ With the heading we may compare the similar notation marking the transition from one book to another in P. Colon. inv. 2381 (ed. A. Henrichs, *ZPE* 8 [1971] 3 ff) and in P. Berol. inv. 11634 (ed. G. Poethke, *Forsch. u. Ber. d. Staatl. Mus. z. Berlin* 8 [1967] 105 ff). P. Colon. inv. 2281 (*ZPE* 7 [1971] 229 ff) has a subscription of an analogous character.

5	ουλομενην	ολεθριαν	(2)
	μυρια	πολλα	(2)
	Αχαιοις	τοις Ελλησιν	(2)
	αλγεα	κακα	(2)
	εθηκεν	[ε]ποιησεν	(2)
10	πολλα[s]	[π]λειστας	(3)
	[ι]φθιμους	ισχυροψυχους αχ()	(3)
	Αιδι	τω Αδη	(3)
	προιαψεν	η εξεβαλεν η προ[ο]διεφθιρεν	(3)
	ηρωων	μητε ανθρωπων	(4)
15	αυτους δε	τα δε σωματα αυτων	(4)
	ελωρια	ελ. .ματα η ελκυσματα	(4)
	τευχε	επροι[ει	(4)
	κυνεσσι	κυσιν	(4)

Top margin:].[resembles left half of η α βιβλ[ιου: perhaps by M²; or α βιβλ(ιου)? 1. οργην: over ορ an upright, then ink from possibly a rounded letter (more letters lost to right?); over ν part of curving horizontal (possibly stray) 2. supra lin.: blotted area; possibly cancelled letters 2a. Μουσα: by M²? πατρωνυμικω.: by M²? 3. Πηληιαδεο pap. 4. Supralinear letters by M²? 11. αχ pap. 14. Before μητε, bits from 1 to 2 letters 16. ελ. .ματα: see comm.

COLUMN II

	οιωνοισι [(A 5)
	πασι ε εν πασι[(5)
	Διος δ ετελειετο βουλ[η η δε του	(5)
	Διος ετελεετ[ο] γνωμ[η	
5	εξ ου δη αφ ου δη χρ[ονου	(6)
	τα πρωτα τα εν αρχ[η	(6)
	διαστητην διεστησα[ν	(6)
	ερισαντε[(6)
	Ατρειδης τε Ατρ<ε>ως[Αγα	(7)
10	μεμνων α.[(7)
	διος ητρο . . .[.][(7)
	διοσηεν . .[(7)
	τις τ αρ σφ[ωε . . .] . . .[(8)
	εριδι φ[ι]λο[νικια	(8)
15	ξυγεηκε .[(8)
	Αη[τρ]ους και Δ[ιος υιος ο Απολλων	(9)
	ο γαρ . . .[(9)

Top margin: at edge of papyrus and above ω , a small loop as from a letter level with].[in margin of Column I; below and to left, part of a vertical (stray?) 2. ϵ : perhaps a letter lost afterwards 9. In margin to left, faint traces forming a large oval (stray or a marginal sign?) *Ατρως* pap. 11. *διος*: \omicron has cross-stroke like cancellation; letter above ς may be ϵ ($\delta\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$?) 15. .[: high dot

Col. I 1. *ὀργήν* P. *Achmim* 2.20, Par. PG; *ὀργήν*, *χόλον* *ἐπίμονον* D. See also Par. A, Phot. s.v., Ba. 301.6, *Ep. Hom.* AO 282.16, Ap. Soph. 112.24, *Ep. Hom.* AP 296.29, Schol. A ad τ 67. For *θυμόν* as an explanation we may compare Schol. AT ad A 1 *ὥσπερ ἐπὶ συκῆς πρῶτον μὲν ἔστιν ὀλυνθος, εἰτα φήληξ σῦκον ἰσχάς, οὕτω πρῶτον ὀργή, θυμὸς χόλος κότος μῆνις*. Our papyrus may have had another word added above the line.

2. Closest is Ap. Soph. 10.9, which has $\alpha\delta\epsilon$, *ὑμνει, δύναμιν περιποιήσαι ὥστε ἄσαι*. See also Hsch. α 1253, Par. PMG, D., Schol. bT. The papyrus may have had supralinear writing. $\omicron\{\varsigma\}$ was perhaps written under the influence of $\epsilon\sigma$ following; see Mayser/Schmoll, *Grammatik* I.1².183; F. Gignac, *A Grammar of the Greek Papyri of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (Milan 1975) I 125 f.

2a. *θεῶν Μουσα*: So P. *Achmim* 2.20, P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 1, Par. A, Hsch. θ 156, [Schol. A]. *Μοῦσα. λέγει δὲ τὴν Καλλιόπην* D.; cf. Par. M.

πατρωνυμικῶς: Probably *πατρωνυμικῶς*, referring to the lemma in line 3. This adverb is attested only in the works of Irenaeus, a near contemporary of our papyrus, and in scholia; see Stephanus, *Thes. Ling. Gr.* and Lampe, *Patristic Greek Lexicon* s.v.

3-4. *τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Πηλέως* Par. PMGA; *τῷ παιδὶ τοῦ Πηλέως* P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 2; *τοῦ Πηλέως παιδός* D. For \omicron written in place of ω as in our papyrus see Mayser/Schmoll I.1².75 f; Gignac I 276 f.

5. So P. *Achmim* 2.20, P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 4, D., Par. PGA. Cf. Hsch. \omicron 1758, Ap. Soph. 124.12, Schol. bT, *Ep. Hom.* AO 316.6, *Ep. Hom.* AP 300.26-301.5. *οὐλωμένην· ὀλεθρία*[ν P. *Freib.* 1c.12.

6. So P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 6, Ap. Soph. 114.12, Hsch. μ 1890, Par. PG, *Ep. Hom.* AO 270.17 and 284.1. *ἥ μυρί· ἥτις πολλά* P. *Achmim* 2.21 (cf. D.). See also Ba. 304.25, Phot. s.v., *Ep. Hom.* AP 302.32.

7. So P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 7, D., Par. PMGA, Hsch. α 8815. *πάντες οἱ ἐπὶ Ἰλιον στρατεύσαντες* Ap. Soph. 50.4.

8. So P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 8, Par. P. *κακὰ ἢ λύπας* D.; *ἀλγήματα καταστρέφει δὲ εἰς τὰ κακὰ* Ap. Soph. 21.18. Cf. Hsch. α 2796, Ba. 65.19, Bekker *An. Gr.* I 375.1, *EM* 58.10.

9. So P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 9, *P. Achmim* 2.21, Hsch. ε 670, Ba. 207.25. προκατέθηκεν, ἥτοι ἐποίησεν Ap. Soph. 63.14. Cf. *EM* 319.30, Apion 233.9.

10. So P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 10, Par. P. παμπόλλους D.

11. Probably ἰσχυροψύχους Ἀχ(αίων). ἰσχυροψύχους *P. Achmim* 2.22, Ap. Soph. 93.18; cf. Hsch. ι 1116, Apion 242.16, *Ep. Hom. AP* 303.19. ἰσχυράς P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 11 (12 has ψυχάς· τὰς ψυχάς), Par. G, [Ba. 264.30], Phot. s.v.; cf. D., Par. A. See also Par. PM, *Ep. Hom. AO* 207.25.

12. So D., Ap. Soph. 14.3, Hsch. α 1755, Par. PMGA.

13. ἐξέβαλεν is not attested elsewhere as an explanation. προδιέφθειρεν. ἐμφαίνει δὲ τὴν μετ' ὀδύνης αὐτῶν ἀπώλειαν Ap. Soph. 135.31; cf. Hsch. π 3485, Ap. Soph. 89.28. Contrast D., Par. PMGA, *Ep. Hom. AO* 369.4, Schol. bT.

14. Between ἡρώων and . μητε there would be room for about six letters. But the absence of any traces of writing in this area suggests that the writer omitted part of the gloss. Perhaps the exemplar had μήτε θεῶν μήτε ἀνθρώπων or the like. τῶν ἡμιθέων ἀνδρῶν P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 13, D., Par. PGA. ἥρωες· ἡμίθεος. δυνατός. γενναῖος Phot. s.v., Ba. 252.19. ἥρωες· δυνατός. ἰσχυρός. γενναῖος. σεμνός Hsch. η 871. ἥρωες· οἱ διαφέροντες ἀρετῇ. ἡμίθεοι. ἄνδρες γενναῖοι Hsch. η 867. ἥρωας . . . τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων Schol. A. See also Ap. Soph. 84.32.

15. So P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 14, *P. Achmim* 2.22, D., Par. PM (and, with minor variations, GA).

16. ἐλκύσματα, σπαράγματα P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 16, *P. Achmim* 2.23, D., Ba. 217.5. *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 1 may have had [σπαράγματα,] ἐλκύσματα. Other sources each include one or both of these equivalents: Hsch. ε 2251, Ap. Soph. 67.7, Par. PMGA, *EM* 332.57.

ἐλ. .ματα: For the remains of the two uncertain letters, see figure 1. The first resembles ε; the second could be σ (the diagonal stroke below does not go well with the μ and could be from the downward-curving top of σ, although I cannot find other examples of σ made in that fashion in this text). A word ἔλεσμα is not attested. However, the *hapax* ἔλεμα is given in Schol. A ad *P* 667 as an equivalent for ἔλωρ. Perhaps the writer or his exemplar intended to write ἐλέματα but inserted an σ (for similar mistakes see Gignac I 131).

17. So P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 16, D., Par. P. ἐποίησε Par. M. κατεσκεύασε Par. GA, Hsch. τ 707; cf. Ba. 386.2.

18. With minor variations, so P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 17, D., Par. PMGA, Hsch. κ 4578.




FIG. 1. P. Mich. inv. 1588

Col. II 1. The gloss in *P. Achmim* 2.24 is τοῖς σαρκοφάγοις ὀρνέοις. Similar are *P. Berol.* inv. 5014 recto 18, *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 2, *P. Oslo* II 12 I.1, D., Par. P, Eust. 19.42 (ad *A* 5). More elaborate are Hsch. ο 458, Ap. Soph. 119.30 (cf. *Ep. Hom.* AP 305.11, Schol. A [gloss, Dindorf]). ὀρνέοις Par. MGA.

2. The area between πασι and ε appears to have been free of writing. The gloss is puzzling. ἄπασι D., Par. PG.

3-4. η δε του] Διος: So *P. Berol.* inv. 5014 recto 19, *P. Oslo* II 12 I.3, D.; cf. Par. PMG.

ετελεετ[ο: ἐτελείτο Par. M. (cf. Hsch. ε 6534). ἐτελειούτο *P. Berol.* inv. 5014 recto 20, *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 4. ἐτελειούτο, ἐπληρούτο D. (cf. Par. PGA).

γνώμη[η: So *P. Berol.* inv. 5014 recto 21, *P. Oslo* II 12 I.4, D. γνώμη, θέλημα Hsch. β 930.

5. So P. Berol. inv. 5014 recto 22, *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 5, D., Par. P, probably *P. Oslo* II 12 I.5. See also Par. GA, Schol. A (gloss, Dindorf).

6.]τοτε τὰ ἐν ἀρχῇ *P. Oslo* II 12 I.6. τὴν ἀρχὴν *P. Berol. inv. 5014* recto 23, Par. PMG. πρ]ῶτον *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 6. Cf. D., Hsch. τ 169. πρότερον πρὸ τοῦ συνάψαι πόλεμον Par. A.

7. So Par. PM, Schol. bT^ε. δι]έστη[σαν *P. Berol. inv. 5014* recto 24. διέστησαν, δυϊκῶς Hsch. δ 1342, *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 7, probably *P. Oslo* II 12 I.7. διέστησαν, ἐχωρίσθησαν Hsch. δ 1335. See also D., Par. GA.

8. Perhaps ἐρίσαντ[ες, φιλονικῆσαντες, as in *P. Achmim* 2.24. φιλονεικῆσαντες D., Par. PMGA (φ., δυϊκῶς *P. Oslo* II 12 I.8).

9–10. Perhaps Ἀτρ(έ)ως τε πα[ῖς Ἀγα]μέμνων. For parallels to the spelling error see Mayser/Schmoll I.1².129; cf. Gignac I 304f. Ἀτρέως γ]ὰρ παῖς *P. Oslo* II 12 I.9. ὁ τοῦ Ἀτρέως παῖς Ἀγαμέμνων Par. P, Hsch. α 8155 (similar D., *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 8). ὁ Ἀγ. ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀτρ. Par. M (cf. G and A).

α.[: Possibly a continuation of the gloss on Ἀτρεΐδης τε. However, the writer may have made use of available space in this line to insert another entry. (For a similar procedure see, e.g., *P. Strassb. inv. 33*, cols. III ff, *ZPE* 7 [1971] 126 ff.) It would in fact be possible to read ἀναξ δεσπ[οτης (comparing Hsch. α 4470). The traces do not seem to allow ἀναξ ἀνδρ[ων or ἀναξ βασι[λευς (for the latter see *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 9, D., Par. PMGA, Ap. Soph. 30.23).

11–12. Although it is possible that the papyrus had two entries on δῖος, more probably there is a single entry covering two lines the second of which the writer failed to indent. The gloss could then be restored as ἢ τὸ γέν[ο]ς ἔχων ἀ[πὸ τοῦ] Διὸς ἢ ἐνδο[ξος (or ἐντι[μος). D. has θεῖος, εὐγενής, ἢ ἀπὸ Διὸς ἔχων τὸ γένος, ἐντιμος; cf. ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἔχων τὸ γένος. καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός. καὶ ὁ ἐνδοξος κτλ. Apion 231.17. ἐνδοξός Par. PMG, *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 10 (cf. Ba. 199.26). ἐνδοξότατος Par. A. See also Ap. Soph. 59.8, *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3206 II.48, Hsch. δ 1916, Schol. bT.

13. The traces of the gloss cannot be meaningfully read. Perhaps it was τίς δὴ αὐτούς, as in Par. PG (cf. D.). τίς δὲ δὴ . . . αὐτούς Par. A. Cf. σφῶ]ε· αὐτούς *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 11 (with entry on τίς τ' ἄρ' apparently lost to the left); σφῶε· αὐτούς, δυϊκῶς Ap. Soph. 147.23, *P. Oslo* II 12 I.11. See also Ba. 378.8.

14. So *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 12, D., Hsch. ε 5818, Par. PGM, Apion 237.12.

15. ξυνέβαλε is given as explanation in *P. Achmim* 2.25. συνέβαλε Ap.

Soph. 117.32, Hsch. ξ 128, Par. PG. συνέβαλεν *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 13. συνέβαλε, συνέμιξε D. συνελθεῖν ἐποίησεν Par. M. ἐποίησεν φιλονεικῆσαι Par. A.

16. So *P. Oslo* II 12 I.15, *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 14. The space precludes a lengthier gloss such as ὁ τῆς Αἰτοῦς καὶ Διὸς παῖς Ἀπόλλων D. (cf. Par. PMGA).

17. The traces are difficult to read meaningfully, but the gloss must have been οὗτος γάρ as in *P. Berol. inv.* 5014 verso 6, *P. Oxy.* XLIV 3207 Front 15 (cf. *P. Oslo* II 12 I.16), D., Par. PMGA.

2. HOMERIC LEXICON (APOLLONIUS SOPHISTA)

P. Mich. inv. 5451a; *Fr.* 1: 5 × 5.5 cm; *Fr.* 2: 6.7 × 13 cm;
second century A.D.; Karanis

Obtained from the excavations at Karanis during the 1928–29 season,⁹ these two fragments of a lexicon contain respectively three and nine entries, many of them nearly complete, from a part of the work dealing with Homeric words in πολυ-, πορ-, and probably ποσ-. The text is written parallel to the fibers in a practiced book hand which probably belongs to the second century, although the latter part of the first could not be absolutely ruled out.¹⁰ Except for a few apparently stray bits of ink, the back of the papyrus is blank. The correspondence, in whole or in part, between several of the entries and those of the sole surviving medieval manuscript of the Homeric lexicographer Apollonius Sophista, the tenth-century Codex Coislinianus 345 (referred to in the commentary as Ap. Soph.), suggests that the Michigan text, like several other papyri, comes from an earlier and in some respects fuller version of the lexicon of that author. The papyrus would then represent a copy of the work made within a few generations of the lifetime of

⁹ The excavation number is 28/C65*E/A. On literary papyri from Karanis, see n.20 below.

¹⁰ The letter forms are generally similar to those of *P. Oxy.* XVII 2079, *P. Oxy.* 2317, and Seider, *Paläographie der griechischen Papyri* II, Pap. 31 (all assigned to the second century). But these hands are more formal, upright, and regular and less cramped horizontally than that of the Michigan papyrus. The writer of the latter at times crowds and reduces the size of his letters as he approaches the right edge of the column, but he may not have succeeded in keeping this edge an even one. However, the left edge appears to have been relatively straight. The surviving intercolumnar space of 1.5 cm and lower margin of the same depth (perhaps originally deeper) in *Fr.* 2 suggest an average format for a literary text. The column width would have averaged 5.5 cm.

Apollonius, who was probably active in the second half of the first century A.D. at Alexandria.¹¹

If the lemma of gloss 12 of our papyrus was πόσις, as suggested below, it would appear that this lexicon was arranged according to the first three letters of each lemma. However, we should beware of assuming that this principle was strictly adhered to throughout; for while even a few completely alphabetized lexica are known to have existed during this period, ordering according to the first two letters appears to have been the commonest system.¹² Much later, the Codex Coislinianus itself follows strict rules of alphabetization only for the first two letters, although groups of lemmata which are ordered on a three-letter basis or even in absolute alphabetical order do occur.¹³ Five other papyrus fragments of Homeric lexica dating from the first through the fifth or sixth centuries A.D. have been plausibly attributed to Apollonius' work. Most of these are alphabetized by two or three letters; one, the latest in date, is fully alphabetized.¹⁴

¹¹ The version of the lexicon in the Codex Coislinianus has been cited after the edition of I. Bekker, *Apollonii Sophistae Lexicon Homericum* (Berlin 1833; repr. Hildesheim 1967). For general information about Apollonius, see the articles of Cohn "Apollonios" 80), *RE* II 1 135 f and Tolkiehn, "Lexicographie," par. 20, *RE* XII 2 2445. There is further discussion, with references to recent studies, by A. Henrichs and W. Müller in *Collectanea Papyrologica: Studies Published in Honor of H. C. Youtie* I, ed. A. Hanson (PTA Bd. 19; Bonn 1976), 27 ff.

¹² On the alphabetical ordering of lexica in the Roman and early Byzantine periods, see L. W. Daly, *Contributions to a History of Alphabetization in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Brussels 1967) 27 ff; J. J. Keaney, "Alphabetization in Harpocraton's Lexicon," *GRBS* 14 (1973) 415 ff. Papyrus fragments of ancient lexica are discussed by M. Naoumides, "The Fragments of Greek Lexicography in the Papyri," *Classical Studies Presented to B. E. Perry* (Ill. Univ. Sts. in Lang. and Lit., Vol. 58; Urbana 1969) 181 ff; on alphabetization, see 187 ff.

¹³ Lemmata in πολ- and πορ- comprise two relatively extensive series in the codex, where the πολ- group of ten lemmata (of which all but two are in πολυ-) is interrupted on three occasions by entries in ποι- πον-, or ποπ-, but the πορ- group of six lemmata is not interrupted at all. The following summary of the lemmata in Ap. Soph. 132.31-134.9 will serve to illustrate (lemmata which appear in the Michigan text or can be restored there with probability are underlined): πολύκλητοι, πολυπάμονος, πολιόν τε σίδηρον, πολυκληϊσι, πολύκεστος, ποιμήν, πολυμήτης, πολύκμητον, πόνος, πολύαινε, πολύαρνι, ποντοπόροισι, πόποι, πολλά, πόρεν, πόρκης, πόρτις, πορφύρη, πόρδαλις, πορφύρεος θάνατος, πόσιος, πότνια.

¹⁴ These texts are: (1) Bodl. Ms. gr. class. e. 44(P) = Pack² 1217 (first or second century A.D., provenance unknown; nine entries in ἐφ-, ἐχ-, and ζα-; two-letter alphabetization), ed. E. W. B. Nicholson, *CR* 11 (1897) 390 ff, corrected by M. Naoumides, *TAPA* 93 (1962) 243 ff. (2) *P. Oxy.* XXX 2517

Of the twelve lemmata in the Michigan papyrus, eight (glosses 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12) occur also in the Codex Coislinianus, provided we accept the probable restorations in glosses 4, 8, and 12 and allow for the difference of inflected forms in glosses 5 and 12. Of the eight, only one (gloss 7) has an explanation absolutely identical in wording to that found in the codex. The explanation of another (gloss 6) is much shorter than in the codex but summarizes an interpretation of Apion which is a major component of the gloss there. Glosses 1, 3, and 5 each preserve an additional synonym or comment which has been lost in the codex; but in each case the codex has a somewhat expanded version (including one case of a quotation illustrating Homer's usage) of the comments which it shares with the papyrus. Explanations which differ from their counterparts in the codex appear in gloss 8 and gloss 4 (as far as the latter entry is preserved). The remains of gloss 12 demonstrate that it had a discussion closely related to the brief and presumably abridged explanation of the lemma given in the codex. Also noteworthy are correspondences of the ordering of the lemmata between papyrus and codex: glosses 1 and 3 appear adjacent and in the same order in the codex, and the series formed by glosses 4, 5, 6, and 7 also appears there a bit later on. Finally, the four lemmata (glosses 2, 9, 10, and 11) which do not occur in the codex are nevertheless included in Hesychius, where their explanations bear a strong resemblance at least in part to those given in our papyrus. Thus while we have seen that some of the explanations of the papyrus are abridged compared with those in the codex, in terms of the number of lemmata in these sections the papyrus represents a somewhat fuller version of Apollonius. We can already conclude from the other papyri attributed to Apollonius that a variety of such editions, richer in lemmata than the codex, were in circulation between the author's lifetime and the incorporation of a version of his work into the original compilation of Hesychius in the sixth century.

(second century, Oxyrhynchus; fourteen entries in $\theta\upsilon\upsilon$ -, $\theta\omicron$ -, $\theta\rho$ -, probably two more in $\theta\alpha\upsilon$ -, two-letter alphabetization), attributed to Apollonius by K. Alpers, *Hermes* 94 (1966) 430 ff. (3) P. Oxy. XLIV 3206 (second century, Oxyrhynchus; 34 entries in $\delta\iota\alpha$ -, $\delta\iota\delta$ -, $\delta\iota\epsilon$ -, $\delta\iota\zeta$ -, $\delta\iota\eta$ -, $\delta\iota\kappa$ -, $\delta\iota\nu$ -, $\delta\iota\omicron$ -, three-letter alphabetization), ed. pr. J. W. Shumaker, *BASP* 7 (1970) 59 ff. (4) P. Cairo inv. 50208 = Pack² 1218 (third century, Oxyrhynchus; nine entries in $\epsilon\nu$ -, two-letter alphabetization), ed. W. G. Waddell, *Mem. Inst. Fr. d'Arch. Or. du Caire* 67 (Mélanges Maspéro II) 1934, 152 ff. (5) P. Berol. inv. 16705 (fifth-sixth century, Hermupolis; 77 entries from $\alpha\gamma\chi\iota\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ through $\alpha\nu\alpha\pi\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$; full alphabetization), ed. A. Henrichs and W. Müller, *Collectanea Papyrologica* I (cf. above, n. 11) 27 ff. The last is the earliest extant copy of a fully alphabetized lexicon of any type.

recopying, excerpting, and abridgment to which his compilation was subjected.¹⁵

The format of the text is of the type most commonly found in papyrus lexic. Lemmata and glosses are written together in a single column, with the second and any further lines of an entry distinguished from the first line by *eisthesis* of one letter-width. A space of one letter-width also separates glosses from lemmata.¹⁶ There are no paragraphi, punctuation marks, accents, or other lectional signs. Spelling errors fall into two general categories. The first includes minor variations of the types found in many papyri (fr. 1, ll. 8 and 9; fr. 2, col. II, ll. 2, 8, 9, 13, and probably 15). The second encompasses omissions of syllables which are potentially serious for the understanding of the text (fr. 1, l. 7; fr. 2, col. II, l. 12). The error in fr. 2, l. 8 has been corrected supralinearly by the writer, although no cancellation of letters has been made. All other errors have been left uncorrected.

FRAGMENT I

.....		
	πολυ[μητις πολυγνω	(gl. 1)
	μων πολυβουλος	
	πολυτροπος επι π[ολ	(gl. 2)
	λα τρεπων την δια	
5	νοιαν	
	πολυκμητον μ[ετα	(gl. 3)
	πολλου καμ<ατ>ου γ[ε	
	γον<ο>τα η πολυν [κα	
	ματον παρε{ι}χοντ[α	
10	[η τον π]ολυεργον	
].[
.....		

1. π: Foot of right upright 7. καμου pap. 8. γονατα pap.
11.].[: Horizontal from top or middle of letter

¹⁵ For discussion of the interrelationships of the various lexicographical compilations during this period, see Henrichs, *ZPE* 7 (1971) 97 ff. (especially 112 ff). On the date of Hesychius see the edition of K. Latte, *Hesychii Lexicon* I (Copenhagen 1953) vii ff.

¹⁶ On the format of ancient lexic on papyrus, see Naoumides (above, n.12), 184 ff.

FRAGMENT 2

COLUMN I

COLUMN II

]α]]ε	πορι[α πο του ηδη{ι} πορευεσθ[αι πορφυρει πορφυριζε ται ταρασσεται οθεν	(gl. 4) (gl. 5)
5	και καλχαινειν λεγ[ε [τ]αι το ταρασσειν [πο]ρδαλις ο αρσην α αλ	(gl. 6)
10	[π]ο του προελεσθαι [η [δε] θηλ<εια> παρδαλι[s α [π]ο του παραλλεσθα[ι [πορ]φυρεος θανατος[με	(gl. 7)
	[λας] και <βα>θυς	(gl. 8)
	[πορ]ε[s] εδωκε	(gl. 9)
15	[πορ]τακι μοσχωι π[[2-3]ρηγν δαμαλιν . [
	[2-3]. α	
	[πορ]φυρε εδισταζεν [ε	(gl. 10)
	[μερι]μνα	
	[.....]γειν κατα[(gl. 11)
20	[2-3]ειν	
	[.....] ανηρ γυν[(gl. 12)

Col. II 1. πορι[: or πορτ[2. About 1 cm to left of beginning of line is a small mark like a dash 9. θηληι pap. 12. καιθυς pap. 15. .[: section of low horizontal, perhaps from finial 16.].: an upright 19. Or]ειν

Fr. 1 1-2 (gl. 1). πολυγνώ]μων A. Henrichs. The word is unattested as an explanation of πολύμητις; according to LSJ it occurs only in Plato and Dio Cassius. Also possible is πολυφράδ]μων. The lemma may have had the variant form πολυμήτης, as in Ap. Soph. 133.10 πολυμήτης· πολύβουλος, πολλὰ βουλευσασθαι δυνάμενος and in Hsch. π 2889 πολυμήτης· πολύβουλος, πολύφρων (πολυμήτα occurs in Opp. H. 5.5). Suda π 1987, Phot. s.v., Ba. 345.29, and [Schol. A (interlin. gloss, Dindorf) ad Φ 355] have πολύμητις· πολύβουλος. Cf. Eust. 1462.19 (ad γ 163).

3-5 (gl. 2). So [D. ad α 1], with the addition of συνετόν, ἢ πολλῶν ἔμπειρον τρόπων. Similar is [Hsch. π 2934] ὁ ἐπὶ πολλὰ τρεπόμενος, ἢ

τρέπων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διάνοιαν ὑφ' ἓνα (οὐκ ἐφ' ἓνα Heinsius) καιρόν. Cf. Eust. 1381.35 (ad α 163). The entry is lacking in Ap. Soph.

6-10 (gl. 3). The word πολύεργος is not attested as an explanation elsewhere. Otherwise, Ap. Soph. 133.11 is nearly identical with the entry of the papyrus but specifically mentions the Homeric use of the adjective as an epithet of iron: τὸν σίδηρον ἐπιθετικῶς, τὸν μετὰ πολλοῦ καμάτου γεγενημένον ἢ τὸν πολὺν κάματον παρέχοντα. Cf. Hsch. π 2870 μετὰ πολλοῦ καμάτου γεγενημένον, ἢ πολὺν κάματον ἡμῖν παρέχοντα (παρέχων codd.). λέγει δὲ τὸν σίδηρον; [D. ad Z 48] μετὰ πολλοῦ καμάτου γενόμενος ἢ ὁ πολὺν κάματον παρεχόμενος. Other discussions, often with similar themes, appear in Eust. 623.62 (ad Z 48), Schol. bT ad Z 48, [Schol. BEHPQ ad δ 718], Schol. Q ad ξ 324, [Schol. PV ad φ 10]. Ba. 345.26, [Suda π 1986], [Phot. s.v.] give simply πολυκάματον.

καμ<ατ>ου: For comparable examples of haplography with omission of vowel and following consonant see Mayser/Schmoll I.1².219.

γ[ε]γον<ο>τα (γ[ε]γονατα pap.): For α written in place of ο see Mayser/Schmoll I.1².70 f; Gignac I 287 f.

παρε{ι}χοντ[α]: The spelling may be due to confusion with the imperfect. The examples of ει written instead of ε that are given by Mayser/Schmoll I.1².41 f and Gignac I 256 f mostly fall into special categories which do not apply here.

Fr. 2, Col. II 1-2 (gl. 4). The lemma for this entry must have been πόρις or πόρτις. The lexicographical sources regard these two words for "calf" (as well as πόρταξ, on which see gl. 9 below), as interchangeable and undifferentiated in meaning; cf. Ap. Soph. 133.29, Schol. AbT ad P 4, Eust. 534.28 (ad E 162), 1091.2 (ad P 4), 1625.42 (ad ι 222), "Zonaras" 1566 s.v. πόρτις, EM 684.1, Tz. ad Lyc. 184, D. ad P 4. The etymological theory connecting πόρις/πόρτις/πόρταξ with πορεύεσθαι and other words from the same root occurs in the "Zonaras," EM, and D. passages as well as in Orion 125.20 and Eust. 534.28. The last most closely parallels the wording of the papyrus: ἡ δὲ πόρτις, ἀφ' ἧς ἐν ἄλλοις ὑποκοριστικῶς ἡ πόρταξ, δηλοῖ μὲν δάμαλιν τὴν ἄρτι πορεύεσθαι δυναμένην . . . γράφεται δέ ποτε καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ τ πόρις.

Assuming that the writer indented here by mistake, the entry may have begun with line 1 of the papyrus. In that case, Henrichs suggests restoring πόρι[ες· νέαι βόες ἀ]πὸ τοῦ ἡδη{ι} πορεύεσθ[αι] (cf. Schol. QV ad κ 410, Schol. T ad E 162). But if the entry began with an earlier line, πορι[in line 1 would be part of the discussion or explanation. Finally, we may compare the (probably abridged) entry of Ap. Soph. 133.29: πόρτις· ἣν δάμαλιν καλοῦμεν. λέγει δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ πόρτακα· "ἀμφὶ

δ' ἄρ' αὐτῷ βαῖν' ὅστις (read ὡς τις) περὶ πόρτακι μήτηρ" [P 4]. λέγονται δὲ καὶ πόριες.

ηδη{ι}: The extra ι is frequent during this period. See Mayser/Schmoll I.1².106 ff, especially 108; Gignac I 185; W. Crönert, *Memoria Graeca Herculanensis* (Leipzig 1903, repr. Hildesheim 1963) 45 f. For another possible example of the same tendency cf. line 9 below.

3-6 (gl. 5). Ap. Soph. 133.32 has πορφύρη· πορφυρίζηται, ταράσσεται· "ὡς δ' ὅτε πορφύρη πέλαγος" [E 16].¹⁷ ἔστιν οὖν πεποιημένη ἡ λέξις, ὡς τὸ μορμύρων. Abbreviated but similar are Hsch. π 3081 πορφύρει· ταράττεται. φροντίζει. μελανίζει; π 3086 πορφύρει· μελανίζει, ταράττει, πορφυρίζει; D. ad E 16 πορφύρη· μελαίνει, ταράσσει; Ba. 347.6 and Phot. s.v. πορφύρει· ταράσσεται. Cf. D. ad δ 427 (= with minor variations Schol. BEPQV ad loc.) πόρφυρε· ἐν βάθει τῆς διανοίας διανοεῖτο καὶ ἐκινεῖτο καὶ ἐταράσσετο, ὥσπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ὑδάτων τὰ ἐκ βάθους κινούμενα μελαίνεσθαι; Schol. A. ad E 16.

But for parallels to καλχαίνειν in the papyrus we must turn to Hsch. κ 550 καλχαίνει· ταράσσει, πορφύρει . . . ἐκ βυθοῦ ταράσσεται; Eust. 964.48 (ad E 16) πορφύρειν δὲ τὸ μελαίνεσθαι, ὅθεν καὶ κύμα πορφύρεον, καὶ πορφύρεος θάνατος. ὅτι δὲ τὸ πορφύρειν καὶ καλχαίνειν λέγεται, ἀλλαχόθι φαίνεται. More interesting is "Zonaras" 1171 s.v. καλχαίνειν [Soph. *Ant.* 20]· κατὰ βάθος μεριμνᾶν, καὶ κάλχη ἢ πορφύρα, ὅθεν καὶ πορφύρειν τὸ μεριμνᾶν (nearly identical is Orion 79.1). Henrichs points out the striking resemblance between "Zonaras" (on which lexicon, not compiled by Zonaras, see K. Alpers, *RE* X A [1972] 732 ff), who uses the Homeric gloss to illustrate the metaphorical usage of καλχαίνειν in Sophocles, and the papyrus, which cites the Sophoclean word as a parallel to Homeric usage. Ap. Soph. does in fact quote passages from Sophocles on occasion (91.34, 148.20). See also glosses 7 and 10 below.

7-10 (gl. 6). The fullest lexicographical discussion of the etymology of πόρδαλις is Ap. Soph. 133.34 πόρδαλις· τοῦ ποιητοῦ λέγοντος ποτέ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ο στοιχείου, "πόρδαλις ἡδὲ μέγας σῦς" [δ 457], ποτέ δὲ διὰ τοῦ α, "παρδαλέην ὥμοισιν ἔχων" [Γ 17]. Ἀπίων (fr. 109 Neitzel) δέ φησι διαφέρειν· πόρδαλιν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀρσενικόν, πάρδαλιν δὲ τὴν θήλειαν, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ προάλλεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ παράλλεσθαι. ῥητέον δὲ ὅτι κοινῶς φαίνεται λέγων, "θῶων πορδαλίων<τε>λύκων τ' ἡἴα πέλονται" [N 103], ὥστε ἐπὶ τοῦ ζώου διὰ τοῦ ο, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς δορᾶς διὰ τοῦ α. As corrected supralinearly, the gloss of our papyrus neatly summarizes the

¹⁷ The spelling πορφύρει was favored by Zenodotus, according to Schol. A^{1m}T¹¹ ad E 16. But its appearance in our papyrus and in many of the lexicographical parallels is adequately accounted for by itacism and assimilation to the indicative.

comments attributed by Ap. Soph. specifically to Apion. The latter, the author of a Homeric lexicon and probably a pupil of Apollonius' father (rather than of Apollonius himself, as a probably untrustworthy ancient tradition proclaims [cf. *RE* II 1, 135 f]), was interested in fanciful etymologies. Hsch. π 3009 has a discussion of πόρδαλις and πάρδαλις that is identical in content with Apion's as given in Ap. Soph. and the papyrus, except that the two infinitives are misspelled as προέλῃσθαι (cf. pap.) and παραλέσθαι. The same explanation, having the infinitives spelled correctly, turns up in Eust. 1092.39 (ad *P* 20).¹⁸ For similar discussions based on etymology see "Zonaras" 1562, *Et. Gen.* (AB) s.v. πόρδαλις, D. ad *P* 20, Eust. 1251.51 (ad Φ 573), 789.39 (ad *K* 29), 922.53 (ad *N* 103), *Ep. Hom.* AP 173.28, *Et. Gud.* 452.49–56, *EM* 652.27, Phot. s.v. πόρδαλιν, Schol. T¹¹ ad *Γ* 17, Schol. AT¹¹ ad *K* 29. Some of these try to explain the nouns by sexual differentiation and others by distinguishing the living animal from its skin (*Ep. Hom.* AO 356.11 does some of each); many incorporate, or are based on, incorrect spellings of the infinitives given by Apion. Cf. also Schol. A^{int} ad *N* 103, Schol. A^{imb}T ad *P* 20, Schol. A^{imb}TT¹¹ ad Φ 573.

θηλ<εια> (θηληι pap.): Perhaps the exemplar had θηληα and the writer of our papyrus omitted the final syllable (which would be in keeping with his errors in line 12 below and in fr. 1, line 7) but added an extra ι to the η as in line 2 above. For η written in place of ει before vowels see Mayser/Schmoll I.1².58 ff; Gignac I 240 ff. A spelling θηληια in the exemplar would seem less probable (Mayser/Schmoll I.1².103). On the other hand, perhaps the false form θηληη was intended by the writer (deviations of this type involving adjectives in -υς, -εια, -υ are discussed in Mayser I.2.52).

11–12 (gl. 7). So Ap. Soph. 134.7, Hsch. π 3084 (with the addition of καὶ παραχώδης). *EM* 684.10, Schol. AbT ad *E* 83, Schol. bT ad *E* 16, Eust. 524.42 (ad *E* 83), 964.43 (ad *E* 16) all either use μέλας to describe a πορφύρεος θάνατος or connect the phrase with a verb related to the adjective (cf. "Zonaras" 1568 s.v. πορφύρεον). See also the references cited for glosses 5 and 10.

και <βα>θυσ (καιθυς pap.): For comparable errors by haplography see Mayser/Schmoll I.1².218 f; Gignac I 313. A contributing factor here might be confusion between αι and α; cf. Mayser/Schmoll, 83 f, 97 and Gignac 194 f.

13 (gl. 8). Compare Schol. T ad *Π* 185 πόρεν δέ οἱ Ἑρμῆς αὐτῇ ἀγαθὸν δῶρον ἔδωκε τὸν υἱόν. Ap. Soph. 133.25 has πόρεν περιποιήσεν,

¹⁸ It may be noted here that the verb παράλλομαι apparently occurs only in the above passages and that it does not appear in LSJ or its *Supplement*.

οὐχὶ δὲ παρέσχεν· “πόρεν δ’ ὁ γε σήματα λυγρά” [Z 168]. Cf. also the entry in manuscript V of *EM* that is reported in Gaisford’s app. crit. on 684.18.

[πορ]ε{s}: Mayser/Schmoll I.1².182 f lists a number of examples of confusion between final -s and final -ν. Many are simple mistakes or arise from nearby case endings; but Gignac I 131 f suggests a phonological explanation of some of them.¹⁹

14–16 (gl. 9). Probably the entry should be restored [πόρ]τακι· μόσχωι. π[όρταξ / ὁ ἄρ]ρην, δάμαλιν (read δάμαλις) ἡ [θή/λε]ια. The error in case ending is probably due to the -ν ending the preceding word; cf. Mayser/Schmoll I.1².182 f. The resulting count of five letters in the lacuna to the right in line 14 is a bit high but possible, since calculation in other lines shows that that edge of the column may not have been even.

The differentiation of πόρταξ and δάμαλις according to sex is ascribed to Aristophanes of Byzantium (Codex Athous ap. E. Miller, *Mélanges de littérature grecque* [Paris 1868] 430 = H. Erbse, *Lexica Graeca Minora* [Hildesheim 1965] 276). Ap. Soph. lacks an entry on πόρταξ as a lemma, although 133.29 (quoted above in connection with gloss 4) does discuss the word along with its synonyms πόρτις and πόρις. Hsch. π 3071 has πόρτακι· μόσχωι. ἡ δαμάλει; cf. 3073 πόρταξ· ἄρρην βοῦς. τινὲς δάμαλιν, ἄλλοι νεογνόν, οἱ δὲ μόσχον. On πόρταξ see also Schol. AbT ad P 4, Eust. 534.28 (ad E 162), 1091.2 (ad P 4), 1625.42 (ad ι 222), Hsch. π 3068 and 3070, D. ad P 4.

17–18 (gl. 10). The entry is lacking in Ap. Soph., although 133.32 concerns the lemma πορφύρη (above, gl. 5). There are no parallels to the use of διστάζειν to explain πορφύρειν. However, the remainder of the gloss in the papyrus can be supplemented by comparison with D. ad Φ 551 πόρφυρε· κατὰ βάθος ἐμερίμνα καὶ διενοεῖτο. For πόρφυρε explained by a form of μεριμνᾶν see also Hsch. π 3082, Schol. A^{int} ad Φ 551, Schol. T ad δ 572 (cf. “Zonaras” 1171 s.v. καλχαίνειν, 1566 s.v. πορφύρα, 1570 s.v. πορφύρω, Schol. bT ad E 16, *Et. Gen.* [AB] s.v. πορφύρη, *EM* 684.10, Schol. Ap. Rhod. 1.461, 2.548). The *Λέξεις Ὀμηρικαὶ κατὰ στοιχεῖον* of Codex Urbinas 157 and Codex Selestadiensis 107 give the following explanations: Cod. Selest. 126^v πόρφυρε· ἐνεθυμεῖτο; Cod. Urb. 210^v πορφυρέεν [sic]· ἐθυμεῖτο [sic] (from notes supplied by A. Henrichs; see his references in *ZPE* 7 [1971] 101, n.13, and 118 to these two largely unedited manuscripts). Further discussions

¹⁹ On the other hand, πορε rather than πορεν may have been in the writer’s exemplar. For mistakes involving the addition of final -s to a vowel see Mayser/Schmoll I.1².183; Gignac I 125 f.

of πόρφυρε are given in Schol. BEPQV ad δ 427, Eust. 1251.3 (ad Φ 551), D. ad δ 572 = ad κ 309, *Ep. Hom. AP* 28.34; and see glosses 5 and 7 above.

19–20 (gl. 11). [πορσαί]νειν· κατα[σκευ/άζ]ειν J. S. Rusten, comparing Hsch. π 3056. Ap. Soph. has no such entry.

21 (gl. 11). The lemma was probably πόσις. The simple πόσις· ἀνὴρ appears in Ba. 347.8 and Phot. s.v. Ap. Soph. 134.8 has πόσιος· ποτὲ μὲν τῆς πόσεως, ποτὲ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ νόμον ἀνδρός; cf. Apion 99.9 πόσις· τὸ πινόμενον. καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ. The gloss in the papyrus must have included an explanation of πόσις (“husband”) based on a supposed connection with πόσις (“drink”) and ποτίζειν (“give to drink,” “irrigate”). Such an explanation forms part of a rather lengthy etymological discussion in *EM* 149.41 ἄρσιν· παρὰ τὸ ἄρδω, τὸ ποτίζω . . . ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ τῇ γυναικὶ ἐπαρδεύει. ἄρδω, ἄρσω, ἄρρην, ὁ ἄρδων τὴν θήλειαν. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο πόσις λέγεται ὁ ἀνὴρ παρὰ τὸ ποτίζειν τῇ γονῇ Closely similar passages are to be found in *EM* 149.50, 684.19, *Et. Gud.* 207.1, 207.6, Eust. 1384.59 (ad α 15). Cf. also Hsch. π 3104–3107. The entry in our papyrus must have continued over into at least the first line of the following column and must have read approximately as follows: [πόσις]· ἀνὴρ· γυν[αῖκα / γὰρ ποτίζει (or ἄρδει)], perhaps followed by further comments.

3. ANTHOLOGY OR SUMMARY-WITH-QUOTATIONS OF *Iliad* Σ-T

P. Mich. inv. 4832c; 11.5 × 8.6 cm; late second or first century B.C.;
Karanis

Peppered with worm-holes, this fragment was obtained during the 1926 season at Karanis. The hand establishes it as one of the earliest texts from that site.²⁰ Two columns of writing parallel to the fibers

²⁰ The excavation number is 26/B13F/A. The probable date of the papyrus makes it an unusual one for Karanis, where the great bulk of the documents date from the Roman period and most of these are later than the first century A.D. The ostraca and documents occasionally bear late Ptolemaic dates, and several have been assigned to as far back as the second century B.C. (see *O. Mich.*). For the probable foundation of the town under the early Ptolemies as well as two inscriptions from the second and first centuries B.C., see E. Bernand, *Recueil des inscriptions grecques du Fayoum* I (Leiden 1975) 164 ff.

I have not made an exhaustive survey, but probably our papyrus no. 3 is the earliest literary piece to come from Karanis. Together with no. 2, the Homeric lexicon, it adds to our information about the modest degree of interest in literature there. Besides more than 20 texts of Homer, papyri of Hesiod's *Th.*

survive; but both are incomplete at the top and the first has lost from one half to three quarters of its width on the left. The writer was hardly a raw beginner. However, his shaky rendering of a characteristic late-Ptolemaic book hand and his lack of success in producing uniform lines and column edges have resulted in a text that is not particularly attractive visually.²¹ The back of the papyrus is blank.

The extant part of column I begins with five verses quoted from the catalogue of Nereids who accompany Thetis to visit Achilles; presumably the papyrus originally contained the entire catalogue (Σ 39–49) from the beginning. The remainder of the column, in prose, apparently summarizes the following events through Thetis' visit and her departure for Olympus to procure arms for her son. The upper part of column II must have dealt with the making of the arms (concluding Σ) and Thetis' return with them to the camp of the Achaeans (Τ 1 ff). The first preserved lines of column II show that the compiler of the text has once again turned to quotation, this time of two verses (Τ 38 f) describing

and *Op.* (cf. *BASP* 3 [1966] 65 ff), Demosthenes, Isocrates, possibly Xenophon, and Chariton are listed in Pack² as coming from the site (see nos. 243, 316, 1246, 1256, 1552). Among as yet unpublished papyri from Karanis in the Michigan collection are fragments of Plato's *Phaedo* and a grammatical treatise, datable to the first or second century A.D. A scribe from Karanis inserted a reference to Callimachus in a tax roll which he was copying (see H. C. Youtie, *Proc. Twelfth Intern. Congr. of Papyrology* [Toronto 1970] 549 ff = *Scriptiunculae* II [Amsterdam 1973] 1039 ff), but of course this is an eccentricity. Finally, of special interest in connection with our Homeric lexicon and anthology of the *Iliad* is yet another literary papyrus from Karanis, the *Life of Homer* by Alcidamas (Pack² 76; second-third century A.D.). Taken together with the actual texts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, these three Homeric demonstrate that rather extensive study of the poems was pursued there, although much of this activity must have been associated with the schoolroom.

²¹ Similar but in some respects cruder is *P. Ryl.* I 30. Similar but more ornamented and regular are *PSI* IX 1092 = Norsa, *La scrittura letteraria greca* Tav. 8; Turner, *Greek Manuscripts* Pap. 55. All three have been assigned to the first century B.C. Also comparable on many points are Roberts, *Greek Literary Hands* Pap. 8a (99 B.C.); 8b (30–29 B.C.); 9c (late first century B.C.); Seider II, Pap. 10 (second century B.C.); Pap. 15 (first century B.C.); Turner, Pap. 12 (second century B.C.). An oddity in the Michigan papyrus is the second ω in II.10, which is shaped like Ω. Perhaps this is due simply to the whim of the writer on this occasion. I do not know of a parallel to it in this type of hand, but it could be an adaptation of one of the earlier forms of the letter which are in use in the third and second centuries, especially in documentary hands. As a mark of a certain pretentiousness in the writer, despite the clumsiness in writing and format, we may note the "filler" mark at the end of I.14. The intercolumnar space fluctuates between 0.8 and 1.5 cm. The lower margin of up to 2.2 cm indicates a fairly generous use of space.

Thetis' preservation of Patroclus' body with nectar and ambrosia. The prose summary then picks up the narrative of the subsequent assembly of the Achaeans, including Agamemnon's bestowal of the promised gifts on Achilles and his oath not to have slept with Briseis. For the oath, the compiler incorporates a single Homeric verse (on which see the commentary). The column concludes in prose with the end of the assembly, Briseis' lament over Patroclus' body, and subsequent events which are perhaps those of *T* 303 ff but which cannot be identified with certainty because of the fragmentary nature of line 17. Presumably the narrative continued into a subsequent column.

This type of composition, having noteworthy or memorable Homeric passages or verses spliced together with rather simple prose that rapidly summarizes the intervening narrative, appears also in three other papyrus fragments which are the object of a recent study by G. Nachtergaele, "Fragments d' anthologies homériques," in *Chronique d'Égypte* 46 (1971) 344 ff. These papyri are P. Strasb. inv. 2374 = Pack² 1185, ed. N. Lewis, *Études de Papyrologie* 3 (1936) 46 ff (third century B.C., provenance unknown; on *Z*); P. Vindob. gr. inv. 26740 = Pack² 791, ed. H. Oellacher, *ibid.* 4 (1938) 133 ff (second century A.D., Soknopaïou Nesos; on *Z*); P. Hamb. II 136 = Pack² 633 (early third century B.C., provenance unknown; on *B*). Together with the Michigan text, these fragmentary anthologies bear abundant witness to the continued popularity through five centuries in Greco-Roman Egypt of a type of study aid which had probably been in use in the schoolroom since at least Plato's day.²²

In the papyrus, blank spaces are employed in I.6 to separate two quoted verses, in II.5 to indicate a break within the prose narrative, and in II.11 before the sentence which leads into the verse describing the oath. Probably this device was used more extensively in the long quotation in column I. There are no marks indicating punctuation and no accents or other lectional signs. *Iota*-adscript is written. The only discernible spelling errors are minor: one in II.17 left uncorrected and another in II.8 which the writer seems to have caught.

COLUMN I

[Δωρις και Πανο]πη και (Σ 45)
 [αγακλειτη Γαλατεια Νημε]ρτης [τ]ε (46)
 [και Αψευδης και Καλ]λιανασσα

²² Cf. Nachtergaele, 347.

	[ενθα δε ην Κλυμενη Ια]γειρα τε	(47)
5	[και Ιανασσα Μαιρα] και Ωρειθυι	(48)
	[α ευπλοκαμος τ Αμαθ]υια αλλαι	(49)
	[θ αι κατα βενθος αλο]ς Νηρηιδες	
	[ησαν ca. 12]ομιμνησκε	
	[ca. 15].ει τωι Αχιλ	
10	[λει ca. 12]ρ. φεατουμε	
	[ca. 13]. .[.] ου οπλα ε	
	[ca. 13]. . .εταϊ η δε τας	
	[ca. 12]πεμψασα προς τον	
	[ca. 14]υηδειστον>	

9.] . : Perhaps λ 10. Before φ, either ο or ε φεα: After ε, perhaps a narrow letter such as ι lost in gap 11.] . .[: foot of diagonal, then upright and low ink 12.] . . . : in middle of area, parts of two uprights

COLUMN II

	Πα]	
	[τροκλωι δ αυτ α]μβ[ροσιην και νεκ]	(T 38)
	[ταρ] ε[ρυθρον σ]τα[ξ]ε κ[ατα]	(39)
	[ρι]ν[ων ιν]α οι χρωσ εμ[πε]	
	[δος] ει[η κ]αι τουτο ποιησ[α]	
5	[σα] χωριζεται Αχιλλευς δε	
	[σ]υγαγει παντας τους Αχαι	
	[ο]υς εις εκκλησιαν και ποι	
	ει[η]ται της μηνιδος απορρη	
	σιν Αγαμεμνων δε αυται	
10	αποδιδωσι παντα τα δωρα	
	και την Βρισηι[δ]α ομνυει δε	
	μηποτε της ευνης επιβη	(T 176)
	μεναι ηδε μιγηναι και ου	
	τως λυεται η εκκλ[η]σια	
15	Βρισηις δε στασα το του Πα	
	τροκλου σωμα θρηνηι τον	
	δ. ηξιουσα . . . α. στε. σ	

8. ει is written in margin, apparently to correct {η} (of which the right upright survives) 17. δ.: perhaps either δε or δη . . . : an upright followed by a gap; then top of rounded (?) letter and another upright α: or δ; next letter has part of an upright .σ: bits from base of an upright (prob. ι), then top and base of σ with perhaps ink from left side

Col. I 1-8. The catalogue of Nereids (Σ 39-49) was athetized by Aristarchus; the Argolic edition of the *Iliad* did not contain it (Schol. A ad Σ 39; cf. T ad Σ 38).

6. *Αμαθ]νια*: The spelling in -νια rather than -εια could be due to error on the part of the writer by analogy with the preceding *Ωρείθνια*. However, some manuscripts do contain this variant, and it may have been present in the text of Homer that the writer had in front of him. T. W. Allen's edition of the *Iliad* (Oxford 1931) gives the following data (ad Σ 48): -εια Bm²Bm⁵L⁶L⁷L¹⁵L¹⁷L¹⁸L¹⁹L²⁰Mo¹O⁵P²P³P⁴P⁶P¹⁵P²¹PaPeU⁹U¹³V¹V⁴V⁵V⁶V¹⁵V¹⁶V²⁰V²³V²⁶Vi²Vi⁵Eu; -ύεια P¹²V²; -νια cet. Eust. 1130.56, discussing the etymologies of *Ἀμάθεια* and *᾽Ωρείθνια*, disapproves of *Ἀμάθνια* . . . ἦν οὐ καλῶς τινες . . . ἐτόλμησαν γράφειν πρὸς ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ᾽Ωρείθνιαν.

8-10. E.g., ἡ (sc. *Θέτις*) δὲ τὸν υἱὸν ὑπ]ομιμνήσκει[ται καὶ ἀνελθοῦσα (sc. ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης) ὁμι]λεῖ τῷ Ἀχιλ[λεῖ (although a bit long for the lacuna in 9). Cf. Σ 51 ff.

10. Perhaps τ]ροφε[ι]α (see app. crit.) or a word from the same root. Against this would be the fact that in the standard text of the *Iliad* Thetis touches upon the birth and upbringing of Achilles mainly in Σ 51 ff, before she comes from the sea to comfort him. But this causes a problem only if the gist of my suggested supplement to lines 8-10 is correct (and Σ 95 f might also have suggested the theme to the writer of our text).

11. E.g., παρ' *Ἡφ]αί[σ]του ὄπλα*. Cf. Σ 136 ff. (ὄπλα might also refer to the armor which Hector stripped from Patroclus' body, since Achilles mentions this in verses 82 ff.)

12-14. E.g., ἡ (sc. *Θέτις*) δὲ τὰς [ἀδελφάς . . .] πέμψασα πρὸς τὸν [πατέρα . . . (cf. Σ 140 ff). But this does not seem to go well with the following]γηδαιστον, a sequence in which one would most naturally see ἡ (sc. *Θέτις*) δ' εἰς τὸν [Ὀλυμπον (or εἰς τὸν [τοῦ Ἡφαίστου οἶκον) πορεύεται or the like (cf. Σ 146 ff).

Col. II 4-5. κ]αὶ τουτο ποιησ[ασα] χωρίζεται: This sentence may have been purely the invention of the author of the anthology, without any particular basis in the text of the poem which he had in front of him. However, the detail was more likely present in his text, since several medieval manuscripts have an "extra" verse T 39a, on which Allen's apparatus reports as follows: 39a ἡ μὲν δ' ἄρ' ὥς ἔρξασ' ἀπέβη *Θέτις* ἀργυρόπεζα fort. γρ. T, vide Schol.; habent Bm⁸GeL²L¹²Le¹M⁴P⁷P²¹Q⁴U³U¹³V²⁰V²⁵.

5-10. Compare the corresponding summary (hypothesis) which precedes the scholia on *T* in D. and Eust.: συναγαγὼν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν τοὺς Ἑλληνας ὁ ἥρωες ἀπόρρησιν ποιεῖται τῆς μῆνιδος. καὶ λαμβάνει τὰ δῶρα ἅπερ αὐτῷ Ἀγαμέμνων ὑπέσχετο.

11-13. In the text of the poem the verse *T* 176, embodying the substance of the oath in a single line, is actually spoken by Odysseus. This occurs well before the actual swearing of the oath by Agamemnon (which is done in verses 258 ff with elaboration and without repeating verse 176) and the breaking up of the assembly and lament of Briseis which follow closely on the swearing. But it would be rash to assume that the text of the *Iliad* before the writer of our anthology necessarily repeated 176 as part of the actual swearing or through some other deviation caused him to put this verse in Agamemnon's mouth. While Ptolemaic papyri do show some eccentricities and "plus-verses" in the text of Homer, verse *T* 176 (= *I* 133) is a concise and easily remembered statement of the oath which on account of these very qualities might well recommend itself for inclusion in an anthology.

16-17. Probably τὸν (sc. Ἀχιλλέα) δὲ ἡξίουσαν (read ἡξίωσαν) . . ., the verses referred to being *T* 303 ff, where the γέροντες Ἀχαιῶν beg Achilles to eat before going to battle (cf. Odysseus' remarks in *T* 155 ff). Assuming a letter lost after α, we might restore τὸν / δὲ ἡξίωσαν οἱ ἀ[ρ]ιστεῖς / [μὴ νηστεύειν . . . On the spelling error in the verb cf. Mayser/Schmoll I.1².76 f; Gignac I 210 f.

THE COLOGNE MANI CODEX RECONSIDERED

ALBERT HENRICHs

MANICHAËISM was a religion which crossed cultural divides and which during Mani's own lifetime (A.D. 216–276) made converts in countries as distant as Egypt and Chorasmia. Its ability to attract men and women of widely different nationalities reflects Mani's own syncretistic background. He grew up in the multicultural environment of Mesopotamia where Semitic, Greek, and Iranian dialects were spoken. In his formative years, he came under the influence of Jewish, Jewish-Christian, Christian, Gnostic, Persian, and perhaps Babylonian cults, thought, and literatures. Before the discovery of the Cologne Codex, very little was known about Mani's childhood and youth.¹ In 216 Mani's father Pattik joined a baptist sect in the marshes of southern Babylonia and arranged to have his infant son brought to him. Mani had a revelation at the age of twelve which changed the course of his life and alienated him from the baptists with whom he was living. The angel who transmitted that revelation was called "twin companion" (in other words, he was Mani's celestial alter ego). Mani split with the baptists when he was twenty-four years old, and his first public appearance as a missionary of his new creed is said to have coincided with the coronation of Shapur I as king of Iran.² And finally, the names of Mani's very first followers were Simeon, Zako, and Pattik, Mani's father.

¹ The present study, which is essentially the text of a lecture delivered at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, on May 22, 1978, has a twofold purpose: to establish a written record of the earliest stages of decipherment of the Cologne Codex and to review the ancient evidence for the Book of Elchasai and its possible influence on Mani's baptists. For other details outside this limited scope the reader is referred to the following basic bibliography on the Cologne Mani Codex (CMC): A. Henrichs and L. Koenen, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* [= ZPE] 5 (1970) 97–216 (preliminary report), ZPE 19 (1975) 1–85 (edition of CMC 1–72.7), ZPE 32 (1978) 87–199 (edition of CMC 72.8–99.9); A. Henrichs, *HSCP* 77 (1973) 23–59; K. Rudolph, in *Mélanges d'histoire des religions offerts à Henri-Charles Puech* (1974) 471–486; L. Koenen, *Illinois Classical Studies* 3 (1978) 154–195.

² This synchronism, which is reported in the *Fihrist* (below, n.3), is erroneous. See the editors' comments on CMC 18.1 ff.

I. THE NEW MANI VITA

All this information comes from a chapter on Manichaeism in the *Fihrist*, an Arabic encyclopedia of the tenth century.³ The Cologne Codex, deciphered in 1969, confirms, clarifies, and expands every aspect of it. The connections will become clearer when we summarize the actual content of this new source. A detailed but legendary account of Mani's childhood can be found on pp. 1-13. Mani claims to have been on speaking terms with the supernatural at the tender age of four when he first received divine visitations. Miracle stories describe in graphic detail how trees and plants bled and cried for help when the baptists tried to prune them or to harvest their fruit, and how Mani refused to participate in such sacrilege. These tales illustrate a particular doctrine of Mani's theology. The Manichees believed that all organic substances contained particles of light which were divine and waiting for salvation. In their eyes, the real crucifixion of Christ was not a one-time event but the ongoing suffering of Light imprisoned in Matter. St. Augustine quotes similar Manichaean legends but scholars were inclined to think that he had made them up in order to ridicule the creed to which he himself once belonged. The Cologne Codex proves that they are genuinely Manichaean.⁴

On pp. 14-44, we find long and valuable excerpts from Mani's own works in which he describes the circumstances and contents of his two major revelations and the function of his twin. Mani's "twin companion" (σύζυγος) is the personification of a typically Gnostic concept, the transcendent projection of one's soul. Mani expressed his sense of identity with the twin in poignant lines, for instance on p. 24: "I recognized him and realized that I am he from whom I was separated."⁵

What follows on pp. 45-72 is a long and apologetic digression in which five Jewish apocalypses (otherwise unattested) and two of St. Paul's letters are quoted with title in an attempt to lend credibility to Mani's visionary experiences and to his own accounts of them. Because of its exclusive focus on the history of revelation, this particular excerpt would seem to be less relevant for one's understanding of Mani's life than the biographical pieces which precede and follow it. But its inclusion in the codex, and its calculated placement in the surrounding biographical material, serve to identify the anonymous editor of the

³ *The Fihrist of al-Nadim*, ed. and trans. Bayard Dodge (1970) II 773-775.

⁴ Koenen (above, n.1) 176 ff; Henrichs, *BASP* 16 (1979) 85-108.

⁵ Koenen (above, n.1) 173 f.

anthology: he was not a mechanical compiler but had a mind of his own that has left its mark on the arrangement of the entire collection.⁶

The next thematic unit, on pp. 72–99, is doubtless the part which has the greatest historical interest and which has already revolutionized the former state of Manichaean studies. It deals in various ways with the customs and rituals of the baptists, and with Mani's opposition to them.

A vivid account of Mani's physical separation from the baptists and of his escape to the city of Ctesiphon follows on pp. 100–116. At the height of their controversy some of the baptists tried to kill Mani, but the intercession of his father, a high-ranking baptist, saved his life. Mani despaired, but the celestial twin appeared to comfort him. He sent Mani on his mission, telling him that two of the baptists and Mani's father would be his first followers. One of the two is called Abizachias, apparently the same man as the Zako mentioned in the Arabic encyclopedia. Mani and his two baptist friends left their village secretly. But as they crossed the bridge over the Tigris to Ctesiphon, another baptist recognized them and informed Mani's father, who finally joined them in the Sassanian capital.⁷

The rest of the codex is filled with a description of their missionary journeys. They must have been successful. One miraculous conversion story follows another. People from opposite walks of life were attracted to Mani's religion. A shaggy hermit who lived on a remote mountain was converted by Mani and returned to society as a missionary of his

⁶ See my essay "Literary Criticism of the CMC" to be published in the Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism held at Yale University in March 1978; *ZPE* 32 (1978) n.269 on CMC 94.1.

⁷ It is extremely probable that Mani was born in or near Ctesiphon, a region from which the baptists recruited Mani's father and other followers (the baptist Aianos from Coche, the twin city of Ctesiphon on the opposite side of the Tigris, is mentioned at CMC 98.10 f). Cf. the *Fihrist* trans. Dodge (above, n.3) II 773 f: "It is said that his father's origin was at Hamadhān, and that he moved to Babylon and lived at al-Madā'in [cf. αἱ πόλεις, the twin cities of Coche and Ctesiphon, at CMC 111.4], in the place known as Ctesiphon, where there was a temple of idols which Futtuq [i.e., Pattik, Mani's father] used to frequent as the other people did. One day someone cried to him in the temple of idols with a shout, 'Oh, Futtuq, do not eat meat! Do not drink wine! Do not marry a human being!' [below, n.48]. This was repeated for him a number of times during three days. Then, after Futtuq had perceived this, he became connected with a group of people in the environs of Dastumīsān [νήσος τῶν Μαισανῶν at CMC 140.5 ff] known as the Mughtasilah [= βαπτισταί]. There is still a remnant of them in those regions and watered districts, even in this our own time. They belonged to the cult which Futtuq was ordered to join when his wife was pregnant with Mānī. When she gave birth to him . . ." On the problem of the location of Mani's birthplace, see H.-Ch. Puech, *Le Manichéisme* (1949) 34 f.

new faith (pp. 126–129). The next episode shows Mani in higher circles: a local shah and his court were so impressed by Mani's preaching and by two impromptu appearances of the twin that they became Manichees (pp. 130–134).

The remaining sixty pages of the codex, though in very fragmentary condition, contribute to the early history of Manichaeism various geographical names which document the extent of Mani's first travels and confirm similar information in the Coptic *Kephalaia*.⁸ Among the more interesting places is Pharat in Mesene, or Maišān, the major port of southern Babylonia. The Syriac Hymn of the Pearl, a Gnostic text which Mani knew, describes Maišān as "the central market for the merchants from the east." In fact Pharat was the port of embarkation for trade with India. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that four pages later the codex mentions merchant ships which sail to Persia and India (p. 144). Mani himself made the passage to India during his first or second year as a missionary. It is at this point in Mani's career that the Cologne Codex fails us. Other sources continue the chronicle, but only after an interval of many years.

II. LOOKING BACK

After this brief survey of the new text as we now know it, I propose to set the clock back and to turn to the events in 1969 which led to the restoration and decipherment of the manuscript. The initial identification did not take place at the University of Cologne, where the codex is kept, but in a suburb of Vienna. On June 14, 1969, I arrived in Vienna carrying an inconspicuous cigar box which would turn out to be a "cave of treasures." I was met at the station by Dr. Anton Fackelmann, the eminent restorer of ancient manuscripts. Once at the Fackelmann home, we opened the box and removed four small and fragile lumps of conglutinated and parched vellum from their cotton wrappings. The largest and thickest lump measured four by four centimeters, or an inch and a half crosswise and lengthwise. It was smaller than the palm of a hand and could be lifted easily with two fingers. After a brief examination of the fragments, Fackelmann shook his head in disbelief and despair. He turned to me and told me that he had never seen such a mess.

At that time the true identity of the codex was completely unknown. It was obvious that each lump consisted of one or more quires of vellum leaves, and that the total number of leaves was very large. But because

⁸ *Keph.* 15.24–31, 184.23–185.17; *HSCP* 77 (1973) 41 n.66.



FIG. 1



FIG. 2




FIG. 3




FIG. 4




FIG. 5




FIG. 6

they were glued together and could not be turned, their content remained inaccessible. Fragmentary passages of Greek text were visible on the outer surfaces of each lump. Although they were not hard to read, their study proved frustrating and inconclusive. Let us review for a moment what was known about their content before the codex arrived in Vienna.

The obverse of the first fragment (fig. 1) was too stained and shriveled to merit close attention at this early stage of decipherment. But its reverse, which is now known as p. 26 of the codex, provided tentative evidence that the book's content was religious and esoteric (fig. 2). The rubric which divides that page into two uneven halves reads οἱ διδάσκαλοι λέγουσιν, "tradition of the teachers." It is followed by a passage which describes the revelation of secret knowledge in the language typical of Jewish, Christian, and Gnostic revelation literature. Key terms such as "secrets" (ἀπόρρητα), "he made manifest" (ἐξέφηνε), "mystery" (μυστήριον), and "I revealed" (ἀπεκάλυψα) occur within the short space of seven lines.⁹

Fragment two is of technical interest because it preserves the original thread with which six pairs of leaves were stitched together at the center fold to form a coherent quire. The obverse of that fragment (fig. 3), p. 29 of the codex, comes from a highly metaphorical context and uses the image of the divine gardener to promise the eventual eradication of the forces of evil. Because of its allusive nature, this page remained almost incomprehensible for a long time.

The reverse of fragment two (fig. 4), p. 46 of the codex, added three memorable phrases and confirmed the impression that the new document was religious, esoteric, and presumably Christian. First, there is the Johannine designation of the Holy Spirit as πνεῦμα τὸ παράκλητον in line 2.¹⁰ Three lines later, reference is made to "the mystical rapture (άρπαγή) of the teacher" and to those who have written about it. According to Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, the term ἀρπαγή was used in that sense by some Christian exegetes who commented on St. Paul's claim that he had been caught up to the third heaven. Two or three scholars in Cologne saw this page of the codex before the fragments were sent to Vienna. They did not dream that the new document dealt with Mani, who elsewhere in the codex would describe his own visionary experience in language borrowed from St. Paul, or that the relevant autobiographical passages from 2 Corinthians and from Galatians were

⁹ CMC 26.6–13.

¹⁰ Koenen (above, n.1) 167–176.

quoted verbatim on pages 60 to 62 by one of Mani's apologetic disciples.

Still on p. 46 and right below the blank space at the end of line 7, there was another notable phrase, *περὶ τῆς γέννης τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ*, or "On the birth of his body." We were surprised to discover that the words *περὶ τῆς γέννης* recur in the upper margin of the same page where they are written in smaller letters surrounded by decorative flourishes. This coincidence seemed at first puzzling. We did not and could not know at that time that this phrase, divided into two equal halves, was used throughout the codex as a running title at the top of each pair of facing pages. Nor did we realize then that "his body" meant "Mani's body" and that in Manichaean eyes the body of Mani had both a literal and a spiritual reality. In the literal sense, Mani's body was the vehicle of his earthly life, and it was appropriate to refer to it in the title of Mani's biography. In the pneumatic sense, which was influenced by Pauline christology, Mani's body was Mani's church so that the story of Mani's life became the first chapter in the history of his church.¹¹ In short, then, we naturally failed to recognize the programmatic content of p. 46 when we first studied it in May 1969.

The third and largest lump of vellum contained 74 pages of Greek text, compared to a total of 192 extant pages. Fig. 5 is a reproduction of the obverse of fragment three, p. 47. But prior to the restoration of the codex, the relative order of the four fragments was unknown. It did not occur to us to connect this page with the last page of fragment two, which precedes it and actually faces it in the restored codex. If we had made the connection, we would have paid more attention to the upper margin of p. 47 where we read the familiar words *τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ*, which continue the running title from p. 46.

As for its content, p. 47 reiterates the theme of revelation. Forefathers are mentioned who made known their revelations to men of their choice (*ἐκλογή*) and who wrote them down for posterity. The term *ἐκλογή* for an elite church has a Gnostic ring, and the same can be said for the written tradition of secret knowledge. Again, p. 47 suggested that the book was in a very general sense Gnostic, but it contained no hint that it was Manichaean.

The five fragmentary pages of the codex which I have discussed so far were published in 1975. As we turn to the reverse of fragment three, we find ourselves at the end of the best-preserved portion of the codex which describes Mani's break with the baptist sect and the first beginnings of his mission. Under magnification, the back of this fragment

¹¹ Koenen (above, n.1) 164-166.

looks like a layer cake nibbled at by a batallion of starving mice (fig. 6). Irregular holes in several of the superimposed codex leaves serve as windows which open partial vistas into underlying layers of vellum. The continuous text in the center of the fragment belongs to p. 118. The extant words are too few and too incoherent to make much sense. But directly below the blank space at the end of line 7 there is a strange proper name which catches the eye. The name is Pattikios. This name alone would have been sufficient to establish the Manichaeian identity of the codex, because it is the attested name of Mani's father. But at that time we had never heard of Mani's father. We could not even trace that name to any recorded holder because no Greek lexicon lists it. Again, the truth eluded us.

The fourth and last piece of the codex begins with p. 121, which is shown in figure 7, and ends with p. 192, of which very few letters survive. As we now know, p. 121 belongs to the itinerary of Mani's first travels, which led him to the Sassanid province of Media in northwest Iran. The name of "the Medes" ($\tau\omega\nu\ \text{Μήδων}$) occurs at the beginning of line 6. The first words of lines 7 and 11 respectively are $\Gammaουναζακ$ and $\Gammaαναζακ$, variant spellings of the same place name.¹² The place is Ganzak in Media Atropatene, or modern Azerbaijan, 150 miles southeast of Tabriz. During the Sassanian period, Ganzak was an important center of the royal fire cult. Northern Media was far removed from the mainstream of Christianity or even Gnosticism, and the odd geographical reference did not seem to tie in with our working hypothesis that the codex was Gnostic. And so I went to Vienna hoping to resolve this and other questions and to uncover the mystery of the "Gnostic" codex.

Let us briefly return to the events in Vienna. Here I was with the mysterious fragments and with the one person able to make them legible, only to be told by him that he was more than skeptical about the outcome. But the miracle happened, and happened fast. Within a few hours of my arrival, and with the help of a chemical solvent manufactured in the United States, Dr. Fackelmann managed to soften the brittle material. When he finally separated the first vellum leaf unharmed from the bulk of fragment three, it turned out to be a detached remnant of the preceding quire. It was later identified as the last leaf of quire two, pages 47 and 48 of the codex. From then on the pages came off much faster than I could transcribe them. By the end of the first afternoon,

¹² The two different vocalizations of the same radicals within five lines of the same page are another indication that the *CMC* was translated from an Aramaic original (below, n. 17).




FIG. 7

several conjugate leaves had been separated, each containing four pages of Greek text.

The particular section of the codex which we had uncovered happened to contain long quotations from five different apocalypses, each under the name of a different Adamite.¹³ The first is ascribed to Adam himself and the last to Henoch, and their content is new but repetitious. Only later did it become clear that this part of the codex constituted a long digression and was untypical of the rest, and that the five revelation texts were in fact not Manichaean in origin but borrowed from Jewish sources.

But the truth was just around the corner. On the morning of June 15, 1969, I finished my transcription of the apocalypses. The emphasis on divine revelation continued on the next two pages with relevant quotations from St. Paul. A couple of pages further on I found another quotation, this time from a letter which "our father" had sent to

¹³ *CMC* 48.16–60.8. These texts contain nothing specifically Gnostic.

Edessa. Edessa was the most cultured city in eastern Syria, the cradle of Syrian Christianity, but who was "our father"? The next page brought the answer. The crucial sentence on p. 66 reads: "He said in the Gospel of his most holy hope: 'I, Mani, the apostle of Jesus Christ through the will of God, the Father of Truth, from whom I was born.'" I found it difficult to believe my eyes. The author who introduced himself in the manner of St. Paul was no less a man than Mani himself, the founder of Manichaeism, a world religion which rivaled Christianity from the middle of the third century down to the Arab conquest. The quotation which solved the mystery of the codex is the beginning of Mani's gospel, one of his five canonical books. What follows on the next four pages of the codex is the longest surviving excerpt from that important missionary work which outlined Mani's message of salvation to the world.

A few hours later I called Professor Koenen, then curator of the Cologne papyrus collection. I told him that the restoration had been successful, that the content of the codex was new and Manichaean, and that it was a sensation, a scholar's dream. But it took several more weeks before we knew that the new Manichaean text was actually the earliest part of a continuous biography which has thrown unexpected light on the darkest period of Mani's life, his first twenty-four years.

This is basically the known story of the "discovery" of the Mani codex. It is not untypical. Ancient manuscripts which antedate the Byzantine period are almost never identified at the place of their original discovery, and more often than not the circumstances of their disinterment are shrouded in obscurity and secrecy. The Cologne Codex is no exception. Rumor has it that the remains of the codex were located several decades ago in Luxor, and it is a reasonable guess that they were found in the vicinity of ancient Lykopolis, a stronghold of Manichaeism in Upper Egypt.¹⁴ In other words, next to nothing is known about the fate of the Mani Codex before it reached Cologne.

In the course of restoration, the four vellum lumps yielded one hundred and ninety-two codex pages. But this total is misleading. Not a single page escaped damage in the sands of Egypt. In assessing the losses the minute size of the codex must be kept in mind. The loss of even the tiniest segment of writing surface inevitably affects several successive lines and disrupts the continuity of sizable portions of text. Less than forty pages from the center of fragment three, or one fifth of

¹⁴ L. Koenen, *ZPE* 11 (1973) 240 f.




FIG. 8 (original size)

what remains, suffered comparatively minor damage along the lower end of their outer margins. Their content can be usually reconstructed in its entirety. But seventy-five pages from the end of the codex survive in such fragmentary condition that isolated words or letters are all that is left.

Before they were returned to Cologne, the leaves were photographed and placed under protective sheets of transparent Plexiglass. In the original codex, six conjugate leaves, or twenty-four pages, were assembled to form one quire. Eight quires survive, and it is likely that many more perished. The complete biography of Mani will have filled more than one codex, or dozens of quires. After conservation, three conjugate leaves, or half of a quire, were arranged vertically under one



FIG. 9

cover, with the center leaf at the bottom. In their present arrangement, they no longer look like a book, but resemble a collection of exotic butterflies in a showcase.

The Cologne Codex is a masterpiece of ancient book production (fig. 8). Written in the fifth century A.D. on vellum of the finest quality, it is the smallest manuscript known from antiquity. When closed the book measured 3.5 by 4.5 centimeters, or 1.4 by 1.8 inches. It was the size of a small matchbox. Several Greek and Coptic codices of similar pocket-size have been found. They have between three and eleven lines of writing per page, and contain biblical texts. By contrast, the Cologne Codex has twenty-three lines of text per page, the running title not included. We know that the Manichees treasured their sacred books. Their bibliophilism had a religious motivation: they produced beautiful manuscripts out of veneration for the spirit of the letter.¹⁵

A striking and unusual feature in the layout of the codex is the occasional use of captions in the middle of a page. They provide the names and sometimes the titles of Manichaean authorities for the passages which follow the captions. Their names are often Semitic, because Mani lived in Mesopotamia and spoke an Aramaic dialect. Many of the names quoted in the codex were already known from other Manichaean

¹⁵ ZPE 5 (1970) 100 ff; O. Klíma, *Manis Zeit und Leben* (1962) 332 f.

or Christian sources. Their historicity is therefore beyond doubt. A typical example can be found on p. 74 (fig. 9). Its caption reads: "Abiesus the Teacher and Innaios, Zabed's son." After long pages of monotonous copying, a new caption was a welcome break in the scribe's routine. For a brief moment, he could indulge in drawing ornaments rather than letters. And indulge he did. In fact our scribe never used the same combination of ornaments twice.

Mani's biography is formally an anthology, and unique in its kind. The narrative is not continuous, nor is it the work of a single author. It consists of excerpts from the writings of Mani's immediate disciples which an unknown editor collected and arranged in the chronological order of their contents. In many cases the disciples describe events in Mani's early life at which they were not present. They apparently reproduced what Mani himself had told them. This explains why their accounts are invariably introduced by brief formulae of authentication of the type "The Lord said" (ἐφ' ἃ ὁ κύριος).¹⁶ The new section which follows the caption on p. 74 begins with these very words. In early Christian literature, the Sayings of Jesus provide an important parallel. It could be argued that the Mani codex is in essence a proto-gospel, except that the Lord is Mani, not Jesus. Justin Martyr described the synoptic gospels as "apostolic memoirs," a description which would be entirely appropriate for the kind of information on which Mani's biography is based. The Islamic tradition of tracing prophetic sayings to Muhammad and his immediate disciples through an elaborate chain of identified intermediaries seems to be a direct imitation of Manichaean practice (see n.16).

We do not know the date when the compilation was made. Very likely it was made soon after Mani's death in 276 from sources written during his lifetime. Their language was Eastern Aramaic, not Greek.¹⁷ The Greek of the Cologne Codex is the product of translation and

¹⁶ *HSCP* 77 (1973) 29-31; Koenen (above, n.1) 164 n.37. Compare the Muslim "Tradition," or Ḥadīth, collections of words and deeds of Muhammad as reported by himself or by one of his companions, and invariably introduced by fixed formulae such as "The Apostle of God said," "The Prophet said," or simply "He said"; cf. J. Robson, "Ḥadīth," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., III (1971) 23-28; W. A. Graham, *Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam* (1977) ch. 1 and pt. 3.

¹⁷ Mani spoke and wrote an Eastern Aramaic dialect, which must have been his native language. See M. Lidzbarski, *OLZ* 30 (1927) 913-917 (rep. in G. Widengren, ed., *Der Manichäismus* [1977] 249-254); F. Rosenthal, *Die aramaische Forschung seit Th. Nöldeke's Veröffentlichungen* (1939) 207-211 (= *Der Manichäismus* 255-259); H. J. Polotsky, *RE Suppl.* 6 (1935) 243.35 ff = *Collected Papers* (1971) 700.

imitates the Greek of the Septuagint and of the New Testament, although some words occur which are only attested in pagan literature. But certain peculiarities of syntax, and occasional phrases which are unidiomatic in Greek, still reflect the Syriac original. The most striking mistranslation can be found on p. 84, where Mani attacks the daily ablutions of the baptists in whose midst he had grown up. He contrasts their external purifications with the true spiritual purification, which he defines as follows: "Separation of light from darkness, of death from life, and of the living waters from those which are terrified."¹⁸ Obviously "living waters" (ὕδατα ζῶντα) and "terrified waters" (ὕδατα τεθαμβωμένα) are intended as an antithesis, like life and death. But "terrified" is clearly not the right word. Something has gone wrong here. We expect the same contrast between living water and stagnant or turbid water which we find in Gnostic and Mandaean texts about baptism.¹⁹ According to the standard Syriac and Mandaic dictionaries, the Semitic root *TMH*, or by metathesis *THM*, has a semantic range which includes numbness, stupor, rigidity, motionlessness, confusion, surprise, and perplexity. Our translator clearly made a mistake and opted for a meaning which the Aramaic word can indeed carry but which is utterly unsuitable in this context. As Hellenists we must leave the detailed study of Semitic intrusions in the Greek of the Mani Codex to the specialists. But there can be no doubt that the Greek Life of Mani was translated from an Aramaic original. This fact is of considerable consequence for our understanding of Manichaean missionary activities in the West. The Syriac works of Mani and his disciples passed through Greek channels before St. Augustine could read them in Latin and before Coptic translations were made for Egyptian monks.

The Coptic Manichaean library which surfaced in 1930 consists of several liturgical and homiletic works. In sheer quantity and diversity of content, its importance far exceeds that of the Cologne Codex. What makes the Mani Codex unique is the special kind of information it

¹⁸ CMC 84.12–17, with the editors' note.

¹⁹ For a typical catalogue of negative epithets as applied to water in a Gnostic denunciation of baptismal rites, see CG VII 37.22 ff, trans. F. Wisse in J. M. Robinson, ed., *The Nag Hammadi Library* (1977) 324: "They are deceived by manifold demons, thinking that through baptism with the uncleanness [ἀκαθαρσία, cf. CMC 95.2] of water, that which is dark [cf. CMC 77.17 f], feeble, idle [ἀργόν], and disturbing [εἰσπορεύει, better rendered as "destructive," cf. CMC 77.13–79.6], he will take away the sins." The Greek loan-word ἀργόν (sc. ὕδωρ), though hardly applicable to water in an original Greek text, would be a more suitable translation of the Mandaic verb *tahma* when used of stagnant water than the τεθαμβωμένα (sc. ὕδατα) of the CMC.

contains. Its content is largely historical, not doctrinal, and it illuminates a period of Mani's life which aroused more controversy among scholars than any other. But much like the Gospels, the Mani Codex is a highly problematic source for the historical reconstruction of its hero's life. Unlike Jesus, Mani, in his own writings, was his best witness. But the accounts he gave of his youth were doubtless colored by legend and doctrine. The oral and written recollections of Mani's disciples, however faithful, will have multiplied the possibilities of error and distortion. For this reason, disagreement among scholars will no doubt continue and could conceivably get worse. But the issues have changed drastically: we are now able to discuss details of Mani's early career that were considered unknowable less than a decade ago.

III. THE ELCHASAITE CONNECTION

By far the most dramatic increase in our knowledge of Mani's early life is due to five separate excerpts on pp. 72-99. Two of them are ascribed to Baraies, one to Timotheos, another jointly to Abiesus and Innaïos, and the fifth to a name which cannot be recovered with certainty. Apart from their contributions to the codex, we know next to nothing about these Manichees.²⁰ Baraies was a "teacher" (διδάσκαλος), the second highest rank in the Manichaean hierarchy, and his name, nothing more, is found in Christian and Arabic accounts of Manichaeism. Although Mani's second successor as pope was called Innaïos, he need not be identical with the "Innaïos brother of Zabed" mentioned in the codex. Three additional excerpts are ascribed to Timotheos elsewhere in the codex, and one to Baraies. But only Baraies has an unmistakable literary identity. So distinct is his personal style that he can be identified as the source of the long apologetic excerpt on pp. 45-72 whose title is lost. One would like to know why Baraies shines more than the other authorities, both in the artistic presentation of his material and in intellectual depth. Was he genuinely superior, or was he closer to Mani? Whatever the explanation, there can be no doubt that the best information in the codex bears the name and stamp of Baraies.

Being a compilation made from different sources, the codex lacks continuity of content and a homogeneous literary form. More often than not, transition from one excerpt to the next is abrupt and leaves chronological and thematic gaps which the editor did not close. He made no attempt, for instance, to connect the brief sketch of Mani's spiritual

²⁰ *ZPE* 5 (1970) 110-112.

development by Baraies, on pp. 72–74, with the pair of parables that follows on pp. 74–79. The second parable and the long account of Mani's final dispute with the baptists on pp. 79–99 are equally unconnected. Sudden breaks in the narrative are in fact a mark of authenticity in a work which purports to be an anthology. By the same token, cases of continuous narrative between two excerpts arouse our suspicion and require explanation.

The most conspicuous example of unexpected continuity can be found on p. 94. At the top of that page, the name of a new authority, perhaps to be read as Zacheas, interrupts an otherwise continuous and carefully structured speech by Mani himself which begins on p. 91.20, in an excerpt from Baraies. In this speech, Mani answers the baptists who charged him with four counts of religious nonconformity: his rejection of their baptisms; his being in conflict with the "commandments of the Lord"; his violations of their dietary laws; and finally, his refusal to do agricultural work. In his answer, and still within the excerpt from Baraies, Mani replies to the second and third charge. After this, the excerpt breaks off in the middle of Mani's reply; the new source is introduced at p. 94.1, and Mani continues his speech, and addresses himself to the remaining charges, without any immediate break in the argument. This is clearly too good to be true. No mechanical combination of two separate accounts of the same incident could ever produce such a smooth continuity of form and content. What has happened here?

The answer lies in the first eight lines of text on p. 94. Although they follow the name of the new source, they continue the I-narrative of the preceding source and repeat the baptists' first charge against Mani, that is, his rejection of their purifications by water. The crucial lines are as follows (CMC 94.1–14):

Ζα . . . [---]

Εἰ τοίνυν περὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος κατηγορεῖτε μου, ἰδοὺ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ὑμῶν δείκνυμι ὑμῖν καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀποκαλυφθέντων τοῖς μεῖζουσιν ὑμῶν ὅτι οὐ δέον ἐστὶ βαπτίζεσθαι. δείκνυσι γὰρ Ἀλχασαῖος ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ νόμου ὑμῶν πορευομένου γὰρ αὐτοῦ λούσασθαι εἰς ὕδατα . . .

After this passage, however, Mani falls silent, and the I-narrative of which he is the subject is abandoned. This sudden change in narrative style contrasts sharply with the undisturbed continuation of the argument on pp. 94–99 which completes Mani's defense. The discrepancy discloses a familiar pattern of editorial tampering and suggests the answer to our question: the editor doctored his text and interpolated

the transition on p. 94.2-9 in order to mediate between two disparate sources.

His first source, Baraies, is highly literary and sophisticated. Mani is the main speaker throughout. His two speeches, on pp. 80-85 and 91-93 respectively, are extremely clever. His arguments are based on formal *reductio ad absurdum* and on the authority of alleged sayings of Jesus. The second source on pp. 94-99, perhaps Zacheas, is totally different. It consists of six separate stories which do not mention Mani or Jesus but such baptist authorities as Elchasai, Sabbaios (whose name means "baptist"), and Aianos. Each story is introduced by stereotyped formulae such as *δείκνυσι, καὶ πάλιν, ἔφη δ' αὖ πάλιν*, and *πάλιν δείκνυσι*. Compared to Baraies, the second source is simplicity itself: a mere collection of edifying conversion stories, with baptists behaving as if they were Manichees.

This is the most serious case of redactional activity in the whole codex. There are a few others, but they are mild by comparison. Close form-critical scrutiny of the anthology reveals that the editor reproduced his sources faithfully. The few changes he did make are superficial and easy to detect. His claim of multiple authorship which is maintained throughout the codex is thus confirmed. The excerpts of which the codex is composed are therefore authentic in the sense that they seem to derive from the sources to which they are ascribed. But to what extent do they reflect historical reality rather than biographical fiction?

Every single piece of new information in the codex has to be examined on its own merit. Mani's dispute with the baptists on pp. 79-99 constitutes the largest body of new data. Its literary form, that of a controversy dialogue which provokes a schism, is inspired by similar descriptions of religious conflict in John and Acts. Mani's argument against repeated baptism borrows from a chapter in Hebrews. But conscious imitation of established literary convention does not automatically discredit the events thus described. Mani in his own writings adopted New Testament phraseology, especially from St. Paul. Only careful scrutiny can separate fact from fiction. In the present context, two questions need to be answered. Who exactly were Mani's baptists, and who was Elchasai, their alleged founder?

In the Cologne Codex, the baptists are plainly called *βαπτισταί*, after their distinctive custom. But modern scholars have learned from the Christian heresiologists that many different groups of baptists inhabited the ancient lands between the Jordan and the Persian Gulf. In their efforts to deal with the widespread baptist movement, scholars

have traditionally adopted a rather sophisticated terminology. But scholarly nomenclature is usually not a true mirror of the actual situation which it is designed to recapture. Our case is no exception. The existing code names are not unambiguous, and they are subject to misuse.

Some of the terms are generic and group the baptists, according to their basic concept of god, as Jewish, Christian, or Gnostic. But these three categories are by no means mutually exclusive. In fact the most common modern description of many baptist sects is Jewish-Christian. Historically the origins of the baptist movement can be traced to the heterodox fringes of Judaism, to the sort of religious habitat which produced John the Baptist and the Qumran community. After the Roman conquest of Judea most baptist sects moved to Transjordan and perhaps further eastward to northern Mesopotamia and eventually to Babylonia. The chronology and circumstances of this migration are unknown.²¹ The most distant groups must have reached their destinations by the end of the second century. During their long journey, few baptist groups were able to preserve their Jewish heritage unadulterated. They usually adopted Christian elements at one time or another, with the result that the vast majority of attested baptists is properly described as Jewish-Christian. They combine with their Jewish ritualism, the belief in Jesus as prophet, the practice of the Eucharist and the use of Christian scriptures. Whether Jewish or Jewish-Christian, baptists in general were potentially open to Gnostic influence which could lead to a deemphasis of ritual and to a spiritual reinterpretation of baptismal rites.

In addition to such generic labels, scholars use individual names for specific groups of baptists. These specific names are often derived from the putative founding father of the group, or from a central religious concept. They include the Essenes, Johannites, Ebionites, Elchasaïtes, and Mandaeans.

If we apply this terminology to Mani's baptists, they turn out to be Jewish-Christian in their general outlook and Elchasaïte through distant affiliation with Elchasaï. But even the best of scholars in the thorny field of ancient sectarianism would hardly know exactly who Mani's baptists were if we described them to him as Jewish-Christian Elchasaïtes. Let us therefore translate each of the three distinctive name tags — baptist, Jewish-Christian, and Elchasaïte — into the concrete language of actual

²¹ The origins and early history of the Mandaeans and other baptist sects in Babylonia are a highly controversial subject. I agree with the majority of scholars who think that the Mandaeans were not indigenous to that region but moved there from the west. See K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* I (1960) 59-252.

cult-practices and of Mani's criticism of them as attested in the Cologne Codex.

They are baptists because they wash their bodies daily in running water for ritual purposes. We are not told whether their daily baptisms were total immersions in water or merely ablutions, or whether they practised both on different occasions and perhaps for different purposes. According to Mani, his baptists practised their water rites in order to be ritually clean (*καθαίρεσθαι*).²² Ritual purity is indeed one of the main purposes of baptism in other baptist sects. But other functions, though less conspicuous, are equally important, especially baptism as an initiation rite for the purpose of admission into Judaism or Christianity, or baptism as a means of obtaining remission of sins.

The use of baptism for sacramental purposes is not mentioned by Mani. Mani's silence does not necessarily mean that his baptists recognized baptism only as a purification rite. Perhaps Mani did not tell the whole story. He taunted the baptists for their belief that lustration with water could actually keep the body clean. In Mani's eyes, the body was dirty by nature and an unceasing producer of waste. He argued very logically that the need to repeat the baptismal rites daily proved their inefficiency. If they could actually cleanse the body, he said, one baptism would have been enough once and for all. Rites which proved inefficient to achieve physical purification would be even less suitable for spiritual housecleaning. Although Mani stopped short of making this point, it is clearly implied in his argument.

There is another consideration which suggests that Mani's baptists used their rites for other than physical purposes. Mani's own religion required a rigid penitential discipline aimed to achieve forgiveness of sin. It is quite possible that Mani inherited his obsession with sin and penitence from the baptists and that he spiritualized their ritual solution to the problem of guilt. Even the language of water rites was retained in Manichaeism as a metaphor for spiritual purification.²³

Apart from their preoccupation with baptismal rites, Mani's baptists combined Christian traditions with their Jewish heritage. The most universal feature which identifies Jewish-Christian groups is their strict observance of ritual laws in addition to a belief in Jesus Christ's mission. Mani's baptists, too, accepted the authority of Christ's teachings. In the Cologne Codex, they refer to the "commandments of the Lord" (*ἐντολαὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος*) as a standard of right conduct while they continued to practise many customs which are clearly of Jewish origin and

²² CMC 80.22-85.12.

²³ L. Koenen, "From Baptism to the Gnosis of Manichaeism," in the Proceedings of the Yale Conference on Gnosticism (above, n.6).

which Christians of the Pauline type had abolished one and a half centuries earlier.²⁴

In their theological dispute with Mani, the baptists describe their religion expressly as "our law and that of the fathers in which we have been living since olden times."²⁵ Their legalism included not only regular baptisms but also minute dietary laws which even required the ablution of all food in water. Certain varieties of vegetables and fruit were forbidden. A special taboo prohibited the use of wheat bread (σῖτινος ἄρτος) which was known to the baptists as "Greek bread," that is, bread of the gentiles. We do not know why the baptists despised wheat bread, and which breadstuff they used themselves.²⁶ It is equally unclear whether or not the Jewish practice of using unleavened bread for ritual purposes has any bearing on this problem. But their preference for some foods, and their rejection of others, connect Mani's baptists with the mainstream of Jewish Christianity. In the Pseudo-Clementines, which advocate Jewish-Christian customs, the unlawful conduct of the gentiles is summarized in a typical phrase as "the indiscriminate use of food."²⁷

The requirements of ritual purity extended to everything the baptists ate. Their food had to be washed before it could be consumed.²⁸ From the point of view of modern health standards, this was a perfectly reasonable requirement. But it seems to have been unusual even by the standards of Jewish ritual law.²⁹ A comparable practice can be found

²⁴ HSCP 77 (1973) 47 ff.

²⁵ CMC 91.6-9; cf. Hipp. Ref. 9.14.1 δεῖν . . . κατὰ νόμον ζῆν (reported as an Elchasaite doctrine).

²⁶ HSCP 77 (1973) 50 f as modified by Koenen (above, n.1) 182 n. 110.

²⁷ Hom. 2.19.2 οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἰᾶσθαι τὰ ἔθνη, εὐκότα κυσὶν διὰ τὸ ἀδιαφόροις χρᾶσθαι τροφαῖς καὶ πράξεσιν.

²⁸ CMC 80.1-3; 80.23-83.13; 88.13-15; cf. the *Fihrist* on the Mughtasilah (below, n.33).

²⁹ It is not entirely clear whether ritual ablutions of food were known in Pharisaic Judaism; they are not mentioned in rabbinical texts. Mark 7.4 (cf. Luke 11.37 ff) καὶ ἀπ' ἀγορᾶς ἐὰν μὴ βαπτίσωνται (v.l. ῥανίσωνται, sc. the Pharisees) οὐκ ἐσθίουσιν is a controversial passage often discussed in this connection; but it seems to refer to purification of the whole body through immersion in water (W. Brandt, *Jüdische Reinheitslehre und ihre Beschreibung in den Evangelien* [1910] 34-41, 148). CMC 81.5 f ἐπὶ πάντας καθαρίσας ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐδωδὴν suggests, however, that Mark 7.19 καθαρίζων πάντα τὰ βρώματα, another textual crux, should indeed be taken as an implicit reference to ritual cleaning of food (see our n.189 on CMC 81.11 f). Apart from Mani's baptists and the Mughtasilah in the *Fihrist* (below, n.33), only the Mandaeans "washed" their food; see, for instance, *Ginza, Right* 225.4 ff trans. M. Lidzbarski (1925): "Alles, was ihr von den Märkten und Strassen hereinbringet, waschet mit Wasser und esset es dann. Wer es nicht abwäscht und isst, wird auf Eisgeräten ["Marterinstrumente des Hagels" according to Brandt, *Reinheitslehre* 35] gepeinigt werden."

among the Mandaeans who cleansed a certain type of ritual bread in running water.³⁰

Another passage in the section on the baptists seems to suggest that Mani's baptists observed the Jewish sabbath. They are credited with "the keeping of the resting of the hands," an expression which recurs in Mandaean polemic against the Christian Sunday and Jewish sabbath.³¹

Pauline Christianity was the antipode of Jewish Christianity. The common Jewish-Christian term of abuse for St. Paul was "Greek." In the Gospel of John (7.35), the Jews suspect Jesus of "going to the dispersion of the Greeks and teaching the Greeks," which was exactly what Paul had done. Mani's baptists too used the word "Greek" in the same derogatory sense and suspected Mani of "going to the Greeks," or "to the gentiles (ἐθνῶν)."³² Again an historical fact, that of Jewish-Christian aversion to gentiles, is couched in New Testament phraseology. In retrospect, the suspicion of Mani's baptists was more than justified. Because of his baptist background, Mani's gnosticism tended to be more ritualistic than that of most earlier Gnostic groups. But compared to the baptists and their literal observance of Jewish ritual laws, Mani's own religiosity was clearly more spiritual and to that extent perhaps more "Greek."

The new profile of this baptist group in southern Babylonia is an important addition to the general picture of Jewish Christianity which used to be very sketchy for this region. But the information which we have reviewed so far, though very valuable, was hardly sensational. What came as a real sensation, however, was the alleged connection of Mani's baptists with Elchasai.

The Cologne Codex, we remember, confirms and corrects an-Nadim's remarks, in his precious history of Manichaeism, on Mani's childhood, youth and first public appearance. The Muslim scholar must have had access to Manichaean books translated from Syriac into Arabic which belonged to the same biographical tradition as the excerpts in the Cologne Codex. Where the Greek and the Arabic versions are in agreement, they speak to us with equal but not independent authority. Their combined testimony reflects Manichaean claims but not necessarily historical fact. In the case of Elchasai, separation of fact from fiction is unusually difficult.

³⁰ Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* II (1961) 124, 132 f.

³¹ *HSCP* 77 (1973) 48 f; Rudolph (above, n.1) 482 n.3.

³² *HSCP* 77 (1973) 51 f.

In a later chapter of the *Fihrist*, an-Nadim describes a baptist sect of his own time in southern Babylonia and traces its lineage back to a founder named al-Ḥasīḥ and to a time when these baptists were the same as Mani's baptists.³³ In 1856, the Lithuanian orientalist Daniel Chwolsohn proposed to identify this al-Ḥasīḥ with the Elchasai of the Christian heresiologists, an identification which has since been generally accepted.³⁴ But no agreement has been reached on its historical value, or if historical, on its implications for the dark history of the baptist movement in the marshes of Babylonia during the third century A.D. Two fundamental questions have defied a definitive answer to this day, and a satisfactory solution is nowhere in sight. How did Mani's baptists come under Elchasaite influence? And given their existence as a separate group at that time, where do the Mandaeans belong in respect to both Elchasaite baptists and their apparent splinter, Manichaeism?

The Cologne Codex adds incisive information which confirms an-Nadim's testimony and Chwolsohn's identification. On pp. 94-97, Elchasai is mentioned eight times as the founder (ἄρχηγός) of the baptist sect of which Mani was a member. But the stories told about him on

³³ The *Fihrist* trans. Dodge (above, n.3) II 811: "The Mughtasilah [cf. above, n.7]. These people are very numerous in the regions of al-Baṭā'ih; they are [called] the Šābat al-Baṭā'ih [Sabians of the Marshlands]. They observe ablution as a rite and wash everything which they eat. *Their head is known as al-Ḥasīḥ and it is he who instituted their sect. They assert that the two existences are male and female and that the herbs are from the likeness of the male, whereas the parasite plants are from the likeness of the female, the trees being veins (roots). They have seven sayings, taking the form of fables. His [al-Ḥasīḥ's] disciple was named Sham'ūn. They agreed with the Manichaeans about the two elemental [principles], but later their sect became separate.* Until this our own day, some of them venerate the stars." It is virtually impossible to decide how much of this information is a first-hand description of the baptists of an-Nadim's own time and how much is merely an historical account, derived from a written (Manichaean?) source, of the same or even a different baptist sect which existed in the same region more than half a millennium earlier. Two of the most urgent questions which arise in this connection cannot be answered with any certainty. Did the Mughtasilah of the tenth century A.D. still remember "al-Ḥasīḥ" as their founding father? (I am inclined to answer no.) Were the Mughtasilah, if different from the earlier baptists of an-Nadim's historical source, identical with the Mandaeans? (Again, I would answer no. But if that part of an-Nadim's account which I reproduced in italics derives from a much older source, the remaining description, though too general for valid conclusions, would fit the Mandaeans.)

³⁴ C. Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus* (1856) I 112-119, esp. 114 f. Cf. W. Brandt, *Elchasai* (1912) 134 f; J. Thomas, *Le mouvement baptiste en Palestine et Syrie* (1935) 244 f; G. Strecker, "Elkesai" in *RAC* 4 (1959) 1178; Rudolph, *Mandäer* I 41 f; *ZPE* 5 (1970) 133 f; Rudolph (above, n.1) 476 f.

these pages are, not surprisingly, to a large extent distorted by Manichaean manipulation. The Elchasai of the Mani Codex who refuses to defile the water, to plough the land, and to bake bread is no ordinary baptist but an orthodox Manichaean elect, as his behavior evinces.

Who then was Elchasai? The name is a transliteration of the Aramaic for "Hidden God" or, according to Epiphanius, for "Hidden Power."³⁵ Most scholars assume with the ancient heresiologists that Elchasai was a historical figure who lived during the reign of Trajan in northern Mesopotamia.³⁶ They compare him with Simon Magus, an earlier prophet, who was called "Great Power." But Elchasai's historicity is not beyond challenge. No ancient author had any creditable knowledge of Elchasai as a person. The so-called Book of Elchasai was widely read but its alleged author remained unknown. It is possible, therefore, that Elchasai is either a pseudonym or the name of a divine hypostasis and that no person of that name ever existed. In any case, Elchasai had acquired a definite religious identity by A.D. 200 at the latest.

The alleged pedigree of the book is as metaphysical as the name attached to it.³⁷ Of heavenly origin, it surfaced in Parthia where Elchasai received it and gave it to the Sobiai, a generic name for "baptists."³⁸ In other words, the book apparently originated in northern Mesopo-

³⁵ The etymology of Elchasai's name is still controversial; see most recently Rudolph (above, n.1) 476 note, and Chr. Elsas, *Neuplatonische und gnostische Weltablehnung in der Schule Plotins* (RGVV 34, 1975) 34-39 (whose far-fetched speculations are implausible).

³⁶ For example Rudolph (above, n.1) 476 note: "Sicher ist jetzt [i.e., after the discovery of the CMC], dass es sich tatsächlich bei Elchasai um eine charismatische Person handelt, was z. B. Schoeps noch bestritt [H.-J. Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judentums* (1949) 326]." The CMC merely confirms what amounts to the *communis opinio* about Elchasai in the first half of the third century A.D. But there is no guarantee that ancient belief in the historicity of Elchasai as a person was justified.

³⁷ The main sources for the Book of Elchasai (Hipp. Ref. 9.13-17, 10.29; Epiphanius, *Pan.* 19 and 30; Origen at Eus. *Hist. eccl.* 6.38) are collected in A. F. J. Klijn and G. J. Reinink, *Patristic Evidence for Jewish-Christian Sects* (1973) 54-67, 114-123, 146 f, 154-161, 184-187.

³⁸ Origen at Eus. *Hist. eccl.* 6.38 "fallen from heaven"; Hipp. Ref. 9.13.1-2 ἐπῆλθε (sc. Alcibiades) τῇ Ῥώμῃ φέρων βιβλον τινὰ φάσκων ταύτην ἀπὸ Σηρῶν τῆς Παρθίας παρεληφέναι τινὰ ἄνδρα δίκαιον [below, n.50] Ἠλχασαί, ἣν παρέδωκέ τινα λεγομένῳ Σοβιαί χρηματισθεῖσαν ὑπ' ἀγγέλου ("... which he [Elchasai] handed over to someone called Sobiai after it had been revealed by an angel.") According to Hippolytos, therefore, the successive recipients of the book included "the Seres" (the Chinese?) of Parthia (who apparently received it through the mediation of the angel); Elchasai; the Sobiai (baptists); and finally Alcibiades who brought it to Rome c. A.D. 220.

tamia and in a baptist milieu.³⁹ After all, books said to have fallen from heaven, *Himmelsbriefe*, were usually written on earth.⁴⁰ Internal evidence establishes that the Book of Elchasai was written before A.D.118/119, presumably in Aramaic rather than Greek. A Greek version of it was available in Syria around 200, in Rome around 220 and in Palestine in 247. In view of its known chronology and distribution, it would seem attractive that the Book of Elchasai should have made its way to an Aramaic-speaking baptist group in Babylonia in the late second or early third century. Obviously the proper question to ask is whether or not Mani's baptists and their doctrine conform to what we know about the book's content.

The Book of Elchasai preached the practice of repeated baptism; further, some sort of cosmological dualism based on the elements of water and fire; divine revelation through the mediation of an angel of gigantic size; seven oath witnesses which include water and earth; certain astrological practices; the observance of the sabbath; and a remarkable christology of the Jewish-Christian type according to which Christ was part of a continuing series of incarnations of an eternal savior.

Two of these customs, repeated baptism and the sabbath rest, are explicitly ascribed to Mani's baptists in the Cologne Codex. In addition, they must have known the doctrine of the True Prophet who is incarnated at regular intervals.⁴¹ This would explain why some baptists were convinced that Mani was one such incarnation, while others regarded him as the False Prophet whose coming had been foretold by their forefathers.⁴² Two further parallels may be added from Epiphanius, although they cannot be linked conclusively to the Book of Elchasai. Certain Elchasaites, he claims, refused to eat meat, and Elchasai himself rejected sacrifices and *σαρκοφαγία*; he recognized as his main authorities "the fathers and the law."⁴³ The frequent references to

³⁹ W. Brandt, *Die jüdischen Baptismen* (1910) 107-110, *Elchasai* (1912) 42-44; Rudolph, *Mandäer* I 236, Chwolsohn (above, n.34) I 114 f.

⁴⁰ W. Speyer, *Bücherfunde in der Glaubenswerbung der Antike* (1970) 23-42, on "Himmelsbriefe," one of the most ancient types of sacred writ, which the author defines, on p. 17, as "eine schriftliche Botschaft, die von Gott verfasst, plötzlich von einem Menschen . . . gefunden wird," and in which he includes "Bücher vom Himmel" such as the Book of Elchasai (discussed on pp. 36 ff).

⁴¹ Cf. *HSCP* 77 (1973) 25 and 54 f; Koenen (above, n.1) 162 n.29. The key passages for this concept are *Wisdom* 7.27 (with D. Winston's note); *Ps.-Clem. Hom.* 3.20.2; *Hipp. Ref.* 9.14.1 and 10.29.2; Epiphan. *Pan.* 53.1.8; the Apocalypse of Adam in the Nag Hammadi Library.

⁴² See editors' notes on *CMC* 86.17-87.12.

⁴³ Epiphan. *Pan.* 53.1.4 and 19.3.6 (vegetarianism); *Pan.* 19.3.6 (the fathers and the law).

fruits, vegetables, and trees by Mani's baptists, and their agrarian life in general, imply that they too were vegetarians. The obscure comments on herbs and plants in the *Fihrist* would seem to provide a theological rationale for some of the food taboos of Mani's baptists.⁴⁴ And like Elchasai, they too lived by the law (*νόμος* in the codex) and the traditions of their fathers.

These similarities are substantial, and the Manichaean claim that Mani's baptists were Elchasaite is not wholly unfounded. Of course, other baptist groups, outside those described in the Book of Elchasai and the Cologne Codex, may have exhibited similar features. In this connection, a third text deserves consideration. The *Pseudo-Clementine Homilies* ascribe to their hero Peter the practice of repeated ablutions in running water along with a vegetarian diet and belief in a True Prophet who appeared in the course of history under different names and in various shapes.⁴⁵ This peculiar portrait of Peter derives ultimately from a Jewish-Christian source composed in Syria around A.D. 200. It has often been suggested that this source was under Elchasaite influence, or at least that it shared a common "Ebionite" ancestor with the Book of Elchasai.⁴⁶ The Cologne Codex adds weight to the assumption, now virtually inescapable, that such connections existed and that the Book of Elchasai and the name of its alleged author enjoyed much wider circulation in the East than the few explicit attestations would suggest.

But predictably, some contradictions and numerous problems remain. According to Epiphanius, Elchasai detested virginity, hated chastity, and compelled his followers to marry.⁴⁷ The ascetic bishop of Salamis was ever so ready to ascribe lax sexual mores to the unorthodox. But in this particular case, he simply overstated the plain truth: Jews, Jewish-Christians, and also the Mandaeans endorsed marriage and procreation. According to the *Fihrist*, however, Mani's father heard a voice which told him to eat no meat, to drink no wine, and to abstain

⁴⁴ Above, n.33.

⁴⁵ *Hom.* 8.2.5 par., 10.1.1 f, 10.26.2 par., 11.1.1 (ablutions); *Hom.* 12.6.4 and 15.7.6 (vegetarian diet); *Hom.* 3.17-28 (True Prophet; above, n.41). On the ablutions in the *Ps.-Clem. Hom.* and *Rec.*, see G. Strecker in W. Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum* (2nd ed., 1964) 271 f versus K. Rudolph, *Mandäer* I 240. Strecker attempts, unconvincingly to my mind, to differentiate between various sources and their respective theologies, and between "ritual ablutions" which were "genuinely Jewish" and baptismal practices of the "so-called baptist sects."

⁴⁶ Rudolph, *Mandäer* I 239-246.

⁴⁷ *Pan.* 19.1.7.

from women, a tradition which is confirmed by a Manichaeon fragment in Parthian dialect.⁴⁸ The *Fihrist* has no doubt that Mani's father joined the baptists out of obedience to that voice. In Manichaeon texts, therefore, Mani's baptists were portrayed as rigorous encratites, similar to the Manichaeon elect. Although the Cologne Codex is not very explicit on this point, its baptists too seem to have been a male society because women are never mentioned. The accuracy of this Manichaeon tradition cannot be fully verified. If accurate, however, their aversion to sexuality would make Mani's baptists unique among baptist sects. On the other hand, strict asceticism was a hallmark of early Syrian Christianity.

The Book of Elchasai also advocated belief in the power of the stars, and the *Fihrist* too ascribes star worship to the baptists of an-Nadim's own time. The Cologne Codex, however, makes no reference to astrology. Its silence here is necessarily inconclusive and must not be construed as an instance of serious disagreement. Even if Mani's baptists had no interest in astrology, they could still be followers of the elusive Elchasai.

On the positive side, one might add that the Elchasaites whom Origen knew "used passages from every part of the Old Testament and the Gospels but rejected the Apostle entirely." This description would fit Mani's baptists, as is borne out by their arguments in the codex where they seem to acknowledge the ἐντολαὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος but implicitly reject Paul as Greek.⁴⁹

How then were Mani's baptists related to Elchasai? The full answer cannot be found in the Cologne Codex or in any other source. There are two chief obstacles which obstruct our view. In the first place, the Greek Book of Elchasai as quoted by Hippolytus and Epiphanius may not adequately reflect the full spectrum and variety of Elchasaite beliefs.

⁴⁸ Above, n.7. The Parthian fragment, found by a Chinese expedition to the Tarim basin in 1928/29, will be published by W. Sundermann in *Acta Ant. Hung.* (Festschrift Harmatta). The moral code of Mani's baptists suspiciously recalls the asceticism of the Manichaeon elect (Henrichs, *HSCP* 77 [1973] 53 n.114) as laid down in the Iranian fragment M 2 v. I 9 f (W. Henning, *Sitzungsb. Preuss. Akad. Wiss.* 1933, 304: "Fleisch und Wein geniessen wir nicht, von [Frauen] halten wir uns fern.") and in the *Fihrist* (trans. Dodge [above, n.3] II 788: "... refrain from eating meats, drinking wine, as well as from marriage."). Two of the three prohibitions reoccur in an unusual Arabic text of the tenth century which deals with Jewish Christianity and Manichaeism: "He (Mani) mentions that women, sacrifices and eating meat were forbidden by him (Christ) to everybody." (trans. S. Pines, "The Jewish Christians of the Early Centuries of Christianity according to a New Source," *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities* 2 [1968] 302).

⁴⁹ *Eus. Hist. eccl.* 6.38; *HSCP* 77 (1973) 51 ff.

For instance, nothing in the extant quotations points to vegetarianism, whereas Epiphanius ascribes this practice to some Elchasaites, a claim which finds support in the Cologne Codex. Second, we must allow that Manichaean tradition was without question capable of distorting the historical record. In fact the baptists of the Cologne Codex do not themselves claim Elchasai as their authority. Mani does so for them, but — this is crucial — he does it in the course of an excerpt, on pp. 94–97, which did not originally belong to Mani's speech against the baptists, of which it now forms the conclusion. Rather, it owes its present place, and its attribution to Mani, to the redactor who put it into Mani's mouth, apparently not on good authority. Though plainly interpolated and full of Manichaean bias, the four stories about Elchasai in the Cologne Codex seem to echo Elchasaite doctrine if only distantly. Their emphasis on earth, water, and bread recalls the Book of Elchasai in which the same three elements are invoked as oath witnesses; in particular, the "voice of the water" in the Book of Elchasai seems to be echoed by the water personified which talks to Elchasai in the Cologne Codex.⁵⁰

Would it make historical sense to conclude that the close similarities between Mani's baptists and Elchasaite tradition count for nothing and that their alleged connection with Elchasai is merely an unhistorical construct of Manichaean biography? Hardly. It is extremely unlikely that the true picture has been blurred beyond recognition. The consistent pattern of authentic Jewish-Christian beliefs and practices with which Mani's baptists are credited in the Cologne Codex proves beyond reasonable doubt that Mani had a Jewish-Christian past.⁵¹ It is inconceivable that he would have claimed a background so alien to the basic tenets of his own religion if the circumstances of his actual life had not warranted it. By the same token, it is not readily obvious why Mani, let alone later Manichaean tradition, would have included Elchasai in the number of baptist authorities alongside Sabbaïos and Aianos (who are otherwise unknown) if the connection had not been based on his-

⁵⁰ Koenen (above, n.1) 181–190 as modified by Koenen (above, n.23) section II; ZPE 32 (1978) 120 ff nn.229 and 288 (bread), n.273 (water), n.284 (earth); CMC 94.9–96.16 and Epiphan. *Pan.* 19.3.7 (voice of the water). Elchasai is *δικαίος* both in Hipp. *Ref.* 9.13.2 (above, n.38) and CMC 95.10 (*HSCP* 77 [1973] 46 n.84; Rudolph [above, n.1] 484 n.2; ZPE 32 [1978] n.278).

⁵¹ Klijn and Reinink (above, n.37) 66 came apparently to the opposite conclusion, without arguing their case: "Since nothing is said about Christian beliefs, the *Kitab al-Fihrist* [above, nn.7 and 33] and the Manichaean papyrus [the CMC] are of no importance for the study of Jewish Christianity." Even if the first half of their statement were true, few scholars would accept their conclusion.

torical fact, most likely the adoption by Mani's baptists of the Book of Elchasai or of some other baptist manual ascribed to him.⁵²

A final word about the Mandaeans. Mani's Elchasaite took a ritual bath every day, washed everything they ate, and baked their own bread. The closest parallels for this set of customs are Mandaean. The Mandaeans are an anti-Christian group of gnosticizing baptists with Jewish roots, whose remnants survive to this day in Southern Iraq. Some scholars assumed that Mani's baptists were a Mandaean community. But their Elchasaite background and pro-Christian leanings according to the Cologne Codex now rule out their identity with the Mandaeans, whose contacts with early Manichaeism must have a different explanation. Both groups, Mani's baptists and the Mandaeans, were offshoots of the same baptist movement which was originally Jewish rather than Babylonian but came under Christian and Gnostic influence at an early date.⁵³

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⁵² W. Sundermann, *Acta Orientalia* 36 (1974) 129 f and 148 discusses a Manichaean fragment in Parthian dialect which has a reference to the year 539 of the Seleucid era, or A.D. 228 (the year of Mani's first major revelation), on recto and which mentions Elchasai on verso. We know that Mani used this method of dating the major events of his life in one of his works, the *Shābuhragān*. It is highly probable, therefore, that the Parthian fragment reproduces an autobiographical tradition which goes back to Mani himself. If so, the "Elchasaite connection" will have originated with Mani and not with his followers.

⁵³ Rudolph (above, n.1) 482.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ULRICH VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF WITH EDWARD FITCH

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INTRODUCTION

THE years 1853 (when Gildersleeve obtained his Göttingen doctorate) and 1919 (when Paul Shorey delivered his rabidly anti-German address to the American Philological Association at Pittsburgh¹) frame the period of what Gildersleeve would call our *teutomania*.² The first American doctorate in classics was earned at Yale in 1861 by James Morris Whiton (1833–1920) with a six-page Latin dissertation on the theme, *Brevis vita, ars longa*.³ But still, for over fifty years, most good students in classics, students who would return and create graduate schools, went to Germany, not least Halle with its easier standards for foreigners, to earn respected doctorates. World War I, the attendant abolishment of German in schools, the maturing of native graduate schools (especially the Hopkins under Gildersleeve), and Rhodes scholarships, changed things. Germany after 1919 never regained its dominance over American classical studies. But the legacy of its long hegemony gave American scholarship an enduring seriousness and exactitude that until very recently has distinguished it from insular British dilettantism. Compare Gilbert Murray with B. L. Gildersleeve,

¹ *TAPA* 50 (1919) 33–61.

² B. L. Gildersleeve, *Selections from the Brief Mention of Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve*, ed. C. W. E. Miller (Baltimore 1930) 79, 232 and *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 11 (1966) 218, where read *Teutomania*.

³ Ralph P. Rosenberg, *Journal of Higher Education* 32 (1961) 392–393, a reference I owe the late Moses Hadas.

Sir John Sheppard with W. A. Oldfather, or Henry Jackson with Paul Shorey. German education caused the difference.

The correspondence, miraculously preserved, that I edit here, provides a remarkable glimpse into the formative era of our discipline. Attentive readers of the *Erinnerungen*⁴ know that Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1843–1931) had one American doctoral student, whose work in Hellenistic poetry he loyally prized⁵ and who, unlike Gilbert Murray,⁶ remained faithful to his master until the end. The virtuous, long, and modest life of Edward Fitch (1864–1946) is briefly told.⁷ Edward, son of George W. and Harriet Fitch, née Sinclair,⁸ was born May 27, 1864, in Walton, New York. He was prepared at Walton Academy and entered Hamilton College (founded 1812) in the fall of 1882. He was taught Greek there by Edward North, whom he would later call⁹ “olim praeceptorem meum maxime venerandum” and whose name the chair he held from 1904 to 1934 would bear. He received the B.A. in 1886, graduating phi beta kappa, the M.A. in 1889, and in 1934 upon retirement the honorary LL.D. from his alma mater. From 1886 to 1889 he taught elementary Greek and Latin and English history at Park College in Parkville, Missouri. This was his *exilium*. In 1889 he was recalled to be assistant professor of Greek alongside North at Hamilton. “Mense Iulio a.h.s. XCIII ut artem ac disciplinam philologicam diligentius colerem me in Germaniam contuli.”¹⁰ In late summer 1893 he spent some weeks at Kiel perfecting his German. In

⁴ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Erinnerungen*, 1848–1914² (Leipzig 1929) 226: “Der Amerikaner E. Fitch promovierte sogar mit einer wertvollen Dissertation und ist mir noch heute ein guter Freund, wohl der einzige drüben, der die hellenistischen Dichter wirklich kennt.”

⁵ *Erinnerungen*² (above, n.4) and his letter to James Loeb of April 28, 1931, where “ausser etwa Apollonios” is a reference to Fitch: see *ICS* 2 (1977) 326 with n.52.

⁶ *Erinnerungen*,² 228.

⁷ The sources are (1) his *vita* at the end of *De Argonautarum reditu quaestiones selectae* (Diss. Göttingen 1896) = *Hamilton Literary Magazine* 31 (1897) 286–287; (2) an anonymous necrology at *Hamilton Alumni Review* 11 (1946) 179–180; (3) summaries of letters from Fitch at *Hamilton Literary Magazine* 29 (1894) 74, 106. For copies of all these I am grateful to F. K. Lorenz.

⁸ Edward Fitch, *The Descendants of Seymour Fitch and Elizabeth Hoyt of New Canaan, Connecticut: A Contribution to the Early History of Walton, New York* (Clinton, N.Y. 1939).

⁹ *Vita* 77 (=287). See further S. N. D. North, *Old Greek: An Old-Time Professor in an Old-Fashioned College: A Memoir of Edward North with Selections from His Lectures* (New York 1905). At pp. 208–263 Fitch describes North.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*



Edward Fitch, c. 1916
photograph courtesy of the Burke Library,
Hamilton and Kirkland Colleges

October, by the start of the winter semester, he was at Göttingen.¹¹ A notice in the *Hamilton Literary Magazine* of 1894 records a surprise:¹² "He [Fitch] went fully equipped with German, but alas! to enter the classical seminary he has to write and speak Latin. So he spent most of his summer vacation with a German friend of his who talks Latin 'like a book,' and prepared himself for this seminary." There he met aged 44 the brilliant author of *Aristoteles und Athen*, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. He studied five semesters under him,¹³ and Friedrich Leo (1851-1914), of whom he later published a brief memoir.¹⁴ Here was the glimpse of a greater world that inspired and disturbed the boy from Clinton for the next fifty years. Wilamowitz showed what total devotion to scholarship required. This devotion poor Fitch could never share; but letters prove that he tried and knew he ought to do more. He writes on January 1, 1912: "Langsam geht mir das wissenschaftliches [*sic*] Arbeiten vorwärts, doch ist das Ziel nie aus dem Auge verloren." In spite of isolation, poverty, and a small library, Fitch read widely and published regularly in *TAPA*, *AJP*, *CW*, and *CP*. He kept up and prepared conscientiously for classes. Wilamowitz had started something. "Quanta benevolentia cum professores tum sodales me peregrinum atque hospitem receperint et in sacra philologiae admiserint, semper grata memoria tenebo."

In August 1896 Fitch received the Göttingen doctorate that Gildersleeve, Goodwin, and John Williams White had held before him, with the dissertation, *De Argonautarum reditu quaestiones selectae* (Göttingen 1896). He had written home in 1894¹⁵ that "certain ambitious women from America have carried by storm the Minister of Public Instruction in Berlin, and are admitted to university privileges with other students." One of them, Annie L. MacKinnon, one of the earliest American women to earn a doctorate (in mathematics), he met there and married on July 3, 1901, at Lakeside, Ohio. They lived together in childless

¹¹ I have often wondered whether because of Gildersleeve.

¹² *Hamilton Literary Magazine* 29 (1894) 106.

¹³ Fitch would have taken the following courses under Wilamowitz: WS 1893/94:Pl. *Euthyd.* (proseminar); SS 1894:Pl. *Euthyd.* (proseminar); WS 1894/95:Bion, *Adonis* (seminar); SS 1895:Cat. 61 (seminar); WS 1895/96:Die Tragoedie *Rhesos* (seminar). See F. Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen and G. Klaffenbach, *Wilamowitz-Bibliographie 1868 bis 1929* (Berlin 1929) 78. In SS 1894 Wilamowitz lectured on Hellenistic history and culture, a subject close to Fitch's dissertation.

¹⁴ *CW* 8 (1914/1915) 40. He heard Karl Diltthey (1839-1907) on archaeology and Bechtel on grammar.

¹⁵ *Hamilton Literary Magazine* 29 (1894) 74.

union for 39 years. Fitch returned to Hamilton and resumed teaching in September 1896. Then the *cursus honorum*: associate professor, 1899; Edward North Professor of Greek, 1904; acting dean of the College, 1922-23; dean, 1926-1932; annual professor at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1932-33;¹⁶ retirement in 1934. He died, aged 82, a devout Presbyterian, in Walton, New York, the village of his birth, on April 15, 1946.

Wilamowitz would have approved the country minister who at "Dr. Fitch's" funeral thanked God¹⁷ "for the courtesy and unselfishness, and unwavering loyalty to the highest seen in him . . . for the lifelong devotion of self to the service of others; for the many years when he served as teacher, mentor, and guide; for the procession of young men down the years whose lives were blessed with his friendship, enriched by his teaching, and challenged by his example; for the many ways in which he served the college and the wider causes of education, and of moral and social progress." Wilamowitz never addressed him as "Herr College" as he did his German students, like Jaeger and Fraenkel. He thought of him more as a schoolmaster, decent and loyal, who deserved encouragement. The two evoked different bests in each other. Fitch's contributions to classical scholarship have been forgotten.¹⁸ He wrote genealogies and Hamiltonia of permanent local interest. I admire him for two reasons. In a lesser way than Oldfather and Gildersleeve he was, as Gildersleeve would say, an American boy whose whole life was changed and enriched by exposure to German ideals. And he was a splendid specimen of that extinct Anglo-American species, a man who devoted his whole adult life to his college. Small liberal arts colleges in America flourished because of men like Fitch, who bought a house on College Hill and never had his suitcases packed awaiting the call to Harvard or Berkeley.

¹⁶ Louis E. Lord, *A History of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1882-1942* (Cambridge, Mass. 1947) 360. He is not listed (376) as a student there, although Wilamowitz' recommendation survives (no. 14 below).

¹⁷ Rev. H. W. Wylie, *Hamilton Alumni Review* 11 (1946) 180. Fitch was interred in the College Cemetery. F. K. Lorenz *per litt.* (September 30, 1976) observes: "Besides College presidents and faculty members, this small cemetery also contains the graves of Secretary of State Elihu Root and Alexander Woollcott, among other assorted distinguished alumni."

¹⁸ Wilamowitz cited the dissertation at *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos* 2 (Berlin 1924) 186 n.1. Hans Herter, *RE* Supp. 13 (1973) 43. 10-11 cites "Apollonius Rhodius and Cyzicus," *AJP* 33 (1912) 43-56. Jacoby at *FGrHist* 471 F 7 accepts his transposition.

THE LETTERS

Twelve letters of Fitch to Wilamowitz are preserved in the Göttingen *Nachlass* (No. 368). I am indebted for copies and permission to publish them to Dr. K. Haenel, director of the Manuscript Division of the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen. In April 1975 I wrote James S. A. Cunningham, professor of Greek at Hamilton College, enquiring whether letters of Wilamowitz to Fitch existed. He conveyed my request to Frank L. Lorenz, reference librarian of the Burke Library, Hamilton and Kirkland Colleges, Clinton, New York. After a careful search Mr. Lorenz reported (May 12, 1975) that no Fitch papers could be found. But on July 28, 1976 Mr. Lorenz wrote that "in a most unexpected place" he had found by chance "a misplaced letter file belonging to Edward Fitch." He adds, "The letter file, methodically arranged by Fitch, along with a list of contents, apparently contains all the correspondence that he wished to leave to posterity. It is evidently selectively chosen and was given to the Library in 1940." Mr. Lorenz included xeroxes of thirteen letters and postcards of Wilamowitz to Fitch, a letter of recommendation to the American School (= No. 14 below), three letters from Dorothea Freifrau Hiller von Gaertringen, née von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,¹⁹ two letters from B. L. Gildersleeve (1831–1924),²⁰ and a signed copy of the eightieth birthday portrait with the Zeus of Kyrene.²¹ He also provided the portrait of Fitch ca. 1916. I am grateful to Mr. Lorenz for all this and permission to publish the letters, to Schwester Hildegard von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff for permission to publish her father's letters, and to my friend, Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald (Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, Munich), who expertly transcribed the eleven handwritten communications. His valuable exegetical notes are indicated. Without his help, publication would not have been possible.

¹⁹ On February 15, 1936, the Baroness Hiller thanks Fitch for having sent her father's letters to Berlin to be copied. "Schon eine flüchtige Durchsicht zeigt, welch interessante Bereicherung diese Briefreihe für unsere Sammlung bedeutet." She is especially grateful for seeing "die Aeusserungen Gildersleeve's . . . die von grösstem Werte für den einstigen Biographen sein werden." The letters are returned after copying on March 16, 1936. Fitch replied April 3, 1936, with a lost letter recalling his Göttingen years. The Baroness replies politely April 15, 1936. Her three letters reveal the enormous effort devoted to gathering everything knowable about Wilamowitz in the thirties. Only small bits of the great archive survived World War II.

²⁰ See my "B. L. Gildersleeve and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: New Documents," *AJP* 99 (1978) 1–11.

²¹ Reproduced *HSCP* 81 (1977) facing p. 277, where for 1928 r. 1927.

The small *corpusculum* is one of the more complete extant. It is Wilamowitz' only extended *Briefwechsel* with an American.²² All letters are dated. Only one Wilamowitz letter is proven by a reference in Fitch to have been lost (February 16, 1902). Wilamowitz' letters attest loss of five Fitch letters. Fitch understandably preserved everything Wilamowitz, the greatest man Fitch ever knew, wrote to him. It is a remarkable tribute to Wilamowitz' historical sense and to his pride in his only American student that he kept any letter from Fitch. Fitch was the desultory correspondent. He did not write easily. On January 1, 1912, he answers Wilamowitz' letter of September 30, 1910; on July 1, 1921, that of October 29, 1920. There is an eight-year hiatus between 1912 and 1920, which Fitch, not the proud Prussian, ends. I edit the thirteen letters in chronological order with the undated recommendation at the end. I publish only three Fitch letters (= Nos. 12, 7a, 8a). The others I summarize or cite. All are in German and in a far more legible hand than Wilamowitz'. My commentary intends to make the letters intelligible to the learned reader without recourse to other books.

1.

[11 VI 96]²³

Herrn stud. E. Fitch

Hier

Burgstr 18

Wollen Sie trotz dem drohenden Doctorexamen Freitag Abend bei uns essen? Ich hoffe, Sie kommen

Ihr

U. v. Wilamowitz

Zusage nicht nötig.

12.

Triberg 16 VIII 1896.²⁴

Sehr geehrter Herr Professor:

Es war meine Absicht Ihnen ein Exemplar der Dissertation²⁵ persön-

²² For a list of Wilamowitz' American correspondents see *CJ* 72 (1976/77) 115, to which I should add Alfred Gudeman, J. E. Harry, and W. A. Heidel.

²³ Bracketed dates are from postcard cancellations. The invitation is further proof of the remarkable hospitality Wilamowitz showed students. Every Wednesday evening was open house.

²⁴ Written from a small resort in the Black Forest, famous for its cuckoo clocks. The letter is Fitch's thanks to his professor. He learned German well but never to punctuate.

²⁵ *De Argonautarum reditu quaestiones selectae* (Dissertation, Göttingen 1896) pp. 77.

lich zu überreichen. Doch ist es mir nicht gelungen dieses sowie manches andere was ich gern gethan hätte selbst auszuführen. Ich habe schliesslich einem von meinen Vereinsbrüdern diesen Auftrag gegeben und er wird wohl schon für alles gesorgt haben. Die Dietrichsche Buchhandlung wollte nicht die überschüssigen Exemplare direct kaufen und ich habe daher mit ihr die übliche Übereinkunft getroffen. Falls Sie an andere Adressen denken wo es wünschenswerth wäre dass die Dissertation hingeschickt werde, so kann ich das leicht von der Buchhandlung besorgen lassen. Ich bin immer zu finden, Clinton, New York.²⁶

Nun dass ich schliesslich weg von Göttingen bin, drängt sich das Gefühl auf dass ich Ihnen gegenüber nur stückweise und annäherungsweise meinen Dank ausgesprochen habe. Als ich vor drei Jahren nach Göttingen kam,²⁷ hatte ich schon die Zeit verlebt worin man einen Doktor macht und machen kann, und zwar in Dilettantismus zum grossen Theil und mit wenig Ahnung von Wissenschaft verlebt. Nur zwei Jahre vorher fing ich wirklich an meine Sache mit Ernst zu betreiben, sowie es meine freie Zeit erlaubte. Aus diesen Gründen bin ich oft in Göttingen sehr ungeduldig gewesen, doch hatte die Sachlage ihre entschiedenen Vorthelle. Denn zu dem was ich hörte, nahm ich eine andere geistige Stellung als die jüngeren Semester ein, und besonders habe ich die allgemeine Beurtheilung der menschlichen Dinge und die Blicke in die menschliche Seele — was der conventionellen Philologie nicht so geläufig ist — geschätzt und genossen. Dazu kommt es dass Sie nicht nur geduldig und liebenswürdig mit mir umgegangen sind, sondern mit aller Treue das was zur wahrhaften Ausbildung und Schulung <gehört> auferlegt und gefordert haben. So etwas hätte ich Ihnen gern gesagt aber das was mir am Herzen liegt ist sehr oft nicht zur rechten Zeit an der Zungenspitze.

Nach der Anstrengung der Abreise ruhe ich mich hier im Schwarzwalde aus. Heute oder morgen geht es weiter nach der Schweiz und so weiter nach Genua.

Mit Liebe und Dankbarkeit²⁸ unterschreibe ich mich
Edward Fitch.

2.

Westend-Berlin
Eichenallée 12 18 XII 06²⁹

²⁶ He never left Clinton and is buried there.

²⁷ That is October 1893.

²⁸ A translation of "With affection and gratitude."

²⁹ Fitch announced his marriage to Wilamowitz, who politely replied in the only Wilamowitz letter provably lost. On February 16, 1902, Fitch wrote again

Lieber Herr Doctor

Ihre Anzeige kannte ich, da mir das Heft des Journal zugesandt war, aber Ihr Brief hat mir noch viel frischer Ihr vertrautes Bild ins Gedächtnis gerufen und ich habe grosse Freude daran, dass es Ihnen wohl geht und Sie an der Wissenschaft in der rechten Weise fortarbeiten. Es kommen hier ja Amerikaner öfter her und auch in mein Haus, ich habe zuweilen auch einmal gehört, dass der oder jener von Ihnen wusste, aber bisher noch nie genaueres zu Ohren bekommen. Bei uns ist in vielem anders geworden, meine Töchter³⁰ sind verheiratet, die jüngere an Fredrich, den Sie in Göttingen gekannt haben müssen, er ist Lehrer in Posen. Natürlich habe ich hier noch viel mehr Amtsgeschäfte und das zunehmende Alter bewirkt auch, dass ich den Verkehr mit den Studenten nicht mehr so treiben kann, zumal ich nicht mehr zu ihrem Kneipen gehe. Aber der Mittwoch Abend besteht, und da kommt wohl auch einmal ein Bekannter älterer Zeit. Sie aber müssen nun doch bald ein Sabbatjahr erhalten, und vielleicht zieht Sie der internationale Congress der historischen Wissenschaften her, den wir lediglich mit Rücksicht auf die amerikanischen Fachgenossen im August (nicht October) 1908 hier abhalten werden. Dass Sie dabei hier mancherlei zu sehen bekommen, ist klar, und mir würde es eine Freude sein, Sie wieder zu begrüßen.

Mit Ihrem Apollonios³¹ geht es hier nicht so gut weiter wie ich hoffte. Ein Schüler von Leo³² wollte Text und Scholien machen, scheint aber

and sent his review of Seaton's *OCT ApRhod* at *AJP* 22 (1901) 326-331 "als Zeuge dafür dass die Wissenschaft mir noch dem Herzen nahe liegt." He is "zunächst Lehrer und Vermittler" and scholarship takes second place. There is also "der Mangel an Hilfsmittel." He writes again on November 25, 1906, the "Decennium" of his doctorate and sends his able reviews of Wilamowitz' *Bucolici Graeci* (Oxford 1905) and *Die Textgeschichte der griechischen Bukoliker*, *Philol. Unters.* 18 (Berlin 1906), at *AJP* 27 (1906) 336-341. The situation of Greek in the schools requires attention; but he promises to write more. "Wenn das Können dem Wollen nur gleich käme!" From *ApRhod* 3. 576 ff he has become interested in "die Geschichte der indirekten Rede also stylistische [*sic*] und litterarische Form." He concludes: "Sie, hochverehrter Lehrer, möchte ich vor allen anderen versichern dass mir die Wissenschaft am Herzen liegt und dass die Freude an wissenschaftlicher Arbeit rege und lebendig ist." Wilamowitz replies December 18, 1906.

³⁰ Dorothea Freifrau Hiller von Gaertringen (1879-1972) and Adelheid Fredrich (1881-1954). Dr. Carl Fredrich (d. 1930), Gymnasiallehrer in Posen, later Oberstudiendirektor in Stettin, was the son of an *Abdecker*, a remarkable example of "upward mobility" in Wilhelminine Germany.

³¹ That is "Apollonios in whom you are interested."

³² Ludwig Deicke (d. 1914): see Carl Wendel, *Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium Vetera* (Berlin 1935; repr. 1958) vii-viii.

abgesprungen zu sein,³³ und das Material ist nicht publicirt. Dass Ihnen Pindar für den Inhalt oder die Behandlung viel geben kann, ist mir nicht wahrscheinlich. Studniczka³⁴ versteht gar kein Griechisch, ist also kein Führer in diesen Dingen.³⁵ Die geographischen Quellen für die Hinfahrt sind wohl wichtiger.³⁶ Aber eins Ihrer Themen ist ganz vortrefflich, die Verfolgung der indirecten Rede. Sie müssen dabei von der psychologischen Erwägung³⁷ ausgehen, dass sie überhaupt etwas spätes sein muss: der naive Mensch kann sie gar nicht anwenden, auch ist die primitive Sprache ja ganz dagegen. Für die semitische Rede reicht die Bibel hin. Nun das Eindringen zu verfolgen, im Epos, in der Lyrik, der Prosa, bis die Zeit kommt, wo die Logik den Menschen dazu bringt, in der directen Rede etwas poetisches zu sehen: das ist wirklich etwas Feines. Eine Parallele: die Modernen Dramatiker wie Ibsen³⁸ werfen den Monolog weg, weil wir keine halten (Shaw hat ihn freilich doch wieder zugelassen), und daher soll er ein unwahres Kunstmittel sein. Und doch ist der primitive Mensch immer geneigt Monologe zu halten, er spricht *προς ον μεγαλητορα θυμον*.³⁹ Homer kennt ja gar kein anderes Denken. So ist die Entwicklung die von dem Monologe des Odysseus zu den indirecten Darlegungen über das Denken der Personen bei Thukydides, *νομιζων* mit Infin.,⁴⁰ <führt> ganz dasselbe wie die Anwendung indirecter Rede. Es ist ein Kapitel aus der psychologischen Sprachgeschichte, das am Ende Stilkritik wird.⁴¹ Es ist auch etwas das

³³ "Valde dolendum est, quod Deickio fatum non fuit opus tam strenue ac feliciter inchoatum perficere, negotiis enim muneris scholastici obrutus scholiorum editionem in dies differre coactus est, dum armis bello exardescente captis claram pro patria mortem Id. Nov. anni 1914 obiit." Wendel (above, n.32) viii.

³⁴ Franz Studniczka (1860-1930): see Herbert Koch, "Nachruf auf Franz Studniczka," *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philol.-historische Klasse* 82 (1930) Heft 2. Fitch had written that he had returned to the "Untersuchungen Studniczkas," presumably *Hermes* 28 (1893) 1 ff and possibly Roscher, *MythLex*, s.v. Kyrene.

³⁵ This sentence was added in longhand. See further Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 506-507 and *GRBS* 15 (1974) 271-277.

³⁶ See Wilamowitz, *HellDicht* 2.228 ff.

³⁷ He wrote first *Erwähnung* and corrected it into *Erwägung*.

³⁸ For a refutation of the alleged influence of Ibsen on Wilamowitz' *Euripidesbild* see my "The Riddle of Wilamowitz' *Phaidrabild*", *GRBS* 20 (1979).

³⁹ *Il.* 11.403, 17.90, 18.5, etc.

⁴⁰ Examples at E.-A. Bétant, *Lexicon Thucydideum* II (Geneva 1847) 166-169.

⁴¹ See Wilamowitz, *KS* 1.464-466 and *KS* 3.477: "Indirekte Rede, die bei späteren Erzählern häufig wird, ist eine potenzierte Hypotaxis, schleppend überall; wenn sie sich Apollonios im Epos erlaubt, empfinden wir es als anstössig."

Gildersleeve interessieren muss. Ich weiss, dass er mich hasst,⁴² aber ich erwidre diese Stimmung nicht, sondern mir ist er ehrwürdig,⁴³ und ich verdenke es ihm um so weniger, als ich nun den Verläumder⁴⁴ kenne. Gildersleeve hat aber so grosse Verdienste um die Philologie Amerikas, dass ich mich freuen würde, wenn Sie ihm so ein Thema behandelten, das er gern haben und ohne Zweifel aus seiner grossen Sachkenntnis beleben kann.

Haben Sie schönen Dank für Ihr treues Gedenken und seien Sie versichert, dass auch in unserm Hause Ihr Gedächtnis in lebendigen Ehren steht

herzlich ergeben

UvWilamowitz

3.

Westend-Berlin

Eichenallée 12 12 VI 07⁴⁵

Sehr geehrter Herr Doctor

Ihr freundlicher Brief hat mir eine grosse Freude gemacht. Ich nahm mir vor ihn zu beantworten, da kam ganz unerwartet der Besuch von Prof. Gildersleeve, den ich natürlich als eine grosse Ehre ansah.⁴⁶ Ich habe ihm unser Institut gezeigt und ihn mit einer gewissen Feierlichkeit den Studenten (etwa 400) vorgestellt, als er in mein Publicum kam. Den Greis in einer solchen geistigen Rüstigkeit und Frische zu sehen, hat mir einen grossen Eindruck gemacht, und ich hoffe, er ist nicht unbefriedigt geschieden. Auf vergangenes bin ich nicht eingegangen: da liegt schon manches; ich weiss manchen, der mir verdenken wird, dass ich all so etwas abstreife. Wenn Sie wissen wollen, wer hinter jenem

⁴² See *AJP* 99 (1978) 8–11.

⁴³ *Erinnerungen*², 312: "den ehrwürdigen Gildersleeve, der noch bei Boeckh gehört hatte."

⁴⁴ Emil Hübner (1834–1901): see B. L. Gildersleeve, *AJP* 22 (1901) 113–114.

⁴⁵ Fitch replied May 22, 1907. He has received a raise and hopes to travel in Europe March–May 1908 and attend the Berlin Congress August 6–12. He works on the "Libyan part" of *ApRhod* 4. Wilamowitz' remarks on *oratio obliqua* have inspired him: "Für Ihre ausführliche und sehr anregende Darlegung die mir gleich Ziele gesetzt und neue Ausblicke aufgetan hat, bin ich im äussersten Grade zu Danken [*sic*] verpflichtet." Gildersleeve has encouraged him (n.20 above). Fitch learned "mit Ueberraschung und Bedauern" of Wilamowitz' personal view of Gildersleeve. He is convinced of Gildersleeve's goodwill and thinks some misunderstanding lies behind the whole.

⁴⁶ The visit is remembered at *Erinnerungen*², 312: "Doch habe ich den ehrwürdigen Gildersleeve . . . sogar in meine Vorlesung führen dürfen, wo die Studenten ihn seiner Würde gemäss begrüsst, und er hat mich wohl nicht so *imperious* gefunden, wie er mich früher im Gegensatze zu dem *imperial Boeckh* bezeichnet hatte."

steckte, so soll der Name nun fallen: das war Emil Hübner,⁴⁷ ein geringer Geselle, den Mommsen erst ungerecht befördert hatte und dann schroff bei Seite warf, wie seine Art war. Hübner war kleinlich genug, seinen Hass gegen Mommsen auf mich zu übertragen. Und er war von der Universität her mit Gildersleeve bekannt.⁴⁸ Doch das ist gleich: ich rechne es mir zu hoher Ehre einen solchen Mann bei mir gesehen zu haben und werde die Freundschaft pflegen.

Dass wir die Freude haben werden, Sie hier zu begrüßen, ist eine unerwartete schöne Aussicht. Gewiss müssen Sie Griechenland sehen, die American school liegt wundervoll, es ist frisches Leben darin, und so werden Sie sich da schon wohl fühlen und viel sehen. Der Congress hier wird Menschen hoffentlich zeigen, mehr kommt bei so etwas nicht heraus. Wir werden da freilich nicht so viel in Ruhe verkehren können, wie ich wünschte: aber wir wollen sehen, was sich tun lässt. Einen Abend, vermutlich den Mittwoch der Woche, hoffe ich doch die auswärtigen Freunde bei mir sehen zu können, wozu Sie denn als erster hiermit geladen seien.

Mit den schönsten Grüßen
Ihr altergebener
UWilamowitz

4.
To

[9.5.08]⁴⁹

Edward Fitch Litt. Dr.
Hamilton College
Clinton/New York
Amerika

⁴⁷ See n.44 above and Lothar Wickert, *Theodor Mommsen: Eine Biographie*, II *Wanderjahre: Frankreich und Italien* (Frankfurt/Main 1964) 239; cf. 277: "Hübner . . . war ein tüchtiger Kärner, der aber menschlich später Mommsen aufs schwerste enttäuschte."

⁴⁸ Wilamowitz errs. Gildersleeve met Hübner at Bonn in 1852: see *Brief Mention* (above, n.2) 66.

⁴⁹ Fitch replies July 11, 1907. He is delighted with Gildersleeve's visit. "Nun ist alles so schön wie nur möglich herausgefallen [*sic*]." Of Hübner Fitch knows only he was long a friend of Gildersleeve. "Was für Böses er auch gestiftet haben mag, das ist nun durch Ihre edle Gesinnung glücklich überwunden worden." He is deeply honored by the invitation to visit Wilamowitz' home. He will see Athens and hear Mau lecture at Pompeii. Wilamowitz does not reply. Fitch writes again April 23, 1908. His European trip has been postponed ("aufgeschoben") a year. He has passed the year "in stiller Arbeit." Scholarship remains always "rückständig"; but he delivered a public lecture to laymen "who scarcely knew the name of Homer."

Verehrter Herr Doctor

Aufgeschoben ist nicht aufgehoben: kommen Sie zu anderer Zeit so entgeht Ihnen der Congress,⁵⁰ aber es ist mehr Ruhe und ich habe mehr Zeit Ihnen zu widmen.

Also in Hoffnung auf ein fröhliches Wiedersehen 1909 — wenn Gott mich so lange leben lässt.⁵¹

Mit herzlichen Grüßen

Ihr

UWilamowitz

5.

Westend-Berlin

Eichenallée 12 12 VII 09

Hochgeehrter Herr Doctor

auf die so freundliche und erfreuliche Ankündigung Ihres Besuches⁵² konnte ich leider nicht mehr nach Rom antworten, weil meine Frau und ich über unsere Ferien nicht verfügen konnten, und doch irgend etwas für unsere grade nicht befriedigende Gesundheit tun mussten. Erst in diesen Tagen hat sich entschieden, dass meine Frau etwa am 20. August, ich aber schon für 4–5 Wochen etwa am 7. August verreisen werde, also etwa am 10. September erst werden wir dann wieder hier sein.

Vorher und nachher wird es uns, seien Sie des versichert, eine ganz besondere Freude sein, Ihre Frau Gemahlin und Sie bei uns zu sehen. Aber bitte, ehe Sie herauskommen,⁵³ lassen Sie telephonisch anfragen, dann ist eine bequeme Verständigung sicher.

Mit schönsten Grüßen zuvor

Ihr altergebener

UWilamowitz

6.

Westend-Berlin

Eichenallée 12 30 IX 10⁵⁴

⁵⁰ The Congress was held in Berlin August, 6–12, 1908: see *Erinnerungen*², 313. He remarks (312): "Da die Amerikaner auch zu dem Berliner Kongresse nicht kamen, konnte der Verkehr mit einigen dortigen Kollegen nur brieflich sein." Besides Fitch, Edward Capps was unable to attend.

⁵¹ In seven months he would be sixty.

⁵² The European journey took place. A letter of Fitch is lost.

⁵³ W. Buchwald observes: "nämlich aus Berlin nach Charlottenburg." Fitch never forgot the visit, the last time he saw Wilamowitz.

⁵⁴ Fitch writes September 17, 1910. He has contacted Deicke (see n.32 above), who has returned to ApRhod. C. Wendel *ad* Schol. in ApRhod 1. 989–991 (=87. 13W) accepts Fitch's certain transposition from a letter to Deicke of October 18, 1910, later accepted by F. Jacoby *ad* FGrHist 471 F 7. Neither

Sehr geehrter Herr Doctor

es war mir sehr erfreulich, durch Ihren freundlichen Brief zu erfahren, dass Sie unserm Freunde Apollonios wieder intensive eigne Studien zuwenden. Ueber die Rückführung der ganzen kyzikenischen Episode auf Deiochos⁵⁵ kann ich kein Urteil abgeben, also dass es eine ansprechende Vermutung ist, etwas bedenklich ist mir in den Scholien die Zusammenstellung mit Neanthes:⁵⁶ kannte [*sic*] die Scholiasten etwa den alten Chronisten nur durch diesen? Was eigentlich da sein sollte, ist eine genaue Karte von Kyzikos und seinem Gebiete. Dort ist eine lockende Ausgrabungsstelle, aber die Türken lassen niemanden heran.⁵⁷

Nur in einem möchte ich Sie von [*sic*] einem Irrtume bewahren, das ist die Beziehung auf die thrakische Chersones, die Sie in Makris finden, trotz den Scholien, die keinen Zweifel daran lassen, dass sie die Makronen in Asien, östlich von Kyzikos ansetzen.⁵⁸ Ich glaube nicht zu irren, dass 1112 Sie zu der Annahme veranlasst hat. Die Argonauten stehen auf dem Dindymon⁵⁹

τοισι δε μακριάδες σκοπιαὶ καὶ πασὰ περαιή
θρηκίης⁶⁰ ἐνὶ χερσὶν εἰς προϋφαινέτ' ἰδεσθαι
φαίνεται δ' ἡρώεν στομα βοσποροῦ ἥδε κολωνναί
μυσίαι ἐκ δ' ἐτερῆς u.s.w.

da wird nur rechts und links unterschieden, also nicht zwei gegenüberliegende Küsten. Dass aber *περαιή* steht, erklärt sich dadurch, dass Arktonesos⁶¹ damals noch eine Insel war, nicht wie heute ein Vorgebirge. Sie sehen also vom Dindymon mit dem Gesichte nach Süden,

Wendel nor Jacoby cite Fitch's later publication at *AJP* 33 (1912) 52. Fitch connects *Μακριάδες σκοπιαὶ* (1.1112) with *Μακρίων* (1.1024) and argues that it is the Thracian Chersonesos, citing J. L. Myres, *JHS* 27 (1907) 222-225. He recommends a young gentleman, Earl K. Hallock, who will study comedy at Berlin.

⁵⁵ = *FGrHist* 471: see E. Fitch, *AJP* 33 (1912) 50-55.

⁵⁶ *FGrHist* 84 F 11.

⁵⁷ See E. Akurgal, *apud The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, ed. Richard Stillwell (Princeton 1976) 473-474.

⁵⁸ Scholiast *ad* ApRhod 1.1024 (= 90.7 ff W).

⁵⁹ A mountain of Kyzikos sacred to Rhea: scholiast *ad* ApRhod 1.985 (= 86.21-22W). Wilamowitz cites ApRhod 1.1112-15.

⁶⁰ Wilamowitz adds a note: "das darf nicht beissen: der Hafen heisst ja auch thrakisch."; that is, "don't let this [the adjective, Thracian] annoy you." On lines 1112 f see F. Vian in I (1976) 264 of the Budé edition of ApRhod, who takes *περαιή Θρηκίης* as "le littoral asiatique qui fait face à la Thrace." (A. Henrichs).

⁶¹ The peninsula (modern Kapu Dag) on the southwest coast of the Sea of Marmara.

aufs Festland, da erscheint Ihnen das makrische Land zum Greifen nahe, natürlich, es ist das nächste Bergland Asiens, fernhin verschwimmend nach Osten der mysische Olymp; nach der anderen Seite zu, nach links, Westen, der Aisepos,⁶² die Troas. Ich denke, das ist klar.

Merkwürdig ist die Bezeichnung der Barbaren, die hier ganz andere Namen führen, Makronen und Pelasger: die Verbindung mit Thessalien und Euboia ist erst auf diese Namen hin erdacht, diese selbst aber sind von den Griechen gegeben: die haben ja auch in Perinth,⁶³ dächte ich, und sicher nördlich vom Hermos Pelasger angesiedelt, d.h. Barbaren so genannt. Ethnisch sind diese unter einander ganz verschieden, aber die um Kyzikos von Bebrykern, Becheiren, Laestrygonen⁶⁴ nicht zu sondern: das sind nur teils mythisch hellenische, teils epichorische Namen. Doch werden sie nicht zu gleicher Zeit gegolten haben, also vielleicht manches positiv lehren, falls man sie auf ihre Urheber verteilen kann.

Mit allen guten Wünschen und den Empfehlungen auch meiner Frau an die Ihre: es war so sehr hübsch, dass Sie beide uns besucht haben. In alter Anhänglichkeit der Ihre

U v. Wilamowitz

7.

Westend-Charlottenburg
Eichenallée 12
12. V 12⁶⁵

Verehrter Herr Doctor

Haben Sie schönen Dank für Ihren freundlichen Brief und ebenso für Ihren Aufsatz zu Apollonios; ich hatte mittlerweile aus anderen Gründen Veranlassung das Buch von Hasluck⁶⁶ zur Hand zu nehmen und las seine Behandlung der Sache. So war es mir gleich möglich zu

⁶² See scholiast *ad* ApRhod 1.1114-15B (=98.6 ff W). At *AJP* 33 (1912) 48, Finch accepts without credit Wilamowitz' explanation.

⁶³ Today Ereklı, a city on the Thracian coast of the Propontis: see *RE* 19 (1937) 802.46 ff.

⁶⁴ Bebryces (ApRhod 2.2, etc.), Becheiri (2.394, 1242), Laestrygonians (*Ody.* 10.77-132), arguably from an Argonautic source: *RE* Suppl. 5 (1931) 538. 39 ff: cf. Wilamowitz, *Homerische Untersuchungen*, Philol. Unters. 7 (Berlin 1884) 166-167.

⁶⁵ Fitch responds New Year's Day 1912. Wilamowitz' letter had clarified and encouraged thought. He later mails an offprint of "Apollonius Rhodius and Cyzicus," *AJP* 33 (1912) 43-56. This is Wilamowitz' reply.

⁶⁶ F. W. Hasluck, *Cyzicus* (Cambridge 1910). Hasluck (1878-1920) corresponded with Wilamowitz. He was Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and a friend of E. M. Forster: see P. N. Furbank, *E. M. Forster: A Life, I The Growth of the Novelist, 1879-1914* (London 1977) 69 with n.10.

sehen, das Sie die Stellen treffend erklären; ich finde gar nichts aussetzen. Die Geschichten sind dort darum von Wichtigkeit, weil sie ersonnen sind, also die Minyer die Argonautenfabel ausbildeten, was dort *vor* dem Laistrygonenabenteuer der Odyssee geschehen ist, die ja auf die Argo verweist.⁶⁷

Ich habe jetzt zwei Studenten im Seminar, die an Apollonios arbeiten; hoffentlich kommt etwas heraus. Auch ich habe einiges beobachtet.⁶⁸

Es freut mich jedesmal, wenn ich von Ihnen höre, vollends wenn Sie die alten Studien verfolgen. Mir liegt zunächst ob wieder ein par [*sic*] neue kleine Kallimachosfragmente zu ediren,⁶⁹ und eins davon ist eine Rede der Medeia,⁷⁰ die auf die Griechen flucht, die sie entführt haben.

Meine Frau vereinigt ihre Grüsse mit den meinen. Ihnen und Ihrer Frau Gemahlin

In alter Ergebenheit

Ihr

UWilamowitz⁷¹

7a.

20ten September, 1920.⁷²

Sehr geehrter Herr Geheimrath:-

Es sind mir vor kurzem Ihre Homer und Platon⁷³ in die Hand gekom-

⁶⁷ See n.64 *supra*.

⁶⁸ To appear in *Hellenistische Dichtung* twelve years later.

⁶⁹ "Neues von Kallimachos," *SBBerl* (1912) 544-547 (Pap. Berol. 11521: Kommentar zu den Aitia des Kallim.) (W. Buchwald).

⁷⁰ "Kallimachos Frg. 7. 31 ff. Pf., von Wil. loco cit. p. 546 aber nicht als Rede der Medeia, sondern einer *Dienerin* derselben bezeichnet" (W. Buchwald). The speaker is actually Aeetes: see Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.* II. 174.

⁷¹ Fitch writes August 2, 1912 to thank Wilamowitz for the two offprints. There is no further correspondence until Fitch's letter (= 7a) of September 20 1920.

⁷² American classical scholars after World War I were sharply divided on the German question. Men like Paul Shorey and John A. Scott turned rabidly anti-German, often slandering Wilamowitz, because, as the greatest German Hellenist, he offered the most tempting target. More thoughtful men, like B. L. Gildersleeve and Edward Fitch (one long retired, the other without ambition for a wider career), not to speak of W. A. Oldfather, tried to calm passion and make sensible distinctions. Fitch's reconciliatory letter (one may only recall the stigma of writing in German) to his beloved teacher is a unique document of the period. I have, therefore, chosen to publish it. Wilamowitz never forgot it (*Erinnerungen*³, 226: "ist mir noch heute ein guter Freund"). The attentive reader will notice that Fitch's German has degenerated considerably.

⁷³ *Die Ilias und Homer* (Berlin 1916) and *Platon* 2 vols. ed.² (Berlin 1920). German books were unobtainable during the war. G. M. Bolling did not review *Die Ilias und Homer* until *AJP* 42 (1921) 274-280.

men. Ausserdem habe ich die zwei Bände des Aischylos⁷⁴ früher bekommen, dem ich manche Erregungen und Neues für meine Klassen verdanke. Ich möchte also für diese schöne Gaben⁷⁵ aufrichtigen Dank aussprechen, auch dazu ein persönliches Wort hinzufügen. Dass die wissenschaftliche Arbeit, trotz der schweren Verlust die Ihrer Familie getroffen hat, nicht aufhörte, kann ich einfach bewundern.⁷⁶ Was Sie in der Vorrede zu dem Platon von den der Gemeinschaft der Gelehrten zerrissenen Faden schrieben,⁷⁷ muss man zuerkennen. Doch können wir und sollen wir uns nicht daran irre leiten lassen dass das absolut Gültiges immer noch gilt. Wenigstens bleibe ich bei der Überzeugung dass die Wissenschaft wie sie zu meiner Zeit in Göttingen gelehrt und gepflegt wurde, der Wahrheit getreu war und einen absoluten Werth hatte. Die vergangenen Jahre haben für manchen bei uns diesen Gesichtspunkt in Vergessenheit gerathen lassen.⁷⁸ Doch bringt die Zeit Heilung.

An Sie und Ihre Frau Gemahlin haben wir oft gedacht, als der Schleier des Krieges alles verhüllte. Meine Frau und ich halte in treuem Gedächtnisse die Stunden die wir vor elf Jahren unter Ihrem Dache zugebracht haben, und wir beide lassen Ihre Frau Gemahlin herzlich grüssen.

Vom wissenschaftlichen Ertrage in den letzten Jahren ist meinerseits wenig zu berichten. Das Studium des Griechischen ist bei uns in der neuen Zeit sehr abgenommen, und wir helfen uns mit Unterricht in der griechischen Kunst u.s.w. aus. Seit Kriegsanfange ist Thucydides mein Lieblingsautor geworden, den ich früher fast ganz beiseite gelassen habe. Einer Aufforderung der Redaktion des *Classical Weekly* zu Folge habe ich eben eine Recension der beiden kleinen Bücher "Tragödie" und "Komödie" von Geffcken und Körte unternommen.⁷⁹ Das ist mir eine Freude gewesen, und hat auch anregend gewirkt.

⁷⁴ *Aeschyli Tragoediae* (Berlin 1914) and *Aischylos Interpretationen* (Berlin 1914). Fitch must have read the grotesque appraisal of P. Shorey, *TAPA* 50 (1919) 39.

⁷⁵ He does not of course mean personal gifts from the author.

⁷⁶ Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff died at the battle of Iwangorod (southeast of Warsaw) during the night of October 14-15, 1914, aged 28.

⁷⁷ See *Platon* I² vi and *GRBS* 12 (1971) 570 n.60. Max Pohlenz called Wilamowitz' words "der Aufschrei eines Todwunden," *NGG Geschäftliche Mitteilungen* 1931/32 (1932) 85.

⁷⁸ Cf. Ed. Fitch, *CW* 8 (1914/15) 40: "I write partly because it is well for us to recall in these days of confusion and passion the hospitality which many an American has enjoyed in the German Universities."

⁷⁹ *CW* 14 (1920/21) 100-101. Fitch presumably knew that both Geffcken (see *HSCP* 81 [1977] 292 n.102) and Koerte were Wilamowitz' students.

Gestatte mir, lieber Herr Geheimrat, Sie nochmal herzlich zu grüssen
und ein treues Andenken zu äussern.

In aufrichtiger Treue,
Ihr ergebenster
Edward Fitch

An Herrn Geheimrath

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff

Berlin, Germany.

8.

Charlottenburg 9

29 X 20⁸⁰

Sehr geehrter lieber Herr Doctor

Ihre freundlichen Worte haben uns sehr wohlgetan und wir danken Ihrer Frau Gemahlin und Ihnen vielmals dafür. Ich hatte nicht gezweifelt, dass Sie die Treue halten würden, obgleich Sie ja drüben über die wahren Ereignisse, Taten und Gesinnungen gar nicht unterrichtet sein können, was ja der Hauptschaden gewesen ist und noch ist. Wir leben und arbeiten noch, erreichen sogar, dass die deutschen Institute in Athen und Rom wieder eröffnet werden. Aber die Not der Wissenschaft ist überaus gross, Buchdruck kaum möglich wegen der Setzerlöhne,⁸¹ doch wird ein Buch von mir gedruckt.⁸² Zu unseren Doctor-jubilaeen⁸³ werden Diels⁸⁴ und ich ein Kapital erhalten, zu dem fast überall Beiträge gezahlt sind;⁸⁵ davon soll der Druck von Anfängerarbeiten ermöglicht werden.⁸⁶ Eben habe ich für die Bibliothek 325£ aus Südafrika⁸⁷ erhalten. Trotz allem haben die Akademien ihren Druck einstellen müssen.

In England regt sich Widerspruch gegen den Boycott der deutschen Wissenschaft. Ich kann mir nicht denken, dass Amerika ihn mitmacht.

⁸⁰ He no longer can afford personalized stationery. Foreign friends, e.g., A. B. Drachmann, send him packets of food. Elias J. Bickerman recalls his wearing a patched suit at this time.

⁸¹ For details see his important letter of June 5, 1920 to W. A. Oldfather, *CJ* 72 (1976/77) 121-127, written some four months earlier.

⁸² *Griechische Verskunst* (Berlin 1921): see p. ix for the difficulties of publication. The preface is dated January 18, 1921, the anniversary of the founding of the Second German Reich.

⁸³ Wilamowitz gained his doctorate July 14, 1870: see *Erinnerungen*,² 98 ff and *GRBS* 11 (1970) 139-166.

⁸⁴ Hermann Diels (1848-1922); see Wilamowitz, *KS* 6.71-74.

⁸⁵ Apparently a veiled command to contribute. Fitch obeys.

⁸⁶ "Anders dann in Brief Nr. 9" (W. Buchwald).

⁸⁷ Wilamowitz had a South African student at Göttingen who performed Kaffir dances for the Philological Society (*Erinnerungen*,² 226). The man may be Johannes Basson (Stellenbosch, South Africa), his only known South African correspondent.

Leider haben Sie noch keine allgemeine Akademie: das sollte wahrlich erreicht werden, natürlich nicht an einem Orte, sondern die Institute, wie das Smithsonian u. dgl. zusammenfassend mit den vornehmsten Universitäten, vierteljährlich zu einem meeting zusammentretend, grosse Unternehmungen durch besondere committees leitend, eine Serie von Schriften der Mitglieder publizierend.⁸⁸

Die Neutralen helfen uns sehr eifrig, namentlich Schweden.⁸⁹ Eine Schwester, Mutter eines Neffen von mir⁹⁰ kommt Anfang nächsten Jahres nach Amerika für eine Hilfsaction gegen das Sterben der Kinder in Europa zu werben. Wenn Sie Gelegenheit haben, so hören Sie diese Frau einmal; sie wirkt Wunder.

Leider habe ich (wegen der Beschränkung des Druckes) keinen Abzug einer wichtigen Arbeit zu Thukydides (Sitzungsber. Berlin 19),⁹¹ sonst schickte ich sie. Sie richtet sich gegen das Werk von Schwartz über Thuk.,⁹² das im hohem Grade lesenswert ist, wenn ich die Resultate auch bekämpfe.

Nochmals schönen Dank und lassen Sie uns weiter in Freundschaft leben, so lange ich noch vorhalte.

In alter Ergebenheit Ihr
UWilamowitz

8a.

July 1, 1921.

Sehr geehrter Herr Geheimrath:

Ihr Brief vom letzten Oktober hat mir eine grosse Freude bereitet und es ist mir lange Zeit Absicht gewesen darauf zu antworten. Im besonderen ist mir Herzenssache was Sie ueber die Noth der Wissenschaft schrieben. Von den Doktorjubiläen die Sie und Diels feierten

⁸⁸ An excellent idea. The American Academy of Arts and Letters is of no importance.

⁸⁹ W. Buchwald notes the dedication of *Hellenistische Dichtung* (Berlin 1924) to "Der Wissenschaftsgesellschaft zu Lund ihr dankbares Mitglied" and *HellDicht* I.vi-vii, the praise of Sweden.

⁹⁰ Presumably *Schwester* means *nurse*. On January 8, 1921, Fanny von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, née Baronin von Fock, Wilamowitz' grand-niece-in-law and herself sister-in-law of Hermann Goering, sailed from Rotterdam to New York. For her American visit see Fanny Gräfin von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Erinnerungen und Begegnungen* (Berlin 1936) 158 ff. For the genealogy see my note at CP 66 (1971) 115.

⁹¹ "Das Bündnis zwischen Sparta und Athen," reprinted in *Kleine Schriften* III (1969) 380-405 (W. Buchwald).

⁹² Eduard Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (Bonn 1919), dedicated to his son who fell at Markirch November 2, 1914: see Schwartz, *Gesammelte Schriften* 2 (Berlin 1956) 12.

hatte ich frueher keine Nachricht, moechte mich also erlauben einen kleinen Beitrag dazu darbioten, wenn auch in sehr verspäteten Weise. Wollen Sie, bitte, lieber Herr Professor, die beigegebene Summe annehmen und dieselbe verwerthen in irgendwelcher beliebigen Weise um Ihre wissenschaftlichen Unternehmungen ein wenig zu fördern. Sie beträgt etwa 25 Dollars, also eins für jedes Jahr seit ich den Doktor in Goettingen erwarb.⁹³ Wenn die Summe nur zehnmal so gross wäre, so wäre das ein passenderer Ausdruck meiner Dankbarkeit. Doch darf sie jedenfalls als Symbol gelten.

Die Stimmungen der Kriegsperiode sind zum Glück viel geaendert. Während des Krieges wurde vielfach deutsche Unterricht aus den oeffentlichen Schulen ausgewiesen. Das aendert sich allmählich. In den Colleges wird Deutsch immer noch getrieben. Der Boycott der deutschen Wissenschaft wird sich sicherlich nicht halten koennen, selbst in England. Bei uns ist die Stimmung vielfach noch ungünstig, aber die Qualität der Wissenschaft wird sich immer noch behaupten.

John A. Scott⁹⁴ von Northwestern Universität macht viel Unsinn ueber Homer. Neuerdings habe ich gegen seiner letzten Auseinandersetzungen etwas geschrieben⁹⁵ und habe noch mehr zu sagen ueber seinen Versuch die Thebais zu verflüchtigen.⁹⁶

Zu Weihnachten sprach ich einen Augenblick mit Gildersleeve,⁹⁷ der sass in einem Empfangszimmer um die Philologen die damals in Baltimore sammelten, zu begruessen. Er ist jetzt im Ruhestand, doch ist sein Verstand noch klar, obwohl die Augen versagen ihm. Etwa wie Teiresias er geht herum mit einem Studenten, der ihm Pindar und die Odyssee vorliest. Er ist jetzt in dem neunzigsten Jahre.

Sei denn begrüsst, lieber Herr Professor, von einem Schueler aus der

⁹³ Fitch's salary would not have been more than \$1500.00 *per annum*.

⁹⁴ John A. Scott (1867–1948), a pupil of Gildersleeve, Homerist, Dean at Northwestern. His friendship with Walter Leaf further prejudiced him against the German side. For Leaf's war letters to Scott see C. M. Leaf, *Walter Leaf, 1852–1927* (London 1932) 241–253. *The Unity of Homer* (Berkeley 1921) is a war book. For an example of Scott's slander of Wilamowitz see CP 64 (1969) 35–36. The Goethean source is confirmed at *Die Ilias und Homer* (Berlin 1916) 16 (E. C. Kopff).

⁹⁵ "Homerica," Cŷ 17 (1921/22) 94–95, a defense of Wilamowitz against Scott.

⁹⁶ "The Evidence for the Homeric *Thebais*," CP 17 (1922) 37–43, in defense of Wilamowitz against Scott, CP 16 (1921) 20–26.

⁹⁷ David Moore Robinson (1880–1958) held the reception at which Gildersleeve was present during the APA meeting at Baltimore December 28–30, 1920. Gildersleeve in a letter of August 22, 1921 to Fitch recalls their meeting: see n.20 above.

Ferne, der immer bei der alten Treue bleibt.

Ihr ergebenster

Edward Fitch.

9.

Charlottenburg

Eichen Allee 12 16 VII 21

Hochgeehrter lieber Herr Doctor

Das war eine schöne Überraschung. Der herzliche Ton Ihres Briefes steigerte den Wert Ihres Geschenkes in eine Höhe, wo man nicht mehr zählt und misst. Ich lasse die Summe der Diels-Wilamowitz Stiftung zugehen, aber binde sie nicht für Anfängerarbeiten;⁹⁸ dann kann ich einmal helfen, wo ein anderes dringendes Bedürfnis ist. Sie sollen den Entschluss seiner Zeit hören.

Es freut mich über Gildersleeve zu hören, den ich einst hier mit gebührender Ehrfurcht begrüßen konnte.⁹⁹ Wenn es Ihnen möglich ist, versichern Sie ihn meiner unveränderten Verehrung.¹⁰⁰ Wir wollen hier darin eine Überlegenheit beweisen, dass wir die Leidenschaften in die Wissenschaft nicht hineinspielen lassen.¹⁰¹ So denken übrigens Ihre Landsleute an der American School in Athen auch, und da wird Treffliches geleistet, doch klagte Prof. Hill¹⁰² über Mangel an Mitteln.

Dass wir über Ihre Litteratur so wenig erfahren, ist bitter. Männer wie Ferguson¹⁰³ und Capps¹⁰⁴ sind sicherlich nicht untätig gewesen.

Ich habe mit einem dicken Buche über Griechische Verskunst¹⁰⁵ eine drückende Last abgeworfen, arbeite, so weit es die Kräfte und der politische Druck gestatten, und möchte auch noch zu unserem Freunde Apollonios kommen — wenn es die Götter noch gestatten.¹⁰⁶

Dass Sie in der Ferne so treu aushalten, ist eine unvergessliche

⁹⁸ See n.86 above.

⁹⁹ See n.46 above.

¹⁰⁰ This Fitch did and received a warm reply from the nonagenarian on August 22, 1921, which he communicated to Wilamowitz December 22, 1921: see *AJP* 99 (1978) 6 with n.33.

¹⁰¹ W. Buchwald cites *Erinnerungen*², 316.

¹⁰² Bert Hodge Hill (1874-1958), director of the American School (1906-1926): see L. E. Lord (above n.16) 190-192.

¹⁰³ William Scott Ferguson (1875-1954), whom Wilamowitz had long admired: see *ICS* 2 (1977) 327 n.53.

¹⁰⁴ Edward Capps (1866-1950): see my life of Capps, *Dictionary of American Biography* supp. 4 1946-1950 (New York 1974) 142-144. In fact Capps had abandoned scholarship for administration.

¹⁰⁵ See n.82 above.

¹⁰⁶ He is already planning *Hellenistische Dichtung* (Berlin 1924).

Freude; ein Südafrikaner¹⁰⁷ handelt ebenso: es fehlt also doch nicht ganz an Trost. Haben Sie den vollsten und herzlichsten Dank.

Auch meine Frau hat Sie nicht vergessen und fügt ihre schönsten Grüsse hinzu.

In vollster Ergebenheit

Ihr

UvWilamowitz

10.

22 XII 24¹⁰⁸

Lieber Herr Doctor

Eben heute bekomme ich Ihren freundlichen Brief und danke herzlich für Ihr treues Gedenken.¹⁰⁹ Bei der Arbeit für Apollonios habe ich an unsere Göttingen Zeit oft gedacht. Das Kapitel ist schlecht stilisiert, ich kam immer tiefer hinein und konnte mich nicht entschliessen, alles noch mal umzuformen.¹¹⁰ Bald kommt eine erklärende Ausgabe von Menanders *Ἐπιτρέποντες* heraus,¹¹¹ die hoffentlich zeigt, was der Dichter wert ist. Capps feinsinniger erster Versuch hat wieder meine volle Anerkennung gefunden.¹¹²

Ihre andere Sendung¹¹³ ist noch nicht eingetroffen; Homer muss sich viel gefallen lassen. Ich lese jetzt Odyssee mit einigen jüngeren Philologen,¹¹⁴ von Schwartz¹¹⁵ bleibt nicht viel übrig, aber der Fortschritt im Verständnis ist beträchtlich und ich wollte, es fände sich Zeit, das auszuführen.

¹⁰⁷ See n.87 above.

¹⁰⁸ On December 22, 1921 (= Wilamowitz' seventy-third birthday), Fitch writes his last preserved letter. He conveys Gildersleeve's admiration (see n.100 above) and announces his forthcoming Homeric articles (see nn.95, 96 above). He notes an appeal by American alumni of Göttingen to aid students there. "Gern habe ich darauf respondirt." No reply of Wilamowitz exists. Wilamowitz' next preserved letter is written on his seventy-sixth birthday and replies to a lost letter of Fitch.

¹⁰⁹ Marie Mommsen hoarded obvious birthday letters and presented them to her husband that morning. The whole of each December 22 was devoted to replies.

¹¹⁰ *Hellenistische Dichtung* II.165-256.

¹¹¹ U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Menander Das Schiedsgericht (Epitrepontes)* (Berlin 1925; repr. 1958).

¹¹² Edward Capps, *Four Plays of Menander* (Boston 1910) 23-128, praised by Wilamowitz, *Menander*, 8: "mit Kenntnis und Geschmack."

¹¹³ Presumably: "Pindar and Homer," *CP* 19 (1924) 57-65.

¹¹⁴ See *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus* (Berlin 1927) v; *GRBS* 20 (1979) 91.

¹¹⁵ Eduard Schwartz, *Die Odyssee* (Munich 1924). Wilamowitz dedicated *Heimkehr* to Schwartz (the grand-nephew of Otto Jahn) "in alter Freundschaft."

Ich bin nämlich immer noch in voller Lehrtätigkeit, Semester 101, und alle waren volle Arbeitssemester — ein Ruhejahr, wie Sie es haben und jetzt mancher sich ausbedingt, hat es nicht gegeben.¹¹⁶ Die Studenten hungern zwar immer noch (wie denn die materielle Lage schwer drückt und drückender werden wird), aber sie sind auch in der Philologie (der die Ochlokratie¹¹⁷ natürlich feind ist) immer noch vorhanden und ganz strebsam.

Von Herrn Merrill¹¹⁸ habe ich noch nichts gelesen — leider höre ich, dass Ihre Athenische Schule über knappe Mittel klagt, was wir nicht begreifen, denn trotz unserer Bettelarmut halten wir die unsere aufrecht, wenn auch die Beamten stark beschränkt sind.¹¹⁹ Aber ich höre, Amerika will in Teos graben:¹²⁰ das habe ich lange also einen Ort bezeichnet, der an die Reihe kommen müsste. Übrigens sieht es in Kleinasien verzweifelt aus. Durch die Vertreibung der Griechen sind die Dörfer leer, die Äcker unbestellt, die Unsicherheit gross. Trotzdem konnten wir in Didyma einiges tun.¹²¹

Zum Schluss die Versicherung, dass ich Ihre treue Gesinnung aus vollem Herzen erwidre, und dann

a merry christmas and a happy newyear.

Treulichst

Ihr

UvWilamowitz

11.

Berlin-Charlottenburg 9

23 XII 26¹²²

¹¹⁶ The young should recall that Wilamowitz taught 111 semesters without a break and published over 70 volumes.

¹¹⁷ W. Buchwald cites *Platon* I² (Berlin 1920) vi.

¹¹⁸ "Merril wird richtig gelesen sein" (W. Buchwald). The obvious correction would be to E. T. Merrill: see E. Fraenkel, *Gnomon* 1 (1925) 37-38, 248, and A. E. Housman, *CR* 38 (1924) 25-27 (= *Collected Papers* 3. 1090-92), which Wilamowitz will have read. But Fitch may have enquired Wilamowitz' view of B. D. Meritt (1904-). Meritt had been a student of Fitch at Hamilton and had recently published his first articles: *AJA* 27 (1923) 334-339, 447-460. The title "Herr" favors Meritt and that Wilamowitz continues to discuss the American School and archaeology: sc. he wrote Merrill but meant Meritt. The other famous Fitch Hellenist was Ezra Pound (E. C. Kopff).

¹¹⁹ I doubt that Wilamowitz understood that the American School was a private undertaking, financed without government help.

¹²⁰ Still not thoroughly excavated: see G. E. Bean (above, n.57) 893-894. I have no evidence that Americans intended to excavate there.

¹²¹ See K. Tuchelt (above, n.57) 272-273.

¹²² Fitch neglected to write in 1925. Wilamowitz replies the day after his seventy-eighth birthday to a lost greeting of Fitch.

Lieber Herr Doctor

Ihre treue freundschaftliche Gesinnung ist mir von hohem Werte und Sie können sicher sein, dass ich sie ebenso fest bewahre. Sie schrieben nichts besonderes über Ihr persönliches Ergehen, da darf ich annehmen, dass es ungestört geblieben ist und Sie nicht zu klagen haben.

Ich merke natürlich, dass die körperliche Leistungsfähigkeit geringer wird, auch dass das Gedächtnis schwindet, aber die Gedanken zusammenzufassen geht immer noch. Ich habe nun im 105. Semester noch ausser der Vorlesung das Seminar zu leiten,¹²³ zum letzten Male allerdings, da nun meine Stelle definitiv besetzt wird.¹²⁴ Vorlesung denke ich noch im Sommer zu halten.¹²⁵ Im September¹²⁶ wird in Göttingen die Philologenversammlung gehalten — eigentlich sollten Sie da auch erscheinen, denn ich hoffe auf ein letztes Wiedersehen mit manchen alten Schülern.

Die Apollonios-Ausgabe wird wohl noch lange auf sich warten lassen; Wendel¹²⁷ ist ein zuverlässiger aber umständlicher Arbeiter. Fränkel¹²⁸ war, als er daran ging, noch ziemlich unvorbereitet. Ich finde leider, dass die junge an sich tüchtige Generation mit zu wenigem fertig wird. Etwas Gutes ist der Gnomon¹²⁹ und ich freue mich, dass Sie ihn sehen. Damit er sich halten kann, ist eine Verbreitung im Auslande notwendig, und je mehr Absatz er findet, um so mehr er die Übersicht über die Production auf allen Gebieten berücksichtigen können.

Ich habe ausser einem zweiten Bande ausgewählter Reden und Vorträge¹³⁰ eben ein kleines Buch über die Odyssee (Die Heimkehr des Odysseus) vollendet,¹³¹ das auf die Homer. Untersuchungen zurückgreift und die Gedichte, die im zweiten Teile der Odyssee stecken, zu fassen und zu datieren unternimmt. Ich lese seit einigen Jahren griech-

¹²³ Recorded is only "Einführung in die Altertumskunde": Hiller-Klaffenbach (above, n.13) 82. "Seminar" means "department."

¹²⁴ In fact the official invitation for Werner Jaeger (then at Kiel) to succeed Wilamowitz is dated Berlin, March 12, 1921: see *HSCP* 82 (1978) 336.

¹²⁵ In summer semester 1926 he lectured on the history of the Greek language and held a seminar on Polybius 6. After that he taught five further semesters through summer semester 1929: see Hiller-Klaffenbach (above, n.13) 82-83.

¹²⁶ See n.135 below.

¹²⁷ The scholia appeared in 1935: see n.32 above.

¹²⁸ Hermann Fränkel (1888-1977), the brother-in-law of Eduard Fraenkel, for whom see *HSCP* 81 (1977) 275-297. His Oxford Text of *ApRhod* appeared in 1961. See K. v. Fritz, *Gnomon* 50 (1978) 618-621.

¹²⁹ Volume I appeared in 1925 edited by Richard Harder.

¹³⁰ *Reden und Vorträge* II⁴ (Berlin 1926; repr. Dublin/Zürich 1967).

¹³¹ See n.114 above. Preface is dated August 1, 1926.

ische Schriften mit jüngeren Fachgenossen, so auch die Odyssee, und was da herauskam, lege ich kurz im Zusammenhange vor. Ein anderes Buch¹³² wird nun gedruckt, ich sage noch nicht, was, da es überraschen soll. Nur als ein Zeichen meiner freundschaftlichen Gesinnung sende ich einen Aufsatz, besser Rede,¹³³ die sonst den Weg über den Ozean nicht finden wird.

Treulichst wie immer
der Ihre
UvWilamowitz

12. Charlottenburg 9
Westend, Eichen Allee 12
10 X 27

Lieber Herr Doctor

Sie haben mir durch Ihren freundlichen Brief eine grosse Freude gemacht und können sicher sein, dass meine Frau und ich Ihr Angedenken immer in Ehren halten and für Ihr treues Gedenken dankbar sind. Zu Ihren Erfolgen¹³⁴ und zu der Anerkennung, die Sie finden, wünsche ich Glück; eine Mehrung der Arbeit wird auch darin liegen. Die Versammlung in Göttingen¹³⁵ war überfüllt, so dass ich sehr viele Bekannte und Schüler gar nicht gesprochen habe. Göttingen ist durch Heranwachsen der Bewaldung und durch Neubauten geradezu schön geworden; Sie würden es kaum wiedererkennen. Nur das Innere der Stadt behält den alten Charakter. Ich konnte nur mit einer Parforce Reise¹³⁶ erreichen, dass ich zu meiner Rede¹³⁷ zur Zeit kam. Ich war nämlich von der italienischen Regierung nach Kyrene eingeladen, eine grosse Auszeichnung, denn man kann dort nur als Gast reisen. Es war

¹³² *Hesiodos Erga* (Berlin 1928; repr. Berlin 1962).

¹³³ Possibly the address on Eduard Meyer, *Südd. Monatschrift* 21 (1925) 55-58; but one cannot be certain.

¹³⁴ Fitch had become Dean of the College in 1926.

¹³⁵ Wilamowitz detested *Philologenversammlungen* which he called "Versammlungen von Nichtphilologen" (unpublished letter). He attended but few in his life: Wiesbaden on September 27, 1877 at the behest of Usener (Usener-Wilamowitz, *Ein Briefwechsel 1870-1905* [Leipzig/Berlin 1934] 5-6; cf. *KS* 3.511) and fifty years later to the day at Göttingen on September 27, 1927 (*KS* 3.461 n.511).

¹³⁶ An Italian gunboat had conveyed Wilamowitz to Germany (Schwester Hildegard von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff).

¹³⁷ "Geschichte der griechischen Sprache," *KS* 3.461-495. He had spoken on the same subject at Wiesbaden fifty years before!

im höchsten Masse lohnend,¹³⁸ aber für meine 79 Jahre anstrengend. Nun muss ich mich wieder in eine Masse Arbeit finden. Ich lese diesen Winter nicht, zum ersten Male seit 56 Jahren; ob ichs nochmal tue, ist fraglich.¹³⁹

So treibt man weiter, so viel man kann, und so lange wollen wir unsere Freundschaft aufrecht halten.

Treulichst

Ihr

UvWilamowitz

13.

Berlin Charlottenburg 9

19 I 31¹⁴⁰

Lieber Herr Doctor

Schönsten Dank für Ihren Brief; es ist mir immer eine besondere Freude, in Ihnen einen alten Freund in Amerika zu wissen. Zu Ihrer Berufung an die American school in Athen gratuliere ich herzlich.¹⁴¹ Sie werden auf einer Reise sicherlich über Berlin gehen, denn das Pergamon Museum¹⁴² ist den Umweg wert; es hat seines Gleichen nicht. Das British Museum wird hoffentlich nach diesem Vorbilde neu gebaut. Es ist freilich sehr fraglich, ob Sie mich dann noch antreffen,¹⁴³ wenn ich auch noch waghalsig genug bin, ein dickes Buch¹⁴⁴ zu schreiben.

Leider habe ich die Anzeige Murrays¹⁴⁵ von meinen *Recollections*¹⁴⁶

¹³⁸ See "Kyrene: Vortrag gehalten im Vortragszyklus der Akademie der Wissenschaften," (Berlin 1928) and Hiller-Klaffenbach (above, n.13) nos. 721-723 (W. Buchwald); cf. *Erinnerungen*², 266.

¹³⁹ See n.125 above.

¹⁴⁰ Fitch had not written for over three years. His imminent visit to Europe caused him to write his last letter.

¹⁴¹ See n.16 above. Fitch's Athenian colleague would be his former pupil B. D. Meritt (University of Michigan).

¹⁴² See Elisabeth Rohde, *Griechische und römische Kunst in den Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin* (Berlin 1968) with bibliography at pp. 174-175.

¹⁴³ Fitch could not arrive in Berlin before summer 1932. Wilamowitz died September 25, 1931.

¹⁴⁴ *Der Glaube der Hellenen* I (Berlin 1931), II ed. G. Klaffenbach (Berlin 1932). "die Gedanken an sein Buch verliessen auch den Sterbenden nicht und beschäftigten ihn bis zum Schwinden seines Bewusstseins," G. Klaffenbach *Glaube* 2.iv.

¹⁴⁵ I cannot trace a review by Murray, nor could Wilamowitz, nor the Baroness Hiller. The anonymous and favorable notice at CR 44 (1930) 210-211 is presumably by the editors, E. Harrison and William M. Calder.

¹⁴⁶ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *My Recollections*, 1848-1914 trans. G. C. Richards (London 1930). Only occasionally (e.g., 144 n.1) is a passage bowdlerized.

nicht zu Gesicht bekommen, auch eine andere nicht,¹⁴⁷ obwohl ich deren Verfasser besonders gebeten hatte. Ich will nun versuchen auf Ihre Angabe der Zeitschrift hin mir die Nummer zu verschaffen.

Mit den schönsten Grüßen

in alter Ergebenheit

Ihr

UvWilamowitz

14.

[No date]¹⁴⁸

Herr E. Fitch gehört dem königlichen philologischen Seminare¹⁴⁹ seit dem Wintersemester 1894/5 als ordentliches Mitglied an, nachdem er sich vorher mit Eifer und Erfolg an den Übungen des philologischen Proseminars beteiligt hatte. Der Eintritt in das Seminar ist an eine lateinische Bewerbungsschrift geknüpft, die Sprache des Seminars ist mündlich und schriftlich lateinisch.

Herr Fitch hat sich in allen Stücken den Ordnungen des Seminars unterworfen und die Schwierigkeiten, die ihm die in Deutschland geltende Aussprache¹⁵⁰ bereiten musste, überwunden. Es hat der Direction des Seminars zu besonderer Freude gereicht, dass ein Ausländer auf jede Rücksicht, die sie sonst wol [*sic*] genommen hat, verzichtete und sich in der Tat allen Aufgaben, die das Seminar stellt, gewachsen zeigte.

Seine wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten konnten noch zu keinem Abschlusse führen, aber sie standen durchaus auf der Höhe der tüchtigsten Seminararbeiten, die in diesen Jahren zur Verhandlung kamen, und die Direction ist überzeugt, dass er befähigt ist, wissenschaftlich wirklich erspriessliches zu leisten.

Persönlich hat er sich sonst bei den Docenten wie unter seinen Commilitonen eine sehr angesehene Stellung zu erringen gewusst.

¹⁴⁷ Possibly *JHS* 50 (1930) 354-55. J. A. Scott, *CJ* 26 (1931) 707, had not yet appeared.

¹⁴⁸ In this remarkable document Wilamowitz is, according to an attached note by Fitch, "commending me as a candidate for a fellowship in the American School." There is no date. One would surmise that Fitch once intended to spend 1896-97 at the school. Either, which is extraordinary, Wilamowitz' letter failed to secure the fellowship; or, which is probable, Fitch withdrew candidacy, kept the letter, and returned to Clinton. North also wrote for him.

¹⁴⁹ "Der Universität Göttingen" (W. Buchwald).

¹⁵⁰ W. Buchwald compares *Erinnerungen*², 264: "ein Engländer bleibt freilich unverständlich und seine Aussprache [des Lateins] erscheint barbarisch."

Die Direction des k. philologischen Seminars
 U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff
 z/Z. vorsitzender Director

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹HSCP 82 (1978) 303-347 corrigenda: 305.9: for *of Posen* r. *of the Province of Posen*; 307 n.27: for *no. 3* r. *n.1*; 310 n.43: for 78 r. 7-8; 313.7: for *Erasmiana* r. *Eunomiana* (F. Solmsen) and delete n.64; 317 n.80: for 1879 r. 1876; 318 n.92: for *meinen* r. *meinem*; 325.15: for *Seit* r. *Seite*; 325 n.128: for *Etwas* r. *Etwa*; 326.19: for *durfen* r. *dürfen*; 330.23: for *in* r. *im*; 346 n.234: for *Übersetzung* r. *Übersetzung*.

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF Ph.D.

JACKSON BRYCE — *The Library of Lactantius*

HE Christian apologist Lactantius is famous for style; for him is reserved the designation "the Christian Cicero." His methods, however, are no less remarkable than his prose. His extant works form a continuous dialogue with the mind of pagan antiquity, a spirited debate about ultimate questions, carried on with the classical Greek and Latin authors whose culture he admired as much as he deplored their errors of philosophy. Because he intended to appeal to the cultivated pagan of his time, he did not write with a Tertullian's sweeping denunciation of the past; nor did he waver in the later, uneasy schizophrenia of a Jerome, drawn on high by the new revelation, yet tugged by literature into the abyss. Lactantius believed that the almighty God of Abraham and Isaac must have revealed Himself no less to Plato and Virgil; therefore, essential points of Christian doctrine could in fact be mined from the works of classical authors. These ancient foreshadowings of Jesus' revelation, when refined in the fire of true wisdom and cast into the form of the Ciceronian period, could not fail to be persuasive.

That Lactantius is highly derivative in philosophy and inadequate in theology to the point of heresy in no way lessened his popularity even into the nineteenth century. Today, the very fact that he was less than an extraordinary thinker makes him useful for the study of an important question. What ancient authors were known to an ordinary, intelligent person who had the best third-century rhetorical training? How did such a person read the ancients? What did their ideas mean to him? What, in a word, was his library?

One must begin with the Index of Authors in the edition of Samuel Brandt and Georg Laubmann (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 18 and 27, 1890-97). Brandt's index lists citations of some ninety Greek and Latin authors, exclusive of the sacred scriptures; the present dissertation explores Cicero, Lucretius, Virgil, and Ennius. The first three authors were chosen because they are in a class by themselves with regard to their frequency in Lactantius. Ennius, on the other hand,

was included because the fragments of his *Historia Sacra* are virtually all preserved in Lactantius' *Divinae Institutiones*; from Ennius, Lactantius had discovered Euhemerism, an important tool for interpreting pagan literature. For the ancient passages used by Lactantius, the investigation depends essentially on Brandt's index, although a few other scholars have supplemented his findings, and I have made some discoveries as well.

Within the chapters, the citations to be discussed are classified into groups according to their several roles in Lactantius' thought, that is, according to the particular fact, argument, or theme which Lactantius uses quotation to develop or illustrate. The material is presented in a manner inspired by Harald Hagendahl's *Augustine and the Latin Classics* (Göteborg 1967), that is, by parallel quotations both from Lactantius and from the passage that he is using, followed by commentary. The dissertation, then, is a commentary upon a large number of quotations, paraphrases, and allusions, organized into chapters according to the four authors mentioned, and organized within the chapters by subject matter. The method has the disadvantages first of requiring an abundance of quoted material, and second of considering Lactantius' words in a different sequence and in different contexts from those he intended; but its corresponding strength is to throw into the greatest possible prominence how and why Lactantius used a certain author. Hagendahl has supplied an encouraging proreptic to these labors (*Eranos* 45 [1947] 128): "I have been chiefly concerned with the method, the technique of quotation, asking not so much *what* is borrowed, but *how* and *why* the alien elements are used. It is a vast field for scholarly work. I should be glad if my suggestions could prove useful for further research." This dissertation rarely considers the method of citation, except for cases of exceptional interest; rather it concentrates upon Lactantius' thought, and how he made its expression effective by using other authors' words.

The major topics considered in the dissertation are as follows. Chapters 1 and 2 present Lactantius' use of Cicero in discussing the nature of philosophy, the god of the pagan philosophers, the nature and purpose of the world, the nature of man and of human society, and the role of religion in human life. Chapter 3 on Lucretius begins by offering some evidence in Lactantius for the text of Lucretius, proceeds to an examination of Lactantius' ambiguous attitude toward this author, and concludes by investigating Lactantius' use both of Lucretius and of other sources in presenting Epicurean doctrine. Chapter 4 on Virgil begins again with textual matters, and after a discussion of poetic citations *ornandi causa* proceeds to the topics of mythology, the meaning of

human life, the nature of justice, and a few questions of theology. Chapter 5 deals with Lactantius and Ennius, and more broadly with Euhemerism in pagan and Christian thought.

Lactantius' citations, whatever topic they may concern, fall into three groups which provide a second principle of organization within these chapters. First, there are citations which do not contribute to the argument so much as to the rhetorical expression, through ornamentation. Second, Lactantius often employs citations with essentially the same purpose in his own argument as they had in their original contexts. Third, he often cites material for purposes quite different from, perhaps even opposed to, the aims of the original author. Some of these citations present the view which is about to be attacked; still others are cited to show that the opponent confirms the apologist's argument in spite of himself. This last group is particularly interesting, since Lactantius shows great ingenuity in verbal adaptation, and sometimes reveals that he is aware of his distortions. Such citations — let us designate them briefly as "out of context" — often appear when the battle is joined on some important question and the rhetoric is appropriately polemical. The modern scholarly mind, detecting what it may regard as citations out of context, is likely to accuse the apologist of ignorance, unfairness, shrillness, even hatred of his opponent. The concluding remarks of the present dissertation analyze some typical scholarly judgments of this sort in order to encourage a better way of reading these old controversies. I believe that scholarly criticism ought to offer more than the correction of so-called misquotations and hackneyed outrage at heated rhetoric. He suggests that ancient debates will be more properly understood when read in the light of specific traditions of polemic, and with sympathy for certain distinctive modes of thought inherent in the ancient mind.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Philology 1974

HELENE MARIE PEET FOLEY — *Ritual Irony in the Bacchae
and Other Late Euripidean Plays*

The view generally taken by scholars that Euripides' *Bacchae* is a play considerably more traditional than its immediate predecessors in structure, diction, and content needs reassessment. The play continually exposes the contradictions in the Dionysiac tradition, and the fact that this process takes place in terms of tradition makes it all the more shocking. Furthermore, the play should be interpreted not only in the context

of the social and religious turmoil of the late fifth century, but with a recognition that the major form in which Dionysus was experienced by his contemporaries was as the god of civic festivals, in particular of the theatrical festivals at which Attic tragedy and comedy were presented. I argue that the *Bacchae* is in essence a play about the introduction of festival or embryonic theater into a crude militaristic city; Pentheus, the ruler of the city, is destroyed because he cannot understand truth in the symbolic form that Dionysiac religion and theater offer to the adherent or spectator. In the first part of the thesis I examine the stage business of the play; the text continually directs us to consider and question the particular "theatrical" form in which Dionysus demonstrates his divinity to Thebes. In the second half I re-examine the ritual content of the play, suggesting that Euripides adapts Dionysiac cult material in a form which invites the audience to rethink the relation between Athens and its contemporary Dionysiac festivals.

Dionysus begins the play by sending his followers into Thebes to beat their drums about the palace of Pentheus "so that the city of Cadmus may see" (61). From this moment the demonstration which Dionysus makes to Pentheus of his divinity is, if we follow carefully the implications about the stage business which can be inferred from the text, primarily a matter of symbols, music, masks, costume, and dance. Dionysus controls all the elements of the drama excluding, initially, Pentheus' own mind. The chorus are his followers, the other characters, with the exception of the second messenger, converts. Dionysus gives his own messenger speech and anticipates the words of the first messenger. He stages a series of symbolic demonstrations for the chorus and Pentheus, the last of which could most accurately be called a "play within a play." The god costumes Pentheus and sends him off to a pre-staged situation on the mountain to be a spectator; instead Pentheus becomes a spectacle, an actor in his own tragedy. The play itself, and the accoutrements of drama, become the net in which Pentheus is entrapped. Pentheus' vision becomes, once he is costumed by the god, double; he begins, too late, to apprehend symbolic truths.

Yet the theatrical demonstration of the god's power, as in many plays about plays, raises questions about the relation of spectator to spectacle, of theater to society. The manipulation of stage business, like the palace miracle, and the continuous appearance of religious symbols in contradictory contexts, presses the audience to be self-conscious about what it sees on stage. The deliberate play with comic techniques, however appropriate to a god who presides over both comedy and tragedy, disturbs our confidence in the relation between appearance and reality.

But the case of Dionysus' mask is above all problematic. In Greek theater the actor represents the mask. To raise questions about the realities behind the mask is to violate the masking convention and to suggest that all mimetic presentation is inadequate to the truth. Yet this is inevitably what happens when the same smiling and inscrutable mask represents both the divine disguised as human, and the god as his epiphany on the machine. This deliberate ambiguity explains the problematic references to the god's mask throughout the play, but particularly in the prologue. The contrast between the increasingly horrible divine smile and the human face becomes most vivid in Pentheus' mad scene, where the two principals, each dressed in nearly identical Dionysiac garb, are distinguished primarily by their masks. After Pentheus' death Agave brings back his mask on stage, an unchanging representation of the man which contrasts once more with that of the mocking divinity on the machine.

The second half of the thesis examines the ritual language and content of the play. In particular, I argue that the ritual pattern of Dionysus' play within a play, marked in the text by the terms *pompē*, *agōn*, *kōmos*, is meant to refer to Athenian festivals, and especially the theatrical festivals. The death of Pentheus is analyzed as a form of corrupted sacrifice and festival. In his negative form Dionysus is manifest in a violent and uncontrolled inversion of the social order; in a positive and controlled form he is manifest in the mild and productive inversion of festivals, such as those celebrated by the early choral odes. By taking festival back to its violent origins Euripides examines the role of festival in mediating between the mythical past and the present, and in enforcing the social order.

I begin my analysis of Pentheus' death with a discussion of the use of ritual sacrifice in Euripides, including a theoretical model and an examination of the role of sacrifice and ritual language in the *Heracles*, *Electra*, and *Iphigeneia at Aulis*. Euripides employs ritual language and settings in these plays to explore the nature of divine/human communication, as in the *Heracles*, to measure social inversion, as in the *Electra*, and to redefine the creative role of ritual in enforcing the social order, as in the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*. In the *Bacchae* all three uses come into play. Euripides goes beyond his predecessors in his use of ritual language in that he employs ritual not only as an external referent or norm by which to measure the social and religious implications of an action, or as a metaphor for the social control of violence; he uses the dramatic action to ask questions about the nature of ritual itself. What kind of demarcation can men make between different acts of violence, between sacrifice

and murder? What is the nature of a divine/human relationship in which communication between the spheres is so often made in terms of violence, whether through sacrifice, rape, social inversion, or punitive justice? In general, Euripides' treatment of ritual seems remarkably parallel to that of modern analysts of primitive religion, particularly that of the sociological school founded by E. Durkheim. In both cases men are envisioned as using ritual and myth to project upon the external world a series of illusions through which they can enforce their own social structures and beliefs. Men are responsible for their own images of gods and the forms in which they worship them. The problems and ambiguities raised by this view of religion lie at the heart of Euripidean drama.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Philology 1975

THOMAS RUNGE MARTIN — *Macedonian Kings and Greek
Coinage in the Fourth Century B.C.*

The subject of the dissertation is the relationship between coinage and autonomy in Greece from the time of Philip II. On the traditional interpretation, when a city lost its autonomy at this period, it also lost its right of coinage. Where the Macedonian kings had the power, they suppressed autonomous Greek coinage and enforced the use of their own coins. This view has serious implications for the evaluation of Macedonian policy toward the Greeks before and after Chaeronea, and therefore it is important for the understanding of this period to look closely at the evidence on which this view is based. In this dissertation the evidence is examined for the suppression of autonomous Greek coinage by the Macedonian kings in order to define the relationship between coinage and autonomy in the second half of the fourth century and therefore to contribute to a clearer comprehension of the way in which Philip and some of his successors dealt with the Greeks they sought to control.

No ancient source tells us that the Macedonian kings of this period suppressed Greek coinage, and it is not immediately obvious why a Macedonian king would have wanted to suppress perfectly good coinages even in areas which he controlled. The suppression of traditional local coinage would have inevitably involved a great deal of confusion and economic hardship. Those conditions could only promote political instability and discontent. Furthermore, the traditional Macedonian kingship was not such that the king would automatically demand abso-

lute sovereignty extending even to the suppression of his subjects' traditional coinages in favor of his own. In fact, the idea that the Macedonian kings suppressed Greek coinage in the fourth century is derived from post-classical political theory about the sovereignty of kings. As early as Cassiodorus, one finds hints of the importance attached to the right of coinage as an attribute of sovereignty, but the most important discussion for the early development of this idea occurs in a non-Thoman section of the *de regimine principum* of Aquinas. By the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin in his *Six livres de la république* had established as a given of political theory the idea that the right of coinage was necessarily the sole prerogative of the sovereign at all times. The only pre-Hellenistic evidence used in the formulation of this idea was Herodotus 4.166, which is irrelevant to the point at issue.

This idea on the right of coinage passed from political theory to early numismatic scholarship. Most important, Joseph Eckhel accepted it in his *Doctrina Numorum Veterum* (1792-98). The idea remained unchallenged by nineteenth-century numismatists like François Lenormant, and the discovery of the Athenian Coinage Decree in the early twentieth century provided further support for the idea.

The application of this idea to the time of Philip II began with Eckhel's suggestion that Philip had suppressed the coinage of Thessaly when the area lost its political autonomy. Eckhel's suggestion reflected the view of contemporary Greek historians that Philip made Thessaly a Macedonian province. Since Ludwig Müller accepted the idea of the suppression of Thessalian coinage by Philip in his work on the coinage of Philip and Alexander, as did Percy Gardner in the *British Museum Catalogue* on Thessaly and Barclay Head in *Historia Numorum*, this view passed uncritically into twentieth-century numismatic and historical scholarship and has only recently been challenged by Marta Sordi, A. R. Bellinger, and J. R. Ellis.

A full investigation of Philip's actions in Thessaly shows that there is no justification for the idea that he suppressed Thessalian coinage. In the first place, Philip did not formally abolish Thessalian autonomy. Rather, after his success against Onomarchus, Philip served as the leader of the Thessalian confederacy. In this way he could preserve the facade of constitutional normalcy while pursuing his own aims. The Thessalians were hoping to exploit Philip's proven ability as a military leader in a further campaign against the Phocians. The leader of the Thessalian confederacy traditionally had no coinage of his own. After the resolution of the Sacred War, Philip made some changes in the government of Thessaly, but the propagandistic justification of these

changes was opposition to tyranny and the restoration of the "ancestral constitution." Since the aim of the tetrarchic reorganization was to mask the military control with the fiction of the preservation of Thessalian constitutional autonomy, the suppression of Thessalian coinage by Philip would have made no sense. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence of the historical record leads us to believe that no suppression of Thessalian coinage took place in the 340s B.C.

A study of the numismatic evidence for the chronology of fourth-century Thessalian coinage supports this conclusion. The available evidence concerning the number and the comparative state of wear of Thessalian coins found in hoards suggests that a cessation of Thessalian autonomous coinage as early as the 340s is extremely unlikely and that the Thessalian cities probably continued to mint coins as late as 320 B.C. The traditional arrangement of the fourth-century issues of Larissa, Thessaly's most important mint, must be abandoned because the issues usually placed last should be, on stylistic and hoard evidence, the earliest of the facing-head issues of Larissa. The end of fourth-century Thessalian coinage probably came about as a result of economic loss from drought and the Lamian War at a time when an influx of Macedonian coinage made the need for the production of local coinage less pressing. There is no good reason for believing that a Macedonian king ordered the suppression of Thessalian coinage.

Similar results are obtained from a study of the coinages of Greek cities garrisoned by Philip and Alexander. Since these cities could be closely controlled, their coinages could easily have been suppressed if such action had seemed desirable. But the hoard evidence militates against the assumption of a link between the imposition of a garrison and the end of civic coinage. First, 338 B.C. is too early a *terminus* for the end of Ambracian coinage, and it is at least possible that Chalcis produced coins later than the 330s. Furthermore, Sicyon minted coins until perhaps the last years of the fourth century. Most important, Corinth seems to have produced coins throughout the last four decades of the fourth century despite the continuous presence of a Macedonian garrison. Finally, it seems likely on historical grounds that Thebes issued coins as late as 335 B.C.

In sum, both the historical and the numismatic evidence speaks against the assumption of the suppression of autonomous Greek coinage by Philip II. Nor is it likely that Alexander's conquest of Persia would have induced him to suppress Greek coinage because the Persian king had permitted the minting of local silver coinages. The Macedonian kings did not suppress Greek coinage in the fourth century, but the

situation may have changed in the early third century, by which time the restriction of the right of coinage to the king at the expense of the cities' right of coinage could be theoretically justified, as in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* 2.1.

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ROBERT MONDI — *The Function and Social Position of the κῆρυξ in Early Greece*

Comparative and internal evidence suggests that the κῆρυξ once occupied a position of greater influence and sanctity than that which is attested for him in our written documents. The Homeric tradition still preserves traces of this earlier role, and indicates that the κῆρυξ was at one time the highest religious assistant to the king, his proxy in many civil and military affairs, and at times even an intimate friend. There is a close parallel to this office in the society of Vedic India, in the person of the religious and political aide to the king known as the Purohita. Indeed, one of the main functions of the Vedic Purohita is to act as *kārú* for his king, a word which has long been thought to be etymologically cognate with κῆρυξ.

The means through which the *kārú* executes his office is by praying and in particular by singing praise-hymns to the gods, of the type contained in the Vedic corpus. It has generally been proposed that the Vedic "singer" and the Greek "herald" are both descended from some common Indo-European office which was somehow a conflation of the attributes of herald and bard. It is here suggested, however, that the common meaning was in fact "singing priest" and that κῆρυξ still has this significance at an early stage of Greek society.

Independent of the comparison with *kārú*, there is evidence within Greek, particularly in the Homeric poems, that the κῆρυξ had some connection with ritual song at an earlier date. Much of the traditional diction associated with the word can be shown to reflect such a prior connection with song, for example, the stems λῑγν- and ῥῑπν-, the words αὐδῆ and πεπνυμένος, and in particular there are several attributes common to both the κῆρυξ and the αἰοιδός which are best explained by the supposition that both offices are descended from a common ancestor, a "proto-κῆρυξ." Further it is argued that the emblems of these offices, the herald's κηρύκειον and the bard's ῥάβδος, are both evolved from the σκῆπτρον, the symbol of the position of this proto-κῆρυξ as religious and political aide to the king and agent of the Muses.

This differentiation into *κῆρυξ* and *αοιδός* seems to reflect a historical cultural fact. As ritual hymn, the oldest form of poetic utterance, became increasingly artistic and narrative, secular epic song developed out of it as a separate genre of performance, and this differentiation of the original ritual poetry into sacred song (*ὕμνος*) and narrative (*οἶμη*) produced a corresponding specialization in the performers. The *κῆρυξ* retained his original office as the singer of hymns, and a new office, the *αοιδός*, came into being for the performance of the secular narrative. However, this dichotomy soon ceased to be functional, and a new differentiation took its place: the *αοιδός* became the sole performer of song, and the *κῆρυξ* came to be in charge of nonmusical verbal tasks.

The god Hermes was at all periods a divine reflection of the human *κῆρυξ*, and his role on Olympus evolved along a path parallel to that of his earthly counterpart. Their careers are not only similar in overall development — both begin as highly placed royal aides and evolve into a more subservient role — but often agree in the smallest details. This is also the case with the Vedic Agni, who similarly functions as a divine counterpart of the human *kārú*. A comparison between these two gods reveals so greatly a similarity in the details of their attributes and functions that one cannot but suspect a common origin for both. Hermes has a notoriously wide range of roles and functions in the Greek tradition, and the assumption that he is the Greek inheritance of an Indo-European fire god, of which Agni shows a more primitive state, goes far toward explaining many of these traits.

Such a comparison suggests that the parallel between Greek *κῆρυξ* and Vedic *kārú* is more than just the common preservation of an isolated lexical element. It is the inheritance of an entire ritual structure: the mechanism of communication and mediation between men and gods. For not only do Agni and Hermes, the divine version of the *kārú* and *κῆρυξ*, assume parallel roles as mediators on behalf of mankind with the gods, but the words used to define this position, Vedic *ángiras* and Greek *ἄγγελος*, appear also to originate in a common source. That is, not only does each culture present a system of mediation which has a human and divine component with parallel functions, but there is an apparent etymological connection between the names attached to the components themselves. This suggests that the whole system is an inheritance of a common Indo-European structure of mediation and reciprocity.

RUTH S. SCODEL — *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*

At the City Dionysia of 415 Euripides produced the *Alexander*, *Palamedes*, *Troades*, and satyr-play *Sisyphus*. That the three tragedies, which concern events of the Trojan Cycle in chronological order, may have constituted a connected trilogy is an obvious suggestion and not a new one. This thesis is an attempt to confirm this suggestion and to analyze some of the trilogy's themes and purposes.

The *Alexander* showed how Paris, exposed as an infant because of Hecuba's ominous dream, was recognized and recovered his princely status. Reared by a herdsman, he was the object of complaints by other slaves for his arrogance, but in a trial before Priam he succeeded not only in escaping punishment but in gaining permission to compete in his own funeral games. His victory over his brothers, Hector and Deiphobus, so enraged Deiphobus that he persuaded Hecuba to murder the victor. The murder was first delayed by Cassandra's prophecy and then averted by Alexander's recognition, which was effected by the old herdsman; there was no *deus ex machina*.

For the *Palamedes*, it can be shown that the only version of the tale which accords with the fragments of the Euripidean play is that of Hyginus *fab.* 105. Odysseus forged or caused to be forged a letter purporting to be from Priam to Palamedes, in which Palamedes was promised a certain sum of gold in return for betraying the Greek camp. This letter was given to a Phrygian prisoner, whom Odysseus had killed near the camp; through an elaborate stratagem he secretly buried the amount of gold named in the letter beneath Palamedes' tent. The central action of the play was the trial of Palamedes. The corpse having been found and the letter brought to Agamemnon, the king investigated the matter. Palamedes defended himself against Odysseus' accusations, and perhaps himself suggested that his tent be searched for the gold. When the gold was found, he was condemned, but his brother Oiax lamented his murder and wrote his story on oars which he cast into the sea in the hope that one of them might reach his father, Nauplius. The ending of the play is uncertain, but there cannot have been any real resolution.

The links which connect the plays to one another are mostly indirect. Two characters from the *Alexander*, Hecuba and Cassandra, reappear in *Troades*. Hecuba is the same character in the two works, though in the first drama her emotions turn from grief to rage and a desire for revenge to final joy, while in the last her attempts at consoling herself and others give way to the hope of vengeance upon Helen and finally to complete despair. Cassandra is exactly the same person in each play,

and in each prophesies to her mother, but the prophecy in the second is a precise reversal of the first. Helen and Andromache of *Troades* correspond to Paris and Hector of the first tragedy.

Two sections of the *Troades* are reminiscent of the *Palamedes*. In the prologue, Euboea and the Capherean Cliffs are in emphatic positions in the list of sites which will receive the Greeks killed in the storm (ll. 84, 90); these cliffs are closely associated with the revenge of Nauplius, which was accomplished through this very storm. The poet does not portray the gods as concerned with vengeance for Palamedes, but they incidentally render it possible. Hecuba's lyric tirade against Odysseus at 278 ff is unmotivated within the play, but it is an exact description of the Odysseus of the *Palamedes*.

The theme of the murder of a harmless innocent is prominent in all three tragedies; in the first play Paris' death is averted, but Palamedes and Astyanax are actually killed. Their innocence is stressed at fr. 588 N² of the *Palamedes* and l. 765 of *Troades*; Alexander and Astyanax are linked by the verbal echo of Snell's fr. 44 of the *Alexander* (58 N²) with *Troades* 742-743. At least one image also helps bind the trilogy together: the torch of Hecuba's dream, first mentioned in the prologue of the first play, finally burns Troy, after reappearing in both Cassandra's scenes. Thus various links — imagery, theme, verbal reminiscence, repeated characters, indirect allusion — subtly unite the work.

Each of the tragedies included an *agon* in which two actors pleaded their cause before a judge. The *agones* resemble each other in structure, though their subjects are different: the first concerned social distinctions, the second the nature of probability in relation to the guilt or innocence of Palamedes, and the third human and divine responsibility. All three reveal a close dependence on sophistic and philosophical sources joined with a criticism of sophistic methods. Gorgias, author of the *Palamedes* and *Helen*, is especially important. In each case, the *agon* leads to genuine insight, but in no case is full understanding or right action achieved. Menelaus succumbs to Helen's beauty and does not kill her and thus seems to justify her claim to have been compelled by Aphrodite. Reason cannot govern or judge action.

Themes from the *agones* are central to the dramatic progress of the work. The discussion of slaves and free men of the first play is developed by the actual enslavement of the Trojan women; poverty and wealth, debated also in the *agon* of the *Alexander*, are important in the *Palamedes* (fr. 580 N²). The contrast between the wisdom of Palamedes and the cleverness of Odysseus is crucial to the other two works; the *Alexander* stresses the connection of nobility and intelligence, the

Troades shows a world where the only intelligence left is the spurious wisdom of Odysseus. Each statement made in the trilogy must be modified as the same subject is treated from another point of view; the course of the action changes victory to defeat and Greeks to barbarians.

The satyr-play of the group was the *Sisyphus*. Its plot cannot be reconstructed with any certainty. However, doxographical considerations put forward by Albrecht Dihle (*Hermes* 105 [1977] 28-41) suggest that Euripides was the author of the famous atheistic fragment usually attributed by modern scholars to Critias (fr. 19 Snell, B 25 D-K). If this speech does belong to Euripides' *Sisyphus*, it shows that the satyr-play continued the themes of the tragedies. Its description of human progress resumes a theme of the *Alexander*, and its portrayal of the gods as the invention of a wise man offers a further twist to the contrast between Palamedes and Odysseus. Palamedes is the inventor, and he is devoted to the upholding of law; but the lie is the tool of Odysseus. The very atheism of the passage is a natural development from the criticism of religion in the trilogy and in particular from Hecuba's attempt to redefine Zeus (*Troades* 884-888). The satyr-play continues the pattern of ironies and contradictions.

The tetralogy of 415 had contemporary political relevance, but it was by no means chiefly concerned with politics. Rather it is an exploration of human knowledge and responsibility in which reversals of fortune are also reversals of ideas and methods of understanding. The work is a vision of chaos. The only solace the characters are allowed is the thought of their undying fame, a consolation which is affirmed by the work itself. If the world of the tetralogy was also the world around the poet, the only comfort the playwright offered himself and his audience was the hope that they, too, might be remembered.

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